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ABSTRACT AND KEY TERMS 
Abstract 
This study is entitled ‘investigating the challenges in enforcing international human rights 
law in Africa: Towards an effective regional system’. It centres around a critical research 
problem namely: what challenges beset regional enforcement of human rights law in 
Africa and how can they be addressed to ensure the effective promotion and protection of 
human rights in the continent? It critically reviews and revisits the discourses and 
scholarly arguments on the crucial issue of regional enforcement of human rights law in 
Africa. It traverses through historical epochs in order to explain the origins, scope and 
evolution of human rights law in Africa. This is done in the quest for answers to 
questions such as: When and how did Africa’s regional human rights system originate? 
What factors led to its emergence? Was the concept of human rights recognised in Africa 
prior to European colonial rule? What is the present status of international human rights 
in Africa? It therefore lays the foundations for a better understanding of the historical and 
philosophical origins and evolution of Africa’s regional human rights system. The study 
then proceeds to review the normative and institutional mechanisms established in Africa 
to enforce human rights at the regional level. Particularly, it highlights the roles of the 
African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the light of their 
contribution to, and challenges in, the enforcement of human rights in the region. The 
study concludes with recommendations on the possible ways to invigorate the African 
human rights system. One of the key findings is that, with appropriate reforms, the 
system can be more effective.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
International human rights law is recognised as a distinct branch of law with its own 
institutions, jurisprudence and norms.1 Currently, it registers a tremendous positive 
impact on legal systems throughout the world2, although this was hardly the situation 
years ago.3 Umozurike correctly observed that human rights appeared to enjoy low 
esteem during the 1970s, particularly in Africa.4 His observations were predicated on the 
overt passiveness the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU)5 maintained in 
condemning human rights violations in a number of independent African states by 
‘unduly emphasising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states.’6  
                                                 
1See Eze O, Human rights in Africa: Some selected problems (1984), p. 1. Eze observed that after the 
Helsinki Accord of 1975 on European Security, human rights issues were injected into and apparently form 
part of the equation of international relations.  
2 See generally the arguments advanced in Titus D, The applicability of the international human rights 
norms to the South African legal system (1993), pp. 2-3. Titus acknowledged that it is not until as recently 
as 1946 when the impact and importance of international human rights law began to be felt, particularly in 
Africa, but more so, in South Africa. 
3 See Kirby M, ‘The role of the judge in advancing human rights by reference to international human rights 
norms’, (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal, p. 530. 
4 Umozurike U, ‘The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights’, (1983) 77 American Journal of 
InternationalLaw, p. 902. 
5 Established in 1963, through the OAU Charter, adopted 25 May 1963, 3 (1964) International Legal 
Material, p. 1116. For a discussion on OAU, see generally, Chanda A, ‘The Organisation of African Unity: 
An appraisal’, (1989), Zambia Law Journal, pp. 1-29; Amate C, Inside Organisation of African Unity and 
its Charter (1968); Mazzeo D (ed.), African regional organisations (1984). 
6Umozurike U, ‘The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights’, note 4 above, p. 902. Umozurike 
expressed his disapproval of the OAU’s inability to end the culture of impunity in the continent by quoting 
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The massacre of thousands of Hutus in Burundi, as well as the despotic regimes of 
dictators Idi Amin of Uganda, Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa of the Central African Republic seem to have escaped the rather blind eye of the 
OAU.7 Indeed even events in international circles at the time were less conducive to the 
thriving of a robust human rights culture.8 For example, international law emphasised the 
doctrine of sovereignty of states which in a way created focus on the consolidation of 
political power rather than the protection and promotion of human rights.  
In pursuit of sovereignty, independent states were constantly in conflict amongst 
themselves while the non-independent ones pursued their independence.9 There was 
therefore an upsurge of violence and by extension, violation of human rights. As a result 
of the need to contain this state of chaos and stem the egregious violation of human rights 
and the attendant culture of impunity, numerous treaties were concluded at both the 
global and regional levels creating mechanisms to stop impunity.  
At the global level, the United Nations (UN) created, for example, reporting mechanisms 
in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination10, the First 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the Convention Against Torture11, and more recently, the Optional Protocol to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
President Sékou Tourés’ assertion that the OAU was not “a tribunal which could sit in judgement on any 
member state’s internal affairs.” He sees this attitude as a self-imposed inhibition by the OAU members, 
“not so much to protect their legitimate states’, as to fend off international concern for gross abuses of 
Human rights in some African states.”  
7 Ibid. 
8 See Mbondenyi M and Sifuna N, ‘A review of procedural and jurisdictional challenges in enforcing 
international human rights law under the African Charter regime’, (2006) Berkeley Legal Press, Working 
paper No. 1869 at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/esps/1869 , 2, last accessed on 13 June 2008.   
9 Ibid 
10 CERD, Art 14. Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 
(XX) of 21 December 1965; entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19.  
11 CAT, Art 22. The procedures stipulated under this Convention are similar in a number of ways to those 
provided for under the CERD. 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.12 At 
regional levels, complaints are allowed under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms13, the American Convention on Human Rights14 and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.15 Some mixed-model approaches have 
also been initiated to overcome the weaknesses of both the international and national 
justice mechanisms.16 
Whereas the universal system of human rights established under the UN played a vital 
role in the enforcement of international human rights law immediately after the Second 
World War, its wide geographical jurisdiction undermined its efficacy.17 Other factors 
such as the lack of adequate resources to accommodate the increasing number of human 
rights violations, the adverse effects of the cold war which pitted one nation against 
                                                 
12 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol in October 1999 (A//res/54/4). The 
Optional Protocol entered into force on 22 Dec 2000, after ten states had become parties thereto. 
13Arts 25-34, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. p. 
222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into 
force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively. 
According to this Convention, complaints could be made either through the Commission or the European 
Court for Human Rights. Both the Court and the Commission have their own procedures that at some point 
are distinct from each other.  
14See, Art 44, American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. p. 123, 
entered into force July 18, 1978. This Article provides that ‘Any person or group of persons, or any non-
governmental entity legally recognised in one or more member state of the organisation, may lodge 
petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a 
state party.’ 
15 Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, (1982) 21 ILM, p. 58, entered into force 
October. 21, 1986; See Art 55. Arts 56 to 59 of the Charter provide further directions on how the 
Commission is to deal with the Communications presented to it.  
16 Following a civil war in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1315 on 14 August 
2000 requesting the UN Secretary General to start negotiations to create a Special Court to prosecute ‘those 
most responsible for committing human rights violations’ in the country during that period. On 16 January 
2002, an agreement establishing the court was signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the UN. 
This court has adopted a statute that prosecutes both international and national crimes.   
17 During this period, the UN was the key (if not the only) enforcer of human rights globally, making it 
practically impossible for it to effectively address all concerns on human rights violations. 
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another and the issue of veto powers, made it even harder for human rights to be 
effectively enforced at that level.18  
Additionally, some states, particularly those in Africa, were not willing to accept the 
human rights standards established by the UN because their participation ‘in the early 
years of the human rights revolution was meagre.’19 It is argued that in the early years of 
the UN, Africa was still largely colonised. Only four African states, which were 
independent at that time, were founding members of the UN.20 The remaining states were 
‘represented’ by their colonial masters.21 Thus, in the drafting and adoption of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 194822, so it is contended, Africans were 
largely un-represented.23 Accordingly, concerted efforts towards the realisation of 
international human rights law led to the emergence of regional human rights systems; 
namely, the European24, Inter-American25 and African systems.26  
                                                 
18 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa: Enhancing human rights through the African regional human 
rights system (2003), pp. 24-29. 
19 Ibid, p. 26. 
20 Ibid. These were Ethiopia, Egypt, the Union of South Africa and Liberia. Egypt was admitted to the UN 
membership on October 24, 1945, while the Union of South Africa, Liberia and Ethiopia were admitted on 
November 7, 12 and 13 respectively. 
21 Mugwanya G, note 18 above, p. 26. 
22 See generally, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A Res. 217 (III), adopted on December 10, 
1948. 
23 See Mutua M, ‘The ideology of human rights’, (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law, p. 605. 
24 For detailed discussions on the European system of human rights, see generally, Higgins R, ‘The 
European Convention of Human Rights’, in Meron T, (ed.), Human rights in international law: Legacy and 
policy issues (1984) p. 495; Jacobs E, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights’, in Benhardt R & 
Jolowicz J (eds.), The international enforcement of human rights (1987), p. 31; Castberg F, The European 
Convention on Human Rights (1974); Morrison C, The developing European law of human rights (1967); 
Wright J, The European Convention on Human Rights: An analysis and appraisal (1978); Fawcett J, The 
application of the European Convention on Human Rights (1987); Beddard R, Human rights and Europe: 
A study of the machinery of human rights protection of the Council of Europe (1980); Mahoney P, 
‘Speculating on the future of the reformed European Court of Human Rights’, (1999) 20 Human  Rights 
Law Journal, p. 1.  
25See generally, Harris D & Livingstone S (eds.), The Inter-American system of human rights, (1998); 
David S, The Inter-American human rights system (1997); Vander Wilt H, ‘The OAS system for the 
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In Africa, a number of important events persuaded the former OAU (currently African 
Union (AU)) to establish a regional human rights system.27 These include, 
encouragement at the UN level for regional human rights mechanisms, NGO lobbying 
and the recognition by some African leaders that human rights violations in another state 
were also their concern.28 This culminated in the adoption of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) by the OAU Assembly of Head of States and 
Government (AHSG).29  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
protection of human rights’, in Hanski R & Suksi M (eds.), An introduction to the international protection 
of human rights: A textbook (1997); Buergenthal T, Human rights in a nutshell (1995); Buergenthal T, ‘The 
advisory practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court’, (1985) 79 American Journal of 
International Law, p. 1; Shelton D, ‘The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 
(1994) 10 American University Journal of International Law and Policy, p. 333.     
26 See generally Ankumah E, ‘Universality of human rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights’, (1992) Universaliteit van Mensrenrechten, pp. 25-38; Benedek W, ‘The African Charter and 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: How to make it more effective’, (1993) 1 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights., pp. 24-40; Busia K, ‘The status of human rights in pre-colonial Africa: 
Implications for contemporary practices’, in McCarthy E, et al (eds), Africa, human rights, and the global 
system (1994); Carver R, ‘How African governments investigate human rights violations’, (1988) Third 
World Legal Studies, pp. 161-83; Flinterman C & Ankumah E, ‘The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights’, in Hannum H (ed), Guide to international human rights practice  (1992), pp. 159-69; 
Kiwanuka R, ‘The meaning of "People" in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights’, (1988) 82 
American  Journal of International Law, pp. 80-101; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African 
Cultural Fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties’, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International 
Law, pp.  339-80; Mutua M, ‘The African human rights system in a comparative perspective: the need for 
urgent reformulation’,  (1993) 5 Legal Affairs, p. 31; Neff S,  ‘Human rights in Africa: Thoughts on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in the light of case law from Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland’, (1984) 33 International  & Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 331-47; Swanson J, ‘The 
emergence of new rights in the African Charter’, (1991) 12 New York Law School Journal of  International 
& Comparative Law, pp. 307-33; Welch C, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A 
five-year report and assessment’, (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly, pp.  43-61. 
27 Murray R, Human rights in Africa: From the OAU to the AU (2004), p. 22. 
28 Ibid. 
29Adopted 27 June 1981, 21 ILM (1982), p. 58.  
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With the subsequent coming into force of the ACHPR in October 1986, the essence of 
regional promotion and protection of human rights in Africa was thus officially 
acknowledged by the OAU.30 Apart from guaranteeing a catalogue of rights, the Charter 
also provided for the establishment of their enforcement mechanism; namely, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter ‘the African Commission’ or 
‘the commission’).31 While the inception of the African Charter was regarded as some 
form of recognition that human rights in one state were matters of concern to other states, 
it has constantly been argued that its enforcement mechanisms are not at all effective.32  
 
Murray, for example, noted that ‘resolutions adopted by the OAU organs relating to the 
work of the African Commission and in the adoption of its reports have generally …been 
limited to formalities….’33 The African human rights system generally, and the African 
Commission in particular, therefore, have been found wanting in a number of areas.34 As 
a result, the commission has gradually lost the favour and unique status of being the only 
human rights watchdog in the region which it initially enjoyed at its inception. Africa’s 
regional human rights system has been seen not only as the least developed but also the 
least effective as compared with its American and European counterparts.35 This is rather 
strange especially since the African Charter is the most widely ratified regional human 
rights instrument in the world.36  
 
In spite of the Charter’s ratification by all the OAU/AU member states, human rights 
have continued to be relentlessly violated in the continent.37 These violations are 
                                                 
30 Murray R, Human rights in Africa, note  27 above, p. 22. 
31 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in 1987 ‘to promote human and 
peoples’ rights and ensure their protection.’ See Article 30 of the African Charter. 
32 Murray R, Human rights in Africa, note 27 above, p. 23. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Mubangizi J, ‘Some reflections on recent and current trends in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Africa: The pains and the gains’, (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 147. 
35 Ibid, p. 148. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hopkins K, ‘A new human rights era dawns on Africa?’ (2003) 18 SAPR/PL, p. 360. 
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instigated by many factors: civil strife, breakdown of states and the rise of dictatorial 
regimes, genocide, and the quagmires of refugee and internally displaced persons, among 
others.38 Baimu correctly observed ‘the fact that conflicts, and the associated massive 
human rights violations, have continued to engulf the continent when most of the African 
states are bound by the provisions of the Charter indicates that the African Charter is still 
not taken seriously by many African states.’39 To complement the African Commission, 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter ‘the African Court’ or ‘the 
court’) was subsequently established.40 Whether or not the court has the potential to 
adequately reinforce Africa’s regional human rights system is analysed in detail 
elsewhere in this thesis.  
 
It is noteworthy, however, that it took a year and a half, for only two of the OAU/AU 
member states- Burkina Faso and Senegal- to ratify the Protocol on the Establishment of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.41 This initial response by African 
states is indicative of their overt resilience to impunity and a display of the incumbent 
laxity to uphold the commitment to human rights promotion and protection in the 
continent as clearly stipulated in the African Charter.42 While some scholars have high 
hopes for the court, believing it will make African leaders more conscious of their human 
rights obligations43, others doubt that it will do much to improve a grave human rights 
                                                 
38 See Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa, note 18 above, p. 54. 
39 Baimu E, ‘Commission and the Court’, Conflict Trends No 3/2001, p. 19.  
40 See generally, Van der Mei A, ‘The new court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an effective 
human rights protection mechanism for Africa?’ Leiden Journal of International law (2005) 18/1, pp. 113-
29; Heyns C, ‘A human rights court for Africa’, Netherlands Quarterly of human rights (2004) 22/3, pp. 
325-7; Viljoen F, ‘A human rights court for Africa and Africans’ (2004) 1/30 Brooklyn Journal of 
International law, pp. 1-66. 
41 Both countries ratified the Protocol in 1998. As at 15 of October 2007, 24 states had ratified the Protocol. 
See Magnarella, J. ‘Achieving human rights in Africa.’ 4(2): 2. [online] URL: 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i2a2.htm, last accessed on the 11 December 2007. 
42 Ibid. See also the Preamble and Article 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
43 See for example, Harrington J, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Evans M and 
Murray R, The African Charter on Human & Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000, (2002), 
p. 305; O’Shea A, ‘A critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 
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situation in the continent, whose causes are primarily economic, demographic and 
political.44   
 
Some have argued that the court, given its normative and institutional frameworks, is a 
typical reflection of the unwillingness of the OAU/AU member states to create a 
powerful regional human rights mechanism that would from time to time call them to 
account for violations in their domestic jurisdictions.45 These arguments are pursued 
further and addressed systematically in the course of this study. However, it is important 
to note at this juncture that the court is a timely innovation, whose establishment cannot 
be underrated.  
  
 An overall assessment reveals that human rights suffered a major blow within Africa 
during the period between the early 1970s and the late 1990s as a result of a series of 
coups and egregious violations of civil, political and economic rights. This was regardless 
of the promulgation of the African Charter and the subsequent establishment of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2001) 1 African Human Rights law Journal, p. 285; Udombana N, ‘Toward the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never’, (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 
p. 45; Mubangizi J and O’Shea A, ‘An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (1999) 22 South 
African Yearbook of International Law, p. 256; Mutua M, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged 
stool?’, (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 342; Naldi G and Magliveras K, ‘Reinforcing the African 
system of human rights: The Protocol on the establishment of a regional court of human and peoples’ 
rights’, (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights p. 431; Stemmet A, ‘A future African court for 
human and peoples’ rights and domestic human rights norms’, (1998) 21 South African Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 233; and Naldi G and Magliveras K, ‘The proposed African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Evaluation and comparison’, (1996) 9 African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, p. 944. 
44 See generally, Dieng A, ‘Introduction to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2005) 15 
INTERIGHTS Bulletin, p. 3; Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding 
the interests of African states’, (2007) 51/1 Journal of African Law, p. 153. 
45See these arguments in Nmehielle O, ‘Towards an African court of human rights: Structuring and the 
court’, (2000) 6/1 Annual Survey of international and Comparative Law, pp. 96-109; Loyds A & Murray R, 
‘Institutions with responsibility for human rights protection under the African Union’, (2004) 48/2 Journal 
of African Law, pp. 165-86. 
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The worrisome increase in human 
rights violations on the continent during this period provoked a number of initiatives 
aimed at salvaging the continent from the rising impunity.  
 
The end of the second millennium was therefore embraced as the opportune time to re-
position and set the continent on a firm path to development, peace and the respect for 
human rights.46 It witnessed the emergence of new human rights institutions and 
initiatives, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Court. It also provoked the 
restructuring of old institutions such as the OAU, which later became the African Union, 
to make them more attuned to the human rights tide that was sweeping the globe more 
intensely than before. These initiatives marked a dramatic departure from the passiveness 
to human rights issues previously displayed by the majority of African states. Their 
contribution to the advancement of human rights promotion and protection on the 
continent cannot be overlooked. The Constitutive Act of the African Union, for example, 
has more human rights provisions than its predecessor, the OAU Charter. We shall revert 
to this argument later.  
 
Meanwhile, it is worthy to note, besides the emergence of new institutions and 
restructuring of the old ones, the continent, during this period, experienced a flood of 
conferences, seminars and workshops, convened to look for ways to articulate human 
rights in its agenda. These include: the Grand Bay (Mauritius), Kigali (Rwanda), Cairo 
(Egypt) and Algiers (Algeria) conferences. The Grand Bay Conference, which was the 
first ever Ministerial Conference on human rights in Africa, was a pointer to the direction 
that the OAU/AU ought to follow when articulating human rights in its agenda.47 The 
                                                 
46 See Kithure K, ‘The normative and institutional framework of the African Union relating to the 
protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security: A critical appraisal 
(2003) 3, African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 99.  
47 This Conference was held in 1999 in Grand Bay Mauritius. 
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conference concluded with a Declaration and a Plan of Action that reaffirmed Africa’s 
commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.48  
 
The declaration ‘urges all African states to work assiduously towards the elimination of 
discrimination against women and the abolition of cultural practices which dehumanise 
or demean women and children.’49 It also called on African states to eradicate genocide 
on the continent and to ratify the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
the Protocol on the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Four Geneva 
conventions, the UN Statute of the International Criminal Court, and a number of other 
major UN human rights conventions.50 In recognition that the promotion and protection 
of human rights are primarily state responsibilities, the conference called on the African 
states to establish and adequately fund national human rights institutions and to engage in 
a process of continuous dialogue with the African Commission.51 
 
In spite of the existing and previous efforts by states, individuals, NGOs and other 
groups, regional enforcement of human rights in Africa is still beset with a multiplicity of 
challenges. This study therefore investigates the nature and scope of these challenges and 
recommends how they can be addressed to foster the effective promotion and protection 
of human rights on the continent. The study is an added voice to the clamour for a more 
effective regional human rights system. It reviews and assesses the existing scholarly 
discourses on various issues concerning the African human rights system with a view to 
making a contribution to existing endeavours for the invigoration and reformation of the 
African human rights system.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48 CONF/HRA/DECL (1), 16 April 1999. 
49 Ibid. 
50 For a detailed discussion on this Declaration see generally, Magnarella, J. ‘Achieving human rights in 
Africa’, note 41 above, pp. 5-10. 
51 Ibid. 
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1.2 Research problem and subject matter of the study 
 
The subject matter of this study is ‘investigating the challenges in enforcing international 
human rights law in Africa: Towards an effective regional system.’ It centres on a critical 
research problem namely: what challenges beset regional enforcement of human rights 
law in Africa and how can they be addressed to ensure the effective promotion and 
protection of human rights on the continent? The relevance of the research problem and 
its implications to the millions of African people makes this study one of the most 
interesting, fascinating and challenging intellectual projects.   
 
Although the African Charter has been ratified by all OAU/AU member states, human 
rights abuses have nonetheless increased on the continent.52 This is to be expected, in the 
light of preponderance of violence as an instrument of governance by African 
governments since independence.53 To perpetuate these acts, many African governments 
employ various tactics, besides violence, to manipulate and control their citizens, 
especially opposition elements. Likewise, torture is still prevalent in many African 
states.54 
 
Notably, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries experienced a wave of atrocities that 
swept across the continent. During this period when most African states were still 
unshackling themselves from colonialism, while others were experiencing strife for 
equitable distribution of power amongst their domestic ethnic communities, human rights 
were grossly violated with impunity. For example, African states such as Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ghana, Togo, Guinea, Uganda, Malawi, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Cameroon, Sudan, and Somalia witnessed enormous repression of opposition groups and 
parties and various kinds of human rights abuses.55 Besides, some of these states have 
                                                 
52 See Alemika E, ‘Protection and realisation of human rights in Africa’, in Kalu A & Osinbajo Y, 
Perspectives on human rights (1992), p. 159. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See generally also, Human Rights Watch, World Report on Human Rights (2009). 
55 See generally Human Rights Watch Africa, The scars of death: Children abducted by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda, Report of September 1997, available at 
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also continued to be politically unstable because of repeated military interventions and 
assassination of large numbers of (unsuccessful) coup plotters.56 One would agree with 
Alemika’s assessment that:  
 
The chronic and worsening conditions of human rights in Africa have produced serious 
political, social and economic consequences. … The violations of political and civil rights by 
rulers often either include or result in the denial of the citizens of full participation in the 
formulation and implementation of vital policies affecting them and their society. Human 
rights violations, therefore, produce a vicious circle of repression, economic stagnation and 
regression, and political instability. The challenge therefore is how to break the vicious chain, 
set in motion and enliven the forces of liberation, social democracy, economic and scientific-
technological advancement, and the enjoyment of the full range of human rights by everyone 
in every African nation. 57 
 
The democratic wave that swept across Africa since the mid-1990s and witnessed the 
demise of many authoritarian regimes only minimised the practice of human rights 
violations; it did not abate it. There are still reports of opposition activists being jailed 
without trial for daring to seek level playing fields in politics; journalists being detained 
or sometimes forced into exile for daring to expose corruption in high places; academics 
being threatened with arrests for daring to write about mis-governance; workers being 
dismissed for attempting to unionise or to ask for better remuneration in the face of 
currency devaluations and inflation.58  
 
Between 1970 and 1998, political instability and repressions in Africa resulted in more 
than 30 active armed conflicts and produced more than half of all war-related deaths 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://.hrw.org/hrw/reports97/uganda/index.html, last accessed 13 June 2008; Abdul T, ‘Human rights 
under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Sierra Leone- A catalogue of abuse’, (1998) 10 
(3) African Journal of International & Comparative Law, p. 481; Kwakwa E, ‘Internal conflicts in Africa: 
Is there a right to humanitarian action?, (1994) 2 African Journal of International Law, p. 9. 
56 Alemika E, ‘Protection and realisation of human rights in Africa’, note 52 above, p. 160. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Akokpari J, ‘Policing and preventing human rights abuses in Africa: The OAU, the AU & the NEPAD 
Peer Review’, (2004) 32/2 International Journal of Legal Information, p. 461. 
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world-wide, as well as eight million refugees, returnees and other victims of forcible 
displacement.59 Moreover, it was during this period when the continent witnessed 
genocides in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the latest of which took place in 1994 in 
Rwanda.60 The situation did not get any better even after the Rwandan genocide from 
which many African states were expected to draw viable lessons. Instead, in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, many African states were engulfed in human rights 
and related crises. Countries such as Sierra Leone experienced a civil war that saw many 
people dead and others wounded, besides experiencing other forms of gross human rights 
violations.  
 
This prompted the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone under the 
leadership of President Ahmed Tijan Kaba to set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
2002.61 Additionally, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), The Gambia, 
Togo, Nigeria and Liberia have also had a share of trouble in the form of civil wars, 
political assassinations and other forms of gross human rights violations. The situation in 
northern Uganda is also perturbing because there is an incessant warfare between the 
government and rebel forces which has, over the years, led to kidnapping of children and 
recruiting them as soldiers, contrary to international norms.62  
 
                                                 
59 Annan K, ‘The cause of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in 
Africa: Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organisation of African Unity’, Reprinted in 
(1998)10 African Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 549, available at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html, last accessed 12 December 2007.  
60 The aftermath of the Rwanda genocide was the loss of approximately 800,000 lives. Following the UN 
General Resolution 955 of 1994, the ICTR was established to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide. 
For more information on the ICTR, visit www.ictr.org, last accessed on 13 June 2008.    
61 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1315 on 14 August 2000 requesting the UN Secretary 
General to start negotiations to create a special court to prosecute ‘those most responsible for committing 
human rights violations’ in the country during that period. On 16 January 2002, an agreement establishing 
the court was signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the UN. This court has adopted a statute 
that prosecutes both international and national crimes. 
62 See ‘Conflicts in Africa’, available at http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa.asp, last accessed 
on 1 March 2007. 
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Additionally, Sudan is in a crisis as a result of the on-going war in its Darfur region. 
Although talks have been initiated in a bid to end the war, human rights have continued 
to be violated with impunity.63 Somalia, which has just emerged from a war that lasted 
for more than a decade, is still staggering to have a stable government in place. Clan 
feuds instigated by the government and rebel forces are the order of the day in that 
country.64 Some countries in southern Africa have also had their share of atrocities and 
violations of human rights. For example, before April 1994, when the first multi-racial 
democratic elections were held in the Republic of South Africa, the country was shackled 
in the bondage of apartheid and racial discrimination.  
 
The end of the apartheid regime was indeed good news to many who had directed their 
efforts and resources to end it. But even so, the new democratic government is still 
fighting to gain ground on the residues of this brutish legacy.65 The government is still 
battling to overcome racial discrimination, xenophobia and other related intolerance. 
Some government policies in South Africa have also been criticised as perpetrating 
discrimination of certain sections of the society. More particularly, its policies and 
legislation concerning ‘unfair discrimination’ have been received with a lot of 
suspicion.66    
 
Zimbabwe is also placed between the rock and a hard place under the autocratic rule of 
its ‘founding father’, President Robert Mugabe. President Mugabe, who has been in 
power since 1980, has joined the ranks of the world’s worst ten dictators.67 Although 
                                                 
63 See generally, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007 (2007). 
64 Ibid. 
65 See South African Human Rights Commission, ‘Shadow Report on South Africa’s compliance with the 
provisions of the International Convention against all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)’ (August 
2006), (Presented to the International Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Geneva, Switzerland).  
66 Ibid.  
67 Wallechinsky D, ‘The world’s ten worst dictators’, available at 
http://archive.parade.com/2005/0213/0213_ dictator.html, last accessed 11 June 2008. Those who were 
listed alongside Mugabe are: Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan, Kim Jong-il of North Korea, Than Shwe of Burma, 
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elections are held regularly, they are never free and fair and the ruling ZANU/PF party, 
except in March 2008, has invariably retained political power.68 Its human rights record 
is an embarrassment to the AU and the continent at large. Additionally, having adopted 
land policies that have largely attracted criticism from all and sundry, the country is 
under economic sanctions that have contributed to its high inflation rates and currency 
devaluation.  
 
Today, in Zimbabwe, there is not much difference between a pauper and a millionaire 
because both cannot engage in any meaningful commercial transaction for the lack of 
commodities to buy. Moreover, the opposition in the country has been gagged and 
frustrated, the press censored and the judiciary reduced to a tool of oppression in the 
hands of the executive, just to mention a few incidents. At the moment, in spite of having 
lost the just concluded 2008 elections, Mugabe has refused to relinquish power in the 
pretext that the situation warrants a ‘run-off’ poll. It is highly suspected that, like in the 
previous elections, he will rig in order to retain himself in office. As a result of the 
deteriorating situation, many Zimbabweans have been reduced to ‘economic refugees’ in 
other countries, such as South Africa. The situation in the country has gradually been 
deteriorating from bad to worse.  
 
Other countries in southern Africa, such as Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola and 
Mozambique are recovering from either the long spells of civil wars or other forms of 
human rights violations. Poverty, which originates not only from the vestiges of 
colonialism but also from economic plunder by the post-colonial leaders, has been the 
hallmark of the lives of the citizens of these countries. There are countless instances of 
gross human rights abuses throughout the continent, which cannot be recounted here 
because of time constraints. Generally, the continent is still wallowing in a miasma of 
confusion, while trying to remain afloat in the sea of turmoil.         
                                                                                                                                                 
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Hu Jintao of China, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Saparmurat Niyazov of 
Turkmenistan, Seyed Ali KhamaneI of Iran and Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. 
68 See ‘Zimbabwe: Is a fair vote possible?’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/debates/african_ debates/798820.stm, last accessed 1 March 2007). 
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The complexity of the situation is that human rights violations within African states 
produce consequences which when carefully considered run counter to the interest of 
regional enforcement of human rights law. Thus, there is the need for Africans and their 
governments, in alliance with human rights organisations within and outside the continent 
to work together to create conditions for development, equity, democracy and freedom on 
the continent.69 When these are attained motivations for human rights violations, 
instability and rebellion would likely be drastically reduced and the regional enforcement 
of human rights law would more likely become a reality.70 Not only would Africa benefit 
from this initiative, but also the world community will advance towards the realisation of 
the global quest for peace and order.    
 
On the basis of the above stated facts, it is now largely appreciated that the most effective 
arena for human rights protection and promotion in the continent would be the regional 
platform.71 However, the African human rights system has suffered great opposition and 
challenges. These challenges take various forms and stem from different quarters.72  It is 
therefore needful to investigate them in order to determine how they can be addressed to 
ensure the effective promotion and protection of human rights in the continent. What 
these challenges are and what should be done to overcome them is an issue worthy of 
scholarly investigation.  
 
                                                 
69Alemika E, ‘Protection and realisation of human rights in Africa’, note 52 above, p 168. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See in this regard, Benedek W & Heinz (eds.), Regional systems of human rights protection in Africa, 
America and Europe: Third Afro-Americo-European Conference, Strasbourg, June 1992 (1992); Nowak 
M, Introduction to the international human rights regime (2003), p. 26; Wachira G, ‘A critical examination 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards strengthening the African human rights 
system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African population’, in Viljoen F (ed.), The African 
human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006), p. 16.  
72 Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An overview of its progress 
and problems’, (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, 1; Heyns C, ‘The African regional human 
rights system: In need of reform?’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 157-158. 
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1.3 Importance and aims of the study 
1.3.1 Importance of the study 
 
The main motivation for this study is to underscore and contribute towards an 
understanding of the challenges that beset regional enforcement of human rights law in 
Africa. The study is important to the extent that it will secure the future of international 
human rights law in the region by recommending suitable reforms that would help to 
surmount the challenges. Thereby, it will contribute to legal certainty, and, hopefully, 
assist states to bring their human rights practices in line with international standards. This 
is because, the level of human rights compliance at the national level influences their 
enforcement at the regional level. For instance, because of their lack of commitment to 
human rights protection at the national level, many African governments and their 
agencies have acted and continue to act in ways that are inconsistent with their 
obligations as stipulated in the various international human rights treaties.73  
 
This situation therefore calls for an in-depth study and investigation of the African human 
rights system— its institutional and normative mechanisms— and its challenges, in order 
to give meaning to human rights law in Africa. Moreover, the steps taken, problems 
encountered as well as the prospects and opportunities for the regional enforcement of 
human rights law in Africa will be illuminated. In this regard, the historical dimensions of 
human rights law and its enforcement mechanisms instituted in Africa, particularly at the 
regional level, will be the most important part of the inquiry. As Umozurike argued, ‘an 
appreciation of the development of human rights in different societies calls for the study 
of history …’74  
 
The study therefore traverses through historical epochs in order to explain the origins, 
scope and evolution of human rights law in Africa. This analysis would help to uncover 
the challenges as well as emphasise the future prospects in enforcing human rights in the 
region. One of its objectives is to prepare the future, although it is not to offer a blueprint, 
                                                 
73 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa, note 18 above, p. XV. 
74 See Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997), p. 1. 
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to the effective regional enforcement of human rights law in Africa. While research on 
challenges in enforcing international human rights law has been undertaken, this has 
concentrated mainly on the universal,75 Inter-American76 and European human rights 
systems.77  
 
More studies need to be conducted on the African human rights system, not only with 
regard to its enforcement mechanisms, but also to the general challenges it encounters in 
the course of enforcing its human rights norms. This, however, is not to say that no study 
has been conducted on the inadequacies of the African human rights system. It only 
intimates a further intense study, which will not only shed some light on the current 
human rights trends and challenges in Africa, but also bring to the limelight those that 
might have not been properly underscored in previous studies.  
 
A comprehensive study on the challenges in regional enforcement of human rights law in 
Africa is also important particularly in light of the fact that the continent seems to lack, 
well established and effective enforcement mechanisms, yet it accounts for a large 
number of the egregious human rights violations in the world. Africa stands poised 
between hope and despair because of the gap that exists between the recognition of 
human rights and their enforcement in the region.78 The system needs to strive to 
surmount certain challenges that undercut its effectiveness.79  
                                                 
75 See, for example, Robertson H & Merrils J, Human rights in the world (1996); United Nations, The 
United Nations & human rights 1945-1995 (1996); Alston P, The United Nations and human rights (1992); 
Hannum H (ed), Guide to international human rights practice (1999). 
76 See, for example, Pasqualucci J, ‘Advisory practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Contributing to the evolution of international human rights law’, (2002) 38/2 Stanford Journal of 
International law, pp. 241-288; Harris & Livingston (eds.), The Inter-American system of human rights 
(1998); Shelton D, ‘Improving human rights protections: recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness 
of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (1998) 3/ Fall American 
University Journal of International Law and Policy, pp. 323-37; Buergenthal T, ‘The OAS and the 
protection of rights’, (1988) 3 Emory Journal of International Dispute Resolution, pp. 1-24.  
77 See Clements, Mole & Simmons, European human rights: Taking a case under the Convention (1999); 
Mowbray A, Cases and materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (2001). 
78 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa, note 18 above, p 343. 
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Accordingly, the study critically reviews and revisits the discourses and scholarly 
arguments on the crucial issue of regional enforcement of international human rights law 
in Africa. In the process, the study is expected to be thought provoking, stimulating and 
an added voice to the scholarly clamour for an effective regional human rights system. It 
is hoped that this study will incite African states and scholars to critically reflect on ways 
to improve the regional enforcement of human rights law in the continent. It builds on 
what already exists with the hope that it will not quench the reforms debate.  
 
This study is also important in that it contributes to the development of better knowledge 
and understanding of the African human rights system. As stated earlier, the African 
human rights system is the youngest and least developed of the three regional human 
rights systems in the world. Additionally, there have been various contradictory 
perceptions on the system, which need to be reconciled through a comprehensive study. 
As Joiner observed, when the African Charter was adopted and the commission 
established, Africa was the continent with the worst human rights records in the world.80 
Although this position might not have changed significantly, particularly at the national 
level, it must be appreciated that the regional human rights landscape has drastically 
changed.81  
 
Some developments of historical proportions have taken place on the regional human 
rights landscape with the likelihood of impacting the future of Africans. For example, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has since been replaced by the African Union 
(AU). Further, in July 2002 the New Partnersip for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was 
inaugurated and was later joined by its linchpin, the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), in February 2004.82 In January 2004, the Protocol to the African Charter on 
                                                                                                                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Joiner J, ‘Beyond commitments, towards practical action’, in Sall E & Wohlgemuth L (eds.), Human 
rights, regionalism and the dilemmas of democracy in Africa, (2006), p.19.    
81 Ibid. See also generally the argument in Mangu A, ‘The Changing human rights landscape in Africa: 
Organisation of African Unity, African union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African 
Court’, (2005) 23/3 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p. 380. 
82 Ibid. 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights came into operation.83 These developments have created challenges and 
opportunities for the enhancement of human rights on the continent which need to be 
unearthed through a study of this magnitude.   
 
The study is also important in that it will lead to a better understanding and appreciation 
of the fact that protection and respect for human rights are sine qua non for development, 
peace and African renaissance. Democratisation and development in Africa are untenable 
without respect for human rights. In fact, human rights violations have been the main 
cause of the governance crises on the continent and the impediment to the much 
anticipated African renaissance. Because respect for human rights is a prerequisite for 
peace, development and African renaissance, the effective enforcement of international 
human rights law would serve as evidence that African leaders are committed to good 
governance. The prospects for peace and development on the continent would be bleak 
without the effective enforcement of international human rights law at the regional level.   
 
1.3.2 Aims of the study 
 
As the title indicates, this study aims at investigating the challenges in enforcing 
international human rights law in Africa. It seeks to unveil what has been hindering the 
effective enforcement of human rights in the region. Specifically, the study aims at 
underscoring a number of concerns that fall within the scope of its subject matter. First, it 
aims at analysing the philosophical and historical foundations of human rights in Africa. 
This is essential because, as shall be discussed later, human rights have been said to be 
foreign and irrelevant in Africa and to Africans. Appreciating that human rights are 
relevant to Africa, and indeed not foreign to Africans as purported in certain quarters, 
will therefore go a long way to emphasise the need to strengthen their enforecement on 
the continent, particularly at the regional level. 
 
                                                 
83 See the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Establishing the African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights, adopted 10 July 1998, entered into force on 25 January 2004.   
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Secondly, this study aims to unveil the theoretical and historical origin and development 
of the African human rights system. As shall be shown in chapter two of this study, the 
system is a product of prolonged negotiations and activities that took place over a long 
period of time. It is therefore imperative to undersore the journey taken to bring the 
system to its present status. This will also enable us to guage whether or not the system is 
progressing or retrogressing. Thirdly, the study aims to review the normative and 
institutional mechanisms of the regional human rights system. Notably, at the centre of 
the debate on the challenges to the effectiveness of the system lies the alleged inadequacy 
of its normative and institutional mechanisms.84 Further, the study aims at investigating 
the challenges in enforcing human rights law in Africa at the regional level. Finally, the 
study aims to recommend possible ways on how to deal with the challenges in enforcing 
human rights under the African system in order to constitute an effective regional human 
rights system.  
 
1.4 Scope and limitation of the study 
 
As already emphasised, this study is on the challenges in regional enforcement of human 
rights law in Africa, with the particular aim of proposing suitable reforms to the regional 
human rights system. Notably, despite the adoption of the African Charter by the OAU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1981, and its subsequent entry into force 
in 1986, the demand for the reform of the African human rights system began within five 
years of the existence of the Charter.85 This demand has been motivated by, among other 
factors, the inadequacy or inherent normative flaws of the Charter and the lack of 
effective enforcement institutions.86 In the course of this study therefore, three major 
                                                 
84 See the arguments advanced in, among others, Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 1987-2000: An overview of its progress and problems’, note 72 above, p. 1; and Heyns C, ‘The 
African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 72 above, pp. 157-158. 
85 See Mutua M, ‘The African human rights system in a comparative perspective,’ note 26 above, p. 7; 
Anthony A, ‘Beyond the paper Tiger: The challenge of a human rights court in Africa,’ (1997) 32 Texas 
International Law Journal, p. 518; Buergenthal T, International human rights (1995), p. 234.  
86 Anthony A, ibid, p. 518.  
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periods that mark the history of Africa— pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial— shall 
be of great essence.  
 
This is in recognition of the fact that human rights, which are entitlements that accrue to 
all people by virtue of being human, were also known on the continent even prior to 
colonialism.87 They were observed and even violated in pre-colonial Africa just like in 
any other continent.88 To explain the extent of the inculcation of human rights in the 
political, social and economic lives of a people, it is therefore necessary to have recourse 
to their cultural, traditional and religious history.89 The controversial debate on the 
existence of human rights as a concept in pre-colonial Africa hinges on another 
controversial subject: whether law existed during this period.90  
 
Some Western scholars disputed the existence of law and human rights in pre-colonial 
Africa.91 To them, pre-colonial societies were lawless and savage. This has been 
attributed to the historical obscurity given to Africa by early Western historians.92 Hegel, 
for example, in his Philosophy of History ignorantly positioned Africa outside history and 
                                                 
87 See generally the arguments advanced in Mbondenyi M, ‘The potential of Taita customary law in the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Kenya: A critical survey’, (2003) LLB Dissertation: Moi 
University, pp. 13-15. 
88 Mutua M, ‘The African human rights system in a comparative perspective,’ note 26 above, p. 7. 
89 Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 74 above, p. 1. 
90 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system (2001), p 7. 
91 See Howard R, ‘Group versus individual identity in the African debate on human rights’, in An-na ‘im A 
& Deng F, (eds.), Human rights in Africa: Cross-cultural perspectives (1990), p. 159; Howard R, 
‘Evaluating human rights in Africa: Some problems of implicit comparisons’, (1984) 6 Human Rights 
Quarterly, p. 160; Donnelly J, ‘Human rights and Western liberalism’, in An-na ‘im A & Deng F (eds.), 
Human rights in Africa: Cross-cultural perspectives, supra, p. 159; Donnelly J, Universal human rights in 
theory and practice (1989).  
92 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 90 above, p 7. 
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civilisation.93 This positioning is not correct because there is ample historical evidence 
that depicts Africa as the cradle of mankind and civilisation.94  
 
Nmehielle correctly pointed out that the lack of recognition of the existence of law in 
early African societies could be attributed to the fact that African societies in the pre-
colonial era were traditional in nature, governed by custom.95 Thus, he argued that 
nineteenth century scholars tried to distinguish between custom and law.96 Accordingly, 
custom was absolutely rigid, and obedience was ensured by the overwhelming power of 
group sentiment which found fortitude in magic.97 Under such circumstances, ‘it was 
impossible to make any distinction between legal, moral or religious rules, which were all 
interwoven into the single rule of customary behaviour.’98  
 
The study of human rights in Africa during the pre-colonial period is therefore an 
essential component of this research since the realisation of respect for human rights in 
Africa depends, to a large extent, on how the historical and philosophical foundations of 
the concept are percieved. It is therefore needless to emphasise that: 
 
We are in an era in Africa where there is the need to emphasise that the accountability 
that existed in governance in the pre-colonial era should be observed by the present 
African leadership. The writing off of African pre-colonial societies as primitive, pre-
capitalist societies without any notion of the concept of human rights will only go to 
defeat the present African struggle to achieve a greater degree of respect for human rights 
and good governance.99   
                                                 
93 See this argument in ‘Alternative histories and non-Written sources: New perspectives from the South’ 
(Proposal for an International Seminar organised by the South-South Exchange Programme for Research on 
History of Development (SEPHIS), Amsterdam, at La Paz, 12-15 May 1999). 
94 See in this regard, Diop A, The African origin of civilisation: Myth or reality? (1974).   
95 See Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 90 above, p. 7. See also, Eze O, Human rights 
in Africa: Some selected problems, note 1 above, p. 10. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Lloyd Introduction to jurisprudence (1972), p. 566. 
99Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 90 above, pp 16-17. 
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This study shall also indulge in a broad discussion on the nature of human rights in 
colonial Africa, emphasising the specific systems and mechanisms of colonial 
administration adopted by the various European powers. The major colonial systems that 
will be examined are: British, Belgian and French. The study of human rights in colonial-
Africa is of great importance because: 
 
The relative dignity and human value enjoyed by Africans in the pre-colonial era became 
negatively impacted by colonialism as an aspect of foreign intervention in Africa. 
…Also, colonialism presented an enormous potential for the plunder, abuse misrule and 
mistreatment of African natives without much check.100    
 
The effects of the occupation of Africa by the colonialists were varied and depended on 
the practice of the particular power.101 Generally, however, there was an attempt at total 
annihilation of the African customary legal order.102 Accordingly, the slave trade and 
colonialism had such a devastating effect on human rights that it required decades of 
redemptive work to revive the tradition of respect for human rights in Africa.103 The 
colonial period witnessed a systematic subjugation and exploitation of the African people 
for the benefit of the European metropolitan powers.104 Tendentious treaties were 
extorted from African rulers, in some cases by sheer military force.105  
 
Further, the study shall examine the status of human rights in post-colonial Africa. It 
should be recalled that the process of decolonisation which gathered momentum after the 
Second World War had both negative and positive repercussions on the human rights 
                                                 
100 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 90 above, pp 17 -18.  
101 See Eze O, Human rights in Africa,note 1 above, p 14. 
102 Nmehielle, The African human rights system, note 90 above, p. 18. 
103 Umozurike U, ‘The significance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Kalu A & 
Osinbajo Y, (eds.), Perspectives on human rights (1992), p. 44. See also Umozurike U, International law 
and colonialism in Africa (1979); ‘International law and the African slave trade, (1971) 16(2) Howard Law 
Journal, pp. 334-349.  
104 Nmehielle, The African human rights system, note 90 above, p. 18. 
105 See Ayittey G, Africa betrayed, (1992), p. 83. 
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situation in Africa.106 The early sixties, for example, saw a large number of colonies 
emerging as ‘independent’ political entities.107 The fight for independence was predicated 
on a fundamental human rights principle that rejected foreign domination of nations and 
peoples and emphasised the right to self-determination.108 These newly emerging states, 
which were eager adherents to the UN Charter as well as to other international 
instruments,109 intended to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights.110 As 
Eze rightly observed: 
 
In spite of the adherence to and apparent commitment to the protection of human rights, 
the experience in most African countries ranges from anarchy to modest progress in the 
field of human rights protection and promotion. For the most part a gap exists between 
declaration and actual practice.111  
 
Although this observation was made in the early eighties, it is still a reality in Africa 
today. The position is vindicated by the ongoing atrocities in some parts of the continent 
such as in Sudan, DRC, Sierra Leone and Somalia, to mention but a few examples. Most 
of these states have signed or ratified international human rights treaties, whose 
provisions they have been violating with impunity. This, in a way, puts to question their 
commitment to human rights. This study’s analysis of the place and status of human 
rights law in post-colonial Africa will therefore include the emergence of institutions and 
mechanisms such as the OAU, AU, NEPAD, APRM and the African Commission and 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Other instruments and mechanisms that influence 
regional enforcement of human rights in Africa will also be examined.  
                                                 
106 Eze O, Human rights in Africa: Some selected problems, note 1 above, p. 23. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966. The former entered into force on 23rd March 1976 and the later on 3rd January 
1976. See UNDOC. ST/HR/1, pp. 1 & 8. 
110 Eze O, ‘Prospects for international protection of human rights in Africa’, (1974) Vol. V/1 The African 
Review, p. 82.  
111 Eze O, Human rights in Africa: Some selected problems, note 1 above, p 23. 
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While the study will analyse the three periods mentioned above, it must be noted that the 
historical survey will not be very detailed because any attempt towards that end would 
make the study gigantic and impossible to complete. The historical survey will be limited 
to those aspects of Africa’s history that would assist in highlighting the challenges in 
enforcing international human rights law in Africa. Additionally, the research topic 
confines the scope of the study to specific parameters of the vast human rights law 
discipline. The key focus areas are ‘challenges’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘the African system.’ 
International human rights law is a multi-dimensional discipline, encapsulating vast 
procedural, jurisdictional and institutional parameters. It can be enforced both nationally 
and internationally.  
 
To conduct research on all the existing national and international mechanisms for the 
promotion and protection of human rights law would therefore be both a formidable and 
monumental task. Thus, the research is confined to the African human rights system and 
shall not endeavour to examine the enforcement of international human rights law at the 
national jurisdiction. Further, even though the study shall concentrate on the African 
human rights system, it is not possible to review all its normative and institutional 
mechanisms herein. As a result, our focus shall be limited to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and its enforcement mechanisms— the African Commission 
and Court. Other institutional and normative mechanisms shall be highlighted to the 
extent of their relevance to the scope and subject matter of the present study.  
 
Arguably, Africa’s human rights discourse has assumed a new dimension with the 
adoption of the African Charter,112 and the establishment of the African Commission and 
Court. Some commentators saw the African Charter as impressive and unique in its 
provisions, and as breaking new grounds in the area of peoples’ rights and the 
incorporation of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as other such progressive 
                                                 
112 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya, OAU, Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev 5, reprinted in (1981)21 ILM, p. 59. 
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provisions.113 This notwithstanding, it is important to illuminate the areas this normative 
instrument and its enforcement mechanisms are lacking in order to have the basis on 
which to propose suitable reforms.    
 
In the course of reviewing these normative and institutional mechanisms, it is expected 
that a number of difficulties might be encountered. In the main, the ongoing 
developments in Africa, generally, and the African human rights system, in particular, 
may affect some of the findings in this study. The continent and its human rights system 
have not been static. The system has been evolving with time and new institutions and 
norms are being initiated in order to facilitate its efficiency. In such circumstances, it may 
be quite difficult for some of the findings to be as accurate as in, for example, a study 
where all factors remain constant. By extension, the evolution of the existing institutions 
and norms, as well as the emergence of new ones, could also impact on some of our 
recommendations.      
 
Further, there is the ongoing debate on the merger of the African human rights court with 
the AU’s Court of Justice. Whatever recommendations are made in this study may be 
affected by the outcome of the proposed merger. Again, the African human rights court is 
still busy with the drafting of its rules of procedure. It is believed that the drafting process 
is at an advanced stage and the rules could be published and adopted any time soon. 
Additionally, the court is yet to assume its seat in Arusha, Tanzania. This of course may 
also have some implications on its initial operations and, by extension, may affect the 
findings and recommendations of this study one way or the other.    
 
                                                 
113 See Benedek W, ‘Peoples’ rights and individuals’ duties as special features of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Kunig P, Benedek W & Mahalu C (eds.), Regional protection of human 
rights by international law: The emerging African system (1985), p. 59; Umozurike U, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 74 above, pp. 87-96; Odinkalu C, ‘Implementing economic, social 
and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Evans M & Murray R, The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice, note, 43 above, p. 185. 
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1.5 Justification of the study 
 
The research consists of different components which together form a very interesting 
subject worthy of scholarly justification.  
 
1.5.1 Justification for ‘investigating challenges’  
The ineffectiveness of the African human rights system is deep-seated and without a 
thorough investigation into the challenges besetting it, it would absolutely be too 
ambitious for scholars to recommend suitable reforms. An ‘investigation’ principally 
involves an examination or an inquiry into something (or the cause of something).114 In 
the case of this study in particular, the investigation calls for an inquiry into the 
challenges besetting the regional enforcement of human rights in Africa.  
 
‘Challenges’ in the context of this study refers to the setbacks and hurdles Africa faces 
(or has been facing) in its quest for an effective regional human rights system. These 
challenges may be historical, political, social, economic, institutional, and normative, 
among others. On the political plane, there is the general reluctance on the part of states 
to submit to international supervision or adjudication. This attitude has led them to cling 
to the principle of state sovereignty and its counterpart, the ‘non-interference with 
internal affairs’ doctrine. By virtue of these two concepts, and despite the recent 
developments in the regional system, Africa still lags behind in the regional enforcement 
of human rights.   
 
It is thus necessary to examine the causes of Africa’s unsatisfactory progress in this field 
and ascertain to what extent the challenges can be eliminated or their effects minimised. 
In examining these issues, the relevance of conflicting ideologies, the dependence of 
African states, the low level of interaction between them and underdevelopment, assume 
an all-important role. The enforcement of human rights with undue regard to other social, 
                                                 
114 See Hornby A, An English-reader’s dictionary (1982), p 219. 
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political and economic factors may in some cases be counter-productive.115 Human rights 
are not an end unto themselves but a means to protect human dignity. Any attempt to 
investigate the challenges to their enforcement is therefore justified. 
 
1.5.2 Justification for studying enforcement of international human 
rights law in Africa 
Human rights enforcement takes place at two levels— national and international. As 
stated earlier, the national level, by the very nature of its organisation, is better equipped 
and placed to ensure that human rights are effectively enforced. However, the need for 
international (or regional) enforcement arises because the existing agencies, policies and 
laws in many states have most often proved inadequate or the state authorities have 
altogether abandoned their roles as defenders or protectors of human rights.   
 
The failure of African states to enforce or even respect human rights in their respective 
national jurisdictions was the cause for the search for international human rights 
mechanisms on the continent.116 With the liberation of Sub-Saharan Africa, there were 
high hopes for the promotion and protection of human rights and for the restoration of 
African dignity; however, the hopes never materialsised.117 As human rights protection at 
the national level worsened, counter-forces emerged to instigate their enforcement at the 
regional level. These efforts could be traced to the early 1960s, when the first inter-
African lawyers meeting took place to discuss the possibility of evolving a workable 
regional human rights system for the continent.118   
 
This study of human rights enforcement under the African human rights system is 
therefore justified by the fact that since most African states have either ignored or 
altogether neglected their obligation to promote and protect human rights in their 
                                                 
115 Baah R, Human rights in Africa (2000), p 90. 
116 Sall E & Wohlgemuth L (eds.), Human rights, regionalism and the dilemmas of democracy in Africa 
(2006), p. 4. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
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respective national jurisdictions, the regional human rights system must be strengthened 
by all means possible to alleviate the human rights crisis that is already affecting the 
continent adversely. As Mugwanya correctly noted: 
 
States have the obligation of giving effect to human rights, but inter-governmental 
instruments,institutions, mechanisms, structures and procedures at the global and regional 
levels are indispensable as a last resort or safety net for individuals when governments 
fail to respect international human rights norms.119  
 
1.5.3 Justification of the aim of addressing the challenges: ‘Towards an 
effective regional system’ 
The African human rights system has not been static since its establishment.120 It has 
been, as it still is, in the process of transformation. However, to date changes within the 
system, though significant, remain minimal. 121 The essence of an extensive study on 
challenges to effective enforcement of international human rights law in Africa is 
therefore to give direction and recommendations on how the system could possibly be 
reformed. This component of the research is also indicative of the fact that the system is 
dynamic and directional.  
 
The world system to which Africa belonged in the early 1980s when the African Charter 
was promulgated was different from the one today. A lot has happened that has altered or 
affected both the objective material conditions and subjective factors such as values and 
relations among people and nations.122 Likewise, the African human rights system has 
undergone a multi-dimensional evolution since its establishment. As Gutto rightly 
observed: 
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Every social institution, like every living organism, undergoes changes necessitated either by 
subjective self-will and initiative or by objective circumstances and pressures lying outside 
of the social institution or living organism itself. The point is therefore not whether reform or 
change is desirable. The question to be asked relates to the extent of the change and whether 
the reform or change embarked upon leads to the renewal and reinvigoration of the 
institution, or to degeneration and ruin.123 
 
Gutto’s observations find support in the positive developments registered in Africa since 
the establishment of the African human rights system. Over the years, there has been 
evidence of an approach towards incorporating human rights in the activities, declarations 
and resolutions of the OAU/AU.124 This reflects the will to entrench human rights in the 
continent’s agenda. Unfortunately, the same degree of attention has not been paid to the 
enforcement of these standards in practice.125  
 
The transformation of the OAU to AU was a positive step towards strengthening human 
rights promotion and protection in the region. The AU is keener on human rights than the 
OAU. The provisions of its Constitutive Act attest to this fact. These provisions, which 
shall be discussed more extensively elsewhere in this thesis, are a sign of the apparent 
change of perception on human rights issues by African leaders. The Act also makes 
provision for a number of organs and institutions that will eventually ensure that human 
rights are adequately protected, promoted and enforced in the region.126 Additionally, 
through its NEPAD and APRM initiatives, the AU has tried to showcase its commitment 
to human rights promotion and protection in the region.  
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In the journey ‘towards an effective regional system’, positive progress has been 
registered through the establishment of the African Court. The clamour for a regional 
court for the protection of human rights has been going on for long.127 However, some 
African states not only resented the idea of a court that would challenge their judicial 
sovereignty but also sought the excuse that African culture gave reconciliation primacy 
over judicial settlement of disputes.128 This notwithstanding, it was inevitable that a court 
would eventually be created. The adoption of its Protocol on 9 June 1998 and its entry 
into force on 25 January 2004 were, therefore, major steps towards reinforcing the 
African human rights system.129  
 
On 2 July 2006, during the meeting of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, the first eleven judges of the African Court were sworn in.130 Since then, 
the court has held several meetings that have dealt with drafting its rules of procedure, as 
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well as discussing its budget and possible location.131 The issue of the location of the 
court is itself a challenge because of the intended complementarity between it and the 
African Commission.132 This issue shall be revisited later when we examine the court in 
detail. 
 
The mere establishment of the regional court, however, is no guarantee of success. An 
effective human rights protection mechanism requires more, such as the accessibility of 
the court to victims of human rights violations, independent and impartial judges who are 
willing to give human rights maximum effect, financial resources that enable it to fulfil 
its tasks adequately, and enforceability of its judgments.133 In other words, the court is 
expected to overcome the inherent flaws or weaknesses associated with the African 
Commission. Some commentators have rightly warned that the court will have no or only 
minimal added value if it were to suffer from the same or comparable shortcomings as 
the commission.134  
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The process of establishing the court has been slow and somewhat encumbered with 
some challenges. These challenges are discussed comprehensively elsewhere in this 
thesis. However, it took until 25 January 2004 (that is, longer than five years) to ensure 
the fifteen ratifications required for the entry into force of the Protocol.135 This is not very 
encouraging, given the fact that its creation was mooted for more than thirty years.136 
This suggests that the African system still has some weaknesses, failures and challenges 
that need to be addressed with a sense of urgency for human rights enforcement to 
become more effective.  
 
However, despite its apparent weaknesses, failures and challenges, the system has made 
some positive contributions to the international human rights law domain. What is now 
left is to ensure that the human rights principles and standards already laid down are 
accompanied with adequate institutional support and effective enforcement mechanisms. 
The existing institutional and normative mechanisms also need to be strengthened or 
reinvigorated. This invites all the stakeholders and role-players to embark on the journey 
‘towards an effective regional system.’  
 
This can only be achieved through a thorough study of the weaknesses, strengths and 
possible ways to reinvigorate the African system. Direction and movement are very 
crucial aspects which could only be ignored to one’s peril.137 The same could be said of 
this study, which evaluates the direction the African human rights system has taken, how 
far it has gone since its inception and the distance that is left to complete the journey 
towards its effectiveness. 
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1.6 Literature review 
 
Any attempt to review the existing literature on the African human rights system is a 
formidable task, given the numerous articles, papers, reports and books that have been 
written on various aspects of this subject in the past decades. This subject has drawn 
scholarly interests from many perspectives and disciplines including international law, 
international relations, sociology and political science, among others. This section will 
therefore highlight the features and major trends in the reviewed literature and as far as is 
practicably possible, point to the neglected questions or questions insufficiently 
addressed in the literature.    
 
1.6.1 The features and major trends in the reviewed literature  
 
The present research identified the features and major trends in the literature which can 
be a useful basis upon which the study could be conducted. The first feature relates to the 
disagreement among scholars on the proper definition and perhaps the scope of the 
African human rights system. The conventional discourse of the African human rights 
system is torn between two conceptions. Gutto argued that a distinction should be made 
between the broader African human rights system and the narrower African Charter 
system.138  
 
According to Gutto, the reason for this distinction ‘rests on the fact that there are a 
number of African regional human and peoples’ rights instruments or generalised 
instruments that incorporate important rights issues but which do not fall directly within 
the promotion and protection mandates of the commission’.139 Thus, whereas the African 
Charter system centres around two enforcement institutions; namely, the African 
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Commission and Court, the African human rights system goes beyond to include the 
political institutions and other organs created under the AU.140   
 
Odinkalu, on the other hand, contended for a much broader definition of the African 
human rights system. 141 According to him, the system encapsulates not only regional 
human rights mechanisms but also supra-national, pan-continental systems and 
mechanisms and the domestic legal systems in Africa.142 This depiction, however, is 
overbroad and misleading. This is because, whereas supra-national and domestic systems 
in Africa may enforce regional human rights norms, the regional system cannot enforce 
supra-national or domestic laws. It may only enforce the human rights norms created 
under it.   
 
The second feature of the discourse is its overall Afro-pessimism and Euro-centrism. The 
literature is Afro-pessimistic in the sense that Africa is depicted as a place of doom and 
despair in as far as human rights are concerned. Consequently, the analysis of its level of 
compliance with human rights focuses more on its failure to adopted western 
standards.143 Euro-centrism, on the other hand, construes the concept of human rights in 
Africa against the background of Western ‘models.’ In this case, Africa is not primarily 
studied in terms of its own dynamics, but is rather ‘an appendix or a periphery to the 
centre (the West) and considered valuable only by its submission to the West and its 
conformity to Western standards.’144  
 
The two trends of scholarship generally perpetuate the differences between Western 
ideals and African realities.145 However, while earlier literature on human rights in 
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Africa, especially the writings from the early 1960s to late 1980s, took the general ‘Afro-
pessimistic’ and ‘Euro-centric’ trends, later writings were a marked departure from this 
pattern.146 Generally, literature displaying the Afro-pessimism-Eurocentric trend 
principally hinged on the discussion on whether or not Africa has had a tradition of 
human rights, an academic debate that has endlessly pitted African against Western 
scholars.147  
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Those in support of the African perspective have argued, for example, that Africa has had 
a tradition of human rights and that the concept is not unique to the West.148 Further, 
although Africa’s pre-colonial societies differed in a number of ways, there is ample 
information to prove that there not only existed legal systems but also some measure of 
protection of human rights in pre-colonial Africa.149 The failure of Eurocentric Western 
scholars to locate human rights in African cultures has been criticised by a number of 
African scholars who laboured to vindicate that African cultures were after all not devoid 
of the concept. These scholars include, but are not limited to, Quashigah, Cobbah, 
Hountondji, Shivji and Wiredu.150  
 
Quashigah analysed the emergence of the concept of human rights in the Western world 
through the application of the methodologies of philosophical idealism and philosophical 
materialism.151 His analysis served to acknowledge that both Western and African 
traditions are similar because each contains an inherent contradiction of respecting and 
violating human rights at the same time. Wiredu and Hountondji attempted to locate 
human rights in some African cultures. While Wiredu dwelt more on Africa’s past 
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cultural experiences in the evolution of an Akan conception of rights,152 Hountondji 
underscored the colonial and post-colonial periods of Africa.153  
 
On his part, Shivji attempted to contrast the philosophical foundations of human rights in 
Africa and the Western world.154 He explained that the philosophical basis of Western 
human rights conceptions is contrary to the African way of thinking. According to him, in 
Africa, the collective is given more emphasis than the individual.155 His views were 
similar to those of Cobbah who concluded that: 
 
Africans do not espouse a philosophy of human dignity that is derived from natural rights 
and individualistic framework. African societies function within communal structure 
whereby a person’s dignity and honour flow from his or her transcendental role as a 
cultural being…. We should pose the problem in this light, rather than assuming an 
inevitable progression on non-Westerners toward Western lifestyle.156 
 
Nyerere and Wai attested to this when they argued, separately, that pre-colonial societies 
emphasised respect for individuals’ dignity and did not allow gross inequalities between 
members.157 This position was confirmed by studies conducted by a number of other 
scholars, including Busia, Wilks and Rattray.158 Nzongola-Ntalaja condemned the Euro-
centric attitude of perceiving Africans as being incapable of determining their own affairs 
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and, by extension, having no history of democracy and human rights. He emphasised 
that: 
 
Such an approach not only glosses over the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on political 
institutions and practices in West and Central Africa but also minimises the role of 
colonial despotism as a school of post-colonial rulers.159 
 
Further, Mamdani ruled out the Western ‘paternity’ of the concept of human rights. 
According to him: 
 
 
It is difficult to accept, even in the case of Europe, that human rights was a concept 
created by 17th century Enlightenment philosophy. True, one can quote Aristotle and his 
ideological justification of slavery as evidence that the idea of human rights was indeed 
foreign to the conscience of the ruling classes in ancient Greece…What was unique about 
Enlightenment philosophy, and about the writings of the French and American 
Revolutions, was not a conception of human rights, but a discussion of these in the 
context of a formally articulated philosophical system.160 
 
Fernyhough is one of the few non-African scholars to objectively claim the existence of 
human rights in pre-colonial Africa.161 According to him: 
 
… there is a fundamental rejection of this as a new, if rather subtle, imperialism, and 
explicit denial that human rights evolved only in Western political theory and practice, 
especially during the American and French revolutions, and not in Africa. Behind this 
protest is the very plausible claim that human rights are not found in western values alone 
but may also have emerged from very different and distinctive African cultural 
milieus.162 
                                                 
159 Nzongola-Ntalaja G & Lee M (eds.), The state and democracy in Africa (1997), p.11-12.  
160 Mamdani M, et al (eds.), Social movements, social transformation and the struggle for democracy in 
Africa (1988), pp. 236-237. 
161 Fernyhough T, ‘Human rights and pre-colonial Africa’, in Cohen R, et al (eds.), Human rights and 
governance in Africa (1993), p. 40-41. 
162 Ibid. 
 41 
 
From the foregoing, it is inevitable to observe that no country has the monopoly of 
human rights respect or abuses. Nor can any society claim to be a paradise for human 
rights. Dismissing the Western ‘paternity’ of democracy and constitutionalism, Mangu 
rightly noted that Athens and Rome that allegedly ‘invented’ democracy ended up in 
authoritarianism and dictatorship, while Greece, the supposed ‘mother of Western 
democracy’, was still a dictatorship in the 1970s.163 Unfortunately, it is too easy for 
Western scholars to give lessons and present themselves as the ‘model’ for human 
rights.164  
 
Following this argument, it seems possible to conclude that indeed the concept of human 
rights emanated naturally from human existence. It is therefore inconceivable that Africa 
would lack a culture of human rights whereas it was inhabited by people, even prior to 
foreign intrusion. The sincerity of the proponents of the ‘Western origin’ of human rights 
should therefore be questioned in as far as it purports to dismiss the existence of the 
concept in pre-colonial Africa. Busia was therefore right in discrediting the Westernised 
analyses of the concept of human rights as ‘facile generalisations not reflecting the entire 
reality of human rights in pre-colonial social formations of Africa.’165  
 
Those Western scholars who deny the existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa 
have hence been accused of advancing imperialistic (Euro-centric) scholarly views which 
do no more than bring back pictures of colonialism.166 It has been argued that Western 
scholars failed to appreciate the existence of the human rights in pre-colonial Africa 
because of the ‘unique’ ways in which different communities observed the concept.167 
The insistence on a ‘unique African human rights concept’ is, however, problematic to a 
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certain extent. This argument, which is largely prescriptive of an autochthonous African 
human rights concept, is at best an exaggeration aimed at countering the universalism 
concept. Consequently, it dilutes, or altogether nullifies, the argument about the existence 
of human rights in pre-colonial Africa.  
 
It should be recalled that the human rights concept is dynamic and not all that are 
considered today as human rights were recognised as such, in the formative years of the 
evolution of the concept. No wonder some African authors such as Baah, after attempting 
to draw parallels between certain indigenous African traditions that allegedly enhanced 
human dignity in the pre-colonial epoch, and the primary objective of human rights of 
protecting human dignity, concluded that Africans have had human rights all along.168 
This view, however, failed to impress those who conceptualised the origin of human 
rights from the ‘Western’ perspective.169 According to Shivji, such a conclusion ‘fails to 
understand the correct material and philosophical basis of certain community-oriented 
conceptions and practices in some of the more or less classless societies in Africa… and 
endeavours to prove that they are similar to Western human rights.’170  
 
Tibi dismissed the assertion that African societies have had human rights all along as the 
confusion of African societies’ indigenous means of securing human dignity among a 
particular people, with the concept of human rights.171 By simply following the evolution 
of the modern human rights concept, Tibi further contended, one should be able to tell 
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that the concept is a Western idea.172 According to this assertion, the philosophical 
foundation of human rights can be traced directly to the historical experiences of France, 
England, and the United States. Pollis and Schwab posit, 
 
the Western political philosophy upon which the (UN) Charter and the Declaration are 
based provides only one particular interpretation of human rights, and that this Western 
notion may not be successfully applicable to non-Western areas…. Efforts to enforce the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in states that do not accept its 
underlying values are bound to fail.173 
 
Howard and Donnelly, for example, are some of the Western scholars in the forefront of 
the argument that human rights did not exist as a concept in pre-colonial Africa.174 
Donnelly asserted that recognition of human rights simply was not the way of traditional 
Africa.175 Howard stretched this view further when she contended that African 
proponents of the concept confuse human dignity with human rights. Accordingly:  
 
The African concept of human rights is actually a concept of human dignity, or what 
defines the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper 
(political) relations with society. Despite the twinning of human rights and human dignity 
in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and elsewhere, dignity can 
be protected in a society not based on rights. The notion of African communalism, which 
stresses the dignity of membership in, and fulfilment of one’s prescribed social role in a 
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group (family, kinship group, tribe), still represents how accurately how many Africans 
appear to view their personal relationship to society.176 
 
Some scholars who harbour similar views contend that even democracy and 
constitutionalism, which are fundamental in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, are also foreign to Africa.177 These concepts have been said to have no future in 
the continent because they are unsuitable, especially in Black Africa.178  Thus, the West 
has been perceived as the model of human rights, constitutionalism and democracy.179 
This perception is not only championed by European and American scholars but also 
some African scholars.180 Simiyu, for example, insisted that democracy had no roots in 
Africa no matter how organised the traditional political systems were.181 This position 
was also echoed by Akindes who considered the ancient Dahomey as typical of the 
authoritarianism of pre-colonial Africa.182 Kedourie also argued that ‘Africa and Asian 
societies are victimised by their own despotic traditions.’183  
 
Despite all the arguments advanced in some of the ‘Western-inclined’ literature, it is 
evident that indeed there are certain elements that reveal the existence of a human rights 
tradition in Africa. The assertion that European ‘liberalism’ is the foundation of the 
concept of human rights in Africa therefore destroys the claim that human rights are 
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universal.184 The universality of human rights does not derive from Western imposition 
of the concept on colonised societies. After all, human beings share certain common 
moral values.  
 
The literature reviewed in this study also comprises historical features. Some authors 
have endeavoured to trace the historical origins of the African human rights system as 
well as the origin of the human rights concept. Numerous anthropological, sociological, 
economic and historical works have unravelled the mysteries surrounding Africa’s past 
and have greatly contributed in providing useful information on her past human rights 
situations.185  
 
The historical origin, scope and evolution of human rights law in Africa have been 
documented in a number of studies.186 Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds and others, for example, 
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briefly discussed philosophical foundations of human rights then proceeded to introduce 
an attractive historical background on evolution of human rights in pre-colonial and 
colonial Africa.187 Some of the literature bearing historical components discussed 
theories of human rights in the African context.188 Generally, however, the historical texts 
that were reviewed in the course of this study were found to be limited. In the main, they 
lacked ample legal information. Consequently, they could not be relied on when 
analysing the various African legal systems or even the promotion and protection of 
human rights on the continent, more so, from the legal perspective.   
 
In addition to being historical, most of the literature reviewed in this study tended to be 
descriptive in nature.189 They described, for example, the origin, scope and evolution of 
the African human rights system, its enforcement mechanisms as well as the procedural 
and other parameters. Some scholars have also described the myriad of limitations of the 
African Commission. Welch, who points out a number of shortfalls associated with the 
commission, concluded that the abilities of the commission are restricted by the fact that 
it was envisaged almost exclusively as a body to promote rather than protect human 
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rights.190 He conceded that the commission’s effectiveness has been confronted with 
severe limitations.191  
 
Others, who admit this fact, opine that the commission is besieged in a situation where 
national legislation, including the constitutions of states parties, has been at variance with 
the express provisions of the African Charter.192 In many other cases, states parties had 
not provided for the domestic application of the Charter.193 One of the major descriptive 
works reviewed in this study is the survey of the International Commission of Jurists on 
how to address a communication to the African Commission.194 This study discusses the 
procedure on how to lodge a communication with the African Commission.195 
 
Another feature of the literature reviewed in this study is its comparative nature. Since 
the 1970s, many academics have become concerned with the comparative measure and 
analysis of human rights.196 Comparative studies have been conducted on, for example, 
the human rights situations in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa.197 
Numerous sociological, economic, historical and anthropological studies in the last few 
decades have resulted in works that have shed more light and provided useful information 
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on Africa’s past political, social and economic formations which are instrumental in the 
study of Africa’s human rights trends.  
 
Further, there has been a proliferation of literature which attempts to compare the African 
human rights system with other regional systems. The predominant trend in a majority of 
this kind of literature has been to judge the African human rights system against the 
achievements of the European or American systems.198 This has partly been attributed to 
the commendable volume of literature on the European and American systems, 
commensurate to their long experience in regional enforcement of human rights.199 
However, some scholars, when conducting comparative studies, seem to ignore the fact 
that the European and American experiences are not similar to those of Africa because 
the former embody ‘liberal values which crystallise centuries of political 
development.’200  
 
Similarly, Western democracies allow high levels of individual civil and political rights, 
and can afford a high level of social security guarantees of basic economic needs, as well 
as social and cultural rights.201 Evaluation of human rights standards in Africa against 
those of the Western democracies has, therefore, to say the least, painted a poor image of 
the continent’s commitment to human rights values. This, however, is not to say that 
Africa’s human rights record is excellent and needs not to be criticised in the light of 
other jurisdictions. 
 
Some scholars have also attempted to compare the enforcement of human rights law in 
national and international jurisdictions.202 Maina, for example, provided an extensive 
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comparison between the Tanzanian Bill of Rights and the African Charter.203 He 
critically compared the rights and enforcement mechanisms provided for in the two 
instruments. Maina conceivably acknowledged that for effective enforcement of human 
rights to be realised, harmonisation of the existing enforcement mechanisms is 
essential.204  
 
Other scholarly works also compared different states to establish their levels of human 
rights promotion and protection.205 Viljoen attempted to gauge the extent to which 
domestic courts have applied the African Charter across the continent.206 The study was, 
however, not a comprehensive survey of the application of the African Charter by all 
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domestic courts across Africa because the relevant sources were hardly accessible.207 It 
instead covered only 16 countries on the basis of sub-regional divides and the major legal 
systems of the continent.208 In another work, Viljoen discusses, more or less in a 
comparative approach, the links between certain institutional mechanisms responsible for 
human rights promotion and protection in Africa.209 The study is a survey of the UN 
mechanisms, the African human rights system and sub-regional human rights institutions 
in Africa.   
 
Apart from the major trends and features of the literature that were identified and 
discussed above, the reviewed literature has also addressed some key issues and concepts 
pertaining to the subject matter of the present study. One of the issues relates to the 
definition of human rights. The apparent difficulty in identifying human rights has 
reduced their definition to a subject of great controversy among scholars.210 Some 
scholars identify human rights as those that are ‘important’, ‘moral’ and ‘universal’.211 
Others conceptualise them as the entitlements individuals possess by virtue of being 
human.212  
 
Despite numerous attempts to find a composite definition of the concept, it is now 
accepted that the province of human rights cannot easily be determined. 213 This means 
that human rights are continually evolving, lending credence to Laski’s observations that 
‘a legal system is surrounded by the penumbra of an attainable ideal which it must reach 
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as the price of its preservation.’214 To understand the concept of human rights, it is 
important to unveil its philosophical foundations.  
 
Thus, some of the literature that was reviewed discussed philosophical bases and theories 
of law and human rights. The theories highlighted in the literature include the: 
naturalist,215 positivist216 and Marxist217 theories. The common thread that cuts across 
these theories is that the concept of human rights originated and evolved as a way of 
protecting a person’s inherent dignity as a human being. The preservation of social 
relationships has also been highlighted as one of the roles of human rights in society.218  
 
Further, some studies address the internationalisation of human rights.219 The point of 
departure is that the concept of human rights as an international legal obligation of states 
is of recent origins. Apart from some isolated controversies over the concept,220 there is a 
certain degree of consensus in the literature that human rights are universal, inalienable, 
and inherent to every human being in every society.221 Further, all rights are 
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interdependent notwithstanding the fact that different measures may be required to 
implement them.222 
 
It emerged from some of the reviewed literature that, as a result of the divergence in 
conceptions and perceptions of human rights, internationalisation of human rights has 
turned to be more effective through regional initiatives.223 This somehow has a bearing 
on the emergence and evolution of regional human rights systems. There is a 
considerable amount of scholarly work that has been conducted on the three regional 
systems; namely, the European,224 Inter-American225 and African systems.226  
 
The African human rights system has also been given considerable attention in the 
reviewed literature. Scholars have addressed many issues pertaining to the system, 
including: its genesis and evolution; its normative and enforcement mechanisms; its 
strengths, weaknesses and challenges; and possible ways of reinvigorating it. Okafor, for 
example, provides a detailed discussion on the conventional conceptions of the system.227 
From the bulk of the literature, one would definitely agree with Murray that no regional 
human rights system attracts as much criticism, contempt or disdain as the African 
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regional system.228 Criticism has been leveled, for example, on the normative provisions 
of the Charter as well as its enforcement mechanisms the African Commission and Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
 
According to some authors, the African Charter was from its inception beset with 
legitimacy crisis.229 Others perceived it as ‘the product of the ideological cleavages of the 
Cold War and post-independence and ‘nation-building’ projects in post-independence 
Africa.’230 According to Dankwa, it reflects a compromise between the various 
ideological and belief systems, including ‘atheists, animists, Christians, Hindus, Jews and 
Muslims; and over 50 countries and islands with Marxist-Leninist, capitalist, socialist, 
military, one-party and democratic regimes.’231   
 
Initially, it was doubted that the Charter would ever come into force232 and if so, whether 
it could be enforceable.233 Gittleman thought that it gave African states ‘wide latitude for 
repressive human rights exceptionalism.’234 According to Mutua, the Charter was ‘… a 
yoke that African leaders have put around our necks.’ Generally, the Charter was 
regarded as problematic because, among other allegations, it is ‘opaque and difficult to 
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interpret.’235 Further, it is a document that ‘might honestly have been entitled the African 
Charter for keeping rulers in power.’236 However, some moderate scholars, such as 
Heyns, thought the Charter’s provisions were adequate enough to fulfil the objectives of 
human rights promotion and protection.237 According to this argument, the Charter 
system is not perfect, but at least in reality, it is operational.238  
 
The African Commission has also been lambasted with the same fervency as the Charter. 
Naldi and Magliveras, for instance, pointed out that it has relatively weak enforcement 
and investigation powers.239 Welch doubted that the commission would ever have the 
power, resources and willingness to fulfil its functions.240 He lamented that ‘the political 
will to interpret the wording of the African Charter broadly has not been present.’241 
Additionally, the commission has been accused of lack of capacity to consider petitions 
alleging human rights violations242 and to award remedies for such violations.243 The 
commissioners, it is said, are not independent of their governments,244 and their meetings 
‘are always disorganised and often verge on the absurd.’245  
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In their 1998 study, Naldi and Magliveras concluded that ‘the commission does not give 
hope for optimism’246 because, in their opinion, it adopts ‘a generally pusillanimous 
approach too respectful of state sovereignty.’247 Further, the African Court, which is not 
yet in operation, has also already had a share of criticism. Some scholars are sceptical of 
its potential to improve the human rights situation in the region.248 Those aspects of the 
court that have contributed to this scepticism include its jurisdiction249, access250 and its 
relationship with the commission, AU and other relevant human rights bodies in the 
region.251 These and other aspects shall be discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis.  
 
Suffice it to state that, the image of the African human rights system, at least on the basis 
of the reviewed literature, is not inspiring. One would therefore agree with Odinkalu that 
the perception of the system that is often conveyed in much of the available literature is 
that the system is a juridical misfit, with a treaty basis and institutional mechanisms that 
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are dangerously inadequate.252 The perceived inadequacy of the system has led to the call 
for its reform.253 
 
The reviewed literature, however, indicates some prospects for a reinvigorated and 
efficient human rights system. For instance, so far the passive OAU has been replaced by 
the AU, whose Constitutive Act, as already stated, attaches more significance to human 
rights than its predecessor, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).254 
The progressive attitude of the AU towards human rights promotion and protection is 
clear in the Preamble of the Constitutive Act and in its objectives and guiding 
principles.255 The Act also provides for the creation of organs within the AU framework, 
some of which could be used to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in 
the continent.256  
 
Additionally, the AU has also adopted programmes and initiatives that further its role in 
human rights promotion and protection in the region. These are, for example, the New 
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Union: Hope for a better protection of human rights in Africa? (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law 
Journal, p. 311. 
256 CAAU, Art. 5 (1) & (2). 
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Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA). Scholars have reviewed the prospects of these institutions in 
enhancing human rights enforcement in the region.257  
 
Some of the reviewed literature also highlighted the possible ways to reinvigorate the 
African human rights system. The aspects of the possible reforms of the system that have 
been given attention in the literature include: the normative258, institutional259 and non-
                                                 
257 See, for example, Mangu A, ‘The changing human rights landscape in Africa: Organisation of African 
Unity, African Union, New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Court’, note 81 above, 
pp. 379-408; Mashood B, ‘Recent developments in the African regional human rights system’, (2005) 5/1 
Human Rights Law Review, pp. 117-149; Murray R & Lloyds A, ‘Institutions with responsibility under the 
African Union’, note 45 above, pp. 165-186; Curtis F & Doebbler J, ‘A Complex ambiguity: The 
relationship between the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other African Union 
initiatives affecting respect for human rights’, (2003) 13/1 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 
pp. 7-31; Manby B, ‘The African Union, NEPAD, and human rights: The missing agenda’, (2004) African 
Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 983-1027; Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the 
African human rights system’, (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 303. 
258 See, among others, Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 72 
above, p. 159; Nmehielle O, The African human rights system,note 90 above, p. 110; Heyns C, ‘Civil and 
political rights in the African Charter’, in M Evans & Murray R (eds.), The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice, note 113 above; Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (1996); Howard R, ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: Should economic rights take priority over 
civil and political rights? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa’, (1983) 5 Human Right Quarterly, pp. 467-
490; Busia K, Jr & Mbaye K, ‘Towards a framework for the filing of communications on economic, social 
and cultural rights under the African Charter, Phase I’, (1994) East African Journal of Peace and Human 
Rights. 
259 See, for example, Rembe S, The system of protection of human rights under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems and prospects (1991), p. 25; Ankumah E, The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 147 above, pp. 18-19; Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000, note 72 above, p. 7; Wachira G, ‘A critical examination of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards strengthening the African human rights system to enable it 
effectively meet the needs of the African population’, in Viljoen F (ed), The African human rights system: 
Towards the co-existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 71 above, p. 19. 
 58 
 
institutional, among others. The nature of reforms suggested in these texts is illuminated 
systematically in the course of the present study. As stated earlier, this study, which 
focuses on these aspects, constitutes an advancement of knowledge on the African human 
rights system as it will also address some questions that have been neglected or 
insufficiently addressed in the literature.   
 
1.6.2 Neglected questions or questions insufficiently addressed in the 
reviewed literature 
There are a number of questions that have been neglected or are insufficiently addressed 
in the literature reviewed in this study.  The first question relates to whether Africa has 
made any positive contribution in the field of international human rights law. Some 
scholars opine that Africa’s contribution in this field of law has been neglected or 
altogether ignored.260 According to Viljoen: 
 
Africa is associated more with human rights problems and humanitarian crises than with 
their solutions, more with the need for international human rights law than its 
applications, and more with the failure of international law than with its success. If Pliny 
had the opportunity of writing today, he would probably have coined the phrase: ‘Out of 
Africa, always something terrible.’261 
 
In spite of its contribution to the development of international human rights law, Africa 
has often been viewed in terms of its poor human rights record, and its regional human 
rights system has always been contemptuously dismissed.262 For example, the African 
Commission has been accused of not being independent.263 The Charter is also purported 
                                                 
260 See, for example, Viljoen F, ‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and 
humanitarian law’, (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 18. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 72 above, p. 156. 
263 Murray R, Human rights in Africa, note 27, p. 52. 
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to have ushered in a weaker regional normative regime than was initially anticipated.264 
Some of the norms are allegedly out of tune with municipal legislation in some member 
states, making their enforcement difficult and even impossible.265  
 
While it cannot be gainsaid that the system is lacking in a number of areas, the efforts 
towards a more effective regional human rights system should also be appreciated.266 An 
uncritical attitude to the African human rights system ‘is as damaging as the cynical 
approach that one sometimes encounters, according to which nothing good can be 
expected …’ from Africa.267 There is the need for engaged, positive criticism of the 
system to enable it to overcome its shortcomings. This solicits for extensive research in 
order to show that the exclusive negativity on the African human rights system is 
misplaced.268  
 
According to Heyns, ‘only after the full magnitudes of potential problems have been 
established in a ‘no punches pulled’ fashion, could an appropriate response be 
devised.’269 The potential problem areas or challenges should be traced from the time the 
system was established. At the moment, the piecemeal diagnosis of the challenges 
besetting the system, conducted by different scholars, may not be very productive for a 
system which may need comprehensive reforms. Only a detailed investigation could lead 
to the conclusion on whether and how the system could be reformed. 
 
                                                 
264 Reisman W, ‘Through or despite governments: Differentiating responsibilities in human rights 
programs’, (1987) 72 Iowa Law Review, p. 392; Hopkins K, ‘A new human rights era dawns on Africa?’ 
note 37 above.  
265 Mbondenyi M & Sifuna N, ‘A review of procedural and jurisdictional challenges in enforcing 
international human rights Law under the African Charter regime’, note 8 above, p. 14. 
266 Acheampong K, ‘Reforming the substance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Civil 
and political rights and Socio-economic rights’, note 253 above, p. 185. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Viljoen F, ‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and humanitarian 
law’, note 261 above, p. 18.  
269 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ note 72 above, p. 158. 
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Another question is whether the discussions on the African human rights system should 
be posited on the general definition of human rights as given by the United Nations, 
notwithstanding the ideological and philosophical expressions of disquiet to the 
contrary.270 There has been an ongoing debate concerning the universality of human 
rights. As stated earlier, some scholars have argued for the contextual application of 
human rights while others have insisted that human rights are universal in content and 
context.271  
 
The existence, validity and content of human rights in Africa have therefore continuously 
been the subject of unending debate although human rights are defined in international 
law and covenants, and further, in the domestic laws of many states.272 Some cultural 
relativists, such as Aka, dispute the universalism concept by arguing that, to be 
acceptable, human rights must first recognise cultural or regional peculiarities.273 Hence, 
any insistence on universal human rights standards is, according to this perception, a 
Western imposition.274  
 
Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General criticised the relativism notion at an OAU 
Summit meeting, maintaining that human rights are ‘fundamental to humankind itself that 
belong to no government and are limited to no continent.’275 He strongly disagreed with 
the African leaders who viewed concern for human rights as a conspiracy imposed by the 
                                                 
270 Acheampong K, ‘Reforming the substance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Civil 
and political rights and Socio-economic rights’, note 253 above, p. 186. 
271 Those inclined to the universal school of thought generally define human rights as the entitlements 
afforded to all human beings regardless of legal jurisdiction or other localised factors such as ethnicity, 
nationality and sex.  
272 See generally, Aidoo K, ‘Africa: Democracy without human rights?’, (1993) 15 Human Rights 
Quarterly, p. 703. 
273 Aka P, ‘The military, globalisation and human rights in Africa’, (2001/2002) 19 New York Law School 
Journal of Humuman Rights, p. 366. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Gaer F, ‘Human rights: What role in U.S Foreign Policy?’, Great decisions, special issue, (1998), p. 33. 
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industrialised West.276 Similar sentiments had been expressed earlier by Annan’s 
predecessor Boutros-Ghali at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna when he categorically stated: 
 
The human rights that we proclaim and seek to safeguard can be brought about only if we 
transcend ourselves, only if we make a conscious effort to find our common essence 
beyond our apparent divisions, our temporary differences, our ideological and cultural 
barriers. In sum, what I mean to say, with all solemnity, is that the human rights we are 
bound to discuss here at Vienna are not the lowest common denominator among all 
nations, but rather what I should like to describe as the ‘irreducible human element’, in 
other words, the quintessential values through which we affirm together that we are a 
single human community. As an absolute yardstick, human rights constitute the common 
language of humanity.277 
 
Arguably, the ‘common language of humanity’ contemplated by Boutros-Ghali could still 
be formulated within the context of ideological and cultural diversity and still maintain its 
essence. In other words, human rights could still be applied contextually without 
compromising their universal character, which is to protect human dignity. Whether this 
‘common language of humanity’ should be the premise when discussing the African 
human rights system, notwithstanding the ideological and philosophical expressions of 
disquiet to the contrary, has therefore not been sufficiently addressed in the existing 
literature. There is the need, therefore, to know, in no uncertain terms, the philosophical 
basis of the African human rights system.    
 
Another issue that has not been sufficiently addressed is the nexus between democracy 
and the regional enforcement of human rights in Africa. Studies have been conducted on 
the relationship between democracy and human rights in individual African states. 
However, such studies fail to sufficiently address the role of democracy in the African 
                                                 
276 Aka P, ‘The military, globalisation and human rights in Africa’, note 273 above, p. 367. 
277 Quoted in Acheampong K, ‘Reforming the substance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Civil and political rights and socio-economic rights’, note 253 above, p. 188. 
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regional human rights system. If the African system is to be reformed, such reformation 
should consider the concept of democracy and the rule of law.278  
 
Generally, human rights are tied to democracy279 and ‘it is difficult to bypass a discussion 
of democracy in relation to human rights in the contemporary world.’280 The concept of 
democracy remains universally popular. In the words of Dahl ‘in our times, even 
dictators appear to believe that an indispensable ingredient for their legitimacy is a dash 
or two of the language of democracy.’281 Accordingly, democracy and human rights have 
interlinked facets ‘and might be considered twins, though not identical.’282 This is 
because, ‘the quest for democracy is the quest for freedom, justice, equality and human 
dignity.’283 These values, freedoms, equality and justice are all necessarily entailed in the 
concept of human rights and find a common root in human dignity.  
 
At the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, Boutros-Ghali emphasised the 
linkage and interplay between the concept of human rights and democracy:  
 
The process of democratisation cannot be separated, in my view, from the protection of 
human rights. More precisely, democracy is the political framework in which human 
rights can best be safeguarded. This is not merely a statement of principle, far less a 
concession to a fashion of the movement, but the realisation that a democracy is the 
political system which best allows for the free exercise of individual rights. It is not 
possible to separate the … promotion of human rights from the establishment of 
democratic systems within the international community.284 
                                                 
278 Ibid, p. 192. 
279 Steiner H & Alston P, International human rights in context-law, politics, morals (1996), p. 207.  
280 Ibid, p. 659. 
281 Dahl A, Democracy and its critics (1992), p. 2. 
282African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, ‘Human rights and democracy’, (1992) 
African Human Rights Newsletter, p. 5.   
283 Gitonga A, ‘The meaning and foundations of democracy’ in Oyugi W, et al (eds.), Democratic theory 
and practice in Africa, (1988), p. 2. 
284 Quoted in Acheampong K, ‘Reforming the substance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Civil and political rights and socio-economic rights, note 253 above, p. 188.   
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According to the above observation, it can be argued that democracy and effective 
regional enforcement of human rights in Africa go hand in hand. Although the present 
study will not delve deeper into this nexus, it should be noted that the success, or 
otherwise, of the African human rights system has much to do with how serious 
democratic values and principles are upheld by states at the domestic level. Put 
differently, whatever takes place at the domestic level has implications on the regional 
human rights system.   
 
Another neglected question is the contribution made by the Western countries towards 
the inefficiency of the African human rights system. The fact that some of the Western 
countries assisted their ‘African agents’ to seize power and remain in office for many 
years, cannot be overlooked.285 The Western powers most often granted support to these 
African leaders, or ‘simply used the silence language when massive human rights 
violations were being committed against African democracy and freedom fighters.’286 
However, Western and Africanist discourses have the tendency to absolve the West and 
former colonial powers from responsibility for African crises and failure to promote and 
protect human rights. Thus, the negative role of the international community, especially 
the West, has not been addressed sufficiently in the literature.    
   
The reviewed literature also failed to sufficiently address the position of women in 
Africa’s regional human rights system.287 In fact, some feminist writers, such as Murray, 
have argued that international law is male biased and thus fails to take account of those 
outside its parameters, particularly women.288 International human rights law, it is 
argued, is based on opposing dichotomies, an approach which fails to take account of the 
                                                 
285 See in this regard, Mangu A, ‘The road to constitutionalism and democracy in post-colonial Africa: The 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, note 137 above, p. 63.   
286 Ibid. 
287 Charlesworth H, et al, ‘Feminist approaches to international law’, (1991) 85 American Journal of 
International law, p. 613.  
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much wider experience beyond traditional male perspectives.289 According to Harding, 
‘feminine views name what is absent in the thinking and social activities of [men], what 
is relegated to ‘others’ to think, feel and do.’290 Murray observed: 
 
…human rights has been posited in contrasting terms such as state/individual, war/peace, 
public/private as though these were clear divides into which issues could clearly be 
separated. The argument is that such an approach neglects the position and experience of 
women.291 
 
The role and potential of the other regional human rights systems in influencing the 
effectiveness of the African human rights system has also not been sufficiently addressed 
in the reviewed literature. Indeed, some comparison has been conducted between the 
African system and the other regional human rights systems.292  
 
There is, however, the need to examine in greater detail the influence these systems have 
on the African system. It cannot be gainsaid that the African human rights system is the 
youngest of the three systems as well as the least developed. In the quest to develop the 
system, the African Commission has begun to draw inspiration from the European and 
Inter-American systems.293 While this should be encouraged, it is imperative to establish 
                                                 
289 Ibid. 
290 Harding S, The science question in feminism, (1986) p. 186. 
291 Murray R, ‘A feminist perspective on reform of the African human rights system’, note 253 above, p. 
210. 
292 See, for example, Mutua M, ‘The African human rights system in a comparative perspective’, note 26 
above; Heyns C, Padilla D & Wolfgang S, ‘A schematic comparison of regional human rights systems’, 
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the criteria for such an approach. It should be appreciated that the backgrounds of these 
three systems are very different and the African Commission needs to be cautious when 
drawing inspiration from the other two systems.  
 
Another question that is not sufficiently addressed in the reviewed literature relates to the 
role of individual African states in ensuring the effectiveness of the regional human rights 
system. Further, scanty information is available on how states promote the human rights 
values and standards propagated by the African human rights system. This is rather 
strange because many African leaders and governments have not lived up to the promise 
of human rights protection in spite of the proliferation of human rights legislations, 
policies and institutions on the continent. Additionally, the role played by the global 
community in the context of globalisation of laws and politics and how they affect the 
African human rights system, is insufficiently addressed in the literature. Understanding 
the role of the global community is essential because of its relevance to the realisation of 
effective regional human rights protection.    
 
This study shall therefore attempt to address some of these issues and fill the gaps in the 
existing literature. This shall be done within the remits of the scope, objectives and aims 
of the study. It must be noted, however, not all questions can be answered and gaps filled 
in a study of this magnitude. Some of the questions shall therefore be left for further 
investigation or research.    
 
1.7 Research questions 
 
This research endeavours to address the following critical questions: 
 
1. What are human rights? Are human rights Western or universal? What is human 
rights law and international human rights law? What are the philosophical and 
                                                                                                                                                 
adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter 
are members.’ 
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conceptual origins of human rights law in Africa? Did human rights exist in pre-
colonial Africa? What was the status of human rights in Africa during the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras? Is the concept of human rights law 
feasible in Africa? Should it be construed as contextual or universal? How did the 
human rights law concept in Africa evolve to attain its present regional status? 
What is the African human rights system? Did the Organisation of African Unity 
play any instrumental role in the promotion and protection of human rights at the 
regional level?  
 
2. What is the twenty-fist century status of human rights promotion and protection in 
Africa, particularly at the regional level? What regional mechanisms subsist to 
enforce international human rights law in Africa? To what extent are these 
mechanisms effective? Are the normative and institutional frameworks of the 
African human rights system adequate to redress the prevailing human rights 
violations on the continent? What are the salient features of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights? What are the rights and duties in the Charter?    
 
3. What is the place of the African Union among the institutional mechanisms to 
protect and promote human rights in Africa? Does the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union contain any human rights provisions? How is the Constitutive Act 
different from its predecessor, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU)? Does it have any prospects of promise for better enforcement of human 
rights in the region? What institutions or organs does the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union create and how are they relevant to the regional enforcement of 
human rights in Africa?     
 
4. What is the jurisdiction of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights? Has this jurisdiction been exercised fully? If not, what factors have 
inhibited the commission from exercising its jurisdiction? What is the 
promotional mandate of the commission? How has it exercised this mandate? 
 67 
 
What limitations does the commission face in the exercise of its promotional 
mandate? What can be done to overcome such limitations?  
 
5. What is the commission’s protective mandate? How has it exercised this 
mandate? What procedural requirements must a complainant fulfil when 
approaching the commission with a complaint? From the time the commission 
began to receive communications, has the jurisprudence contextually improved, if 
not, why? Does the commission have the power to grant remedies when it finds a 
violation of the Charter? If any, what is the nature of the commission’s remedies? 
What limitations does the commission face in exercising its protective mandate?  
 
6. What factors contributed to the establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights? When was the court established and what is its composition? 
Who can access the court? What is its jurisdiction? What is the intended 
relationship between the court, the commission, the AU and other relevant human 
rights bodies (organs) in the region? What is the procedure of the court with 
regard to admissibility and consideration of cases, judgements and remedies?    
 
7. What promise is offered by the court in redressing human rights violations on the 
continent? Are there any particular provisions in the Protocol on the 
Establishment of the African court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that need to be 
re-examined to make the court more effective when it commences its 
proceedings? How far has the quest to operationalise the court gone? 
 
8. Given that the effective enforcement of human rights law, particularly at the 
regional level, is not an ad hoc but a gradual process, how far is Africa in its 
journey towards this goal? In practice, how have the institutions and mechanisms 
for the enforcement of human rights law in Africa worked and what has been their 
impact? If any, what has been the influence and roles of other regional human 
rights systems in the advancement of the African human rights system? Do these 
regions present useful lessons that can be emulated by the African system?  
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9. What are the challenges besetting regional enforcement of human rights law in 
Africa? Can these challenges be overcome? If not, what should be done to reduce 
their impact on the effective enforcement of human rights law in the continent? 
Are there any prospects for an effective regional human rights system in Africa? 
What are they, if any? What assurance justifies one to conclude that the future of 
regional protection and promotion of human rights in Africa is promising? What 
scholarly proposals have been made to enhance the efficacy of the African human 
rights system? How viable are these proposals?  
 
10. What should be done to enhance the effective regional enforcement of human 
rights in Africa? What factors should be considered when proposing a reformed 
regional human rights system? Does the status of human rights protection and 
promotion at the national level have any implications on the regional human 
rights system?  
 
1.8 Hypotheses, expected findings and conclusions 
 
The study investigates, tests and verifies a number of hypotheses. The major working 
hypothesis of this study, albeit a truism, is that regional enforcement of human rights law 
in Africa has been faced with many and tremendous challenges. The emergence of 
international human rights law and its enforcement at the regional level has encountered 
numerous challenges, not only in Africa but also in other regions.294 However, although 
the role and efficacy of regional human rights systems in Europe and the Americas in 
ensuring the observance of human rights by states is widely acclaimed, the adequacy of 
the African regional system is still very much in doubt.295  
                                                 
294 For a detailed survey of the European and Inter-American human rights systems and the challenges they 
have since encountered in the enforcement of international human rights law, see generally, Jacobs E, ‘The 
European Convention on Human Rights’, note 24 above; Castberg F, The European Convention on Human 
Rights, note 24 above; Morrison C, The developing European law of human rights, (1967); Wright J, The 
European Convention on Human Rights: An Analysis and appraisal, note 24 above; Fawcett J, The 
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, (1987).   
295 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa, note 18 above, p. 26. 
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In the main, the normative, institutional and procedural adequacies of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights are surrounded by many controversies.296 This is 
compounded by the claim that the Charter is based on ‘African philosophy’ which 
therefore raises the issue whether it retreats from ‘universalism’.297 Other commonly 
cited challenges associated with the Charter’s normative, institutional and procedural 
inadequacies are its incorporation of duties as well as group or solidarity rights, its claw-
back clauses and the mandate and functioning of the Commission.298 
 
Another hypothesis that shall be tested in this study is that the status of human rights 
protection and promotion at the national level has implications on the performance of the 
regional human rights system. In spite of the clamour for human rights, many 
governments in Africa have failed to comply with international human rights norms.299 
The study shall confirm that ‘the gap between the international recognition of human 
                                                 
296 See in this regard Heyns C, ‘Civil and political rights in the African Charter’, in Evans M & Murray R, 
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rights and their national and local implementation is the most problematic aspect of the 
international effort to ensure universal respect for human dignity.’300 The effective 
enforcement of human rights law at the regional level has thus been hampered by the 
failure of governments and civil servants to comply with the obligation to promote and 
protect human rights at the national level. Indeed, there is a close nexus between respect 
for human rights at the national level and their enforcement at the regional level.  
 
Violation of human rights at the national level depicts the lack of seriousness among 
states and non-state actors to uphold the values and rights entrenched in the African 
Charter. Further, it is very likely that a state that is not committed to the promotion of 
human rights at the national level would treat regional enforcement efforts with equal 
contempt. This partly explains why, in spite of there being a regional human rights 
Charter that seeks to protect and promote the rights of individuals in African states, 
countries such as Uganda, for example, still experience massive human rights violations 
in the forms of killings, abductions, mutilations and wanton destruction of property.301 
Other states, such as Sierra Leone302, Chad303, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, just to 
mention but a few, still experience wars between government and rebel forces.304  
 
These are just but few examples of how the Charter is being violated with impunity at the 
national level, under which circumstances it would be difficult to enforce it at the 
regional level. It is obviously impracticable for a country that is in the middle of a civil or 
political strife to contribute to the advancement of the regional human rights system 
                                                 
300 Ibid. 
301 See generally, Uganda Human Rights Commission, 1997 Annual Report (July 1998), p. 51-52; Human 
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 71 
 
given that during crises, human rights are either being violated or are derogated from. 
Suffice it to state that the instability of many African countries has led to poverty and loss 
of human and material resources which could otherwise be useful in strengthening the 
regional human rights system.    
 
This study also tests the hypothesis that the divergence in conceptual and philosophical 
understanding of human rights contributes to the challenges besetting their enforcement 
under the African system. Human rights were universalised soon after World War II 
when leaders from the West, such as Harry Truman and Winston Churchill, conceived it 
as the way to prevent atrocities of the war from happening again.305 Ironically, some of 
the nations that pretended to champion human rights were the chief perpetrators of vices 
such as slavery, colonisation, discrimination, genocide, conquest and other forms of 
inhuman and degrading treatment.  
 
This suggested, at least to the African elites at that time, that the concept was a 
convenient tool for achieving selfish interests.306 Consequently, the universalisation of 
the concept was construed with lots of suspicion. This study therefore seeks to test the 
hypothesis that the divergence in conceptual and philosophical understanding of human 
rights law acted as a catalyst in, for example, resisting the establishment of powerful 
regional human rights enforcement mechanisms. Arguably, the idea of establishing 
powerful regional human rights mechanisms was, at that time, perceived by most African 
leaders as an attempt by the West to interfere with the sovereignty of African states in the 
guise of human rights protection.307  
 
Another hypothesis to be tested, which is linked to what is stated above is, that regional 
promulgation and enforcement of human rights norms in Africa is increasingly 
influenced by the human rights standards established by the general international 
                                                 
305 Baah R, Human rights in Africa, note 115 above, Prologue.  
306 Ibid. 
307 See Marks P, ‘Social and humanitarian Issues’, in Tessitore J & Woolfson, (eds.), A Global agenda: 
Issue before the 51st General Assembly of the United Nation (1996), p. 56. 
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community. It is important to note that the African system cannot be studied in isolation 
from the universal and other regional human rights systems. Human rights, in spite of 
people’s cultural, political, economic, social and other differences, remain the same 
throughout the world. Thus, they are universal, inherent, inalienable and indivisible. 
 
Another hypothesis that this study shall test is that effective regional enforcement of 
human rights law in the continent is challenged by the persistence of socio-economic 
crises. Underdevelopment and the need to create viable nations have been the hallmark of 
the continent for many centuries now. In spite of the many experiments in the manner of 
government and the emergence of new institutions and tribunals for dealing with issues 
of human rights violations, there is a gap between declarations on protection of human 
rights and actual implementation.308  
 
In many African states, human rights are more of a myth than reality. For the starving 
persons in the rural area, for example, human rights are empty abstractions if human 
rights cannot address their immediate needs.309 Similarly, in many societies where abject 
poverty still persists, income from child labour may mean the difference between one 
square meal a day and a roof over their family’s heads or starvation and homelessness.310 
Thus, it may not be enough to casually state that children should enjoy their childhood.311 
Similarly, children cannot enjoy the right to education when there are no schools.312  
 
Another hypothesis that will be verified in this study is that the effectiveness of the 
African human rights system depends, to a large extent, on the relevant enforcement 
mechanisms and their proper functioning. This study will show that the under-
performance of the African system has mainly been due to the inefficiency of its 
                                                 
308 Baah R, Human rights in Africa, note 115 above, p. 2. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
311 For a catalogue of rights entitled to the African child see the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. 
312 Baah R, Human rights in Africa, note 115 above, p. 2. 
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enforcement mechanisms. As already stated, the African Commission has been accused 
of inefficiency. The same can be said of its former political body, the OAU. With the 
emergence of the AU and the establishment of the African Court, there is optimism that 
the system will perform much better than before. However, this will only be possible if 
all the loopholes for potential inefficiency are sealed. 
 
The study will also confirm that the normative mechanisms of the Africa human rights 
system need to be reformed for effective human rights enforcement in the region to be 
realised. The Charter is an innovative human rights instrument that incorporates into one 
document all the three generations of rights: civil and political rights; economic, social, 
and cultural rights; and group (peoples’) rights. Sadly, however, the Charter’s norms have 
a number of shortcomings, including their numerous claw-back clauses, their non-binding 
character and their failure to provide for adequate remedies. These shortcomings have 
therefore hampered the effective enforcement of human rights at the regional level. 
 
The study will further verify that the effectiveness of the African human rights system 
depends on the political commitment and will of the African leaders, as well as the 
people. The lack of political will is one of the contributing factors to the poor 
performance of the African system. Even prior to the inception of the African Charter, 
African leaders were reluctant to accept human rights in their agenda. This is clearly 
reflected in how long the Charter took to be adopted; the scanty human rights provisions 
in the domestic legislation of many states; the resistance to have a powerful continental 
human rights court that would challenge them on human rights violations committed in 
their domestic circles…the list is endless.  
 
In tandem with the commitment of the African leaders to human rights protection is the 
role of the international community in the human rights agenda of the continent. This 
thesis shall show that the effectiveness of the system also depends on the commitment of 
the international community to the promotion of human rights in Africa. Indeed, the 
international community has contributed to a large extent in bringing the continent’s 
compliance with human rights to the level it has reached. However, it has also played a 
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negative role in ensuring some leaders stay longer in power so as to safeguard their 
interests. Some of the chief violators of human rights in the continent got a helping hand 
from some Western countries.        
 
Another hypothesis that shall be tested, but which also stands as a truism, is that, with 
appropriate reforms, the African human rights system can be more effective. It is evident 
that the normative and institutional reforms undertaken in the European and Inter-
American regional systems have greatly enhanced the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the concerned regions. In the same way, suitable reforms to the African 
system may go a long way to improve the promotion and protection of human rights in 
the region. Such reforms may be normative, institutional, procedural, jurisdictional, 
political, and financial, among others.  
 
In line with this, the thesis contends that, for the system to operate effectively, 
institutional mainstreaming and rationalisation is necessary. Currently, there are a number 
of institutions and initiatives (or programmes) on the continent with the mandate to 
promote and promote human rights. As a result, they either overlap or duplicate each 
others’ efforts. For example, the African Commission has now been joined by the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,313 and the African human 
rights court. The Constitutive Act of the African Union has also provided for the 
establishment of the African Court of Justice, among other organs.  
 
While it is encouraging to note that the African system is registering a positive impact, 
institutional mainstreaming is necessary. This is because, the existing and emerging 
institutions tend to overlap and duplicate the functions which could otherwise be 
performed by fewer and better resourced institutions.314 It does not make sense, for 
                                                 
313 Established under the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child which came into force in 
November 1999. 
314 Kithure K, ‘Overlaps in the African human rights system’ in Viljoen F, (ed), The African human rights 
system: Towards the co-existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 71 above, p. 135. 
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example, that the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child should have its 
own enforcement mechanism that duplicates the African Commission.315  
 
At another level, the African Court of Justice (ACJ) and the African human rights court 
tend to duplicate each others efforts. For instance, while the human rights court has 
jurisdiction over the interpretation of the African Charter,316 the ACJ has a broader 
jurisdiction extending over all AU treaties and conventions and other issues concerning 
international law, including bilateral issues between AU member states.317 Clearly, the 
ACJ also has a role in enforcing human rights in the region. Moreover, the Assembly of 
the Union may confer jurisdiction on the court over any other dispute.318 Hence, there is a 
broad symmetry in both courts in relation to their composition and jurisdiction.319 
Beyond these broadly stated hypotheses, it is expected that the thesis shall discuss more 
issues than those highlighted above. The expected findings and conclusions in this study 
shall confirm a number of these hypotheses. 
 
1.9 Research methods  
A number of approaches were deemed appropriate in the furtherance of the objectives of 
this research. These include: the legal, juridical or normative approach; the comparative 
approach; secondary data analysis approach; historical approach; and philosophical 
approach. These approaches are examined below, their strengths and weaknesses 
highlighted and the reasons why they were preferred in the present study stated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
315 Gutto S, ‘The reform and renewal of the African regional human and peoples’ rights system’, note 120 
above, p. 178.  
316 Art 4 of the Protocol Establishing the court. 
317 See the Protocol Establishing the Court of Justice. 
318 Ibid, Art. 9.  
319 Both courts consist of eleven Judges, no more than one from each of the states parties and with the 
president serving full-time. See Baimu E, & Viljoen F, ‘Courts for Africa: Considering the co-existence of 
the African Court on Human an Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice’, note 251 above, p. 250. 
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1.9.1  The legal, juridical or normative approach 
This approach is institutional, normative and exegetic insofar as its focus is upon 
institutions, norms or rules that are to be interpreted.320 Its primary concern is more with 
the rules enacted to regulate the functioning and the organisation of institutions than with 
their functioning. The relevance of this approach to the present study stems from the fact 
that this is primarily a legal study. Human rights is a legal concept and international 
human rights law implies the existence of institutions, norms or rules to protect and 
promote human rights at the international level. This approach is therefore essential when 
the enforcement mechanisms under the African human rights system are reviewed. The 
normative framework of the African human rights system will be analysed.   
 
The African human rights system comprises a number of normative instruments and 
institutional mechanisms, whose parameters shall be discussed elsewhere in this study. 
However, the African Charter remains the main normative instrument under the 
system.321 Similarly, the African Commission has, since its inception, been the sole 
institution that ensures state compliance with its norms. Additionally, the African Court 
has been established to complement the commission’s protective mandate. The legal, 
juridical or normative approach will therefore be very useful in this study when analysing 
the above mentioned institutions and normative provisions of the African system. 
Noteworthy, however, the method has both strengths and weaknesses.  
 
The main strengths of the approach lie in the fact that it deals with rules and institutions 
that are primarily of concern to any study on the African human rights system.322 
                                                 
320 See Mangu A, ‘The road to constitutionalism and democracy in post-colonial Africa’, note 137 above, p 
79. 
321 Wachira G, ‘A critical examination of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards 
strengthening the African human rights system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African 
population’, in Viljoen F, (ed), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 71 
above, p. 16. 
322 See Mangu A, ‘The road to constitutionalism and democracy in Africa’, note 137 above, p. 84. 
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However, it suffers from a number of weaknesses as outlined in the massive criticism 
levelled against it and its legal champions by other social scientists, especially political 
scientists, economists, historians and sociologists. It is suggested that the legal or 
institutional approach is deficient; that ‘it cannot help apprehend the entire ebb-flux 
phenomenon that results from the tendency of law to capture the real world and that of 
the latter to break the legal framework and revolt against it.’323  
 
1.9.2  The comparative approach 
This approach focuses on the similarities and differences between groups or units of 
analysis. These may include individual organisations, cultures, countries, societies, 
institutions and even individuals.324 The African human rights system cannot be studied 
in isolation from other existing human rights systems. The systems contemplated here are 
the universal system for the protection and promotion of human rights created under the 
United Nations;325 the European system326 and the Inter-American system.327  
                                                 
323 Ibid.   
324Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, (2005), p.154. 
325 See generally, Alston P, The United Nations and human rights: 1945-1995 (1995); Lewis S, ‘Treaty-
based procedures for making human rights complaints within the UN system’, in Hannun H (ed.), Guide to 
international human rights practice (1999), pp. 41-50; Rodley N, ‘United Nations non-treaty procedures 
for dealing with human rights violations’, in Hannun H (ed), op. cit, pp. 461-82; Scheinin M, ‘Economic 
and social rights as legal rights’, in Eide, Krause and Rosas, (eds.), Economic, social and cultural rights 
(1995), pp 41-62.   
326 This system is essentially important since it produced the first regional human rights mechanism and it 
is the latest to be substantially reformed with regard to its enforcement mechanism. For detailed discussions 
on this system see generally, Macdonald J, et al, The European system for the promotion of human rights 
(1993); Harris D, et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1995); Van Dyke P & Van 
Hoof G, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1990); Merrils G, The 
development of international law by the European Court of Human Rights (1993); Clements C, et al, 
European Human rights: Taking a case under the Convention (1999); Mowbray A, Cases and materials on 
the European Convention on Human Rights (2001).    
327 See Pasqualucci J, ‘Advisory practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the 
evolution of international human rights’, (2002) 38/2 Stanford Journal of International Law , pp. 241-288; 
Rescia & Seitles, ‘The development of the Inter-American human rights system: A historical perspective 
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Comparative analysis will help to determine the extent to which the African system has 
drawn upon and may further be inspired by the universal (global) and other regional 
human rights systems. This approach assigns primacy to comparison; it sees the systems 
in the eyes of interdependence and interconnectedness in their various facets and stages 
of development. Thus, besides merely juxtaposing the African with the other regional 
systems, the approach is also useful in emphasising social realities and analysing 
contradictory elements. Although this approach is necessary when comparing different 
theoretical viewpoints across different settings, it has its own unique limitations.328 In this 
case, the degree of comparability of cases cannot be overlooked. For example, the 
European and Inter-American systems of human rights bear unique historical, social, 
political and cultural aspects which may not tally with those that inform the African 
system.  
 
Whereas it is appealing, at least in theory, to have homogenous human rights standards 
across the globe, it is evident from the prevalent conditions in various regions and 
derived from their historical and cultural experiences, that this is not tenable. This fact 
was acknowledged in the Cairo seminar of 1969 which encouraged a regional organ 
‘among groups of countries which shared, to a large extent, the same heritage and faced 
similar problems.’329 This position was also recognised by the member states of the 
Council of Europe when its then deputy secretary observed the following during the 1968 
Tehran conference: 
 
…What cannot be achieved at the world level may be accepted by a group of states. 
Having the same customs, usages and interests, the countries of a single region can more 
                                                                                                                                                 
and modern-day critique’, (2000) 16/2 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights pp. 693-733; 
Shelton D, ‘Improving human rights protection: Recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, (1988) 3/Fall American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy pp. 323-37.  
328 Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p. 155. 
329 See Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with special reference to 
Africa, Cairo, 2-15 September 1969, para. 20, cited in Eze O, Human rights in Africa: Some selected 
problems, note 1 above, p. 223.  
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easily bind themselves to each other by treaty obligations, just as they are better able to 
tolerate a control exercise within the same family.330   
 
There is also the obvious divergence in regional interpretations accorded to similar 
rights.331 Rules of law cannot always be interpreted in the abstract. They deal with 
concrete situations in a given socio-economic and political environment and would be 
reduced to absurdity and ineffectiveness if they do not reflect that environment.332 
Therefore, although it is no shame for Africa to draw lessons from the experiences of 
other regions, it is equally important that restraint is exercised in comparative study to 
avoid the re-invention of the European or Inter-American systems, something that may be 
completely at odds with Africa’s realities. 
 
1.9.3  The secondary data analysis approach 
This approach aims at re-analysing existing data in order to test hypotheses or to validate 
existing models.333 This involves extensive survey of literature connected with or 
incidental to the present research topic. This study endeavours to intertwine theory and 
practice through an extensive review of the existing literature. It relies on the bulk of 
literature on international and regional human rights systems. The study also necessitates 
an in-depth analysis of legislation, treaties, conventions and the entire normative 
framework that would be pertinent to its findings. Thus, the secondary sources that are 
essential to this study include, but are not limited to, books, journal articles, conference 
papers, information from the internet, reports of national and international human rights 
commissions, newspapers and reports of international and national Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs).334  
                                                 
330 E/CN.4/975/Add. 1, cited in Eze O, Human rights in Africa: Some selected problems, note 1 above, p. 
223. 
331 Ibid.  
332 Ibid. 
333 Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p. 164. 
334 These include the reports compiled by Amnesty International, Africa Watch, Lawyer’s Committee for 
Human rights, among others. 
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In analysing the existing secondary data, the qualitative research technique will be 
preferred. Secondary data analysis generally provides insight into the conceptual, 
historical and empirical issues on the subject under enquiry as perceived by other 
authors.335 Thus, there is an apparent need to acknowledge both the strengths and 
limitations of these sources as far as fact-finding reporting and analysis of human rights 
issues are concerned.  
 
When conducting research of this magnitude, it is reckoned that the topic is not the 
exclusive domain of legal institutions or lawyers. In fact there is an interdependence and 
interaction between the legal protection of human rights and non-legal factors such as the 
political, social, economic, geographical and demographic contexts and realities.336 The 
Secondary data analysis approach, therefore, demands that the observations and 
conclusions in this study should not be viewed exclusively in the legal sense but also in 
the non-legal contexts mentioned above. Hence, the information gathered is not confined 
to the views or opinions of legal scholars. Ultimately, this approach will ensure that the 
conclusions and findings in this research take a holistic approach that does not preclude 
the non-legal conceptualisation of human rights.  
 
Like any other research method, secondary data analysis has both strengths and 
limitations. Its main strength is that it saves on time and costs because reliance is on 
existing data. It does not call for sophisticated techniques such as conducting oral 
interviews, experimentation or quantitative evaluation. The researcher is only required to 
reanalyse the previous findings of other researchers. On the other hand, the approach 
constrains a researcher from controlling data collection errors because the objectives of 
the secondary and primary studies may have been different. This normally arises when 
there is a misunderstanding of the original objects of the principal investigator.  
 
 
                                                 
335 See Kithure K, ‘Humanitarian intervention in Africa: The role of Inter-Governmental Organisations’, 
(2002) LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria, p.  38. 
336 Ibid.  
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1.9.4 Historical approach 
This study necessitates a historical approach that would assist in reconstructing the past 
and the chronology of events.337 The main purpose of the historical component here is to 
clarify issues relating to the genesis and evolution of human rights law in Africa. The 
approach shall be handy in the analysis of the three periods that define the history of 
human rights in Africa. These are pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.  
 
A look at the history of the evolution of international human rights law in Africa will 
therefore reveal the progressive shift in the way human rights have been enforced from 
the time of the inception of the regional system. This is necessary because the intended 
progression of knowledge will bring to the surface the challenges besetting their effective 
enforcement in Africa. In order to be in a position to suggest reforms to the existing 
institutions and norms of the African human rights system, an approach which takes due 
account of the history of human rights in Africa is imperative.  
 
This, by extension, requires the proper use of the existing historical techniques such as 
the historical-descriptive338, causal questions339 and historical case studies.340 The main 
questions that this approach will seek to demystify will therefore include: how and when 
did the African human rights system originate? How did the system evolve to attain its 
present form and status? The historical approach will also be imperative when clarifying 
the theoretical foundations of human rights.   
 
Whereas the historical approach has been adopted in furtherance of this study, it is 
inevitable to note a number of limitations associated with it. As already stated earlier, 
                                                 
337 Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p. 170. 
338 This refers to a narrative analysis attempting to reconstruct the past as accurately as possible. For a 
detailed discussion of this technique see Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, 
note 320 above, p. 170.  
339 Ibid. This technique is employed when one is attempting to reconstruct a chain of events and identifying 
those events that caused or triggered other significant events. 
340 This involves a comparative analysis of historical events. It is also known as ‘event history analysis’. 
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although the study’s focus is on the regional enforcement of international human rights 
law in Africa, the existence of human rights on the continent will have to be traced from 
the pre-colonial period. This would be done primarily to vindicate our argument that 
human rights were not foreign to Africa and that the concept is relevant to Africa and 
Africans. Unless this is made clear through a historical study, the importance of the 
African human rights system will not be appreciated, especially by those who perceive 
the human rights concept as foreign imposition.  
 
Research on human rights in pre-colonial Africa, however, would have to depend on the 
available scanty materials. It is acknowledged that there is a dearth of literature in the 
legal field ‘which has dealt in a comprehensive manner with the various aspects of human 
rights protection and promotion in Africa, given her past experiences and her present 
predicament of underdevelopment.’341 The research will therefore deduce information 
from non-legal materials. Brendalyn reinforces this argument by lamenting the ‘paucity 
of materials on human rights education and literature on human rights’ in Africa.342 
Another limitation to the historical approach is linked to the nature of the available data. 
Primarily, the nature of the historical data that is collected depends on the understanding 
and judgement of the historian.343  
 
Thus, differences in theoretical perspectives, which at times may be very contradictory, 
are expected.344 For example, whereas some African scholars have argued that the 
conceptual foundation of human rights is imperialistic and does not promote the welfare 
of Africans, others claim that ‘Africans have had human rights all along and that they 
don’t need to be told about human rights.’345 In spite of the herein-discussed limitations, 
                                                 
341 Eze O, Human rights in Africa, note 1 above, p. 8. 
342 Brendalyn A, Democratisation and the protection of human rights in Africa: Problems and prospects, 
note 146 above, p. XVI.  
343 Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p. 171. 
344 Ibid. 
345 See Baah R, Human rights in Africa, note 115 above, p. 6. See generally, Mojekwa C, ‘The African 
perspective’, note 147 above, p. 91; Hansungule M, The African theory of human rights (1995); Welch C, 
‘Human rights as a problem in contemporary Africa’, in Welch C & Meltzer R (eds), Human rights and 
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the historical approach will be a useful emphasis on process and change, hence, an 
important tool for the achievement of the objectives of this research.346  
 
1.9.5  Philosophical approach 
This approach aims at analysing arguments in favour of, or against a particular position, 
sometimes of a normative or value-laden kind.347 There are various modes of 
philosophical analysis. The more prominent modes, however, are the normative analysis, 
ideological critique, deconstruction and phenomenological analysis.348 This study shall 
concentrate on the normative analysis and ideological critique of the African human 
rights system. In view of the fact that this research shall examine the normative and 
institutional framework of the African human rights system, a philosophical approach is 
necessary. The current position on the enforcement of human rights in Africa has 
generated an array of philosophical ideas, which need to be evaluated, scrutinised and 
expounded in the present research.  
 
Almost every chapter of this study requires an in-depth philosophical analysis of the 
available information. This is mainly because, to answer certain questions, philosophical 
analysis is required. For example, it would take more than mere historical facts for one to 
conclude whether or not law was indeed an entity in pre-colonial Africa. This is 
compounded by the fact that even after it has been proved that pre-colonial African 
societies were governed by customs which were enforceable by sanctions,349 some 
scholars still insist that those customs were absolutely rigid, therefore, ‘it was impossible 
                                                                                                                                                 
development in Africa (1984), p. 11; Silk J, ‘Traditional culture and the prospect for human rights in 
Africa’, in An-Na’im A & Deng F (eds), Human rights in Africa: Cross-cultural perspectives, note 147 
above,  pp. 293-294. 
346 Mouton J, How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p 171. 
347 Ibid, p. 178. 
348 Ibid.  
349 Elias T, The nature of African customary law, note 147 above, p. 9. 
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to make any distinction between legal, moral or religious rules, which were all 
interwoven into the single rules of customary behaviour.’350   
 
This approach is equally fundamental when examining the enforcement of human rights 
in the continent. When analysing the enforcement mechanisms of African human rights 
system, good scholarship demands that one goes beyond the letter of the law entrenched 
in treaties or conventions, to the critical analysis of the arguments advanced in favour of, 
or against, particular positions by other scholars. Admittedly, therefore, the strengths of 
philosophical analysis, particularly in the present study, are varied.  
 
In summary, this approach will enable us to clarify concepts; critique the existing 
ideologies on the regional enforcement of human rights law in Africa; and develop 
different philosophical positions from those prevailing in the existing bulk of literature.351 
The approach, however, has its own limitations.352 According to Mouton,  
 
Philosophical analyses sometimes tend to become very abstract and far removed from the 
concerns of everyday life. Some philosophical traditions have developed very esoteric 
conceptualisations and idiosyncratic forms of reasoning, which make them rather 
inaccessible to outsiders.353   
 
 Philosophical traditions also tend towards dogmatism and intolerance of other 
philosophies.354 This shall therefore be avoided as much as is practicably possible in the 
course of this study. 
 
 
   
                                                 
350 Lloyds D, Introduction to jurisprudence (1972), p. 566. 
351 For further illumination on the strengths of the philosophical approach, see Mouton J, How to succeed in 
your Master’s and Doctoral studies, note 324 above, p. 178. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid, p. 179. 
354 Ibid. 
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1.10 Overview of chapters 
 
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter One lays the foundations for the entire 
work in what has been referred to as the general introduction. It introduces the problem to 
be investigated and sets out the aims and scope of the study. It also describes the study 
methodology, reviews the available literature on the subject and outlines the limitations 
of the study, among other things.  
 
Chapter Two is a historical survey of the emergence, evolution and scope of human 
rights law in Africa. This chapter principally responds to questions such as: when and 
how did the African human rights system originate? What factors led to its emergence? 
Was the concept of human rights recognised in Africa prior to foreign intervention? What 
is the present status of international human rights law in Africa? Generally, it, lays the 
foundation for a better understanding of the conceptual and philosophical origins and 
evolution of Africa’s regional human rights system. 
 
In Chapter Three, the regional enforcement of human rights law in Africa is discussed. 
This chapter examines the normative and institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of 
human rights under the African system. One of its aims is to analyse the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the light of their contributions 
to the African human rights system. The chapter also reviews the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and its protocol establishing the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.  
 
Chapter Four, which is the backbone of this study, excurses the challenges and the 
possible ways to reinvigorate the African human rights system. A number of historical, 
conceptual, philosophical, institutional, jurisdictional, procedural, normative and other 
challenges are discussed. Possible reforms of the system are also suggested throughout 
the chapter. Chapter Five concludes the study with a summary of the findings and 
recommendations for further research in order to achieve a more effective human rights 
system on the African continent. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
International human rights law is a branch of public international law.1 Alston correctly 
acknowledged that, while its antecedents lie in domestic legal, social and political 
developments, the process through which an authentic body of human rights law has 
emerged at the global level has been very much a top-down rather than a bottom-up one.2 
This is because it was the inclusion in the United Nations Charter of a commitment to 
human rights and the subsequent elaboration of more precisely defined obligations in 
international law that marked the transition of human rights from a field of philosophical 
inquiry and moral invocation to its present universal status.3 Currently, this branch of law 
has a definite personality, albeit one which is expected to change dramatically owing to 
its disputed philosophical foundations.4  
 
At the moment, international human rights law has attracted some of the most sustained 
philosophical challenges, especially in Africa. This is certainly true in relation to the 
debate over cultural relativism against that of universalism. It is against this background 
that this chapter examines the historical and philosophical background of international 
human rights law in Africa. The objective here is to trace the historical origin and 
                                                 
1 Alston P (ed.), Human rights law (1996), p. Xii. See also generally Viljoen F, International human rights 
law in Africa (2007), chapter 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The disputed philosophical foundations largely centre on the argument whether the concept of human 
rights is universal or contextual and on its existence in pre-colonial African societies.   
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development of human rights law from pre-colonial to contemporary Africa. This is 
based on the premise that to understand the development of Africa’s regional human 
rights system, the study of its history, philosophy and sociology is necessary.5 The 
bottom-line of this study are the arguments and counter-arguments on the place of human 
rights in the history of Africa. As discussed later in this chapter, some scholars have 
contended that human rights had no place on the continent prior to foreign intervention 
while others have countered this view.6  
                                                 
5 Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997), p. 1. 
6 For arguments on the existence, or otherwise, of human rights in pre-colonial Africa, see generally, 
Mangu A, ‘The Road to Constitutionalism and Democracy in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2002), LLD Thesis University of South Africa, p. 235-257; Mamdani M, 
‘Social movements and constitutionalism in the African context’, in Shivji I, State and constitutionalism: 
An African debate on democracy, (1988), p. 237; Mutua M, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A two-
legged stool?’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 342; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African 
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, p. 342; Wiseman J, Democracy in black Africa (1990), pp. ix-xi; Nzongola-Ntalaja M, 
The state and democracy in Africa (1997), p. 10; Busia K, ‘The status of human rights in pre-colonial 
Africa: Implications for contemporary practices’, in McCarthy-Arnolds E, et al, Africa, human rights, and 
the global system: The political economy of human rights in a changing world, p. 49; Appiagyei-Atua K, 
‘A rights-centred critique of African philosophy in the context of development’, (2005) 5 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, pp. 335-357; Quashigah K, ‘The philosophic basis of human rights and its relations to 
Africa: A critique’, (1992) Journal of Human Rights Law and Practice, pp. 22-38; Wiredu K, ‘Democracy 
and consensus in African traditional politics: A plea for a non-party polity’, in Eze O, Postcolonial African 
philosophy: A critical reader (1997), p. 303; Hountondji P, ‘The master's voice: The problem of human 
rights in Africa', in Ricoeur P (ed), Philosophical foundations of human rights (1986), p. 319; Diganke O, 
‘Protection of human rights in Africa’, (2000) 10 Transnational law & Contemporary Problems, pp. 374-
378;  Shivji I, The concept of human rights in Africa II (1989), p.; Cobbah J, ‘African values and the 
human rights debate: An African perspective’, (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 309-331; Gittleman 
R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal analysis’ (1982) 22 Virginia Journal of 
International law, p. 671; Okere J, ‘Human rights and the African Charter’ (1984) 6 Human rights 
quarterly, pp. 153-156; Pollis A & Schwab P (eds.), Human rights cultural and ideological perspectives; 
Berger H, ‘Are human rights universal?’, (1977) Commentary, p. 62; Welch C, ‘Human rights as a problem 
in contemporary Africa’ in Welch C & Meltzer R (eds.), Human rights and development in Africa (1984), 
p. 16; El-Obaid A & Appiagyei-Atua K, ‘Human rights in Africa: A new perspective of linking the past to 
the present’, (1996) 41 McGill Law Journal, pp. 829-836;  Donnelly J, The concept of human rights (1985), 
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An in-depth study of the historical origin of human rights law in Africa is therefore 
essential because of the relevance of the concept to the contemporary society. It should 
be recalled that this study is concerned with the enforcement of international human 
rights law at the regional level and not the national or domestic one. Any attempt to 
undersore human rights in pre-colonial Africa, as is done here, should, however, not be 
construed as a deviation from the scope and subject matter of the present study, but rather 
as a way of trying to establish their origin and basis in Africa.  
 
Such an inquiry is imperative because, to appreciate that the concept of human rights was 
also recognised by Africans even before the advent of European colonialists will debunk 
the argument that denies the pre-colonial practice of human rights. Moreover, before 
human rights became an international concern, they were promoted, protected as well as 
violated at the national or domestic level. Consequently, we cannot blindly focus on 
human rights as an international concept and ignore their domestic background; 
otherwise the study would be partial and incomplete.  
 
Further, before Africa became ‘a region’, which is undoubtedly the focus of the present 
study, it was a place inhabited by diverse communities, living more or less independently 
from each other. Ignoring this fact in a study of this magnitude would be to betray the 
fact that before Africa became ‘regional’, the various communities that inhabited it had 
their own historical and philosophical backgrounds and perceptions of issues pertaining 
to life, including human rights.  By extension, these backgrounds and perceptions played 
a critical role, as they still do, in influencing the emergence and evolution of the regional 
human rights system.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
p. 8; Mojekwu C, ‘International human rights: The African perspective’ in Nelso J & Green V (eds.), 
International human rights: Contemporary issues (1980); Marasinghe L, ‘Traditional conceptions of 
human rights in Africa’, in Welch C & Meltzer R (eds.), Human rights and development in Africa (1984), 
p. 37; Legesse A, ‘Human rights in African political culture’, in Thompson K (ed.), The moral imperatives 
of human rights: A world survey (1980), p. 125.   
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While the foregoing discussion attempted to vindicate the importance of underscoring the 
existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa in this study, we will at the same time be 
cautious not to delve deep into the domestic concerns of human rights, save for the reason 
of establishing the background to international human rights law, generally, and the 
origin and evolution of the African human rights system, particularly. In doing so, this 
chapter will be forming a necessary link with chapter 3 that reviews the the normative 
and institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system, and chapter 4, which 
deals with the challeges and possible strategies on reforming the system.   
 
This chapter shall therefore endeavour to answer a number of questions, including: what 
is human rights law? Is this branch of law Western or does it have a place within the 
African context? What arguments have been advanced for or against the existence of 
human rights in pre-colonial Africa? Are the arguments plausible? What are the 
philosophical and conceptual origins of the human rights concept? How did human rights 
evolve in Africa to attain their present regional status? Did the OAU/AU play any role in 
the evolution of regional protection of human rights in Africa? Should the concept of 
human rights in Africa be construed as contextual or universal? The end result would be a 
better understanding and appreciation of the historical, philosophical and conceptual 
foundations of human rights in Africa, generally, and the African human rights system, 
particularly.       
2.2 Definition, classification and scope of human rights 
 
2.2.1 Definition of human rights 
 
One of the initial questions in any study of this magnitude relates to the definition of the 
term ‘human rights.’ Shestack attempted a definition by referring to attributes such as 
‘important’, ‘moral’ and ‘universal’.7 Such an approach is, however, precarious because 
not all entitlements with such attributes qualify as human rights. Again, the terms 
‘important’ and ‘moral’ may not necessarily have universal interpretations in the sense 
                                                 
7 Shestack J, ‘The Philosophic foundations of human rights’ in McCorquodale R, Human rights (2003), p. 
4. 
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that what is ‘important’ or ‘moral’ to one community or person may not be the same to 
another. The apparent difficulty in identifying human rights has therefore reduced their 
definition to a subject of great controversy among scholars.8  
 
According to Cassese, for example, human rights are generally ‘based on an expansive 
desire to unify the world by drawing up a list of guidelines for all governments…an 
attempt by the contemporary world to introduce a measure of reason into its history.’9 If 
this observation is anything to go by, it would mean that human rights are not inherent in 
all human beings but are rather conferred through the so-called ‘list of guidelines.’ In 
other words, based on this observation, governments have the discretion to decide 
whether or not human rights are relevant to their people. This argument is based on the 
premise that there is nothing absolute about guidelines. Rather, they can be varied, 
depending on the prevailing circumstances, to suit the whims of those implementing 
them.  
 
The perception of human rights as ‘guidelines’ is therefore myopic because it is 
antithetical to the understanding that human rights are inherent entitlements which cannot 
be granted to anyone nor be deprived without a great affront to justice.10 Hence, 
Cassese’s assertion cannot be embraced uncritically because the promotion and 
protection of human rights goes beyond the desire to unify the world. Any suggestion in 
this regard should therefore not be entertained. It has further been suggested that human 
rights are those entitlements individuals possess by virtue of being human.11 This implies 
that all human beings are equal and have rights in equal measures regardless of age, sex, 
race, social class, talent, or religion.12  
 
                                                 
8 Brendalyn A, Democratisation and the protection of human rights in Africa (1995), p. 29. 
9 Cassese A, Human rights in a changing world (1990), p 3. 
10 Cranston M, ‘Human rights: Real or supposed’, in Raphael D (ed), Political theory and the rights of man, 
(1967), p. 52. 
11 Brendalyn A, Democratisation and the protection of human rights in Africa, note 8 above, p. 29.  
12 Ibid. 
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Similarly, Henkin concluded that human rights are universal rights accruing on all human 
beings that are fundamental to human existence and can neither be transferred, forfeited, 
nor waived.13 This observation is proper because unless it is appreciated that human 
rights are inherent in all persons, it will not be possible to enforce them in Africa. It 
cannot be gainsaid that the concept of human rights has, at some point, been dismissed as 
a Western idea or creation having no bearing in Africa.14 The discussion on whether or 
not Africa has a history of human rights shall be revisited later in this chapter.  
 
Legal positivism regards human rights as those entitlements which have become part of a 
positive legal system and derive either from the will of the state or the command of the 
sovereign.15 This proposition is not very appropriate to Africa because, if states are 
allowed to become the ultimate source of rights, it is not unlikely that such status would 
be used to suppress human rights with impunity.16 Legal positivism fails to appreciate the 
fact that the will of the state or the command of the sovereign can only give effect to 
rights that are inherent but not create them through legislation. This is to say, if human 
rights are legislated by a state, it simply means that the particular state can confer them 
only to the extent it acknowledges their importance to its people or to the extent of its 
available resources. In this regard, a state may choose to guarantee or violate human 
rights at whim without necessarily being called to question.  
 
Further, legal positivism seems to perpertuate some negative cultural biases in as far as it 
seems to suggest that human rights were non-existent in classless societies that were 
governed by customs rather than law. This proposition is not correct because it ignores 
                                                 
13 Henkin L, The Age of rights (1990), p. 2.  
14 See generally, Busia K, ‘The status of human rights in pre-colonial Africa, note 6 above, p. 49; 
Appiagyei-Atua K, ‘A rights-centred critique of African philosophy in the context of development’, note 6 
above, pp. 335-357; Quashigah K, ‘The philosophic basis of human rights and its relations to Africa: A 
critique', note 6 above, pp. 22-38; Wiredu K, ‘Democracy and consensus in African traditional politics’, 
note 6 above, p. 303.  
15 Brendalyn A, Democratisation and the protection of human rights in Africa, note 8 above, p. 29. See also 
Lloyds D, Introduction to jurisprudence (1972), pp. 291-292. 
16 Ibid. 
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the very fact that wherever human beings existed, human rights were promoted, protected 
and even violated. Amid all these contradicting schools of thought, one would agree with 
Azinge’s observation that, to postulate a precise definition of human rights is a highly 
elusive task.17 Justice Oputa of Nigeria alluded to this definitional problem when he 
posited: 
 
If therefore we attempt to probe human rights in the political and legal culture of Nigeria 
without a clear idea of rights, a clear theory of rights in general, and of human rights, in 
particular, we shall not be right about human rights.18 
 
Oputa seems to suggest that, for human rights to be properly defined, the starting point of 
the enquiry should be to define the term ‘right’. Accordingly, the term ‘right’ could either 
be defined in the abstract or concrete sense. In the abstract, it refers to ‘justice’, ‘ethical 
correctness’, or ‘consonance with the rule of law or the principles of morals’.19 In the 
concrete sense, it means ‘power’, ‘privilege’, ‘faculty’ or ‘demand’, inherent in one 
person and incidental upon another.20 Accordingly, legal positivists defined ‘legal right’ 
as a legally protected interest,21 while natural law thinkers, after viewing the term in 
relation to nature, concluded it is something inherent in humanity.22  
 
It has therefore been contended that those claims which are based on, or are in accord 
with, some objective standards, be it a code of moral values or laws, can rightly be 
termed as ‘rights’.23 Eze therefore defined human rights as ‘demands or claims which 
                                                 
17 Azinge E, ‘Milestone decisions on human rights’, in Kalu A & Osinbajo Y (eds.), Perspectives on human 
rights (1992), p. 196. 
18 ‘Human rights in the political and legal culture of Nigeria’, Second Justice Idigbe Memorial Lecture, 
University of Benin, (1986), p. 2. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Black law dictionary (5th ed.). 
21 See Fitzgerald P, Salmond on jurisprudence  (1966), p. 217. 
22 See Azinge E, ‘Milestone decisions on human rights’, note 17 above, p. 197; See also generally, Finnis J, 
Natural law and natural rights, (1980). 
23 Azinge E, ‘Milestone decisions on human rights’, ibid, p. 197. See also the arguments advanced in 
Dowrick F, (ed), Human rights, problems, perspectives and texts (1979), p.8. 
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individuals or groups make on society, some of which have become part of ex lata while 
others remain aspirations to be attained in future.’24 In Eze’s understanding, only that 
which is recognised and protected by the legal system can be considered as a right. This 
perception is somewhat limited.  
 
Arguably, while some rights are recognised and protected by law for various reasons, 
others are not; yet they are important, as they are inherent in man. The law or legal 
system should not be seen as a ‘guarantor’ but a ‘protector’ of rights. It is true that in 
most legal systems, especially those founded on the common law tradition, one cannot 
assert a claim unless it is recognised by the legal system. In the case of human rights, 
however, this fact should not be taken to mean that rights are conferred by the legal 
system. Rather, it should be an emphasis of the fact that the legal system enforces and 
protects what already exists inherently in human beings. 
 
It is to underscore this argument that Cranston maintains, and rightly so, that ‘a human 
right is something of which no one may be deprived without a great affront to justice.’25 
According to him, ‘there are certain deeds which should never be done, certain freedoms 
which should never be invaded, some things which are supremely sacred.’26 When this 
position is extrapolated further, one would arrive at the conclusion that if the deprivation 
of human rights would result in ‘a great affront to justice’, no institution or individual 
qualifies as a guarantor of human rights. At the same time, it could be argued that all 
institutions and individuals are expected to be protectors of human rights.   
 
Despite numerous attempts to find a compromise definition of human rights, it is now 
accepted that the province of this concept cannot easily be determined. This means that 
human rights are continually evolving, lending credence to Laski’s observations that ‘a 
legal system is surrounded by the penumbra of an attainable ideal which it must reach as 
                                                 
24 Eze O, Human rights in Africa, note 6 above, p. 5. 
25 Cranston M, ‘Human rights: Real or supposed’, note 10 above, p. 52. 
26 Ibid. 
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the price of its preservation.’27 In the context of this study therefore, human rights can be 
defined as the demands or claims individuals or groups make that are essential for 
individual well being, dignity, and fulfilment,28 the deprivation of which may lead to a 
great affront to justice. Accordingly, they are demands or claims: 
 
which stand above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact [are] antecedent to the 
political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilised existence and …could be 
immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the constitution itself. 29 
 
As shall be argued elsewhere in this chapter, the definition of human rights cannot ignore 
the fact that they are inherent, indivisible, interrelated, universal and belong to every 
society regardless of geography, history, culture, ideology, political or economic system. 
It is easy to contest the authenticity of such a definition with respect to the rights of 
vulnerable persons in the society, such as women, children, the old and disabled.  
 
Thus, as if motivated by the need to cater for these categories of persons, Humana 
defined human rights as laws and practices that have evolved over the centuries to protect 
ordinary people, minorities, groups, and races from oppressive rulers and governments.30 
This, however, is a narrow view which fails to take into account those persons who do 
not fall into any of these categories. If Humana’s definition is anything to go by, then 
human rights may be confined, not to claims asserted and recognised ‘as of right’, but to 
claims based charity.31 This has never been the essence of human rights since their origin.  
 
Instead, human rights have always been ‘those liberties, immunities and benefits which 
by accepted contemporary values, all human beings [are] able to claim ‘as of right’ of the 
society in which they live.’32 They are not privileges granted by the state or society but 
                                                 
27 Laski H, A grammar of politics (1967), pp. 91-92. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ransome Kuti v. Attorney-General of Nigeria, cited in Azinge E, ibid. 
30 Humana C, World human rights guide (1983), p. 7. 
31 Azinge E, ‘Milestone decisions on human rights’, note 17 above, p. 197. 
32 Henkin L, ‘Human rights’, in Bernhardt R (ed.), Encyclopaedia of international law, (1985) 8, p. 268. 
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are the ideals and distinguishing marks of a civilised society.33 Although the term ‘human 
rights’ as it is commonly used today is a twentieth century concept for what was referred 
to as ‘natural rights’ or ‘the rights of man’34, its philosophical and historical foundations 
may be traced back to the existence of humankind. We shall revert to this debate at a later 
part of this chapter.   
 
2.2.2 Classification of human rights 
 
Human rights may be divided into different categories. These are: civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural.35 Civil and political rights include the right to self-determination, 
the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery and 
forced labour, the right to liberty and security of the person, freedom of movement and 
choice of residence, right to fair trial, right to privacy, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to assembly, freedom of 
association, the right to marry and found a family, the right to participate in one’s 
government either directly or through freely elected representatives, the right to 
nationality and equality before the law.36  
 
Economic, social and cultural rights embrace, inter alia, the right to work; the right to 
just conditions of work; the right to fair remuneration; the right to an adequate standard 
of living; the right to organise, form and join trade unions; the right to collective 
bargaining; the right to equal pay for equal work; the right to social security; the right to 
property; the right to education; the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress.37 
                                                 
33 Nsirimovu A, Human rights education techniques in schools, (1994), p. 24. 
34 Cranston M, What are human rights (1973), p. 1. 
35 See this classification in, for example, Aka C, ‘Military, globalisation and human rights in Africa’, 
(2002) New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, p. 371. 
36 Ibid. See also generally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 2-14, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, The European Charter on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
37 Ibid. See also the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
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While political and civil rights impose restraints on the exercise of state power and are 
therefore negative rights, socio-economic rights tend to extend the scope of state 
activities, translating them into positive rights.38 It is equally important to note that 
human rights are not static; their codification is an ongoing and never ending process 
both nationally and internationally. Sometimes they are codified in response to a specific 
threat or act of repression.39 An example to be cited in this regard is freedom of religion, 
which was codified in reaction to the powerful Catholic Church in Europe and the 
religious wars and government coercions that the church provoked.40  
 
The classification of rights into the various categories listed above should not be 
construed as rigid because human rights are generally interrelated and interdependent.41 
Moreover, human rights are not absolute and they may be limited or derogated from on 
the basis of, for example, state security, national survival or any other necessary 
circumstances.42 That is why some modern constitutions entrench limitation and 
derogation clauses that would enable them to limit the enjoyment of certain rights and 
derogate from others in cases of emergencies that threaten the life or security of a 
nation.43  
 
2.2.3 Scope of human rights  
 
Human rights are of broad application; they are recognised in the constitutions of many 
states whose political principles are otherwise quite divergent.44 Accordingly, they are 
applicable both nationally and internationally. Initially, human rights were purely a 
matter of national concern. However, the adoption of the U.N Charter, after the Second 
                                                 
38 Eno W, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as an instrument for the protection of 
human rights in Africa’, (1998) LLM Thesis University of South Africa, p. 7. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Article 5 of Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
42 Nowak M, Introduction to the international human rights regime, note 6 above, p. 2.  
43 See, for example, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Arts. 36 & 37.   
44Azinge E, ‘Milestone decisions on human rights’, note 17 above, p. 199.  
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World War, ushered in a process leading to their gradual universalisation.45 The Charter 
after reaffirming, in the preamble, faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, pronounces in Article 
1(3) that one of its purposes is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  Thus, the UN has been able to consolidate the principle that 
human rights are a matter of international concern and that the international community is 
required to promote and protect them.46 
 
Internationalisation of human rights, however, cannot be effectively discussed without 
recognition of the efforts to enforce human rights at the regional level. Conspicuous 
regional achievements in this regard are the adoption of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights; and the American Convention on Human Rights. Due to this, people from 
different regions of the world now have established institutionalised processes through 
which they can freely and unambiguously find recourse to the violation of their rights.  
 
Consequently, human rights can now be regarded as the benchmark below which no 
national law may fall.47 They can be enforced at the international level when they become 
a matter of treaty obligation or to the extent that their respect has become a customary 
rule of international law.48 Those parts of a treaty that form part of customary law are 
relevant to parties and non-parties just as the principles of humanitarian treaties, such as 
                                                 
45 Ibid, p. 200. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 5 above, p. 6. 
48 See Nationality Decrees of Tunis and Morocco PCIJ Ser. B No. 4 1923. In this case, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice answered the question whether the extension of French nationality decrees in Tunis 
and Morocco to British citizens was a matter within domestic jurisdiction. Giving a negative answer, the 
court found that the status of a matter depended on the development of international relations. Accordingly, 
a matter was removed from the domain of domestic jurisdiction once it became the subject of treaty 
obligation. 
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the Genocide Convention 1948, the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocols of 1977.49  
 
In the Barcelona Traction Case50, the International Court of Justice found that the 
principles and rules concerning basic human rights were binding on all states. Principally, 
the protection and promotion of human rights is the fundamental purpose of 
governments.51 Hence, states are obliged to incorporate international human rights 
standards into their domestic systems. The level of a state’s development is determined or 
even affected by the extent to which its citizens enjoy human rights in all their 
ramifications. It follows therefore, that peace, progress and stability are predicated at both 
national and international levels on the respect for human rights.  
 
Consequently, human rights have become ‘a potent instrument of diplomacy to which has 
been added democracy.’52 For instance, how a state treats nationals of another state 
residing in its territory would determine whether the two states may have a good 
diplomatic relationship or not. The yardstick used to determine or define such a 
relationship is usually predicated on the respect for human rights of the concerned 
individuals. However, the concern for human rights does not nullify the principle of non-
interference in domestic affairs.53 Unfortunately, the paradox in human rights is that their 
most effective protectors (governments) are also most often their worst violators.54 The 
                                                 
49 Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 5 above, p. 6. 
50 ICJ Rep. 1970 p. 32, para. 34.  
51 Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 5 above, p. 7. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See generally the arguments in Umozurike U, ‘The domestic jurisdiction clause in the OAU Charter’ 
(1979) 311 African Affairs, p. 197; Okongwu O, ‘The OAU Charter and the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction in Inter-African affairs’, (1973) 13 Indiana Journal of International Law, p. 589; Lalive A, 
‘The protection of human rights within the framework of existing regional organisations’, in Robertson A 
(ed.), Human rights in national and international law (1986), p. 330; Markovic I, ‘Implementation of 
human rights and domestic jurisdiction of states’, in Eide A and Shou (eds.),  International protection of 
human rights (1968), p. 47.  
54 Okongwu O, ibid, p. 589. 
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challenge has therefore not been to lay down standards for states but also to ensure, 
through effective enforcement mechanisms, that states carry out their human rights 
obligations.   
2.3 Philosophical foundations of human rights 
 
To understand the concept of human rights, it is important to unveil its philosophical 
foundations. The concept of human rights, having come this far legally, may prompt one 
to wonder why there should be any concern with its philosophical foundations. Why 
should the ink continue to be spilled in arguments over how and when the concept of 
human rights originated? Is it at all necessary in the contemporary world, and in a 
research of this magnitude, for one to delve into the philosophical origins of this concept? 
Sheshtack opines that philosophy plays an instrumental role in deepening understanding 
of truth.55  
 
Accordingly, there are a myriad of reasons for exploring the philosophical origins of the 
human rights concept. For example, unless the philosophies that shape human rights are 
unveiled, the understanding of the concept is likely to remain obscure.56 Further, 
understanding the philosophical foundations of the concept will ‘help to devise a 
translation formula that will permit men and women to speak to each other across the gulf 
of creed and dogma, a necessary exercise for universal recognition of human rights 
principles.’57 Thus this part of the study will examine some crucial philosophical theories 
relating to the origin of human rights. Focus shall be on three main theories that have also 
been linked with the philosophical foundations of law. These theories are naturalism, 
positivism and Marxism. It is important to emphasise that these theories shall not be 
analysed in great detail due to the defined scope of this study. 
 
                                                 
55 Shestack J, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, note 7 above, p. 202. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
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2.3.1 Natural law (rights) theory 
 
Human rights were originally perceived as the natural rights of every individual. That is 
to say, they were determined by their author’s perception of the nature and essential 
characteristics of the human person.58 Hence, in their search for the philosophical 
foundations and meaning of law, some philosophers and jurists developed the theory of 
natural law (rights). This theory has its roots in Sophocles and Aristotle and was further 
developed by the stoics of the Greek Hellennistic period, and later by those of the Roman 
period.59 Particularly, Thomas Aquinas perceived natural law as part of the law of God 
that confers certain immutable rights upon individuals.60 The particular rights and 
freedoms that were thus thought to be natural concomitants of being human were 
identified by contemplating the condition of an individual in a stateless society.61  
 
As feudalism declined, modern secular theories of natural law arose, particularly as 
enunciated by Grotius and Pufendorf. Their philosophy detached natural law from 
religion, laying the groundwork for the secular, rationalistic version of modern natural 
law. According to Grotius, a natural characteristic of human beings is the social impulse 
to live peacefully and in harmony with others. Whatever conformed to the nature of men 
and women, as rational, social beings was right and just; whatever opposed it by 
disturbing the social harmony was wrong and unjust. Grotius defined natural law as a 
‘dictate of right reason’.62  
 
                                                 
58 Eno W, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as an instrument for the protection of 
human rights in Africa’ note 38 above, p. 6. 
59 Some of the chief early proponents of this theory include Callicles, Plato, Aristotle, Sophocles, St. 
Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Stoic, Wiliam Ockham, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. See Roux W, 
‘Natural law theories’, in Moellendorf D & Roederer C, Jurisprudence (2006), pp. 25-61. 
60 Eno W, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as an instrument for the protection of 
human rights in Africa’, note 38 above, p. 6, citing, St. Thoman Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Lib. II, pt. II 
(1475). 
61 Centre for Human Rights Pretoria, From human rights to human wrongs (1995), p. 50. 
62 Grotius H, De jure belli et Pacis (Book 1, 1689), cited in Eno W, ‘The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights as an instrument for the protection of human rights in Africa’, note 38 above, p. 6.  
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Natural law theory led to natural rights theory— the theory most closely associated with 
modern human rights.63 The chief proponent of this theory was John Locke, who 
premised his philosophy on the imagination of the existence of human beings in a state of 
nature.64 In that state, men and women were in a state of freedom, able to determine their 
actions, and also in a state of equality in the sense that no one was subjected to the will or 
authority of another.65 The state of nature, however, suffered from certain limitations due 
to the absence of a superior power that would regulate the conflicting interests of 
individuals.66 To ensure order and harmonious co-existence, the individuals entered into a 
‘social contract’ by which they mutually agreed to form a civil society (pactum unionis) 
and set up a political authority to protect their respective natural rights.  
 
In setting up that political authority, individuals retained the natural rights of life, liberty, 
and property.67 Government was obliged to protect the natural rights of its subjects, and if 
government neglected this obligation, it forfeited its validity and force.68 According to 
this theory, the civil government derived justification for its existence and continuous 
exercise of political power from the contractual duty to protect the natural rights of its 
subjects.69 
 
Locke’s theory was the basis for the principle that law should protect the basic human 
rights of the individual against the abuses of governments. This can at least be traced 
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back to his Two treatises of government, published in 1690.70 In his celebrated work, 
Locke believed that human beings, not governments, came first in the general order of 
things. He therefore argued that: 
 
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute Lord of his own 
person and possession, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with 
his freedom? Why will he give up his empire, and subject himself to the dominion and 
control of another power? To which ‘tis obvious to answer, that though in the state of 
nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly 
exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he is, every man his 
equal, and the greater part no strict observer of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the 
property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecured. This makes him willing to 
quit a condition, which however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: And ‘tis not 
without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others who are 
already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties 
and estates.71 
 
Thus, under the natural law (rights) theory, human rights were originally perceived as the 
natural rights of every individual. Those rights were determined by their author’s 
perception of the nature and essential characteristics of the human person.72 Human rights 
were therefore considered to be something which persons possesses in their natural state, 
devoid of the intervention or support of society.73 This simply means that a person brings 
rights with him or her into society which is created to protect these rights by enacting 
laws.  
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Natural rights theory is believed to have been the philosophical impetus for the wave of 
revolts against absolutism during the late eighteenth century.74 It is visible in the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man,75 in the US Declaration of Independence,76 in the 
constitutions of numerous states created upon liberation from colonialism, and in the 
principal UN human rights documents.77 Hence, through various philosophical writings 
found in the works of Locke, Montesquieu and Jefferson, among others, the ideas of 
individual rights and popular sovereignty gained acceptance in Europe and America 
during the eighteenth century.78  
 
For example, in 1776 in Virginia, a bill of rights was adopted at a convention of delegates 
representing the thirteen original states of the United States of America (US)79, which 
stated that all men are equally free and independent by nature and in possession of certain 
inherent rights of which they cannot be divested; namely, the right to life, liberty and 
property.80 The US constitution later defined these rights in greater detail.81 The theory of 
natural rights, however, constituted a barrier between the individual and the 
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government.82 People demanded participation in the political process, and individual 
rights became a legal tool.  
 
In US, for example, the settler mentality, which rewarded the virtues of competition and 
initiative, served to extend individualism that by then had become the customary norm 
throughout the Western world.83 To ensure that the government did not penetrate this 
barrier, advocates of natural rights devised mechanisms to limit the government with 
regard to the individual.84 The more important of these mechanisms were the theory of 
separation of powers and the notion of the rule of law to guarantee protection of each 
individual’s natural rights.85 Hence, Western political systems produced institutional 
arrangements in such a way as to ensure that the essential natural rights were not 
infringed upon by the government.86  
 
Be that as it may, the natural rights theory makes an important contribution to the human 
rights discourse. It identifies with and provides for human freedom and equality, from 
which other human rights easily flow. The natural rights theory, however, had some 
limitations. From a philosophical viewpoint, the critical problem that this theory faced is 
how to determine the norms that are to be considered as part of the law of nature and 
therefore inalienable.87  
 
Under Locke’s view of human beings in the state of nature, all that was needed was the 
opportunity to be self-dependent; life, liberty, and property were the inherent rights that 
met this demand.88 But what about a world unlike the times of Locke, in which ample 
resources are not available to satisfy human needs? Does natural law theory have the 
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flexibility to satisfy new claims based on contemporary conditions and modern human 
understanding? As Shestack observed, the potential for flexibility has formed the basis 
for the chief criticism of natural rights theory.89 In short, the principal problem with 
natural law is that the rights considered to be natural can differ from one theorist to 
another, depending on their conceptions of nature.90 
 
Because of this and other difficulties, natural rights theory became unpopular with 
philosophers such as Bentham, who termed the theory as a fallacy.91 However, natural 
rights philosophy had a renaissance after World War II. Cobbah noted that over the years, 
after World War II, it has been recognised that human rights are not just pious 
declarations,92 but are declarations that must be practicably enforceable. The recognition 
of the practicality and enforceability of human rights has meant that governments have to 
put in place limits both on the exercise of these rights by the individuals, as well as on the 
powers of their agents.93 Human rights have to be enjoyed with due regard to the rights 
and freedoms of others. Limitations on the enjoyment of individual human rights have 
today found expression in a number of human rights instruments.94  
 
2.3.2 Positivist theory 
 
Legal positivism is a theory of law that is typically founded on empiricism and the 
rejection of metaphysics.95 The positive method in social sciences was first set out by 
August Comte in his Cours de philosophie positive.96 Comte rejected metaphysical 
                                                 
89 Shestack J, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, note 7 above, p. 208. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid.   
92 Cobbah J, ‘African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective’, note 6 above, p. 309. 
93 Shestack J, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, note 7 above, p. 210. 
94 See, for example, Art. 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), which provides for 
the limitation of rights under certain circumstances. 
95 Kroeze I, ‘Legal positivism’, in Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds.), note 59 above, p. 63. 
96 See generally, Comte A, Cours de philosophie positive (1975), cited in Kroeze I, ‘Legal positivism’, in 
Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds.), note 59 above, P. 63. 
 107
speculation and argued that science ought to concern itself with empirical facts. Once 
these facts are established, general rules or laws of nature can be abstracted by means of 
induction. In this way, the theory was premised on the need for man to control and rule 
over nature and not the other way round.97 Hence, some early legal positivists opposed 
the natural law postulation due to its unscientific nature and its tendency to insist on the 
status quo rather than reforms.98 They contended that natural law in its essence and form 
was against legal reforms.99 It should be clear from the onset that legal positivism is 
neither a simple nor a single doctrine. This is essentially because it has undergone 
numerous changes in the course of time as a result of the numerous differences among its 
postulants.100 What has remained constant in the theory is the insistence on a view of law 
as a product of human action.101 
 
Classical positivists ascribed all authority to the state and its officials. They rejected any 
attempt to define and articulate law as a phenomenon that transcended from a source 
other than the existing legal systems. Accordingly, the source of human rights could only 
be in the enactments of a system of law with sanctions attached to it. Views on what the 
law ‘ought to be’ had no place in classical positive law and were therefore worthless.102 
Regarded in this sense, the theory hinged on the need to distinguish ‘law as it is’ from 
‘law as it ought to be.’ In the words of Austin, the ‘science of jurisprudence… is 
concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard 
to their goodness or badness.’103 On this premise, therefore, natural law and natural rights 
could not be used to deduce what law actually is because at best they provided a standard 
or ideal for what the law ought to be.  
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 See this argument in Johnson D, Pete S & Du Plessis M, Jurisprudence: A South African perspective 
(2001), p. 64-65. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Kroeze I, ‘Legal positivism’, note 59 above, p. 73. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Shestack J, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, note 7 above, p. 208.  
103 Austin J, ‘The province of jurisprudence determined’ (1894), quoted in Kroeze I, ‘Legal positivism’, 
note 59 above, p. 68. 
 108
Put differently, not only is it a mistake to look to natural law in trying to establish what 
the law is, it is also a mistake to turn to natural law in order to evaluate what the law 
ought to be.104 Other than this, some positivist scholars insisted on the separation of law 
and morals.105 Kroeze argued that the influence of Bacon, Burke and Kant could have 
generated this kind of thinking among these scholars.106 According to Kant, one of the 
scholars who insisted on this premise, terms like ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ meant different 
things in legal and moral contexts respectively.107 In the legal context, these terms could 
only have a meaning determined by positive law. Similarly, Bentham dismissed 
‘deontological morality’ or natural law as nonsense on stilts.108 To him, whatever could 
not be established or verified empirically failed to exist. While this is the case, it has been 
argued that legal positivists never denied that morality influences the law.109 
Accordingly: 
 
What they deny is the use of morality to determine whether a rule is a valid rule or not. 
The validity of a particular rule is one question, the morality of that rule is an entirely 
different question. The insistence on the separation of law and morality therefore deals 
with questions of validity and not with evaluation…. Hart’s view of the separation of law 
and morality is a much more nuanced one than of his predecessors. He accepts that 
natural law has a role to play. For a group of people to constitute a society, a number of 
basic rules must apply. This he calls the ‘minimum content of natural law.’… These 
minimum rules occur in both law and morality and, as such, there is an overlap between 
the two. But they are not the same. However, Hart does not believe that the validity of 
law is dependent on morality, because law does not derive its validity from such a higher 
source.110 
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As a result of its insistence on the separation of law and morals, legal positivism has been 
accused of negating the moral philosophical basis of human rights.111 It is contended that, 
by divorcing a legal system from the ethical and moral foundations of society, positive 
law encourages the belief that the law must be obeyed, no matter how immoral it may be, 
whether or not it disregards the individual.112 For instance, the anti-Semitic edicts of the 
Nazis although abhorrent to morality, were obeyed as positive law. The same could be 
said of the immoral apartheid practices that prevailed in South Africa for many years.113  
 
Further, positivism has been criticised for its tendency to undermine an international 
basis for human rights because of its emphasis on the supremacy of national 
sovereignty.114 Positivism regards rules of international law as not being law but merely 
rules of positive morality set or imposed by opinion.115 This assumption has been one of 
the major impediments to the effective human rights protection in Africa. The doctrine of 
state sovereignty, which is a culmination of legal positivism, has hampered human rights 
promotion and protection at the regional level. 
 
2.3.3 Marxist theory 
 
Marxism, like the natural law theory, is also concerned with the nature of human beings 
in society. However, the theory’s approach is rooted in the causal role of things such as 
the forces of production, relations of production, and political and legal arrangements.116 
The proponent of this theory, Karl Marx, regarded the ‘law of nature approach’ to human 
rights as idealistic and ahistorical.117 He saw nothing natural or inalienable about human 
rights. In a society in which capitalists monopolised the means of production, Marx 
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regarded the notion of individual rights as a bourgeois illusion.118 Concepts such as law, 
justice, morality, democracy, freedom, and others, were considered historical categories, 
whose content was determined by the material conditions and the social circumstances of 
a people. Accordingly, as the conditions of life change, so the content of notions and 
ideas may change.119  
 
Marxism sees a person’s essence as the potential to use one’s abilities to the fullest and to 
satisfy one’s needs. Actualisation of potential, according to him, is contingent on the 
expression of men and women as social beings, which can only occur in a communist 
society devoid of class conflict.120 The only rights are those granted by the state, and their 
exercise is contingent on the fulfilment of obligations to society and to the state. The 
Marxist theory has therefore been referred to as ‘parental’ with the authoritarian political 
body providing the sole guidance in value choice.121 The creation of such a ‘special 
being’ is a type of paternalism that not only ignores transcendental reason, but negates 
individuality.122  
 
The Marxist theory has been said to be inconsistent with the universal system of human 
rights because it does not recognise international norms.123 This was evident in the days 
of Communism in that, while communist states conceded to the promulgation of 
international norms, they held the application of those norms to be subject to the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states.124 At the international fora, they repeatedly 
asserted that their alleged abuse of human rights was not just a matter of protecting 
sovereignty, but was an expression of the communist theory of the unlimited role of the 
state to decide what is good for the people.125 Marxism was, therefore, associated with 
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more good than bad and with the gross human rights violations that took place across the 
globe after World War II, particularly in the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic.126    
 
Although the discussion of the philosophical foundations of human rights law focused on 
the natural, positivist and Marxist theories, it should be noted that social sciences have 
developed and begun to increase understanding about people and their cultures, their 
conflicts, and their interests. Consequently, a number of disparate theories have 
emerged— including the sociological and utilitarian— to build on the earlier theories. 
Within a human rights context, the evolution of such theories is useful because it 
identifies the empirical components of a human rights system; especially, in the context 
of the social process. Generally, human rights have been a product of social forces that 
instigated certain forms of responses from the society, as explained in the discussion 
above. This partly explains why the ongoing debate on the historical and philosophical 
origins of human rights still persists in academic circles.  
 
As it is argued elsewhere below, although the above theories have tried to discuss the 
philosophical foundations of the human rights concept, no society has the monopoly of 
human rights respect or abuses; nor can any society claim to be a paradise for human 
rights.127 The fact that the philosophical foundations of human rights in this study have 
been analysed on the basis of the natural, positivist and Marxist theories does not mean 
that human rights owe their origin in Europe or America. It should be recognised that 
even though a particular concept may be articulated or developed in a specific cultural 
system, it does not imply that the phenomenon does not or did not exist in other 
cultures.128  African societies, for example, had a culture of human rights, whose 
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philosophical foundations may be akin to some of the theories discussed above. We shall 
revert to this argument later below.     
  
2.4 Internationalisation of human rights 
The concept of human rights as a universal legal obligation of states is of recent origin 
and its historical antecedents can be traced to the events during and after the Second 
World War.129 Mugwanya argued that the consequent awareness of the nexus between 
respect for human rights and dignity and peace motivated the World War II Allies to set 
in motion a revolution that culminated in the universalisation of human rights. This was 
epitomised by the inclusion of certain provisions in the UN Charter that made a 
qualitative leap towards the promotion and protection of human rights for all.130 Soon 
after the universalisation of human rights through the UN and its organs, international 
protection of human rights devolved to the continental level in what latter came to be 
known as ‘regional human rights systems’.   
 
Traditionally, international law granted states national sovereignty whereby every state 
had complete freedom to deal with its own nationals (personal sovereignty) within its 
own territory (territorial sovereignty).131 This principle dictated that in all matters falling 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, international law did not permit interference, 
let alone intervention, by another state. In other words, such matters did not fall within 
the concern of international law.132 Accordingly, as long as personal sovereignty 
continued to be regarded as exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign 
states, ‘what a government did to its own citizens was its own affair and beyond the reach 
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of international law or legal interference by other states.’133  However, matters stood 
differently in the case of aliens.  
 
As part of its national sovereignty, a state was always entitled to demand respect for its 
own nationals abroad as any maltreatment of them could constitute a violation of the 
personal sovereignty of the state to which they belonged.134 This demand, however, was 
reciprocal in the sense that if a state fell short of the requirement of protecting another 
state’s nationals, for example, by expropriating their property, the compensation was due 
to the other state whose personal sovereignty had been violated and not the individual 
whose property had been taken. In such a case, therefore, only states were allowed to 
claim compensation under international law.135 Whether that state chose to pass the 
compensation on the injured individuals was entirely their own affair.136   
  
Thus, for centuries, one proposition remained unchallenged: by reason of the doctrine of 
national sovereignty, international law could not recognise any rights vested in any 
individual against any sovereign state whether his or her own or another.137 Individuals 
featured only insofar as they were the subjects of states.138 Thus, an injury to an 
individual by the nationals of another state could be interpreted as injury of one state by 
another.139 This notion of the primacy of states and the relative insignificance of the 
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individual runs deeply through international law and it is reflected in a number of 
contexts.  
 
The best example can be seen in the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Even though described as the principal legal organ of the UN (popularly referred to 
as the ‘World Court’), the ICJ is expressly prohibited from having individuals commence 
actions or appear before it.140 It is exclusively for the use of states and an extremely 
limited class of international organisations. The interests of an individual can only be 
brought to the notice of the court in the event that a state chooses to act on the 
individual’s behalf.141 Even when the state takes up the matter, the individual has no right 
of appearance, nor any ability to compel the direction of the state’s case.142 
 
Behind this state of affairs is the notion of the sovereign equality of states.143 Since each 
state is equal, at least on the basis of this doctrine, no state can be allowed to impose its 
will on another.144 International rules can only be adopted by consent and each state 
within its own territory is sovereign, with its freedom of action, ‘only fettered by some 
obligations as it, itself, chooses to assume.’145 Accordingly, this concept permitted a state 
to: 
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Impose draconian measures on its own populace… provided it does not impact upon the 
sovereignty of any other state, or breach an obligation which it has voluntarily 
undertaken. While this principle has been modified over time, it is to a large extent still 
intact, and presents a significant obstacle to the advancement of human rights law in 
many states.146     
 
By the nineteenth century, however, international law developed a doctrine of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ in cases where a state committed atrocities against its own 
nationals which ‘shocked the conscience of mankind’.147 At that time, there was a 
growing realisation of the inseparable link between individual liberty and international 
peace and security. It was therefore imperative for world leaders to discuss how to ensure 
the protection of these liberties, not only within their own territories but also 
internationally.148 This humanitarian intervention doctrine was invoked largely against 
the Ottoman Empire in 1827 on behalf of the Greek people; by French in Syria in 1860-
1861; and again in 1876 when a large number of Christians were massacred by irregular 
Ottoman troops in what is today Bulgaria.149  
 
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, 
international law had a very different view of the manner in which force could be 
deployed against individuals, both within a state and against the nationals of another 
state. War was seen as a legitimate method of diplomacy; being referred as merely the 
extension of diplomacy by other means.150 Territory could be acquired by conquest 
without regard to the inhabitants, whose property could be forfeited and who could be 
denied any role in the government of their land. Thus, by 1914, most of the earth’s land 
territory was part of the various colonial empires, and other states such as China, Turkey 
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and those of Central and South America were effectively dominated by the ‘Great 
Powers’.151  
 
In that state of affairs concern over the rights of individuals within the colonial power did 
not apply to the same extent, if at all, in the colonised territory. Similarly, the core of 
rights that constituted international humanitarian law were in an extremely primitive 
state, with little regard being paid to the care of the wounded in the battle-field, and the 
methods by which force could be employed.152 Efforts to protect individuals under 
international law intensified after the First World War, during which period treaties were 
concluded to protect the rights of linguistic and ethnic minorities.153 The protection of 
minorities took three main forms. First, there were five special treaties on minorities with 
the Allied or newly created states: with Poland (Versailles, 1919), with Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia (St. Germain-en-Laye, 1919) with Romania (Trianon, 1920), and with 
Greece (Sevres, 1920).154  
 
Secondly, chapters on the rights of the minorities within borders were included in the 
peace treaties with the ex-enemy states such as with Austria (St Germain-en-Laye, 1919), 
Bulgaria (Neuilly, 1919), Hungary (Trianon, 1920) and later with Turkey (Lausanne, 
1923).155 Thirdly, certain states made declarations before the Council of the League of 
Nations as a condition of their admission to the League.156 Generally, the various 
arrangements for the protection of the rights of minorities provided for equality before 
the law in regard to civil and political rights, freedom of religion, the right of members of 
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the minorities to use their own language, and the right to maintain their own religious and 
educational establishments.157  
 
Moreover, it was recognised that these various provisions protecting the rights of 
minorities constituted ‘obligations of international concern’, which were placed under the 
guarantee of the League of Nations and could not be modified without the consent of the 
Council of the League.158 Members of minority communities could petition the League 
with complaints as to their treatment, which would in turn pass on the complaint to the 
state concerned.159 Further, a minorities’ section was set up within the Secretariat of the 
League in 1920. The Permanent Court of International Justice was on the other hand 
asked by the League to give advisory opinions on various practices and laws in states 
with regard to minorities, to determine the scope of the protection contained in the 
treaties.160  
 
The period after the First World War also witnessed the intensification of international 
collaboration in the abolition of both the national and international salve trade.161 
Noteworthy, many efforts had been made prior to this period, with a number of 
agreements between states entered in this regard.162 The General Act of the Brussels 
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Conference was the most comprehensive instrument on this subject until the outbreak of 
the First World War.163 Thereafter, the mandate system established by Article 22 of the 
League Covenant declared that the well-being and development of the peoples in the 
mandated territories should form a ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ and that the mandate 
powers should administer the territories under conditions ‘which will guarantee freedom 
of conscience and religion…and the prohibition of abuses such as slave trade.’164 As a 
result of these efforts, the International Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and the 
Slave Trade was concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1926.165  
 
Meanwhile, the doctrine of sovereignty of states still dominated the international law 
agenda and the relationship between states. The turning point and the subsequent 
downfall of this doctrine, at least as far as it relates to human rights, came in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, when unprecedented atrocities were perpetrated by the regimes of 
Italy, Russia, Germany and other dictatorial regimes in Europe and Asia, against millions 
of their own citizens.166 Sadly, many of these atrocities were sanctioned by the respective 
national legislation. At that time, domestic laws of many states authorised pernicious 
injustice against their nationals.167 Up until the Second World War, international law did 
not regulate how sovereign states should treat their citizens or subjects.168 As explained 
earlier, this was still by and large a matter within exclusive domestic jurisdiction.  
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Although international law provided that prisoners of war had a right to be protected from 
torture and to be treated with human dignity, it did not preclude states from, for example, 
committing genocide on ‘their own’ people. A frequently cited example in this context is 
the passiveness of the international community during the Turkish genocide in Armenia 
in 1915.169 The application of double standard was perhaps what instigated the dogma of 
state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in national matters.170  
 
The double standard of international law was also made clear during the Second World 
War when many people were brutally and innocently assassinated and international 
humanitarian law was atrociously violated.171 This partly explains why at the end of the 
Second World War, shocked by the barbaric atrocities committed and sufferings caused 
by some states against their nationals, the victorious Allied powers were determined to 
introduce into international law new concepts designed to outlaw such events in the 
future, or to make their recurrence at least less likely.172  
 
The means adopted was the establishment of new inter-governmental organisations, such 
as the UN, and the development of a new branch of international law, specifically 
concerned with relations between governments and their own subjects.173 This branch of 
international law eventually came to be known as international human rights law. The 
Allied Powers came to the conclusion that it was the gradual infringement of individual 
liberty within member states that had led to the Second World War.174  
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They then pledged to ensure that protection of individual rights internationally would 
have to become their major priority if there was to be international peace and security. To 
make sure that their pledges became a reality, they adopted legally binding treaties that 
exposed the treatment of individuals by their governments to international scrutiny.175 
Thus, in the aegis of the UN, the Allied Powers embarked on a serious mission of 
universalising human rights.176 This was especially through the adoption of, for example, 
the UDHR in 1948, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) together with its Optional Protocols; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)177 and other human rights instruments.178  
 
Apart from some isolated controversies over the concept of human rights, generally179, 
there is a certain degree of consensus that human rights are universal, inalienable, and 
inherent to every human being in every society.180 Further, all rights are interdependent 
notwithstanding the fact that different measures may be required to implement them.181 In 
order to implement human rights norms and call states to account for human rights 
violations, the international community of states established various institutions and 
mechanisms. For example, through the UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) 
Resolution 1235 of 1967, followed by ECOSOC Resolution 1503 of 1970, foundation 
was laid for UN Charter-based systems for the protection of human rights.182  
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From 1976, ECOSOC adopted a series of resolutions, which culminated in the 
establishment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a permanent 
body with the mandate to promote the implementation of ICESR.183 Treaty-based 
institutions and mechanisms have also been evolved to reinforce the UN Charter-based 
mechanisms. These treaty-based institutions and mechanisms are, for example, the U.N 
Human Rights Committee (now known as the Human Rights Council), which is the 
enforcement mechanism for the ICCPR.184  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination came into being with the 
entry into force of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.185 Various other treaty-based institutions such as the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child are also in place.186 Further, Specialised Agencies of the UN, such as UNESCO 
and ILO, have over the years adopted special mechanisms to deal with human rights 
violations falling within their scope of competence.187 
 
Despite all attempts to give it international credence, the concept of human rights faced 
great resistance during the Cold War period, a time when the question of human rights 
protection was deeply politicised.188 There was tension between the Western capitalist 
and the Eastern socialist nations. Western industrialised states took it upon themselves to 
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criticise the socialist states and the South for their gross and systematic human rights 
violations based on their own (Western) standards.189 Starting from the 1970s, the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), along with the UN, began to 
serve as a platform for the human rights clash between East and West.190  
 
As of the late 1970s, the US, the European Union (EU), as well as several European 
donor states formulated development policies with the intention to extract human rights 
concessions.191 To counter this move, the East responded by pointing to violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights in capitalist states. However, their defence was a 
mere attempt to conceal the massive violations and the deteriorating human rights 
situation in the East.192 The East, which professed and was inclined to the socialist human 
rights philosophy, rejected to be monitored by any international mechanism. Instead, it 
opted to take cover under the doctrine of state sovereignty.193 Similarly, the South also 
began to resist the doctrine of international human rights, especially in the 1980s and 
1990s.194 The main cause of the resistance was the imposition of the concept of ‘universal 
human rights’ without due regard to cultural and ideological differences.195  
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As stated elsewhere in this thesis, the universalism concept drew lots of suspicion from 
non-western states, terming it as a move by the Western states to impose its culture on 
other states.196 During the late 1980s, the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
began to collapse, and these ‘velvet revolutions’ were also considered a victory for 
human rights.197 As the Cold War ended and President Gorbachev’s vision of a ‘common 
European House’ was taking root together with the ‘New World Order’ based on the 
principle of human rights and democracy, the time seemed ripe for the advancement of 
the international human rights agenda.198  
 
The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights eventually set out the parameters 
for this advancement agenda.199 The conference reaffirmed ‘the solemn commitment of 
all states to fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and 
protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and 
international law.’200 It cannot therefore be gainsaid that concern with the protection and 
promotion of human rights at the international level has been one of the most outstanding 
developments since the end of the Second World War.201 This is especially because, 
notwithstanding national and regional differences in historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds, the Vienna Declaration recognised that it is the responsibility of all states to 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.202  
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The Declaration seems to have settled, at least for the time being, the heated debate on 
the philosophical and ideological differences in perception of the human rights 
concept.203 At the same time it also aimed to put an end to the tiresome dispute on state 
sovereignty by identifying protection of human rights not only as a legitimate concern of 
the international community, but a priority objective of the UN.204 That brought to an end 
the prolonged argument that under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, human rights 
protection was exclusively a national matter.205 The end of the Cold War eventually 
reinforced the international human rights movement. It liberated international human 
rights efforts from the ideological conflicts and political sloganeering that had for 
decades undermined efforts to combat massive violations of human rights.206  
 
It is imperative to note, however, despite the international acknowledgement of the 
concept, widespread violations of human rights show that the attempts to provide 
international protection are not as effective as they ought to be and that a great deal 
remains to be done to improve the existing international efforts.207 But in order to 
improve them, we need also to appreciate that their implementation and enforcement 
depend largely on the various conceptions held by the different peoples of the world. 
People from different parts of the globe recognise the need to protect human rights but 
adopt methods that suit their particular needs.208 As a result of the divergence in 
conceptions and perceptions, international enforcement of human rights has turned to be 
                                                 
203 Nowak M, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, note 168 above, p. 26. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates: ‘Nothing contained in the Present Charter shall authorise the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Member to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’ See Gandhi P, 
International Human Rights Documents (1995), p. 15.   
206 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa, note 129 above, p. 20. 
207 Robertson A and Merrils J, Human rights in the world, note 6 above, p. 1. 
208 Ibid. This position is reiterated in The Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, 
Tehran, 1968, as published in UN document A/Conf 32/41. 
 125
more effective through regional initiatives that have emerged in what is generally referred 
to as the regional protection and promotion of human rights.  
 
Currently, international human rights are promoted and protected through regional and 
sub-regional mechanisms such as the European, Inter-American and African human 
rights systems.209 Before they gained momentum, it was initially believed that regional 
approaches to human rights might detract from the perceived universality of human 
rights.210 As the European and Inter-American systems evolved, however, this view later 
changed.211 The UN considered creating regional human rights regimes of its own but 
later concluded that member states themselves bore the responsibility of forming regional 
human rights systems.212 It thus appealed to states not belonging to regional human rights 
regimes to ‘consider agreements with a view to the establishment within their respective 
regions of suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.’213   
 
The apparent inadequacies of the global system were some of the reasons that prompted 
regional promotion and protection of human rights. For instance, from its inception in 
1945, it took nearly two decades for the UN to finalise and complete the ICCPR and 
ICESR.214 Due to such long-stalled efforts, it became clear that there was need for more 
expedient mechanisms that would bring to materialisation the quest for a speedy 
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implementation of international human rights norms.215 In this regard, regional human 
rights systems were perceived as the potential mechanisms.216  
 
It is now widely accepted that global and regional human rights systems are 
complementary, aimed at giving effect to the rights first comprehensively guaranteed in 
the UDHR as ‘a common standard of achievement for all people and all nations.’217 
Experience shows, however, that regional human rights systems can be more effective 
than the universal system in realising human rights.218 The older European and Inter-
American human rights systems have had an enormous impact on domestic human rights 
practice in their member states. An examination of the functioning of the African system 
demonstrates that this system also offers serious promise to aid human rights in the 
region.219  Regional human rights systems have thereby been said to be capable of filling 
gaps in the global human rights mechanisms.220  
 
At this juncture, this thesis shall examine the origin and evolution of the African regional 
human rights system. The European and Inter-American systems mentioned above, which 
have been discussed in detail elsewhere, fall out of the scope of this study and shall 
therefore not be examined herein. The examination shall be preceded by an evaluation on 
the existence, or otherwise, of human rights in Africa. 
2.5 Human rights in Africa 
 
A study of the current status of Africa’s human rights system cannot be complete when 
the structures and social forces that influenced pre-colonial African societies are 
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ignored.221 These rather simplistic structures and social forces later spilled over to the 
colonial period, emerging as intricate models of social institutions and processes, which, 
in turn, surfaced in post-colonial Africa as factors influencing the protection or, in the 
alternative, violation of human rights.222 It is imperative, therefore that this study 
examines the evolution of the human rights concept in Africa by tracing its roots to the 
pre-colonial societies. Thus, three periods in the history of Africa shall be considered. 
The first period will cover human rights protection in pre-colonial Africa while the 
second and third periods will cover colonial and post-colonial Africa, respectively.  
 
2.5.1 Human rights in pre-colonial Africa 
 
 
Mutua believed that much of the discussion on whether African pre-colonial societies 
knew of and enforced human rights has taken place in the absence of considered studies 
of, and reference to, judicial processes and socio-political formations in those societies.223 
As a result, scholars have engaged in an unending academic battle on this issue.224 This 
observation may not entirely be true because substantial research on pre-colonial African 
societies had already been conducted prior to Mutua’s assertion.  
 
Arguably, what was lacking in previous research conducted on these societies was an 
indepth search to establish whether or not the concept of human rights existed at that 
time. In other words, much has already been said on the judicial processes and systems 
and socio-political formations in pre-colonial Africa but without a clear focus on the need 
to investigate the status of human rights during this period. This position is also gradually 
changing as more scholars are taking interest in studying the status of human rights 
promotion and protection in pre-colonial Africa.   
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To speak of human rights in pre-colonial Africa therefore necessitates an indepth inquiry 
into some critical questions, such as: What was the nature of Africa’s pre-colonial 
societies? Were human rights a concern in those societies? What arguments have been 
advanced to refute claims that human rights were an entity in pre-colonial Africa? Are 
these arguments authentic, if not, why? An attempt is made herein to explore some of 
these questions.      
 
2.5.1.1 The nature of Africa’s pre-colonial societies 
 
 
As a point of departure, it is important to note that Africa’s pre-colonial period witnessed 
the prevalence of traditional communities living under various socio-political 
arrangements.225 Our human rights debate on this period will therefore assume a more 
generalised position because it would be misleading to pretend that a universal socio-
political arrangement subsisted on the continent during this period. However, although 
Africa’s pre-colonial societies differed in a number of ways, there is ample information to 
prove that they not only had legal systems but also some measure of respect for and 
protection of human rights.226  
 
According to Mutua, for example, pre-colonial Africa consisted of two categories of 
societies. The first comprised societies such as the Zulu and Asante, which had 
centralised authority, administrative machinery and standing judicial institutions. On the 
other hand, the second are those societies such as the Akamba and Kikuyu of Kenya, 
which had more communal and less intrusive governmental paraphernalia.227 However, 
almost all pre-colonial African societies characteristically displayed ethnic, cultural, and 
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linguistic homogeneity, a common trait that gave them fundamental cohesion.228 This 
observation was confirmed by Umozurike when he asserted that most pre-colonial 
African societies were at one time socialistic and communalistic.229 Cohen also took note 
of this aspect and observed: 
 
Many African cultures value the group-one should never die alone, live alone, remain 
outside societal networks unless one is a pariah, insane, or the carrier of a feared 
contagious disease. Corporate kinship in which individuals are responsible for the 
behaviour of their group members is a widespread tradition. …230 
 
In tandem with this position, Okere observed that the ‘African conception of man is not 
that of an isolated and abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by 
a spirit of solidarity.’231 Mbiti illustriously summed up this philosophy by stating, ‘I am 
because we are, and because we are, therefore I am.’232 By reason of most of pre-colonial 
societies being ‘socialistic’ or ‘communalistic’, rights and privileges of their members 
were respected and regarded as rights and privileges of the community itself.233 Those 
rights and privileges were thus not isolated or held against the community ‘but formed a 
great admixture with community rights so that members had an interest in the well being 
of other members.’234 Consequently, rights and privileges were restricted to the members 
of the community and were not regarded as universal.235  
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The communality of most African societies notwithstanding, the individual and his or her 
dignity and autonomy were equally protected, as were individual rights.236  Nyerere and 
Wai attested to this when they argued, separately, that pre-colonial societies supported 
individual welfare and dignity and did not allow gross inequalities between members.237 
This position is confirmed by studies conducted by a number of scholars, including 
Busia, Wilks and Rattray.238 These studies concentrated on democracy in pre-colonial 
Africa, particularly the political system of the Asante of Ghana. Busia noted that an 
individual could exercise his right to depose of a king, if he could show that the king had 
breached an oath of office or any other obligation.239 In his study of pre-colonial West 
Africa, Loucou also insisted that various ethnic societies; namely, the Abbey, Abidij, 
Abourè Adjoulkrou, Ahizi, Alladian, Akyè, Avikam, Ebriè, Ega, Ehotilè, Essouma, 
Krobou and Mbatto, practised ‘democracy of age classes.’240  
 
The Akan, Mandè and Baoulè societies were democratic monarchies with even slaves 
exercising senior administrative and political responsibilities, especially in the Mandè 
kingdom.241 In sub-Saharan African kingdoms, unwritten laws existed that limited the 
power of the monarch. This was illustrated by some examples from the Anyi kingdoms in 
Ivory Coast and Ghana.242 The king could be impeached or removed from office. A 
college of electors, political and military chiefs of villages, called Asafohene, chose 
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several candidates or postulants, based on their individual qualities and not their 
genealogical position.243 
 
Whereas the above discussion gives a generalised perspective of the pre-colonial African 
societies, Eze noted that all human societies have had to go through certain stages in the 
process of their development.244 At one stage, because of the primitivism of the means of 
production, collective ownership, collective labour and equal distribution of the fruits of 
labour were necessary for subsistence.245 There was no room for private acquisition and 
accumulation of wealth. Since the society had no classes, there was neither the need for a 
state nor law. Such machinery would only be necessary where exploitation of man by 
man occurred.246 Whatever rules of conduct existed could at best be described as non-
legal, even if they were ‘binding’ usages and rules of custom. The adage that ubi societas 
ubi jus’—where there is a human society there is law—was not applicable at this stage.247 
 
With the passage of time, pre-colonial African societies evolved to such a level that 
primitive communalism, slave owning and feudalism became the predominant socio-
economic structures immediately prior to colonial incursion.248 The slave-owning 
societies and feudalism structures were characterised by the existence of laws which were 
promulgated to govern social relations.249 Nmehielle therefore attributed the origin of law 
in pre-colonial Africa to these two forms of socio-economic structures.250  
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Accordingly, this explains the argument from certain quarters to the effect that societies 
in pre-colonial Africa had achieved a reasonable degree of political, social and economic, 
organisation akin to a modern state.251 Not only so, there is sufficient historical evidence 
that kingdoms flourished in Africa as far back as the fourth century.252 In West Africa, 
there were the Ghana, Songhai, Mali and Walata empires. In the south-east Africa, there 
was the Zulu empire, in central Africa the kingdom of Monomotapa, and in East Africa 
the ancient Bunyoro Empire and the Buganda kingdoms.253  
 
Basing his argument on the confirmation of the first Europeans to reach East and West 
Africa by sea, Rodney concluded that the levels of development between Europe and 
Africa were comparable, although the former had an edge.254 The impressive level of 
legal and political development in pre-colonial Africa was further enunciated by Elias, 
according to whom: 
 
African societies with strong centralised political systems tended to have a more 
advanced body of legal principles and judicial techniques than had those with more or 
less rudimentary political organisation. In the former, there were usually hierarchically 
graded courts ranging from the smallest chiefs to kings’ courts, with well-defined 
machinery for the due enforcement of judicial decisions. In the latter, rules rather than 
rulers, functions rather than institutions, characterised the judicial organisation of these 
societies.255 
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Further, Gluckman’s study found the Lozi to be a society with a fairly advanced legal 
system.256 He found that in Lozi, as in western jurisprudence, the sources of law 
consisted of customs, judicial precedents, legislation, laws of natural morality and of 
nations.257 The bottom line of his argument is that the judicial process in Loziland on the 
whole corresponded to, rather than differed from, the judicial process known in Western 
societies.258  
 
Notwithstanding the above observations, the existence, of law generally and human rights 
in particular, in pre-colonial Africa has been questioned. It has been contended that law 
did not exist in the traditional African societies.259 The reason for this lack of recognition 
of the existence of law in early African societies has been attributed to the fact that 
African societies in the pre-colonial era were largely governed by custom.260 Customs 
have been found to be extremely rigid and their obedience could only be ensured by the 
overwhelming power of group sentiment which was amply fortified by religion and 
magic.261 Under these circumstances it was impossible to make any distinction between 
legal, moral or religious rules, all of which were ‘interwoven into the single texture of 
customary behaviour.’262  
 
Eze correclty queried this observation. He contended, the argument that traditional 
African societies did not possess legal systems was based either on inadequate 
information or lack of appreciation of the true nature of pre-colonial African societies on 
the one hand; and on the other, Western scholars’ concept of law as emanating from the 
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state.263 Nmehielle was equally right to conclude that defining law as an offshoot of the 
state ignores the possibility that it could also emanate from other sources, as it did in 
traditional African societies and as it does from the international circles such as the 
United Nations.264 One would also agree with the reasoning that this argument has the 
implication that African societies operated in a total legal vacuum before foreign 
intervention.265  
 
It cannot be disputed that indeed, there were certain barbaric practices in some pre-
colonial African societies which could lead one to presume the absence of law or even 
human rights. Umozurike succinctly captures this phenomenon as follows: 
 
One of the most heinous acts committed in some societies was the practice of human 
sacrifice. This practice was conducted for atonement or cleansing for serious crimes or to 
avert major catastrophes. Primitive belief in the spirit world also necessitated that on their 
death, dignitaries should be buried along with slaves and servants that would serve them. 
Similarly, the practice of killing of twins was very radical as well as controversial. 
Whereas twins were admired, for example, among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria, they 
were loathed among the Igbo, Efik and Ibibio of Eastern Nigeria. To the latter, they 
symbolised the wrath and displeasure of the gods and had no right to live. Twins were 
thus put to death and their mothers excommunicated, banished or sent back to their 
parental homes. In the contrary, their fathers were not condemned, something that clearly 
depicted gender disparity and discrimination.266   
 
Another general characteristic of pre-colonial African societies was their emphasis on 
morality. Morality was of the greatest importance in both private and public relations.267 
As a moral dictate, anyone who claimed a right or privilege was also required to carry out 
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the obligations that accompanied it.268 Societies had stabilising factors which included the 
sense of obligation to one’s kith and kin, the fear of the deity that was omnipotent and 
omniscient, and accountability to him for all human actions on earth.269 This had a 
restraining effect on human activities, since the good expected to be appropriately 
rewarded and the wicked or their successors to be condemned.270  
 
The foregoing discussion on the nature of Africa’s pre-colonial societies sets the basis for 
our evaluation of the arguments on the existence, or otherwise, of human rights during 
the pre-colonial period. This solicits answers to a number of questions: Is the notion of 
human rights a Western invention, Western import in Africa and is the West the model 
thereof? Were human rights experienced in pre-colonial Africa or are they foreign to 
African societies? There is an ongoing debate on these issues. This study seeks to assess 
both sides of the argument and also add a voice to the already existing scholarly 
contribution on this debate.  
 
2.5.1.2 Arguments on the existence of human rights in pre-                      
                     colonial Africa 
 
The existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa has been a prolonged academic 
debate drawing dissenting views and opinions from scholars across the academic divide.  
Some allege that non-Western cultural and political traditions ‘lacked not only the 
practice of human rights but also the very concept.’271 Howard and Donnelly, for 
example, are some of the Western scholars in the forefront of the argument that human 
rights did not exist as a concept in pre-colonial Africa.272  
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Donnelly asserted that recognition of human rights simply was not the way of traditional 
Africa.273 He further observed that ‘even in many cases where Africans had personal 
rights vis-à-vis their governments, these rights were community, status or some other 
ascriptive characteristic.’274 Like Howard, he opined that the argument is now lame since 
the communitarian ideal had been destroyed and corrupted by the ‘teeming slums’ of 
non-Western states, the money economy, Western values and products; even if it could 
be agreed that societies based on communitarian ideals existed at a point in time in 
Africa.275 Howard stretched this view further when she contended that African 
proponents of the concept confuse human dignity with human rights. Accordingly:  
 
The African concept of human rights is actually a concept of human dignity, or what 
defines the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper 
(political) relations with society. Despite the twinning of human rights and human dignity 
in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and elsewhere, dignity can 
be protected in a society not based on rights. The notion of African communalism, which 
stresses the dignity of membership in, and fulfilment of one’s prescribed social role in a 
group (family, kinship group, tribe), still represents how accurately how many Africans 
appear to view their personal relationship to society.276  
 
As Busia noted, it appears, at least from the foregoing, that Donnelly and Howard, like 
most of their Western colleagues in this argument, had a problem with the idea that 
African communal characteristic could accommodate the concept of human rights.277 
However, in the search for human rights in other cultural systems, it should be recognised 
that even though a particular concept may be articulated or developed in a specific 
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cultural system, it does not imply that the phenomenon does not or did not exist in other 
cultures.278 
 
The argument on human rights being foreign to Africa is not confined to the sentiments 
expressed by Donnelly and Howard. In fact, some scholars who harbour similar views 
contend that even democracy and constitutionalism, which are fundamental in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, are also foreign to Africa.279 These concepts 
have been said to have no future in the continent because they are unsuitable, especially 
in Black Africa.280  Thus, the West has been perceived as the model of human rights, 
constitutionalism and democracy.281  
 
As far as African traditions in pre-colonial Africa are concerned, it is alleged that they 
totally ignored these concepts.282 Constitutionalism and democracy, it is further said, are 
‘at variance with African traditions’ or ‘out of tune with the needs of African countries at 
this stage in their history.’283 This perception is not only championed by European and 
American scholars but also some African scholars.284 Simiyu, for example, insisted that 
democracy had no roots in Africa no matter how organised the traditional political 
systems were. Accordingly, he insisted that:   
 
In black Africa, whether the political system was that of the highly centralised states or of 
the amorphous non-centralised communities, it did not belong to a democratic tradition. 
There were rudiments of democratic principles and practices, especially in the non-
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centralised communities, but it would be dangerous to equate those practices with 
advanced forms of democracy.285 
 
This position was also echoed by Akindes who considered the ancient Dahomey as 
typical of the authoritarianism of pre-colonial Africa286, and Kedourie, who argued that 
‘Africa and Asian societies are victimised by their own despotic traditions.’287 
Conversely, a number of African scholars have risen in defence of the existence of 
human rights in pre-colonial Africa, thereby sharply refuting the views held by Donnelly, 
Howard and their cronies.288 For example, Nzongola-Ntalaja correctly argued that a very 
disturbing phenomenon is: 
 
The tendency of Northern countries on both sides of the Atlantic to think that Africans do 
not deserve the same rights as peoples elsewhere, and that strong men are what is needed 
to keep a restless and volatile continent at peace. Thus, what is absolutely intolerable 
elsewhere can be justified as understandable, ‘by African standards’.289 
 
Indeed, it is not proper for the West to pretend to be the inventor or the model of human 
rights. Human rights, constitutionalism and democracy are not un-African; nor were they 
unknown in pre-colonial Africa. They also belong to Africa.290 Ake deplored the attitude 
of the North and the Western conventional approach to the study of Africa. Accordingly: 
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Through decades of involvement in Africa, the North’s attitude has been that democracy 
is not for Africa. That attitude was an important component of the ideology of 
colonisation, which held that Africans were unfit to govern themselves, that they needed 
the civilisation of colonial tutelage as their one hope of eventually achieving self-
determination and development.291 
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja refuted the Euro-centric attitude of perceiving Africans as being 
incapable of determining their own affairs and by extension having no history of 
democracy and human rights. He correctly emphasised that: 
 
Such an approach not only glosses over the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on political 
institutions and practices in West and Central Africa but also minimises the role of 
colonial despotism as a school of post-colonial rulers.292 
 
Further, Mamdani ruled out the Western ‘paternity’ of the concept of human rights by 
stating that: 
 
It is difficult to accept, even in the case of Europe, that human rights was a concept 
created by 17th century Enlightenment philosophy. True, one can quote Aristotle and his 
ideological justification of slavery as evidence that the idea of human rights was indeed 
foreign to the conscience of the ruling classes in ancient Greece…What was unique about 
Enlightenment philosophy, and about the writings of the French and American 
Revolutions, was not a conception of human rights, but a discussion of these in the 
context of a formally articulated philosophical system.293 
 
From the foregoing, it is inevitable to observe that no country has the monopoly of 
human rights respect or abuses. Nor can any society claim to be a paradise for human 
rights. Dismissing the Western ‘paternity’ of democracy and constitutionalism, Mangu 
rightly noted that Athens and Rome that allegedly ‘invented’ democracy ended up in 
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authoritarianism and dictatorship, while Greece the supposed ‘mother of Western 
democracy’ was still a dictatorship in the 1970s.294  
 
Unfortunately, it is too easy for Western scholars to give lessons and present themselves 
as the ‘model’ for human rights. Busia was therefore right to discredit the Westernised 
analyses of the concept of human rights as ‘facile generalisations not reflecting the entire 
reality of human rights in pre-colonial social formations of Africa.’295 Hence, ‘an inquiry 
into the origin of human rights is not only a false search but a precarious adventure which 
can only resurrect the cultural relativist’s argument which is now running out of 
steam.’296  
 
The failure of Euro-centric Western scholars to locate human rights in African cultures 
has been criticised by a number of African scholars who laboured to vindicate that 
African cultures were after all not devoid of the concept.297 Quashigah, for example, 
analysed the emergence of the concept of human rights in the Western world and 
concluded that, if the Western concept of human rights was so developed, then: 
 
The irresistible inference is therefore that each and every human society, whatever its 
stage of development, from absolute primitivity to modern statehood, logically recognises 
some rights which could be rightly termed human rights. The concept of human rights is, 
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therefore, not alien to African societies; if anything at all, it is absent only in any 
articulated philosophical form.298 
 
Quashigah’s analysis served to acknowledge that both Western and African traditions are 
contradictory because they embody both respect for and abuse of human rights. As 
elsewhere, there was democracy and human rights in Africa, in addition to tyranny and 
other forms of human rights abuses.299 If the concept of human rights was a Western 
discovery as argued by the host of Euro-centric scholars, the same should be said of 
concepts such as genocide, slavery, absolute monarchy, inquisition, authoritarianism and 
so on.300  
 
Wiredu and Hountondji also attempted to locate human rights in some African cultures. 
While Wiredu dwelt more on Africa’s past cultural experiences to evolve an Akan 
conception of rights301, Hountondji underscored the colonial and post-colonial periods of 
Africa.302 On the historico-colonial front, Hountondji analysed and denounced the 
Western claims to being the repository of human rights.303 On his part, Shivji attempted 
to contrast the philosophical foundations of human rights in Africa and the West.304 He 
explained that the philosophical basis of Western human rights conceptions is contrary to 
the African way of thinking. According to him, in Africa, the collective is more esteemed 
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than individuals, with the result that emphasis is put in communal rights rather than 
individual rights.305 Shivji’s views were consistent with those of Cobbah who asserted: 
 
Africans do not espouse a philosophy of human dignity that is derived from natural rights 
and individualistic framework. African societies function within communal structure 
whereby a person’s dignity and honour flow from his or her transcendental role as a 
cultural being…. We should pose the problem in this light, rather than assuming an 
inevitable progression on non-Westerners toward Western lifestyle.306 
 
Socio-cultural differences between the Western and African societies might have 
contributed to the argument that pre-colonial Africa was devoid of human rights. 
However, as Nzongola-Ntalaja observed, the sociological reality of ancient Africa is too 
complex to be simplified through the lenses of Afro-centric romantics as a golden age of 
freedom, or those of Afro-pessimists as an epoch of despotism.307  
 
Indeed, since human rights are concerned with the preservation of human dignity and the 
recognition of the intrinsic worth of the individual, there is no conceivable reason why 
they should not be a preserve for all societies.308 This argument, however, should not be 
taken to mean that there are no cultural differences which inform the various 
philosophical perceptions of the human rights concept. Rather, it emphasises the obvious 
fact that, since the values of justice and human dignity are applicable and therefore 
relevant to all societies, so does the human rights concept. Kannyo correctly pointed out 
that ‘… the factors which gave rise to the need for constitutional guarantees and led to the 
evolution of the philosophy of human rights in the West have become equally relevant in 
other parts of the world….’309    
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This argument is sensible especially because a close nexus has been established between 
the modern human rights corpus and some pre-colonial African practices.310 In this 
regard, Mutua contended that the right to life, for example, was so valued in pre-colonial 
African societies that the power over life and death was reserved for a few elders and was 
exercised ‘only after elaborate judicial procedure, with appeals from one court to another, 
and often only in cases of murder and manslaughter.’311 He then dismissed the claim that 
human rights could only exist in a post-feudal state, and also the assertion that the 
concept was alien to specific pre-capitalist traditions.312 This view, he observed, 
suggested that these traditions can make no normative contribution to the human rights 
corpus.313  
 
One would agree with Mutua’s observation that pre-colonial values have been 
undermined by change as a result of interaction between different cultures brought about 
by colonisation of African peoples.314 During the colonial period, Western political and 
legal systems were superimposed upon the customary traditions of the African people.315 
At the same time, colonial rule curtailed much of the traditional African freedoms and 
practices in the name of improving and bettering the lives of Africans.316 However, the 
colonial powers did not allow classical Western concepts of human rights to be 
assimilated into the African life-style. Instead, colonialists applied standards to the 
indigenous African population which differed from classical liberal traditions.317 In fact, 
the period of colonialism was one in which scant respect was paid to human rights in 
Africa.318 
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Consequently, at independence, African countries inherited Western notions of individual 
rights.319 Unfortunately, these philosophical constructs disregarded the actual 
development of African cultures.320 In spite of this, it was difficult for the change process 
arising from this interaction to totally or completely invalidate or eradicate African 
cultures and values systems.321 This could be interpreted to mean, whatever constitutes 
acceptable human rights standards has much to do with the cultural and historical 
perspectives of a given society, generally, and those in power, particularly.322 For 
instance, slavery and colonialism, which are now forms of human rights violations, were 
at one time not considered incompatible with human rights.323 
 
In line with the approach of juxtaposing the present day notion of human rights with the 
cultural practices of some societies, Wai concluded that indeed human rights existed in 
pre-colonial Africa. According to him, rulers were bound by traditional checks and 
balances to limit their power and guarantee a ‘modicum of social justice and values 
concerned with individual and collective rights.’324 The Akamba of Kenya, it is said, 
believed that all members of the society were born equal and were supposed to be treated 
as such regardless of sex and age.325 The same was said of pre-colonial Taita society.326  
 
On the same template, Wiredu tabulated a list of rights and responsibilities borne by the 
Akan in the pre-colonial era. These included rights to political participation, land and 
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religion, as well as the duty to defend the nation.327 Fernyhough, though not subscribing 
to a unique concept of human rights, also outlined many of the rights protected in pre-
colonial societies.328 According to him: 
 
From one perspective the human rights tradition was quite foreign to Africa until 
Western, “modernising” intrusions dislocated community and denied newly isolated 
individuals access to customary ways of protecting their lives and human dignity. Human 
rights were alien to Africa precisely because it was a pre-capitalist society, social 
organisation. From the opposing viewpoint there is a fundamental rejection of this as a 
new, if rather subtle, imperialism, and explicit denial that human rights evolved only in 
Western political theory and practice, especially during the American and French 
revolutions, and not in Africa. Behind this protest is the very plausible claim that human 
rights are not found in western values alone but may also have emerged from very 
different and distinctive African cultural milieus.329 
 
After his analysis of the catalogue of rights in pre-colonial Africa, Fernyhough cautioned 
Howard and Donnelly to stick to a consistent theory of human rights in the sense that if 
they believed that human rights derive directly from a person’s humanity and embody 
human dignity, which makes them inalienable and universal, it would be contradictory 
for them not to apply their own definitions and philosophical conception of human rights 
to pre-colonial Africa.330 Indeed, human beings occupied pre-colonial Africa. By virtue 
of this fact, it is impossible to adopt the position that pre-colonial African societies knew 
not of human rights. This would definitely turn out to be a misplaced argument for the 
reason that human rights are inherent in all humans.  
 
As already pointed out, this should not be taken to mean that human rights were not 
violated in pre-colonial Africa. It should be noted, however, violations were not peculiar 
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to Africa. Factually, all cultures suffer from this duality of the good and the bad.331 As 
Eze contended, which contention this thesis agrees with, human rights were recognised 
and protected in pre-colonial Africa, but this fact must be looked at in the context of 
societies that were communal and at the same time unified by mythological beliefs.332 
Hence, emphasising community over individual rights, some scholars have relentlessly 
insisted that the African and Western perceptions of the concept sharply contrast.333  
 
In the main, African societies were said to be humanistic and socialistic and could not 
have failed to pay attention to the human being and all that appertained to him, 
particularly his or her rights.334 This type of humanism led as a consequence, to a 
scrupulous mutual respect and recognition of the right and liberties for each individual 
and for the group.335 According to Cobbah: 
 
The pursuit of human dignity is not concerned with vindicating the right of any individual 
against the world. The African notion of family seeks a vindication of the communal 
well-being. The starting point is not the individual but the whole group including both the 
living and the dead.336 
 
The above sentiments notwithstanding, there are other African scholars who perceive the 
notion of human rights in Africa not solely from communalistic, but also individualistic 
angle. Asante, for example, argued that ‘human rights, quite simply, are concerned with 
asserting and protecting human dignity, and they are ultimately based on a regard for the 
intrinsic worth of the individual.’337  
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The point that has been emphasised all along in this discussion is that the whole debate 
on the existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa is surrounded by controversies. 
Those Western scholars who deny the existence of human rights in pre-colonial Africa 
appear to be perpetuating Euro-centric views which conjure the memory of colonialism, 
while their opponents in Africa who defend its existence and go further to assert the 
concept’s African uniqueness, have been dismissed as overzealous Africanists.338  
 
This thesis maintains that the nature and character of a particular society has always 
determined the categories of rights to be protected, their scope and ultimately who is to 
enjoy them.339 This argument is premised on the observation that human rights protection 
evolved gradually on a stage-by-stage sequence as societies developed. The nature of the 
rights protected differed depending on whether the society was based on the slave mode, 
feudal mode or nascent capitalism that followed in the wake of colonial rule.340 It is 
therefore not correct to argue that pre-colonial African societies did not have the notion 
of human rights because to say so would simply mean that Africa at that time was 
inhabited by non-humans, which assertion is derogatory.341 Human rights have neither 
‘father’ nor ‘founder’ and no one society can therefore claim ‘paternity’ of the concept. 
 
Related to the issue of ‘paternity’ is the question of autochthony. Should the concept of 
human rights as known in the West be imported as it is in African legal systems or should 
it be clothed with autochthonous or domestic forms? Further, is it proper to posit an 
‘African concept’ of human rights as distinct from that of the Western world, especially 
Europe? Such a debate would definitely centre on two conflicting concepts— 
universalism and relativism. It is therefore expedient to discuss these concepts in the light 
of the ongoing debate on the African concept of human rights. 
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2.5.1.3 The African concept of human rights 
 
The seemingly un-ending debate on the relevance and place of human rights in both pre-
colonial and post-colonial African societies has been exacerbated by the arguments on the 
existence, or otherwise, of an ‘African’ concept of human rights. In this respect, there are 
African scholars who insist that human rights should be contextualised to take root on the 
continent.342 Such scholars are inclined to the ‘cultural relativism’ theory that views 
human rights from a relativist perspective. Other scholars, however, opine that human 
rights are universal and should be construed without cultural overtones.343 Two theories 
are therefore fundamental in the discussion of the African human rights concept— 
‘cultural relativism’ and ‘universalism’.      
 
Cultural relativism is a concept based on the theory that human rights should not be 
construed as absolute because there is infinite cultural variability in every society.344 The 
concept has several different possible meanings. Teson defined it as the position 
according to which local cultural traditions properly determine the existence and scope of 
civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society.345 According to this 
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view, no trans-boundary legal or moral standards exist against which human rights 
practices may be judged acceptable or unacceptable.346  
 
Thus, as a point of departure, substantive human rights standards vary among different 
cultures and necessarily reflect national idiosyncrasies. In the superficial sense, this 
essentially means that what may be regarded as a human rights violation in one society 
may probably be considered lawful in another.347 Additionally, this proposition holds that 
even if, as a matter of customary or conventional international law, a body of substantive 
human rights norms exists, its meaning varies substantially from culture to culture.348   
 
‘Universalism’, on the other hand, is a variant of cultural relativism. The terms 
‘universal’ or ‘universality’ can be defined as ‘of, belonging to, done by, all; affecting 
all’, and a universal rule as one with no exception.349 According to this definition, in 
order for a rule or concept of human rights law to be defined as universal, it would have 
to have been established by a consensus of all states and must apply to all individuals 
within each of these states.350 Panikkar correctly commented that:  
 
…In order for a concept to become universally valid it should fulfil at least two 
conditions. It should, on the one hand, eliminate all the other contradictory concepts…. 
On the other hand, it should be the universal point of reference for any problematic 
regarding human dignity. In other words, it should displace all other homeomorphic 
equivalents and be the pivotal centre of a just social order. To put it another way, the 
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culture which has given birth to the concept of human rights should also be called upon to 
become a universal culture.351      
 
Supporters of universalism base their arguments on the significance of the 1948 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Some argue that its inception marked 
the transition of human rights from a contextual (national) to a universal (international) 
concept.352 The UDHR is not only the first global instrument to clearly define a general 
catalogue of human rights and freedoms, but is also recognised as the ‘human rights 
pioneer’ in the preambles of most of the subsequent global and regional instruments, 
besides the constitutions of most independent states of the world.353 Its relevance in the 
promotion of the culture of human rights on the globe was reiterated in the First World 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Teheran, where it was termed as ‘an obligation for 
the members of the international community.’354  
 
Similarly, the Second World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993, 
reaffirmed in several paragraphs the universality of human rights.355 In its Declaration 
and Programme of Action, the Second World Conference on Human Rights emphasised 
that the ‘universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.’356 At 
paragraph 3, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action stated that: 
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and inter-dependent and inter-related. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
                                                 
351 Panikkar R, ‘Is the notion of human rights a Western concept?’ in Alston P (ed.), Human rights law, 
note 1 above, p. 170. 
352 Shestack J, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights’, note 7 above, p. 228. 
353 Ibid.    
354 Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 5 above, p. 6. 
355 See Vienna Declaration and programme of Action, paragraph 1.  
356 Ibid.   
 151
This is a strong and definitive ideological statement, which would somehow urge one to 
ascribe to the universalism theory. However, it has been difficult for the theory to gain 
acceptance in Africa, especially due to the insistence on the need to evolve an ‘African 
concept’ on human rights. Moreover, it is believed that at the time the UDHR and the two 
International Covenants were drafted, most of the member states of the UN were states 
‘with white populations and largely Christian traditions.’357 Consequently, ‘the 
individualistic conception of human rights that is reflected in the UDHR indicates the 
domination of the Western world.’358 From their point of view, ‘the rights contained in 
the UN documents are not necessarily valid for all peoples at any time.’359 This 
perception did not only lead to the search for a ‘uniquely African document’360 more 
responsive to African needs361, but also to the ongoing academic debate on the African 
human rights concept.362 
 
The African concept of human rights, according to Mojekwa, ‘was fundamentally based 
on ascribed status…’363 Unlike the Western concept of human rights which emphasises 
individual rights, the African concept shares significant similarities with the Islamic 
concept in that both emphasise rights based on community. The concept is not static but 
dynamic and has been subject to various forces both internal and external, which have 
influenced and continue to a certain degree, to shape its essence and content.364 Eze is of 
the view that in order to fully appreciate the African concept of human rights it is 
necessary to, among other things, 
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locate it in the context of Africa’s history spanning from pre-colonial pre-capitalist-
formations to the present day; examine the dynamics of its internal evolution before and, 
after contact with external forces, bearing in mind the pervasive influence of African and 
imported religions with their tendency towards fostering mythical and naturalist 
conceptions of human right; take due account of the process of universalisation of the 
principles of human rights…; determine whether in view of the overwhelming impact of 
external variables on Africa’s socio-economic and political formations and the resultant 
acculturation, it can seriously be maintained that there is much left of the ‘traditional’ 
African conception of human rights, and; ascertain, given the heterogeneity of African 
societies whether there existed and still exists a sufficient degree of homogeneity, to 
justify the assertion of the existence of an African notion of human rights….365  
 
Africa presents a paradoxical picture in the study of contemporary international human 
rights. The realities of post-colonial Africa differ greatly from those envisaged in the pre-
colonial and colonial periods. As argued above, recognition and protection of human 
rights certainly existed in pre-colonial Africa only that African definitions of human 
rights differed in key respects from those propounded by the West.366  
 
The conception of human rights in traditional African society was not sanctioned by a 
normative system deriving its validity from a constitutional base or Grundnorm. Instead, 
it was premised on social values fortified by African beliefs and transmitted to posterity 
through oral history and manifested through positive traditional practices.367 Thus, 
African traditional systems of human rights were underpinned by social forces peculiar to 
each society and were not the creation of modern constitutions.368 The abrogation of a 
constitution, therefore, did not have any effect on the traditional concepts of human 
rights.369 There is another point of departure between African traditional conceptions of 
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human rights and the conceptions of human rights fostered in modern (or Western) 
societies.  
 
In the latter, rights are considered universal and individualistic in nature and apply on the 
same footing to every human being irrespective of geographical location.370 In the 
former, human rights existed within the context of a particular group or community.371 
Generally, ‘African law’ was a law of the group, not only because it applied to micro-
societies (lineage, tribe, ethnic group, clan or family), but also because the role of the 
individual was largely insignificant.372 It was within the group that the individual found 
security to enjoy his or her rights. The individual was subjugated to the archetype of the 
totem; of the common ancestor or protecting spirit.373  
 
The African concept of human rights thus revolves around the African ‘communitarian 
ideal’. This is underscored by the fact that decisions in traditional African societies were 
made by consensus rather than by competition, and economic surpluses were generated 
and disposed on a distributive rather than a profit-oriented basis.374 Thus, as Shivji put it, 
‘African traditional society is based on collectivity (community) rather than on an 
individual and therefore, the notion of individual is foreign to African ethno-
philosophy.’375 Some scholars, however, dispute the ‘communitarian ideal.’376 James 
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Silk, for example, contended that the emphasis on groups is arbitrary since groups by 
their very nature do not exist without the individual in them.377  
 
Mutua observed, in one culture the individual may be venerated as the primary bearer of 
rights; while, in another, individual rights may be more harmonised with the corporate 
body.378 It has also been argued, and rightly so, that the apparent absence of the 
individual conception in the traditional society should not be taken to mean the absence 
of individual rights.379 Individual rights and interests were defined in groups or 
communities through which the individual found expression. It would also be wrong to 
assume that the authoritarianism or absence of Western styled democracy in most post-
colonial African states reflects the nature of human rights of the traditional African 
political systems.380 This seems to be the central thesis of those who deny the existence of 
the concept, and even the practice, of human rights and democracy in non-Western 
systems.381  
 
Further, while the modern concept of human rights protection relies on the courts and 
other agencies for their enforcement, traditional African societies mainly relied on 
communal solidarity and the moral upbringing of its people.382 It was believed that if 
individuals were properly brought up to respect one another, their elders, and live in 
solidarity with one another, there would be no room for human rights violations, and 
consequently no cause for the establishment of courts for their protection.383 Keba 
M’Baye noted that: 
 
According to African conception of the law, disputes are settled not by contentious 
procedures, but through reconciliation. Reconciliation generally takes place through 
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discussions which end in a consensus leaving neither winners nor losers. Trials are 
always carefully avoided. They create animosity. People go to court to dispute rather than 
to resolve a legal difficulty.384 
 
This argument tends to purport that there existed a discernible tradition in pre-colonial 
Africa favouring reconciliation rather than litigation. However, a cursory glance at the 
political traditions of societies in pre-colonial Africa reveals the inaccuracy of the 
proposition. The Amhara of Ethiopia, for example, historically thrived on litigation and 
the vigorous examination and cross-examination of witnesses.385 The Taita of Kenya also 
had a judicial mechanism, comprising the council of elders, similar in many respects to 
the present court systems.386  
 
Although the descriptions of the above traditions are not exhaustive, such arrangements 
are certainly representative of the general scheme that existed in most pre-colonial 
societies with standing judicial institutions.387 Hence, to suggest that courts tend to create 
animosity rather than promote the resolution of disputes is to flagrantly misrepresent the 
function and purpose of judicial institutions.388 This argument notwithstanding, studies 
conducted on the African concept of human rights, as recognised by traditional societies, 
illustrate enormous satisfaction as to the basically democratic way in which the societies 
protected their own human values: the choosing of leaders, the settlement of conflicts, the 
provision of social amenities, the rendering of assistance and support, among others.389  
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Some of the rights guaranteed in modern constitutions were fully guaranteed and enjoyed 
in traditional societies, although not embodied in texts negotiated by a certain portion of 
the population.390 Basic human rights such as the right to life, the right to shelter, the 
right to food, the freedom of association, assembly, and expression, among others, were 
recognised and guaranteed, and even the head of a particular community could not, 
without the consent of the subjects, and by due customary process, deprive an individual 
of any of these rights.391 However, it must not be forgotten that with the advent of 
colonialism things suddenly changed.  
 
At the social spheres, for example, the imposition of colonial rule brought new 
complexities and changes in existing indigenous practices.392 When collective and 
individual expression came into conflict, the values of the colonising power were 
presumed to be superior to those of the indigenous African societies. The European rulers 
thus had both the will and the power to impose new procedures and values. The 
frameworks brought by colonialism reflected Western liberal assumptions; traditional 
expectations, such as those about the responsibilities of chiefs or the nature of judicial 
settlement were jeopardised.393 The overall effect was one of weakening the effectiveness 
of indigenous standards and traditional institutions without firmly implanting new ideas 
that were consistent with the African value system and beliefs.394    
 
In summary therefore, the African concept of human rights can be said to envisage three 
important elements; these are, the pre-eminence of the group over the individual; the 
preference of consensus over competition and; the redistribution of economic surplus 
rather than profit making.395 In addition, the concept hinges upon the premise of human 
dignity. The inherence of human rights in every person in the community, according to 
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this concept, stems from the fact that every human being has inherent dignity which must 
be respected by all.396 By extension, every bearer of rights had the duty to protect the 
rights of others in society. Thus, the African concept of human rights advocates for rights 
which are intertwined with duties. This aspect of the concept is reflected in the African 
Charter.397 
 
In spite of its being romanticised by certain African scholars, the African concept of 
human rights has sharply been criticised by others for various reasons. First, there has 
been much debate among scholars as to whether Africa has a tradition of human rights.398 
The arguments in this regard have been discussed in detail elsewhere above. However, it 
is worth reiterating that those who affirm its existence insist that Africa in fact had the 
tradition of human rights and that the concept is not unique to the West.399 Others 
attacked this proposition as one which fails to understand the correct material and 
philosophical basis of pre-colonial African societies.400  
 
With this debate still going on, and notwithstanding the various aspects discussed above, 
what is needed is the enquiry whether it is proper to talk of a uniform, or even unique, 
‘African concept’ of human rights. If we sum up the various positions societies find 
themselves at the various stages of development, it is clear that it is not possible to have a 
uniform or unique African concept of human rights.401 However, while maintaining that 
Africa is not one society and that diversity exists, it is possible to make certain 
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generalisations in relation to the supposed ‘African concept’ of human rights.402 In line 
with Lindholt’s suggestion, to arrive at such generalisations, the important distinction 
between form and essence must first be drawn.403 Hence, looking for an African human 
rights concept in the same form as it is known from a European perspective may not be 
fruitful.404 There is obviously nothing sacrosanct about the forms evolved in the West 
because they differ from one Western country to another.  
 
Thus, every nation should be allowed to express itself according to its own wishes and 
traditions.405 The enforcement of human rights must be premised on local conditions 
because the simplistic adoption of models designed elsewhere is likely to be 
unsuccessful.406 Although African countries slavishly imitated former colonial masters’ 
institutions, these institutions have to a large extent failed to yield tangible results as they 
cannot function in the same way in a culturally, historically and socially different 
context.407 However, while it is proper to predicate human rights enforcement on local 
conditions, insisting on autochthony or a ‘unique African concept’ of human rights would 
be contradictory to the view that human rights also belong to Africa and that pre-colonial 
Africans were familiar with them. This is because the debate on autochthony insists that 
human rights are ‘Western’ inventions or notions foreign to Africa that should be 
domesticated in order to develop or consolidate.408  
 
Further, the issue of a ‘unique African concept’ of human rights is highly problematic 
and controversial since it is hard to define what constitutes ‘African’ and what is, or may 
be, actually an ‘African version’ of the concept that is uniformly applicable, or known 
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throughout the continent.409 Simply put, African cultures are diverse and its societies 
differ in many respects, making it difficult for one to talk of an ‘African’ version of 
human rights. On the other hand, this should not be taken to mean that one cannot speak 
of an African contribution to human rights. Indeed the continent has contributed 
invaluably, in more than one ways, to the concept and its development.410  
 
In fact, all societies, be they modern or traditional, have contributed to the development 
of the human rights concept by upholding certain essential values.411 However, the ways 
these values are conceptualised differ.412 Put differently, although the conceptualisation 
of human rights differs from one society to another, all societies manifest the notion. This 
point was emphasised in the first meeting of the group of experts preparing a Draft 
African Charter in Dakar in November 1979 as follows: ‘You have to be careful that your 
Charter may not be a Charter of the ‘African man’. Humankind is one and indivisible and 
the basic needs are similar everywhere.’413 This means that Africa can have a model 
where human rights are universal in their essence, but allow for cultural diversity in their 
form, interpretation and practical application.414 Adherence to universalism does not 
imply that African peoples have no contribution to make to the development of the 
concept. 
 
Principally, universalism, it is argued herein, does not in itself preclude the expression of 
regional or national preferences and peculiarities.415 Thus, what may be deemed to be 
‘universally valid’ are the standards or values that define and perpetuate the inherent 
dignity of all human beings. These standards or values are what define the core of human 
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rights, viz inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence, interrelation and inherence.416 It 
is upon these standards or values that all human rights hinge, thus giving them a universal 
appeal.  
 
By extension, this means that universalism of human rights is only applicable to the 
extent that it is appreciated that all persons are vested with inalienable, interdependent, 
interrelated and indivisible rights by virtue of being custodians of inherent human 
dignity. Anything short of this recognition waters down its relevance. These standards 
may be uniformly (universally) enforced and realised notwithstanding the divergent 
interpretations (or margins of appreciation) given to human rights across socio-economic 
or political divides or geographical locations. It is argued that the fact that rights are 
interpreted contextually does not mean that human rights are not universal. 
 
It is therefore submitted that no single document, or even society, can represent a 
blueprint of the full content of ‘human rights’.417 This is because, as stated earlier, the 
substance of human rights depends on the cultural setting of a particular society. As 
Quashigah observed, ‘since societal development has never been universally in pari 
materia, human rights contents which are specific ideas rooted in certain social 
circumstances of particular societies cannot be expected to be universal.’418 He, however, 
acknowledged that certain human rights are ‘indisputably universally ascribable to 
persons of every historical, geographical and cultural background.’419 This view seems to 
bridge the gap between the hypothetical absolute universalism and the purely relativistic 
view. It emphasises an approach which on the one hand recognises that universalism 
exists to some extent but that some space must also be given to relativism. 
 
Undoubtedly, most African governments have accepted the UN Charter and UDHR.420 
However, to conclude that their acceptance of the UN documents has led to the evolution 
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of universal human rights standards would be merely legalistic and ignorant of the 
political, economic, cultural and social factors that underpinned the promulgation of these 
documents.421 Some governments adopt international instruments as a mere formality or 
as a public relations exercise. Again, in many regards, the UDHR is universal in essence 
but not in form. This is because, although it contains certain provisions which are 
respected in all societies and cultures, for example, the right to life and the right against 
torture, the conceptualisation of these rights tends to differ from one society to the other.  
 
The lack of uniformity in conceptualisation exposes the concept of human rights to many 
exceptions as a result of which universalism loses meaning. For example, while the right 
to marry in most parts of the world involves members of the opposite sex, in some states, 
mainly in the West, it is increasingly being extended to homosexuals, despite strong 
objections from certain quarters.422 Similarly, in states where the death sentence has been 
abolished, the right to life is absolute, while in other states where this sentence may be 
imposed it is qualified or limited. Again, whereas freedom of worship includes the right 
to change one’s religion, Muslim states, by virtue of Islamic tenets, may regard such a 
change as apostasy.  
 
It follows that ‘universalism’ varies to a great extent and is subject to remarkable 
specificities and peculiarities, a phenomenon that puts its relevance into question. Hence, 
it might take some time for universalism to be acknowledged in practice and be legally 
recognised by all states.423 This is especially if Europe and the US will continue to expect 
high human rights standards from the countries of the south yet fail to do the same on 
their part.424 On a more positive note, it is inevitable to note that the African human rights 
system, which was previously more inclined to cultural relativism, is gradually shifting to 
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a less radical approach. This approach, at least to some degree, recognises the 
universality of human rights. 
 
It is now accepted that the African Charter is based on a compromise between a wide-
ranging diversity of national legal and cultural backgrounds.425 At the same time, the 
African human rights system looks upon the UN and other regional human rights systems 
when developing its normative and jurisprudential frameworks. Thus, African states 
cannot validly argue that human rights represent ‘Western imperialism’, because the 
African human rights system, a system Africans specifically crafted, is inspired by, and 
reinforces universal human rights norms.  
 
The African human rights concept, on the other hand, can only be valid if it does not 
trample on the universal standard that acknowledges the inherent dignity of every person. 
The question that could be asked is, should African scholars continue their search for a 
‘suitable African human rights concept’, or should the present discussion be taken to 
mean the end of the debate on this issue? The answer is, the quest for a ‘suitable African 
human rights concept’ is not about to end, however much one may want to discourage it.  
 
The ongoing debate on the African concept of human rights should be encouraged in 
order to develop the African human rights system. Adoption of African notions or 
concepts of human rights will not make African leaders any less responsible for their 
human rights commitments at the international level, as the universalists fear.426 
However, the goal of adopting such notions should not be to allow oppressive leaders or 
intellectuals to formulate ‘African concepts’ of human rights that would perpetuate 
oppression of the African masses and neo-colonialism.427 Rather, the goal should be to 
develop the African human rights system, taking heed of the pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial experiences of the African people. Caution should also be taken when 
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crafting a ‘suitable African human rights concept’ to avert the possibility of giving the 
impression that human rights are foreign to Africa and Africans. 
 
2.5.2 The status of human rights in Africa during the slave trade period 
 
The nature, scope and dynamics of human rights violations on the continent took a 
dramatic turn for the worst since her contact, over the past many centuries, with the 
Islamic jihadists, Arab merchants and later Euro-American slavers and imperialists.428 
Since the seventh century, Africa witnessed successive waves of military assault, massive 
destructions and killings.429 During the first half of the 8th century, Islam began to work 
its way across the trans-Saharan trade route from North to West Africa. Not long after the 
Arab conquerors had overrun North Africa, the Umayyad rulers there began organising 
military expeditions and slave raids into the southern regions of Morocco and as far south 
as the boundaries of the ancient Ghana empire. On several occasions, Arab settlers, 
particularly those in Mauritania, unleashed persecution, summary execution, deprivation 
of citizenships, illegal expulsion and arbitrary arrests on African-Mauritanians.430  
 
The widest suppression and desecration of human rights during Africa’s colonial period 
has been attributed to the slave trade.431 The trade in slaves was accompanied by wars, 
ironically waged just to capture slaves. Victims of slave trade were mainly men, women 
or children who were thought to have brought dishonour to the family, the village or the 
clan. They were often sold into slavery to prevent further disrepute.432 Slaves went 
through agonising and torturous experiences from the time they were captured, marched 
to the slave market and finally sold to the intermediary slave trader.433  
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They were tied to each other, with chains around their necks and their hands tied behind 
their backs. Some had their lips perforated and locked with a view to preventing them 
from eating when desired. Such act can be described not only as barbaric but also a gross 
violation of human rights.434 The slave ship itself was the ultimate in human degradation, 
for the slaves were packed like sardines and left in chains.435 In the process many slaves 
died due to the poor conditions of transportation. Worse still, stubborn or sick ones were 
thrown overboard. William Wilberforce is quoted to have said: ‘Never can so much 
misery be found condensed into so small a space as in a slave ship.’436  
 
According to statistics, it was not unusual to have an 80% casualty-rate in a boat. It was 
also estimated that for every 300 slaves that survived in the Americas, 700 had died— 
500 during the raids and the march to the coast, 125 in slave ships and 75 after landing in 
the New World.437 As a result of the slave trade, large areas of Africa were depopulated. 
It is estimated that about twenty million people were transported out of the continent 
during this period.438  
 
Besides having negative implications on human rights, the trade was totally extractive of 
human resources, negated political, economic, social and cultural development and 
stultified the growth of civilisation.439 It destroyed kingdoms and prevented the 
development of legitimate trade. Personal insecurity was highest during the slave-trade 
era with consequent degradation of the quality of life.440 Slaves who survived the long 
tortuous journey across the Atlantic sea finally reached their destinations where they were 
subjected to hours of daily toil, further torture, the denial of adequate food and 
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satisfaction of innate human desires. Most were transported to the New World for the 
exploitation of its resources.441  
 
Shocking as it now appears, the institution of slavery was generally legal under the 
national laws of many European countries and America by the end of the eighteenth 
century.442 It was legal in the United States until 1863, in Brazil until 1880, and in some 
countries into the twentieth century. In England it was illegal according to the Somerset’s 
case of 1772, and at the turn of the century, a humanitarian movement, largely inspired 
by William Wilberforce, sought to prohibit it internationally.443 Due to its inhuman and 
degrading nature, and following the campaigns of anti-slavery activists, steps were taken 
to secure the abolition of slave trade so as to prevent the increase in the number of 
slaves.444  
 
In 1807, slave trade was prohibited in British colonies.445 It was also abolished in France, 
and by the treaty of Paris of 1814 the British and French governments agreed to 
cooperate in the suppression of the traffic in slaves. This undertaking was generalised and 
accompanied by a solemn condemnation of the practice by the major European states at 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815.446 More than fifty bilateral treaties on the subject were 
concluded between 1815 and 1880, and at the Berlin Conference of 1885 the practice was 
forbidden in conformity with the principles of international law.447 All the efforts and 
successes to end the trade in slaves notwithstanding, a permanent imprint had been left on 
the face of the continent on how brutal human beings can be against one another.448  
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Thus, the subsequent attempts, centuries later, by Western states to reprove African states 
for their poor human rights records went largely unheeded and were largely dismissed as 
pretentious.449 Unluckily, the slave trade was just the beginning of the nightmarish ordeal 
Africans would experience for a couple of centuries thereafter.450 With the demise of the 
trade in slaves came the urgent need among the European powers already in Africa to 
translate their presence into other commercial activities.451  
 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the British, French, Dutch, 
Portuguese, and other Europeans brutishly jostled one another for influence and control 
over trade of certain valued commodities.452 So intense was the competition for 
commercial hegemony that in 1884 Chancellor Bismarck of Germany convened a 
conference of European nations to diffuse the tension that had built among them. The 
purpose of the conference was to establish rules ‘for recognising spheres of commercial 
suzerainty.’453 Its end result was the partitioning of Africa amongst European powers. 
This was climaxed by a frenetic scramble to establish spheres of dominance where none 
existed before.454 Eventually, Africa found itself under the control of ‘white’ foreigners. 
The major colonial powers at that time were France, Britain and Belgium. Portugal and 
Spain exacted some measure of colonial authority as well, though they had no great 
impact as the other three.455  
 
As already stated above, each of these powers had its unique system of administration. 
Differences in the systems were based on the philosophical and historical experiences of 
the colonisers.456 These systems could loosely be dabbed: indirect, direct/paternalism and 
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the assimilation systems. It is therefore imperative to consider them separately in order to 
determine the status of human rights under each. 
 
2.5.3 Human rights in colonial Africa 
 
Before the coming of foreigners to Africa, local societies, as already indicated, were 
mostly governed by customary law and traditions.457 Foreign intrusion later led to the 
decline and subsequent demise of the then subsisting African kingdoms, chiefdoms and 
empires. In spite of this, there remained a substantial part of the culture, political systems 
and customs inherited from the past.458 African customary law amazingly survived the 
onslaught from foreign invasion, even after vehement attempts to subjugate it. Foreign 
invasion did, however, have a direct and decisive impact on it.  
 
In the first place, with the coming of Arab slave traders and later the colonialists, African 
customary law ceased to be endogenously developed by Africans. It no longer evolved 
according to African needs. African societies became subject to political, economic and 
social domination. Local cultures were either ignored or supplanted with foreign ones.459 
Besides tampering with the socio-economic and political formation of the then existing 
societies, foreign intervention in Africa was characterised by gross violation of human 
rights.460  
 
In many instances, Africans were regarded as beasts rather than human. It is against this 
background that this part of the study examines the status of human rights in Africa in the 
wake of colonialism. The term ‘colonial period’ is deliberately used to depict that period 
when Africa was subjugated by the cruel hand of its European foreign ‘masters’, who 
initially posed as its trading partners only to reveal their true intentions later on. In this 
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study therefore, ‘colonial period’ essentially envisages the entire epoch from the coming 
of the European imperialists to when they relinquished their dominion over the continent.   
 
It should be noted that foreigners employed different techniques to bring the African 
inhabitants to submission as well as plunder their resources. As a result, the techniques 
and systems of administration preferred, for example, by the British, French, and Belgian 
colonialists to govern their subjects varied a lot. However, the end result of each was the 
gross violation of human rights and suppression of the local African population. To put 
this phenomenon into perspective, this part of the study illuminates the status of human 
rights in colonial Africa by examining the following key systems that marked this period: 
indirect administration system (British rule), direct administration/paternalism 
(Belgian/Portuguese rule) and the assimilation system (French rule). 
 
2.5.3.1 The status of human rights in colonial Africa under the   
                        Indirect Rule system 
 
The indirect rule system of colonial administration was coined and perpetuated by the 
British in their colonies. The system was ‘indirect’ because it encouraged the use of 
existing institutions and the traditional political leaders.461 Where the system flourished, 
the African traditional chief became a tool in the hands of the British colonisers for the 
main purpose of maximising exploitation.462 It was also invented and imposed on 
societies that were generally not hierarchically structured.463 Under this system, each 
colony was divided into regions governed by regional administrators or chiefs, each 
region into provinces under provincial commissioners, and each province into districts 
under district commissioners.464 Each district consisted of one or more of the traditional 
communities, and the day-to-day affairs and local ordinances were left in the hands of 
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traditional rulers and the council of elders.465 The system recognised and provided for the 
application of African customary law. Although the system utilised the services of local 
chiefs and rulers, indirect rule had two major limitations in that regard.  
 
First, it tended to conserve and reinforce the authoritarian aspect of the powers of the 
chiefs who frequently abused them. Their authority went beyond the limits that would 
have been tolerated in traditional African societies.466 Secondly, the imposition of this 
system derailed the dynamic evolution of African institutions that would have 
increasingly developed and become more democratic as a result of inevitable intercourses 
between various groups; notably, the emergence of the elite who would be opposed to 
absolute traditionalism.467 
 
Generally, the indirect rule of colonial administration was essentially authoritarian and 
even the introduction of English law as the basis for the local legal systems did not result 
in the colonial subjects enjoying the full rights of liberty, due process, free speech and 
other rights, which the common law was said to guarantee to the English themselves at 
that time.468 The system encouraged buttressing of the powers of the traditional rulers, the 
creation of special native courts to apply unwritten customary laws and administrative 
orders, the exercise of powers of political detention or deportation and use of laws of 
sedition and censorship framed more widely than those of England.469  
 
In addition, the system established and maintained, by means of law, a governmental and 
societal system characterised by authoritarianism and racial discrimination in such fields 
as the administration of justice, the development of representative institutions and 
agrarian administration.470 Like the French and Belgian systems, indirect rule did not 
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create adequate appeal machinery, nor did it place fundamental and justiceable 
limitations of power on either the legislature or executive. The legislature had a wide 
measure of freedom in the areas in which it could legislate and the emergency powers 
granted to it could only have exacerbated the denial of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.471  
 
The point remains that this system, like colonialism at large, was disrespectful of African 
traditions and values. It relegated Africans to subservience in all fields. It arrested and 
destroyed the internal dynamics of the evolution of African societies.472 Undoubtedly, by 
abolishing certain objectionable traditional practices that were prevalent in pre-colonial 
Africa, such as human sacrifice, slavery, killing of twins, among others, the colonialists 
somehow contributed to the development of human rights.473 However, the negative 
effects of colonialism generally, and the indirect rule system in particular, on colonial and 
independent Africa cannot be taken lightly.   
 
2.5.3.2 The status of human rights in colonial Africa under the   
                        Direct Rule/ Paternalism system 
 
Direct rule or paternalism system was employed by Belgium to govern its colonies in 
Africa.  These colonies were located in the Congo basin and embraced also the Rwanda-
Burundi regions.  Under this system of colonial administration, Africans were considered 
to be incapable of guiding their own destinies.474 Thus, the colonialist controlled every 
aspect of African life and welfare. Thus, Belgian Congo was administered directly from 
Brussels to the effect that all edicts and directives came from there. The Congolese were 
not consulted in the administration of their own affairs. Belgian overlords felt free to 
interfere in the selection of African leaders in their protected states.475 Prior to the 
introduction of this system, the personal influence of King Leopold II of Belgium 
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prevailed in this region. Later, Congo graduated from the personal rule of the king to the 
status of a Belgian colony.476  
 
Colonial rule in the Congo was a tripartite arrangement: rule by corporation, which 
consisted of the crown, the Catholic Church and large companies in which the crown held 
substantial stock. The colonial administration of the Congo under the tripartite 
arrangement was brutal, portraying a picture of almost total human degradation. This was 
aggravated by the preoccupation of King Leopold who not only reaped benefits from the 
region but also regarded the territory as his private property.477 The brutality and 
exploitation of the Congo by King Leopold II attracted widespread protests in the region. 
This forced the Belgian parliament to annex the Congo Independent State, as it was then 
called, under Leopold’s sole ‘ownership’, and brought it under Belgian state rule, after 
the adoption of the Colonial Charter of 1908, as the Belgian Congo.478 The takeover by 
the Belgian parliament achieved little by way of reform after that date. From the period of 
takeover, Belgian colonial policy was one of direct rule, also known as paternalism or 
tutelage.    
 
Through the direct rule system, stringent conditions were imposed on the subjects. For 
example, the African could not travel in the Congo without a permit, possess arms or 
drink anything stronger than beer.479 He could be a bishop, journalist, an accountant, a 
medical assistant, a teacher, a civil servant or a pharmacist, but not an architect or an 
attorney. By the 1930s there were several lawyers in British and French West Africa, but 
not a single one in the Congo.480 The reason for restricting Africans in the Congo from 
the study of law was because of colonial politics. Lawyers meant politics, and they would 
instigate demands for political rights outlawed for the Africans.481  
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Despite the total control that Belgium had over their African colonial subjects, the 
subjects were never considered citizens nor given the opportunity to become one, as was 
done by the French.482 Unlike the British and the French, the Belgians did their utmost to 
keep their African subjects out of Europe, particularly out of Belgium itself. Africans in 
other European colonies could attend universities in Europe, but not the Congolese.483 
The Belgian administration, like that of the French and British, was equally brutal. To 
suppress rebellions, the ‘scotched-earth’ policy was applied where villages were burned 
down to ashes.   Its policies were not for the betterment of Africans. They were racist and 
degraded Africans in many respects, to say the least. Human rights were therefore more 
of a myth than a reality under this system of colonial administration.  
 
2.5.3.3 The status of human rights in colonial Africa under the   
                       Assimilation system 
 
The assimilation system was the handmaiden of the French colonial administration. 
Under this system, the colonised people were expected to assimilate the French culture. 
The rationale for assimilation was based on the belief that French culture was superior.484 
The system made it impossible to have a uniform application of policies. Policies in 
many cases had to be modified to accommodate the various categories of persons present 
in society.485 Most often, this meant that at the political level, the traditional rights of 
African societies to participate in their own government had to be suspended. This system 
posed the gravest danger to indigenous African institutions, especially the great 
paramount chieftaincies, which were deliberately destroyed.486  
 
Apart from an unacceptable arrogance, in some areas, as to the superiority of the French 
law and jurisprudence, the French made a distinction between various categories of 
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Africans on the one hand and the French on the other.487 For example, customary law was 
applicable to persons who were considered as having customary status (statut coutumier), 
while persons to whom the French law applied acquired the French civil status (statut 
civil Francais). Assimilation was limited to a few Africans and the French were 
compelled to resort to indirect rule when they failed to do otherwise.488  
 
Notwithstanding the applicable system, chiefs who were at the apex of traditional African 
societies were reduced to being agents of French colonial administrators. At the societal 
level, freedom of movement was restricted so as to ensure the provision of cheap labour 
both for the administration and the colonial corporations and for this adequate pay was 
not given.489 Forced labour was also practised. The indigenat, which consisted of 
regulations that allowed colonial administrators to inflict punishment on African subjects 
without obtaining a court judgement or approval from the metropolis, was largely applied 
under the French system.490 It allowed the colonial officers to jail any African for up to 
two years without trial, to impose heavy taxes and punitive fines, or to burn the villages 
of those who refused to pay.491  
 
In summary therefore, there is no doubt that no one system of colonial administration was 
better than the other. A closer look at these systems will reveal that they had the same 
objectives and produced more or less similar consequences for the colonised peoples.492 
By whatever name called, or philosophies under which they were formulated, all the 
systems were fashioned to exploit the colonies in the maximum way possible. Colonial 
policies and legislation were generally racist, and degraded Africans in many respects. 
Even when native law and custom could generally be enforced, they could not be 
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observed or enforced if they were repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, or incompatible with any ordinance in force in the territories.493  
 
Ironically, the standards of natural justice, equity and good conscience by which they 
were to be judged were of colonial origin.494 Additionally, all colonisers practised forced 
labour; were disrespectful of African traditions and values and by relegating Africans to 
subservience, particularly in the field of administration, arrested and destroyed the 
internal dynamics of the evolution of African societies.495 Colonialism denied the people 
of the right to determine their political, economic, and social future.  
 
No wonder in many cases, the history and legacy of violations of the rights of African 
peoples that began during colonialism became the basis on which post-colonial despots 
undermined international efforts against human rights abuses on the continent. Thus, 
former President of Zaire (now ‘the Democratic Republic of Congo’), the late Mobutu 
Sese Seko, a leading despot in Africa (during his time) and an ally of Western 
governments (particularly the US), was able to claim without remorse, shamelessly 
though: 
 
we are often accused of violating human rights. Today it is Amnesty International and 
tomorrow it is a human rights league and so forth. During the entire colonial period, the 
universal conscience never thought it necessary to have a human rights organisation when 
indignities, humiliations and inhuman treatment inflicted in those days against the people 
of the colonies should have been condemned. It is rather odd. Everybody waited until we 
became independent suddenly to wake up and start moralising all day long our young 
states. 496 
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While Mobutu’s sentiments cannot be upheld as a justification for the continued violation 
of human rights in post-colonial Africa, it must be conceded that indeed the exploitation 
and subjugation witnessed during the colonial era were done with impunity in utter 
violation of international standards. One example is the noble International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) minimum standards for dealing with labour under the ILO 
Conventions. According to M’Baye, the application of these standards in the colonial 
territories appeared to be practically outside the purview of the conventions, or the 
colonialists chose on their own not to apply them without any consequences.497  
 
Ironically, the abuse and marginalisation of Africa from the international human rights 
affairs could not be stopped by the League of Nations. Member states of the league 
misused international law against Africa while it remained passive.498 This was 
epitomised by Italy’s invasion and colonisation of Ethiopia in 1935, an independent 
member of the league.499 Umozurike argued that certain states failed to regard Ethiopia as 
a sovereign state, ‘because it was African.’500 Thus, the failure of the UN Security 
Council to respond adequately to violation of human rights in Africa compared to other 
regions may be a legacy of the marginalisation and oppression of Africa. 
 
Furthermore, the colonised states were excluded from deriving benefit from the whole 
international human rights movement that had been galvanised by the League of Nations 
and further developed under the UN.501 The UDHR, for example, while theoretically 
intended as profiting the colonised peoples and nations, was not in fact applied to check 
discrimination and other injustices resulting from colonialism. It was not until the 
promulgation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
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and Territories by the UN in 1960 that serious consideration was given to the conditions 
of peoples and nations under alien domination.502  
 
2.5.4 Human rights in post-colonial Africa 
 
The status of human rights protection and promotion in Africa took a slightly different 
turn from the late 1950s when the then colonised states began to emerge from colonial 
bondage.503 By then, colonialism had greatly damaged the socio-economic and political 
structures of the traditional African societies. New systems, which were totally in contrast 
with the values and norms of the local populace, were in place.504 Thus, the emerging 
states had to face the challenge of embracing new values, systems and institutions, on the 
one hand, and the universal agitation for human rights promotion and protection, on the 
other.505  
 
Amid these challenges states that were independent resolved to consolidate their efforts 
and forge a common front to blot out colonialism in its entirety from the face of the 
continent. This move saw the emergence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
whose historical antecedents shall be examined in detail below. Further, albeit 
reluctantly, independent African states also saw the need for regional mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights on the continent. This came along with the unending concern 
for an African concept of human rights, whose parameters were demystified elsewhere 
above.  
 
This part of the study shall therefore examine the status of human rights promotion and 
protection in post-colonial Africa. The key aspects of this examination shall be: the 
emergence of independent Africa states; the emergence and role of the OAU in human 
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rights protection in Africa and the emergence and evolution of Africa’s regional human 
rights system to its present status.  
 
2.5.4.1 The emergence of independent African states 
  
With the emergence of independent African states, there were high hopes for the 
protection and promotion of human rights and the restoration of human dignity on the 
continent.506 This was especially because, political governance had passed from the hands 
of colonialists to indigenous leaders who were expected to understand and appreciate the 
problems of their people. It was equally expected that the lost glory and traditional 
institutions that were undermined by colonialists would be restored, of course with some 
reforms that would accommodate the incumbent socio-economic and political 
diversity.507 This, however, turned out not to be the case. Many of the emerging 
independent states adopted constitutions and legal systems similar to those of the colonial 
powers, regardless of the fact that they were in conflict with the socio-economic and 
political set-up of the traditional societies.508 With these legal and constitutional systems 
came a package of guarantees— multiparty systems, independence of the judiciary, rule 
of law, and the promotion and protection of human rights, among others.  
 
Sadly, the end of the 1960s was characterised by the negation of the pledged democracy 
as well as gross violation of human rights with impunity across the continent. Multiparty 
democracy became a by-word as opposition parties were regarded as ‘clogs in the wheels 
of progress.’509 Thus, ruling parties which had become more intolerant of the opposition 
politics denied government resources and facilities to their opponents and some even 
veered to the single party system.510  
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The line between public, party and private property became blurred, as evidenced in the 
massive wealth of most long-reigning political leaders— even as their countries 
wallowed in penury.511 As corruption became rife, the misused resources were 
insufficient to support the expected rate of development. A wave of coups therefore 
swept across the continent, where the military took over or attempted to overthrow 
virtually all African governments, purportedly to clean the socio-economic and political 
messes.512  
 
Military regimes were usually enthusiastically received as saviours by the populace at the 
initial stages but with time fell into the same errors as the civilians.513 Eventually, the rule 
of law changed to the rule of force and in some states some ethnic groups were marked 
out for systematic decimation and marginalisation.514 There were mutinies in Burundi and 
Rwanda in the 1970s and 1990s and in Nigeria, as early as 1966. In the same period, 
Ghana witnessed ten-minute trials and executions of former heads of government, 
following a successful military coup.  
 
Generally, respect for human rights reached its lowest ebb on the continent in the 
1970s.515 During this period, for example, a number of African states deported foreign 
Africans from their territories and in most cases deprived them of their property.516 
Nigerians were deported from Cameroon soon after independence, Ghanaians from Ivory 
Coast, Rwandans from Burundi and vice versa. Ghana deported foreigners in 1969 and 
1970 in order to check unemployment.517 Liberians were deported from Ivory Coast and 
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Nigerians from Zaire. Kenyans, Tanzanians and Asian Ugandans were expelled from 
Uganda.518  
 
In summary, although African leaders were expected to promote and protect human 
rights at independence, they violated the same with impunity. Unfortunately, as Babu 
sarcastically stated, liberation was duly climaxed by the following tendencies commonly 
embraced by leaders all over Africa: 
 
Arbitrary arrest of citizens; disrespect for the right of habeas corpus; imprisonment 
without trial; denial of freedom of movement; … organised and systematic police 
brutality; domination of government by secret police; mass arrests and detentions; 
concentration camps; physical and mental torture of prisoners; public executions; and the 
whole apparatus of violent repression.519 
 
This has been an ongoing situation in Africa. Human rights violations have taken new 
forms and status, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As 
recently as 1994, for example, the continent experienced one of the gravest genocides in 
its history where approximately 800,000 people were brutally massacred in Rwanda.520 
Violence has, since the colonial era, been an instrument of governance in the hands of 
Africa’s ruling class.521 Likewise, torture is still widely popular among the rulers. The 
paradox of the situation is that human rights violations in independent African states has, 
and continues to produce consequences which when carefully considered are antithetical 
to the interests of protection and promotion of human rights, particularly in the regional 
set up.522 This in a way justifies the previous and current intergovernmental efforts 
towards the promotion and protection of human rights at the regional level. These efforts 
shall therefore be highlighted below. 
  
                                                 
518Ibid.  
519 Babu A, African socialism or socialist Africa? (1981), p. 171. 
520 For more information on the Rwandan genocide and the ongoing trials of its perpetrators, visit 
www.ictr.org.  
521 Alemika E, ‘Protection and realisation of human rights in Africa’, note 428 above, p. 152. 
522 Ibid. 
 180
2.5.4.2 The emergence and role of the OAU in human rights  
                     protection in Africa 
 
The background to the creation of the OAU can be traced back to a series of 
developments in various regions across the continent,523 with the various groupings 
among French-speaking countries524, East and Central Africa525 and others pulling in 
slightly different directions.526 In August 1959 a conference of nine independent African 
states527 was held in Monrovia to look specifically at the Algerian question— to stop the 
war there and assist the nationalists, many of these states having recognised the Algerian 
provisional government. The successes of this conference provoked a number of All-
African Peoples’ conferences, which were held in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the 
aim of encouraging those who were not yet liberated to liberate themselves and to 
organise non-violent revolution in Africa.528 At this stage the potential role of African 
states in the concerted effort to promote and protect human rights within the continent 
emerged in the forms of condemnation of racism in South Africa, the call for the need for 
universal vote and concerns about religious separatism, among others.529 
 
With the passing of time, these states acknowledged the need for a regional organisation 
of independent states that would help them speak as one voice. States did not, however, 
agree on the nature of the regional organisation, with some falling into the ‘Monrovia’ 
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bloc530, favouring a ‘more classical, ‘confederal’ approach where, ‘far from aiming at the 
integration of African states, sovereignty would be preserved in the framework of a much 
looser arrangement.’531 In contrast, other states under the leadership of Ghana’s President 
Nkrumah, in what became known as the ‘Casablanca’ bloc532, had signed the more 
federalist Casablanca Charter for economic cooperation, stressing elements of self-
defence and the need to eliminate colonialism.533  
 
In May 1961 a pan-African conference was held in Monrovia in which twenty-two of the 
twenty-seven states in Africa that were independent at that time participated, although the 
Casablanca bloc was not represented. Some liberation movements were also admitted as 
observers.534 One of the recommendations of the conference was that a charter should be 
drawn up for an Organisation of African and Malagasy states.535 Therefore, in January 
1962 a second conference of the newly formed Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government was held in Lagos, Nigeria to look at drafting a Charter.536 Among other 
things, it proposed the establishment of a Council of Ministers.  
 
Eventually the conference approved in principle a detailed charter for an Organisation of 
Inter-African and Malagasy states with three organs: an Assembly of Heads of State, a 
Council of Ministers and a Secretariat, with a Secretary General. It proposed setting up 
committees on certain issues.537  The text of the charter was finally adopted and at a 
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further meeting in December 1962, seventeen states signed the charter of the 
Organisation of African and Malagasy states, or Lagos Charter.538 
 
Emerson observed, the history of colonisation to which nearly all of Africa had been 
subject, the resulting groupings among newly independent African states and the idea of a 
sense of African unity were behind the creation of the OAU.539 It was within the remits of 
the OAU that the independence of the African states should be safeguarded and all forms 
of colonialism and racism, especially as manifested in southern Africa, be ended.540 What 
therefore reinforced the OAU was what Kannyo called ‘the strong and unanimous desire 
to complete the process of decolonisation and dismantle the system of apartheid in South 
Africa.’541 However, the OAU Charter did not intimate the protection and promotion of 
human rights as one of its principal goals. Instead, its objectives simply mentioned the 
eradication of ‘all forms of colonialism’ from Africa, while its preamble glossed over the 
desire of its members to observe human rights, in the following words:    
 
Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent… 
[p]ersuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for 
peaceful and positive cooperation among states... 
 
Dlamini observed that besides the issues of apartheid and decolonisation, the only sense 
in which the OAU could be considered as an organisation for the promotion of human 
rights was in relation to its general goal of ‘total advancement of our peoples in spheres 
of human endeavours.’542 Kannyo attributed the absence of human rights provisions in 
the charter of the OAU to the purpose for which the organisation was established, that is, 
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the termination of foreign dominion.543 Perhaps one of OAU’s major failures was its lack 
of emphasis on human rights protection and promotion; which could have been the 
reason why some of its member states lacked comprehensive Bills of Rights in their 
independence constitutions. Member states were expected to ascribe to the human rights 
fundamentals entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.544 
 
Despite its obvious failure to entrench human rights through the provisions of its charter, 
the OAU’s role in agitating for the right to self-determination in the continent cannot be 
overemphasised. The organisation relentlessly played a crucial role in strengthening and 
invigorating the UN’s efforts against colonialism and apartheid by setting up a Liberation 
Committee through which it channelled support to the liberation movements fighting in 
Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Guinea (Bissau) and South Africa.545 The organisation 
gave its official approval to the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 adopted by the Heads of State 
of East and Central Africa and secured its adoption by the UN General Assembly.546 The 
manifesto renewed faith in ‘the belief that all men are equal and have equal rights to 
human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, religion or sex. We believe that all men 
have the right and duty to participate as equal members of the society, in their 
government.’547 The manifesto was a carefully crafted instrument that embodied the ideas 
of democracy and was therefore an unassailable condemnation of apartheid.  
 
Additionally, the OAU exerted itself to ameliorate the plight of refugees that was created 
by colonial repression and liberation wars.548 It adopted the 1969 Convention on the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa549, which not only incorporates aspects 
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of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, on persons fleeing 
because of a well-founded fear of persecution, but also extends the status to others 
escaping from the consequences of aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order.550 The OAU in this regard co-operated with 
international agencies and helped the host states financially to support refugees who had 
fled their countries in Africa.551  
 
The OAU’s role in human rights protection and promotion in the continent was also 
emphasised by the myriad conferences552 and summits held to discuss the issue of 
conflicts and human rights affecting the continent, from which an array of treaties, 
protocols, declarations and communiqués emanated.553 Other commissions established 
under the organisation’s charter also had the mandate to consider human rights matters. 
These included the Labour and Social Affairs Commission, the Population Commission 
and the Women’s Committee on Peace and Development.554 All these initiatives 
evidenced a willingness by African states to perceive human rights as a matter within the 
OAU’s remit.555 
 
In spite of its roles in human rights protection and promotion on the continent, the OAU 
suffered a serious legitimacy crisis in as far as it remained passive while its members 
grossly violated human rights with impunity. The organisation was strongly accused for 
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unduly emphasising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member 
states.556 Similarly, during its tenure, many armed conflicts on the continent escaped its 
rather blind eye. Among its many failures, the OAU was generally criticised for its 
inability to halt the genocide in Rwanda, stop the civil war in Liberia, mitigate the crisis 
in Burundi and put an end to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).557  
 
The end of the millennium therefore presented an opportunity for re-positioning the OAU 
in order to set the African continent as a whole on a firm path to development, peace and 
the respect for human rights.558 This therefore provoked the transformation of the OAU to 
the African Union (AU) whose Constitutive Act entrenches more human rights 
provisions than the OAU Charter. The evolution and normative parameters of the AU are 
discussed in detail elsewhere below.  
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that it is during the subsistence of the OAU that the 
continent witnessed the evolution of its regional human rights promotion and protection 
system. As different scholars have argued, the creation of this system was not of the 
OAU’s liking.559 In fact the OAU was utterly opposed to its formation for various 
reasons. It is therefore imperative to illuminate the evolution of this important 
phenomenon in the history of the continent’s efforts to ensure effective human rights 
promotion and protection.   
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2.5.4.3 The emergence of Africa’s regional human rights system  
 
The African human rights system is a product of prolonged negotiations from both within 
and outside the continent.560 Its emergence centres on a series of events that also instigated 
the rise and fall of the OAU. As already stated, the OAU was established to encourage a 
unified African front.561 The OAU leadership, for political expediency, resisted agitation 
by non-state actors for a proactive regional human rights system. The incumbent OAU 
leaders were reluctant to embrace a human rights system that would strictly define 
benchmarks for their compliance.562 Given the alarming levels of violations and the 
attendant impunity, there was so much agitation that resistance by the OAU could no 
longer hold back reforms.  
 
Notably the agitation for change had by then got the eye of the international community 
which precipitated international response by powerful nations such as the US calling for a 
proactive human rights dispensation in the continent.563 As Umozurike succinctly put it: 
 
Chief among these was the emphasis that President Carter placed on human rights in the 
international relations of the United States. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by the 
United States, Canada, and 33 European countries, emphasised respect for human rights. 
Watch committees were subsequently set up to monitor observance and this kept the issue 
alive in international politics…. Though unsuccessful, an attempt was made to include 
human rights in the renewed EEC-ACP pact, the Lome II Convention. The stage was thus 
set both internally and externally for the debut of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.564 
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President Carter of the US promoted human rights in his African policy to the point of 
cutting off aid to Uganda and placing an embargo on the importation of coffee as a 
sanction against Idi Amin’s violations of human rights.565 Similarly, there were futile 
attempts to incorporate human rights into the EEC-ACP, Lome II Convention. This, 
however, emphasised European concern for human rights in independent Africa.566 In 
addition, the activities of the UN on human rights and the pressure of non-governmental 
organisations, especially Amnesty International, popularised and strengthened the 
demand for the respect and promotion of human rights in the continent.567  
 
Political dictatorship had at that time reached its core on the continent, with some leaders 
proving to be more dictatorial than the European imperialists had been, and set out to 
demonstrate their superiority in brutal action against the people they ruled.568 The 
massive human rights violations in post-colonial African states became embarrassing to 
some of the African elite and leaders, such as President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, who 
had great respect for genuine African socialism and moral values.569  
 
Such a cadre of leaders was ashamed of the uncivilised and primitive behaviour of some 
of their colleagues who denied the continent not only the dignity it deserved in the eyes 
of the world but also the necessary adjustment to the changing times and circumstances 
of the universal moral order of the post-Second World War era.570 Consequently, they felt 
they had to do something to ensure respect for the rule of law and the protection of 
Africa’s image in the post-colonial period. They regretted the breakdown of the African 
code of the extended family and African values. This provoked an earnest search for a 
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human rights system that would incorporate African values without necessarily 
compromising universal standards.571  
 
The search for a new human rights dispensation in Africa goes back to as early as 1961 
when African jurists met in Lagos, Nigeria, under the auspices of the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and proposed the promulgation of a Human Rights Charter 
for Africa.572 The African Conference on the Rule of Law, as it was called, took steps to 
carry out the intentions of the ICJ to ensure the global adherence to the principle of Rule 
of Law.573 Here, the Conference proclaimed the ‘Law of Lagos’, which stated, among 
other things: 
 
That in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, this 
Conference invites the African governments to study the possibility of adopting an African 
Convention of Human Rights.574 
 
Interestingly, the conference also proposed the establishment of an African court of 
human rights, which was temporarily abandoned at the conception of the African Charter 
in favour of a more promotionally-oriented commission.575 During the 1960s and 1970s 
the process towards the creation of a legal framework for human rights protection and 
promotion in Africa, began in Lagos, intensified, expressed through a series of 
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conferences and seminars.576 Some of the most important milestones of this process were 
the UN Human Rights Commission seminar in Cairo in 1967 pressing for the 
establishment of an African human rights commission577, which in 1971 was followed up 
by a seminar in Addis Ababa in conjunction with the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa adopting this proposal.578  
 
Though their importance could hardly be overemphasised at that moment, it was common 
cause that regional human rights commissions would be meaningful if set up by the 
members of the regions themselves and not imposed from outside.579 The UN Human 
Rights Commission then advised the UN Secretary-General to organise seminars in those 
regions where no human rights commissions existed with a view to discussing the need 
for them.580 In 1969, another UN seminar was held in Cairo, Egypt, at the close of which 
the participants, including 19 African states, requested the UN Secretary-General to, inter 
alia, communicate the report and its recommendations to the OAU Secretary-General and 
members. One of the recommendations was the setting up of a regional commission in 
Africa that would be fully supported by the OAU member states.581  
 
The Cairo seminar opened the floodgate for other seminars, meetings and conferences in 
various parts of Africa. These were held in Lusaka, Zambia in 1970582; Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia in 1971583; Yaounde, Cameroon in 1971584; Libreville, Gabon in 1971585; and 
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Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in 1973.586 Most of these meetings echoed the urgent need for an 
African human rights commission or some other human rights protection mechanism.587  
 
Another significant event worth mentioning here was the International Commission of 
Jurists’ seminar on ‘Human Rights in a One-Party State’ co-hosted with the government 
of Tanzania in 1976, which drew up the important conclusions that human rights included 
both ‘individual and collective rights’, and stated that the establishment of civil and 
political rights must go hand in hand with the promotion of economic, social and cultural 
rights.588 These statements were to represent some of the most characteristic aspects of 
the African Charter. Later, seminars took place in 1978 in Butare, Rwanda and in Dakar, 
Senegal, both under the heading ‘Human Rights and Economic Development in 
Francophone Africa’.589  
 
Also in 1978 the third general meeting of the African Bar Association in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone, affirmed that individual human rights were fundamental in Africa, at the same 
time as the UN Human Rights Commission decided to review the human rights situation 
in several African countries. The Commission also adopted a resolution moved by 
Nigeria, which requested the assistance of the UN in establishing regional human rights 
institutions.590 The seminar in Dakar was particularly important since it succeeded in 
drafting concrete proposals for a human rights document. Here, President Sengor of 
Senegal agreed to sponsor a draft resolution which would provide for an African human 
                                                                                                                                                 
584 Seminar on measures to be taken on National Level for the implementation of the United Nations 
Instrument Aimed at Combating and Eliminating Racial Discrimination and for the Promotion of 
Harmonious Race Relations’ Yaounde, Cameroon 16-29 June 1971. 
585  Seminar on the Participation of Women in Economic Life, Libreville, Gabon 27-29 August 1971. 
586  Seminar on the study of New Ways and Means for Promoting Human Rights with special Attention to 
the Problems and Needs of Africa, Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania 23 October- 5 November 1973. 
587 Dlamini C, ‘Towards a regional protection of human rights in Africa: The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, (1991) XXIV CILSA, p. 189. 
588 Bello E, ‘Human rights: African developments’, Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1985), p 
287 See also Onguergouz F, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 576 above, p. 22.  
589 Ibid. 
590 Naldi G, The Organisation of African Unity (1989), p. 110. 
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rights commission at the next OAU Assembly meeting. Furthermore, he delegated Keba 
M’baye, President of the Supreme Court of Senegal and a judge of the International 
Court of Justice, to draft a text on human rights, which was later to form the basis of the 
present African Charter.591  
 
In more than one respect the road had then been paved for the initiation of the process 
that would result in the elaboration and adoption of the African Charter. The founding 
principles had already been laid down and even more significant was perhaps the OAU’s 
constructive change of policy towards more direct interference against the massive 
human rights violations in some African states.592 Significant in this respect was the 
establishment of the Bokassa inquiry in May 1979, where an independent OAU 
commission of five judges from the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo 
publicised its findings of substantive violations of human rights.593 Unable to bear the 
intense pressure and agitation for a regional human rights mechanism, the OAU caved in 
to the demands.  
 
At a summit conference held in Monrovia in July 1979, the OAU resolved to facilitate the 
process of establishing a commission on human rights.594 Later in the same year the UN 
convened another seminar to discuss the possibility of establishing an African human 
rights commission. The outcome of these meetings was the establishment of a working 
group to draft concrete proposals for the creation of an African Commission on Human 
Rights.595 The actual drafting process of the charter began with the first meeting of 
                                                 
591 Ibid.  
592 Bello E, ‘Human rights, African development’, note 588 above, p, 290. 
593 Ibid.  
594 This conference was preceded by a symposium organised by the OAU Secretariat in Monrovia, Liberia, 
from 12-16 February 1979, to discuss the theme, ‘What kind of Africa by the year 2000?’ Experts in 
various fields attended the symposium.  
595 UN seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference 
to Africa, Monrovia, 10-21 September 1979, UN Doc. ST/HR/SER.A/4 (1979); See also Kannyo E, Human 
rights in Africa: Problems and prospects, note 541 above, p. 28. 
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experts in Dakar, in November and December 1979, which produced a draft ‘specifically 
suited to cater for the special problems relating to human rights in Africa.’596  
 
The forceful accentuation of the need to take into consideration special African culture 
can to some degree be seen in view of the fact that the expert group, to their surprise, 
discovered that the Secretariat of the OAU had already prepared a preliminary draft based 
primarily on the European and American Conventions on Human Rights.597 The meeting 
rejected this draft accordingly, and outlined their own draft charter, which had the same 
basic characteristics as the final charter, even though it underwent several 
amendments.598 The next step was for the ministers of justice of the OAU member states 
to review the project, and the first meeting in this regard held in March 1980 in Addis 
Ababa failed to materialise, mainly due to political reasons.  
 
Subsequently, however, the Council of Ministers managed to meet two times in Banjul, 
Gambia, although the first of these sessions in June 1980 was unsuccessful, resulting in 
the drafting of only 11 articles at the end of the session.599 The basis for these difficulties 
was mainly the lack of consensus and a general atmosphere of suspicion among some 
delegates, and a prevailing tendency to maintain a cautious attitude on certain subjects.600 
Fortunately enough, the tension diffused remarkably at the second meeting of ministers in 
January 1981, also in Banjul, and in only two weeks the delegates succeeded in fully 
revisiting and adopting the text of the charter.601 In January 1981, the preliminary draft of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was finally adopted by the OAU 
Council of Ministers with some modifications. The 18th Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG) later adopted the charter in its session held in Nairobi, Kenya.602  
 
                                                 
596 Bello E, ‘Human rights, African development’, note 588 above, p. 30.  
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598 Ibid.  
599Lindholt L, Questioning the universality of human rights, note 195 above, p. 80.  
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In accordance with its Article 63(3), the Charter came into force 3 months after a simple 
majority of the member states of the OAU had ratified or acceded to it. The number of 
member states of the OAU was, at that time, 50, and a simple majority therefore meant 
that 26 states would have to ratify the charter in accordance with the provisions of art 
63(1) & (2) in order for it to come into force.603 This caused great concern and doubt 
among those who wanted to see the charter come into effect, because they feared that 
lack of sufficient commitment among the African states would render the charter to be of 
no effect.604 Indeed the process was slow, with only one state ratifying it in 1981, five in 
1982 and in 1983, and four in 1984.605  
 
In 1985 the process seemed to have come to a halt, when no state at all ratified the 
charter, giving way to grave speculations and widespread scepticism about its future. In 
1986, however, as many as 13 states ratified it, and suddenly the charter was a reality 
with a status similar to the European and the American Conventions on Human Rights.606 
It happened on 21 October 1986, when on 21 July 1986 Niger, as the 26th country, 
deposited its instrument of ratification, and as such tipped the crucial balance of the 
charter coming into force.607  
 
                                                 
603 Lindholt L, Questioning the universality of human rights, note 195 above, p. 80. 
604 Ibid.  
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The charter eventually entered into force on 21 October 1986.608 Once this was a reality, 
several other states took steps to ratify it. Lindholt argued that the period of five years 
from the adoption of the charter to its coming into force was not unduly long, considering 
the fact that the UN Covenants took eleven years to accomplish the same.609 Compared to 
the other regional instruments, where the European Convention took only three years and 
the American Convention nine years, the African Charter stands out proudly, given the 
political, social and economic circumstance in which it was born.610   
 
The adoption of the charter heralded the establishment of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. This commission was formally initiated in November 2, 
1987 and its Banjul Headquarters were established in mid-1989. The time span between 
the initiation of the commission and the establishment of its headquarters in Banjul 
speaks volumes about the ‘cold reception’ it got from its political principal, the OAU. 
Bello tried to explain this phenomenon by observing that:  
 
apart from concern held by governments, who were clearly unwilling to give up too fast 
their chosen policy of violating human and peoples’ rights for fear of losing comfortable 
privileges and positions, a substantial number of African leaders since the days of 
independence in the mid-sixties regarded almost all jurisdictional bodies, particularly of 
an international nature, with suspicion, and therefore were hesitant, at best, to accept 
supra-national provisions regarding human and peoples’ rights.611  
 
The fact that the charter has today been ratified by virtually all the states of Africa, 
however, indicates the growing commitment and willingness of African states to improve 
the state of human and peoples’ rights on the continent. Although it has been said to be a 
‘faulty document’, the African Charter is on record as the first major attempt by African 
leaders to establish regional mechanisms for the implementation of the rights of 
                                                 
608 For a detailed exposition of the Charter see, for example, D’Sa R, ‘Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
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609 Lindholt L, Questioning the universality of human rights, note 195 above, p.  80.  
610 Ibid.  
611 Bello E, ‘Human rights: African developments’ note 588 above, p. 135.  
 195
Africans.612 The Charter reaffirms the support of African leaders for protection of human 
rights and freedom, as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.613  
 
Having thus given consent to the internationalisation of human rights, African leaders 
could no longer plead that human rights were matters reserved exclusively for the 
domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, the concept of ‘national sovereignty’ would no longer 
provide a cover up for grave breaches of human rights.614 Just like its predecessors, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter entrenches a catalogue of 
rights. The context and scope of these rights shall be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that despite the international acclaim that heralded the 
adoption of the charter, and its subsequent entry into force, the demand for its reform 
began barely within five years of its existence.615 One reason for this demand is its failure 
to provide for adequate or effective enforcement institutions. While the African 
Commission has an elaborate promotional mandate under the African Charter, it does not 
possess sufficient protective powers.616 In fact, neither the Charter nor the Commission’s 
Rules of Procedures provide for enforceable remedies, or a mechanism for encouraging 
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and tracking state compliance with decisions that the Commission makes.617 Despite 
some positive developments in the Commission’s individual complaint mechanism618, the 
decisions it renders are non-binding, and attract little, if any, attention from governments 
of member states.619  
 
There was therefore the need to supplement the Commission’s mandate by creating other 
mechanisms, such as a regional human rights court. The agitation for a regional human 
rights court was coupled with increased activism and a continental call for the respect for 
human rights. This further necessitated the transformation of moribund institutions, such 
as the OAU and the creation of new mechanisms and initiatives such as the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). Consequently, the beginning of an important chapter in the history 
of regional promotion and protection of human rights in the continent was marked. What 
follows therefore is a discussion on the evolution of the African human rights system 
from its initial status, under the OAU and the African Commission’s regimes, to the 
current status, under the African Union (AU) and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.  
 
2.5.4.4 The evolution of the African human rights system to its    
present status  
 
From the 1990s, there has been a rapid transformation in the international human rights 
discourse which by extension has affected regional promotion and protection of human 
rights in Africa. This period witnessed what has been described as a ‘New World Order’, 
whose dictates have led both to positive and negative consequences in the protection and 
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promotion of human rights. The New World Order actually began with the collapse of the 
Berlin wall in 1989, which in turn marked the beginning of the end of the ideological 
division between the East and the West.620  
 
As this process advanced, African states struggled to integrate themselves continentally 
through increased sub-regional and regional coalitions and associations. By losing the 
benefits of East-West ideological divisions, they not only lost the political and 
ideological protection they had enjoyed since independence and throughout the Cold War 
era, but also became vulnerable as their Western allies turned their backs on those 
regimes whose outrageous human rights records had previously been ‘overlooked’ in the 
interests of retaining ‘African friends’ for strategic, economic, political, military and 
other reasons.621  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the West applied new conditions and pressures on African 
states and used human rights as a weapon against certain African governments perceived 
as perpetuating human rights abuses.622 Pressure appeared in different forms, including 
political isolation, economic embargos and incitement of political forces to strongly 
oppose some government’s poor human rights records.623 As if to reciprocate 
international efforts and concerns, African states embarked on a series of initiatives, 
meetings and conferences targeted at purging its human rights record. These initiatives 
were a marked departure from the passiveness previously displayed by a majority of 
African states in so far as human rights issues were concerned. Their contribution to the 
advancement of human rights promotion and protection in the continent cannot be 
overlooked.  
 
The Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, Austria, in 1993, 
perhaps inspired the positive attitude of African governments to human rights. The 
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greatest demonstration of Africa’s determination to improve its human rights situation 
occurred when the African Ministers of Justice and Attorney’s-General met in Tunis in 
November 1992 to prepare an African Position Paper that was presented in that 
conference.624 At the end of this meeting, they had adopted an ‘African Declaration of the 
Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights’. In this 
declaration, stress was laid on ‘the need to promote and protect human rights everywhere 
in Africa by all concerned institutions, groups and individuals, as well as by 
governments, national institutions, nongovernmental organisations and other bodies.’625  
 
The main objective of the 1993 conference was to set out the parameters of international 
human rights law. In its Declaration and Programme of Action, it was categorically 
stated: 
 
The promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms must be 
considered as a priority objective of the United Nations in accordance with its purposes 
and principles, in particular the purpose of international cooperation. In the framework of 
these purposes and principles, the promotion and protection of all human rights is a 
legitimate concern of the international community.626  
 
The Declaration and Programme of Action also settled the long drawn debate on the 
universality of human rights by stating: 
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.627     
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In spite of the outcome of the conference, violations of human rights increased during the 
1990s due to the prevailing political situations in various parts of Africa, most notably 
Algeria, Burundi, the DRC (formerly Zaire), Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda 
South Africa and the Sudan. At the same time, demands and pressure on African 
governments to enhance the promotion of human rights both locally and internationally 
were also intensified.628 This forced African governments to individually and collectively 
embark on efforts to resolve internal and regional conflicts in order to protect human 
rights.  
 
A number of meetings and conferences were therefore convened in Africa to look for 
ways to for arbitrating the human rights principles evolved at the Second World 
Conference on human rights. These conferences include the Grand Bay (Mauritius), 
Kigali (Rwanda), Cairo (Egypt) and Algiers (Algeria) conferences. Consequently, some 
of the conferences and summits led to the establishment of the African Union (AU), 
NEPAD, APRM and the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights. The emergence 
and evolution of these institutions is discussed in detail below. 
2.5.4.4.1 The transformation of the OAU to African Union (AU)  
 
On 8 and 9 September 1999, forty-four African leaders met in Sirte, Libya at an 
Extraordinary Summit of the OAU called by Muammar Gaddafi, to discuss the formation 
of a ‘United States of Africa.’629 The theme of this summit was ‘Strengthening OAU’s 
capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium.’ At this meeting, the 
Sirte Declaration630 was adopted, calling for the establishment of an African Union, the 
shortening of the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty and the speedy 
establishment of all institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty, such as the African 
Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and the Pan-
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African Parliament.631 The legal parameters of the Union were to be defined by the legal 
experts who were instructed to model it on the European Union, taking into account the 
Charter of the OAU and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.632   
 
The OAU legal unit then drafted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (herein 
CAAU or the Act). The draft Act was debated in a meeting of legal experts and 
parliamentarians and later at a Ministerial Conference held in Tripoli from 31 May to 2 
June 2000.633 The involvement of the African parliamentarians was intended to ensure 
that the Union becomes more closely connected with the people. The Act was adopted by 
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé in July 2000.634 All 
members of the OAU had signed the Act by March 2001,635 and therefore the OAU 
Assembly, at its 5th extraordinary summit held in Sirte, Libya from 1 to 2 March 2001 
declared the establishment of the AU.636 However, for the Union to be operationalised, 
the Constitutive Act had to be ratified by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU.637 
This was achieved on 26 April 2001 when Nigeria became the thirty-sixth OAU member 
state to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Constitutive Act of the AU with the 
OAU Secretary-General.638 The AU became a legal and political reality a month 
thereafter, on 26 May 2001, when the Constitutive Act entered into force. 
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The Constitutive Act of the African Union incorporates a number of human rights 
provisions, a marked departure from its predecessor, the OAU Charter, which, as 
discussed earlier, had a passing mention of human rights. The progressive attitude of the 
AU towards human rights promotion and protection is clear in the Preamble of the 
CAAU and in its objectives and guiding principles. One of the objectives of the AU is to 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter 
and other relevant human rights instruments.639  
 
This provision, which concretises the relationship between the regional human rights 
system and its political affiliate, the AU, is an indication of the latter’s resolve to take 
human rights issues seriously. This is also alluded to by the objective to promote 
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.640 
Poor governance and unconstitutional change of government have had the major stake in 
human rights violations in Africa.641 It is therefore a welcome idea that African 
governments have taken cognisance of this fact.   
 
As alluded to earlier, some of the guiding principles of the AU also embody human rights 
provisions. For instance, respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance are some of the principles of the Union.642 Other principles that 
have human rights implications include promotion of gender equality643; the promotion of 
social justice to ensure balanced economic development644; respect for the sanctity of 
                                                 
639 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3(h).  For a detailed discussion on the role of the AU in 
human rights protection in Africa see Viljoen F, International human rights law in Africa, note 1 above, pp. 
178-234. 
640 Ibid, Art. 3(g). See also Baimu E, ‘The African Union: Hope for a better protection of human rights in 
Africa? (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 311.  
641 See generally, Mbondenyi M, ‘The right to participate in the government of one’s country: An analysis 
of Article 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the light of Kenya’s 2007 
elections crisis’, African Human Rights Law Journal, (forthcoming in 2009).  
642 CAAU, Art. 4 (m). 
643 Ibid, Art. 4 (l). 
644 Art. 4 (n). 
 202
human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of 
terrorism and subversive activities645; and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional 
change of government.646 In fact, the CAAU categorically states that a government that 
shall seize power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in 
the activities of the Union.647  
 
One remarkable innovation in the CAAU is the provision for the imposition of sanctions 
on members that fail to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU.648 There was 
no such provision in the OAU Charter. Although it may be debatable how far this 
provision will be put in practice, the decision to suspend the Central African Republic 
from participating in the AU policy organs as a result of the coup d’etat in March 2003 
offered some hope for its implementation.649  
 
It is also encouraging to note that the provision was initially implemented against 
Madagascar, which was barred from the AU inauguration summit in 2002, because of 
doubts over the legitimacy of its president.650 The state was, however, re-admitted in 
2003, during the second AU Summit in the Mozambican capital, Maputo.651 
Unfortunately, the AU has failed to implement this provision in a number of cases that 
show utter disregard for its attempts to promote and protect human rights in the region. 
One notable example is its failure to punish the notorious government of Robert Mugabe 
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in Zimbabwe, among other recalcitrant states. The AU’s reluctance in dealing with 
Zimbabwe has caused accusing fingers to be pointed at it by the civil society.652  
 
In addition to its objectives and principles that embody human rights, the CAAU also 
provides for the creation of organs within the AU framework, some of which could be 
used to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in the continent.653 These 
organs include the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representative 
Committee (PRC), the Specialised Technical Committees (STCs), the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council, and the Financial Institutions.654  
 
While the CAAU is a marked departure from the OAU Charter, it clearly has its own 
flaws and limitations. For example, in spite of its reference to human rights and the 
African Charter, it is silent on the Charter’s enforcement institutions— the African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This limits the intended 
relationship between the human rights institutions and their political affiliate. It further 
raises the question as to what extent the AU envisioned human rights to be of paramount 
importance on its agenda.655 Fortunately, this omission was addressed when the AU 
Assembly resolved to incorporate in its framework the African Commission and the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.656  
 
Another issue of concern in the provisions of the CAAU is the retention of the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.657 This principle, in the main, 
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accounted for the failure of the OAU to address human rights violations on the 
continent.658 However, unlike the OAU Charter which blatantly prohibited interference 
with the internal affairs of its member states, the attempt to diminish the impact of this 
principle in the Constitutive Act must be commended. The CAAU permits the AU to 
intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances; namely, war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.659 It also provides for the right of member states 
to request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security.660  
 
The scope of the right to intervene provided for in the CAAU is, however, not 
satisfactory because most of the human rights violations in Africa do not reach the levels 
of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity.661 This suggests that other forms of 
violations of human rights are not of importance to the AU, as long as they have not 
reached the magnitude or status contemplated under article 4(h). Article 4(h) of the 
CAAU, therefore, keeps other forms of human rights violations outside the purview of 
the AU’s intervention.662 
 
From the foregoing, it is inevitable to note that the transformation from the OAU to AU 
ushered in a new dimension in regional enforcement of human rights in Africa. While the 
full impact of the AU is yet to be seen or felt, its inception is a bold step intended to 
further the realisation of human rights in the region. Its Constitutive Act is also an 
instrument that strengthens the African human rights system. It is noteworthy that the 
creation of the AU culminated to a series of other activities of relevance to the human 
rights discourse in the region. For example, the Union held its ‘First AU Ministerial 
                                                 
658 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 393 above, p. 80. Nmehielle observed that the 
notable principle that has always stood in the ways of the human rights agenda in Africa is the principle of 
non-intervention in internal affairs of states enshrined in Article III (2). 
659 CAAU, Art 4 (h). 
660 Ibid, Art 4 (j). See ‘African Union: A new opportunity for the promotion and protection of human rights 
in Africa’ (AI Index: IOR 63/0002/2002). 
661 See Baimu E, ‘The African Union: Hope for a better protection of human rights in Africa? note 640 
above, p. 314. 
662 Ibid. 
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Conference on Human Rights in Africa’ in May 2003, which culminated to the adoption 
of the Kigali Declaration.663  
 
This declaration forms the basis of the revised agenda of the AU on human rights in 
Africa.664 It reaffirmed the AU member state’s commitment to the objectives and 
principles contained in the Constitutive Act of the African Union665, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights666, the solemn Declaration of the Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)667, the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD)668, the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on relations 
between States adopted in Tunis669, all relevant AU Declarations and Decisions as well as 
the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna 
Declaration of 1993.  
 
The Kigali Declaration should therefore be seen as an added impetus to the human rights 
revolution that has been sweeping across the continent particularly at the dawn of the new 
millennium. It is expected that many more developments will be made in this regard. In 
fact, many other conferences, of relevance to human rights promotion and protection in 
the region, took place before and after the Kigali Conference.670 It is, however, 
unfortunate that most of these conferences ended with declarations which are anything 
but binding on the member states.    
 
                                                 
663 Kigali Declaration, MIN/CONF/HRA/Decl. 1 (I), adopted at the First AU Ministerial Conference on 
Human Rights in Africa, 8 May 2003. 
664 See Murray R and Lloyd A, ‘Institutions with responsibility for human rights protection under the 
African Union, note 548 above, p. 172. 
665 Lome, Togo 2000.  
666 Nairobi, Kenya 1981.  
667 Lome, Togo 2000.  
668 Lusaka, Zambia 2001.  
669 Tunisia in June 1994.  
670 For example, the Grand Bay Conference, Algiers Conference, Cairo Conference and Sirte Summit.  
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2.5.4.4.2 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
 
Another phenomenon that depicts the evolution of regional enforcement of human rights 
in Africa is the emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). NEPAD is an initiative that started 
off as the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) conceived by Presidents Mbeki of 
South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria in the year 2000.671 MAP 
merged with the OMEGA plan developed by President Wade of Senegal to form the New 
African Initiative (NAI) in July 2001.  
 
The title NAI was later changed to NEPAD in October 2001.672 The MAP document had 
its immediate origins in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit held in Togo 
in July 2000. This summit mandated Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of 
Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria to engage the countries in the North with a view to 
developing a partnership for the renaissance of the continent.673 About the same time, the 
newly elected president of Senegal, Wade, conceived a plan titled OMEGA.674 The MAP 
and OMEGA plans were presented, respectively, by Presidents Obasanjo and Wade 
during the fifth Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya from 1 to 2 March 
2001.675  
 
Recognising the synergies and complementarities between the two plans on continent-
wide development, the Sirte Summit recommended the integration of the two 
                                                 
671 See Ohiorhenuan J, ‘NEPAD and dialectics of African underdevelopment’ (2002) 7 New Agenda, p. 10. 
672 Para 5(b) of the Communiqué issued at the end of the first meeting of the HSIC, Abuja, Nigeria, 23 
October 2001. 
673 Para 321 of the OAU Secretary-General Report (2001). Pursuant to this mandate, the three leaders 
relentlessly engaged the industrialised countries in the north and multi-lateral organisations on the 
partnership at various fora. For example, the three leaders made a presentation on the MAP at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in January 2001. 
674 Para 323 of the OAU Secretary-General Report (2001). 
675 Ibid, Para 318. 
 207
initiatives.676 The decision to have a single, coordinated African plan was grounded on 
the need to avoid confusing Africa’s partners, diffusing the focus, eroding capacity, 
splitting resources and undermining the credibility of the plans.677 The result of this 
merger, which was finalised on 3 July 2001, was the New African Initiative (NAI). The 
NAI was approved by the 37th OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held 
in Lusaka in July 2001.678 The NAI had to be reorganised and edited to clear repetition 
and inconsistencies emanating from the hasty merger of the MAP and OMEGA plans. 
The finalisation of the NAI document was achieved on 23 October 2001, when its name 
was also changed to NEPAD.679  
 
NEPAD is a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal.680 It is an African 
innovation practically designed to support the vision and goals of the AU and although it 
is an economic development programme, in many ways it continues the African 
insistence that human rights, peace and development are interdependent matters.681 As a 
development programme, it has a strong human rights component and provides for the 
development of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which deals with the 
human rights practices of member states.682  
 
                                                 
676 Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’ (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 303. 
677 Ibid. 
678 See OAU Declaration on the New African Initiative [MAP and OMEGA] 37th ordinary session of the 
Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU, July 2001 Lusaka, Zambia, OAU Doc 
AHG/Decl 1 (XXXVII) para 9. 
679 See Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’, note 
676 above, p. 303.   
680 See ‘NEPAD in brief’, available at http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php, last accessed 1 March 
2007). 
681 See Nagan W, ‘Implementing the African Renaissance: Making human rights comprehensive for the 
new millennium’, available at http://www.cha.uga.edu/CHA-CITS/Nagan_paper.pdf, last accessed 1 March 
2007. 
682 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: The African Charter’ (2004) 108/3 Penn State 
Law Review, p. 684. 
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NEPAD consists of three initiatives: a Peace and Security Initiative683, an Economic and 
Corporate Governance Initiative and the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative. 
It is the latter which is important from the perspective of human rights. It notes that 
‘Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of 
which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties 
and workers unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to 
enable people to choose their leaders freely.’684 In July 2002, the AHSG of the AU 
agreed to the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance. In the particular context of human rights, paragraph 15 of the Declaration 
states as follows685: 
 
To promote and protect human rights, we have agreed to: 
• facilitate the development of vibrant civil society organisations, including 
strengthening human rights institutions at the national, sub-regional and regional 
levels;  
• support the Charter, African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as important instruments for ensuring the promotion, protection and 
observance of human rights;  
• strengthen co-operation with the UN High Commission for Human Rights; and  
• ensure responsible free expression, inclusive of the freedom of the press. 
 
Through NEPAD, African leaders have set an agenda for the renewal of the continent. 
This agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development plans that must 
be prepared through a participatory process involving the people of Africa.686 It is a 
                                                 
683 Comprising development and security, early warning and prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts. 
684 NEPAD Document, para 79. 
685 Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, AHG/235(XXXVIII), 
Annex 1, adopted by the HSIC at its Third Meeting in June 2002; Communique´ Issued at the end of the 
Third Meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (HSIC), Rome, Italy on 11 June, 2002. 
686 NEPAD Document, para 47. 
 209
framework intended, among others, to define the nature of the interaction between Africa 
and the rest of the world, including the industrialised countries and multilateral 
organisations.687 This is born out of the realisation that the continued marginalisation of 
Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its 
people constitute a serious threat.688 To achieve NEPAD’s objectives, African leaders 
take responsibility for:  
 
strengthening the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution; 
promoting and protecting democracy and human rights; restoring and maintaining micro-
stability through fiscal and monetary policies; regulating financial markets and private 
companies; promoting the role of women in social and economic development by 
reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training, revitalising health 
training and education with high priority to HIV/AIDS; maintaining law and order; and 
promoting the development of infrastructure.689  
 
Implementation of the NEPAD is envisaged through a number of mechanisms. Firstly, a 
Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) composed of 20 
states690, meets every four months. Secondly, a Secretariat is at present based in South 
Africa and deals with the administrative workload. Thirdly, implementation of NEPAD is 
voluntary but for those states which choose to be bound, enforcement is through the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).691 Thus, paragraph 28 of the NEPAD 
Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance 
acknowledges the establishment of the APRM on the basis of voluntary accession. Its aim 
is to ‘ensure the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed 
                                                 
687 Ibid, para 48. 
688 Ibid, para 2. 
689 NEPAD Document para, 49. 
690 This was expanded from 15. They are: Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa as the five 
founding states; as well as the central African states of Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe; East 
African states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda; North African states including Libya and 
Tunisia; Southern African States of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique, and West African states of Ghana 
and Mali. 
691 African Peer Review Mechanism, AHG/235(XXXVIIII), Annex II. 
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political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in 
the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.’692 
 
The APRM entails a series of periodic reviews including a base review carried out within 
18 months of joining, and periodic reviews every two to four years. States can also 
request additional reviews and these can be prompted by an ‘impending political or 
economic crisis’ in the country.693 The reviews entail visits to the country by a Panel of 
Eminent Experts comprising of Africans who have distinguished themselves in careers 
that are considered relevant to the work of the APRM and who are ‘persons of high moral 
stature and demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism.’694  
 
The reports finalised by the Team have also to be tabled in a variety of organs such as the 
Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission, the Peace and Security Council and the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the AU.695 According to NEPAD’s Secretariat, 
reviews of the first four countries— Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda— were 
completed in 2006.696 A state’s review by its peers focuses on areas of high priority in 
NEPAD such as strengthening institutions of democracy and human rights. The intention 
of such reviews is to increase the adoption of best practices and standards among the 
participating states. Where matters relate to human rights, democracy and political 
governance, the arrangements expressly provide for the assessments to be conducted by 
existing OAU/AU institutions with a human rights remit. Among those mentioned are the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Central Organ, Pan-African Parliament and 
CSSDCA Unit.697  
 
                                                 
692 Ibid, para. 1. 
693 Ibid, Annex II, para 13. 
694 Ibid, paras 5 and 6. 
695 African Peer Review Mechanism, Annex II, para. 24 
696 For more information, visit www.nepad.org. See also ‘Zambia: ready for NEPAD governance review’, 
available at http://www.afrol.com/articles/14260, last accessed 1 March 2007. 
697 Ibid. 
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Further, NEPAD has also resolved to address the recurrence of conflicts in the continent. 
Thus it has directed its efforts towards the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflict, peacemaking and peace enforcement, post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction, and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons 
and landmines.698 To further these objectives, a subcommittee on peace and security has 
been established within NEPAD.699 If these commitments are fulfilled, then it will 
promote peace and security and reduce the occurrence of conflicts. Income previously 
spent on wars and conflicts may be diverted to the realisation of human rights.  
 
Generally, the NEPAD and APRM initiatives can innovatively be used to come up with 
uniform human rights standards across the continent. They can also be useful tools to 
persuade states to ratify human rights treaties that they have not, in order to ensure 
uniformity among the participating states.700 Arguably, the initiatives provide a holistic, 
comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of 
Africa, within the constitutional framework of the AU. Specifically, NEPAD serves as 
the socio-economic development blueprint for the AU to implement its objectives.701 It is 
believed that, unlike prior endeavours, NEPAD is realistic in the sense that it recognises 
the dynamics of the current global economy and its inevitability, and suggests a 
partnership with the outside world, based on mutual commitments and obligations.702 The 
initiatives, however, have some overt shortcomings.    
 
One of the most evident shortcomings of the NEPAD is its superficial approach to human 
rights promotion and protection. Economic, social and cultural rights are vaguely referred 
                                                 
698 NEPAD Document, para 74.  
699 See Communiqué issued at the end of the first meeting of the HSIC, Abuja, 23 October 2001. 
700 Mbazira C, ‘A path to realising economic, social and cultural rights in Africa? A critique of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights law Journal, p. 44. 
701 Murray R & Lloyd A, ‘Institutions with responsibility for human rights protection under the African 
Union’, note 548 above, 179. 
702 Mbazira C, ‘A path to realising economic, social and cultural rights in Africa? A critique of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development’, note 700 above, p. 44; Ohiohenuan J, ‘NEPAD and dialectics of 
African underdevelopment’, note 671 above, p. 10. 
 212
to in terms of greater access to services instead of as concrete, inherent rights.703 There is 
nothing concrete in the NEPAD document about integrating human rights in the 
development process.704 This is contrary to the understanding that, if human rights are to 
be realised, they have to be streamlined in all activities, including development. 
According to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, human rights are integral to 
the promotion of peace and security, economic prosperity and social equity.705 This is 
particularly relevant to the enforcement of socio-economic rights, because of their 
recognition as non-justiciable rights in so many constitutions of African countries.706  
 
Further, NEPAD is an initiative of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. As a 
result of this, it has encountered some problems in gaining legitimacy.707 This is a serious 
shortcoming, because by its nature, the realisation of rights requires the participation of 
beneficiaries. It is for this reason that NEPAD has in many circles been viewed as 
dubious economic globalisation.708 It is also important to note that, despite its 
commitment to human rights, NEPAD does not in any manner establish a direct nexus 
with the African human rights system. There is need for it to make reference to the 
African Commission on matters relating to human rights, this is because the later is in a 
better position to conduct a human rights audit based on impartial evidence.709   
 
                                                 
703 Rights & Democracy, ‘Human rights and democratic development in Africa: Policy considerations for 
Africa’s development in the new millennium’, available at http://www.ichrdf.ca, last accessed 27 August 
2007. 
704 Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’, note 676 
above, p. 303. 
705 Secretary-General Report to the General Assembly, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme of 
Reform A/51/950, 14 July 1997, para 78. 
706 See, for example, the Constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria which include them as Directive Principles of 
State Policy. 
707 See Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’, note 
676 above, p. 303. 
708 Ibid. 
709 Ibid. 
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The APRM should also be faulted. In the main, because its membership is voluntary, 
states can withdraw without any severe consequences.710 The project also lacks definite 
elements of compulsion. The reviewing body has no clearly defined ways of compelling 
deviant states to reform. This rather loose setup with seemingly no serious strings and no 
internal coercive mechanisms has failed to attract African countries to the project.711 A 
further source of concern is the tendency for African leaders to shy away from 
condemning their peers even in cases where the APRM produces damning reports.712  
 
The continental silence on human rights violations including the range of human rights 
abuses in the Sudan, Rwanda, Cameroon, Liberia, Somalia, Kenya, Burundi and the 
absence of a clear stance on the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe, have amply demonstrated 
African leaders’ lack of moral courage to chastise each other. This lack of ‘tough stance’ 
by African leaders on human rights violations, even in countries across their borders, is a 
cautionary signal that it is extremely dangerous to place undue expectation on the APRM 
in its bid to police or prevent human rights violations in Africa.713 
 
Despite such shortcomings, NEPAD and the APRM cannot be dismissed as having no 
positive influence on the realisation of socio-economic rights. There is no doubt that 
under the umbrella of the AU, through the inspiration of the NEPAD and APRM, African 
leaders have developed their own strategies for meeting the continent’s pressing 
challenges, including extreme poverty, illiteracy, HIV/AIDS, war, environmental 
degradation and, most importantly, human rights abuses.714   
 
                                                 
710 Ibid. 
711 Akokpari J, ‘Policing and preventing human rights abuses in Africa: the OAU, the AU & the NEPAD 
Peer Review’, (2004) 32/2 International Journal of Legal Information, p. 468. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid. 
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2.5.4.4.3 The establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
 
Following the creation of the African Commission and the consequent dissatisfaction 
with its output, efforts were directed at the establishment of a regional human rights court 
in Africa. The idea of a regional court, however, generated another debate of almost a 
similar magnitude to the one that preceded the creation of the regional human rights 
system and the African Commission. At the Third Afro-Americo-European Conference 
on ‘Regional Systems of Human Rights Protection in Africa, America and Europe’ in 
Strasbourg in June 1992, the issue of regional human rights courts was discussed.715 
Here, some of the participants were of the view that the creation of an African court 
should be postponed to a later stage.  
 
Their opinion was based on the argument that given the desperate shortage of funds for 
the work of the commission, it would have been unwise to establish another institution at 
that time.716 There was also the issue to determine which rights in the Charter were 
justiciable and could be taken to a court. Without underestimating the importance of a 
court, in view of the existing constraints, it was deemed wise to strengthen the 
commission and revert back to the issue of a court at the appropriate future time.717 
 
After prolonged discussions, it was resolved that a Protocol creating a regional human 
rights court for Africa should be drafted. The process of drafting the Protocol was 
initiated at a Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Tunis in June 
1994.718 A resolution adopted at this summit requested the Secretary General of the OAU 
to convene a meeting of government experts to examine ways of enhancing efficiency of 
                                                 
715 Benedek W & Heinz (eds.), Regional systems of human rights protection in Africa, America and 
Europe: Third Afro-Americo-European Conference, Strasbourg, June 1992 (1992). 
716 Ibid. 
717 Ibid. 
718 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 393 above, p. 255; Onguergouz F, The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 576 above, pp. 688-690. 
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the African Commission and to consider in particular the question of the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.719 A Draft Protocol, prepared by the 
OAU Secretariat, was submitted to a meeting of government experts in Cape Town, 
South Africa, in September 1995. 
 
The Cape Town meeting was followed by a number of intermediary meetings, until the 
meeting of Ministers of Justice in December 1997 at which the draft Protocol was 
adopted, before being ratified by the Summit of Heads of State and Government in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 9 June 1998.720 The Protocol was largely inspired by 
existing regional instruments which established the European and Inter-American Human 
Rights Courts, the Statute of the International Court of Justice as well as the Report of the 
International Law Commission on the International Criminal Court.721 It came into force 
on the 25th of January 2004, after the fifteenth instruments of ratification was deposited 
by Comoros.722 
 
In July 2004, the AHSG resolved to integrate the African court of justice and the African 
human rights court into a single institution.723 The motivation for such a merger was that 
it would be financially expedient to do so.724 The issue of the merger of the courts is 
underscored in the next chapter of this thesis, where the relationship between the African 
human rights court and the AU and its organs, is examined at length. Due to the 
prolongation of the negotiations on the intended merger of the two courts, it was deemed 
expedient to go ahead with the operationalisation of the African human rights court. 
                                                 
719 Resolution no. AHG 230 (XXX), doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR, September 95.  
720 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 393 above, p. 255. 
721 Ibid. 
722 See Explanatory Notes to the Protocol to the African Charter On the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1 (6-12 September, 1995), Cape Town South Africa. 
723 See paras 4 and 5 of Assembly/AU/Dec 45(III).  See also Viljoen F & Baimu E, ‘Courts for Africa: 
Considering the co-existence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of 
justice’, (2004) 22/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p. 241-267. 
724 Ibid. 
 216
Hence, on 2 July 2006, the first eleven Judges of the African human rights court were 
sworn in.725  
 
The establishment of the court has been applauded as a means of strengthening the 
regional mechanism for human rights in Africa.726 Given the continent’s history of 
serious human rights violations, the court is a potentially significant development in the 
protection of human rights at the regional level. The adoption of the Protocol thus 
demonstrated a resolve by African governments to realise the spirit of the African Charter 
and ensure the protection of human rights in Africa.727  Similarly, through it, victims of 
human rights violations or their representatives would have recourse to judicial redress. 
The court possesses the authority to issue a binding and enforceable decision in such 
circumstances.728  
 
In addition, an African Court would provide the platform for the articulation of 
international legal principles at the regional level. At the same time, it is supposed that 
domestic courts in Africa will look to it for direction and precedents in their application 
of human rights instruments at the domestic level.729 Ultimately, the court could be an 
important institution in sustaining constitutional democracies and facilitating the 
fulfilment of human and peoples’ rights, which are now universally recognised. A 
detailed discussion on the court in the light of its normative framework is entailed in the 
next chapter. 
                                                 
725 See Viljoen F (ed), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (2006), 
p. iii.  
726 See Amnesty International, Credibility in question: Proposals for improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AI Index: IOR 63/02/1998. 
727 Ibid. 
728 See generally the provisions of the Protocol establishing the court. 
729 See Amnesty International, Credibility in question: Proposals for improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 726 above. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the historical and philosophical foundations of human rights, as well as 
the emergence and evolution of the African human rights system were examined. A 
review of the definitions, classification and scope of human rights was conducted with a 
view to contribute to the existing scholarly discourse on the concept. Particularly, the 
definition of the concept was found to be a subject that has generated great controversy 
among scholars. The study confirmed that despite numerous attempts to find a composite 
definition of human rights, the province of this concept cannot easily be determined; 
meaning that human rights are continually evolving.  
 
The study also evaluated the various theories advanced by different scholars to demystify 
the philosophical foundations of human rights. In the main, it analysed the naturalist, 
positivist and Marxist theories. It also acknowledged the existence of various sociological 
theories evolved to explain the philosophy of this concept. At the same time, it was 
pointed out that although these theories, which are ‘Western’ in origin, have been used in 
the present study to explain the philosophical foundations of the concept, no society has 
the monopoly of human rights respect or abuses; nor can any society claim to be a 
paradise for human rights. On this premise, one of the main arguments in this chapter has 
been that the concept of human rights is not foreign to Africa; Africa has a tradition of 
human rights.  
 
The major difference between the African and Western conceptions of human rights is 
their philosophical formulations. No society can therefore rightfully claim to be the 
custodian or ‘father’ of rights. The chapter reiterated, even though a particular concept 
may be articulated or developed in a specific cultural set-up, it does not imply that the 
phenomenon does not, or did not, exist in other cultures. It also established that the 
concept of international human rights law is of recent origin and its historical antecedents 
were traced to the events during and after the Second World War. This is not to say that 
the concept was unknown before this period. Indeed, the study confirmed, efforts to 
protect individuals under international law begun after the First World War, during which 
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period treaties were concluded to protect the rights of linguistic and ethnic minorities. 
This was largely because the rights that constituted international humanitarian law were 
in an extremely primitive state.  
 
International human rights law, as it is known today, evolved as a branch of international 
law specifically concerned with the protection of individual’s rights from an international 
platform. This was largely because states were known to be the chief violators of the 
rights of their nationals. It was noted, as a result of the divergence in conceptions and 
perceptions, international enforcement of human rights has turned to be more effective 
and readily acceptable through the regional human rights systems. Regional human rights 
systems could therefore be said to complement, while at the same time fill gaps in the 
global human rights mechanisms.  
 
In particular, the study underscored the emergence and evolution of the African human 
rights system. Generally speaking, to attain its present status, the system evolved under 
difficult circumstances. Its inception was resisted by the then OAU leadership because of 
the fear that elevating human rights protection to the regional status would most likely 
compromise state sovereignty, which to them was more important at that time. The study 
discussed the many reasons for resisting the evolution of human rights in Africa. At some 
point, the concept of human rights was dismissed as a baseless foreign ideology with no 
relevance in Africa and to Africans. This position was mainly maintained by the 
proponents of the African concept on human rights, particularly those who fronted the 
‘autochthony’ idea. Moreover, the gross violations of human rights during the slave-trade 
and colonial periods made many to view the concept with suspicion.  
 
As alluded to earlier, some African leaders questioned the double standards invoked in 
condemning human rights violations. They could not understand why violations of 
human rights committed during the colonial period did not receive as much attention as 
those committed in the post-colonial era. Indeed the application of double standards in 
condemning human rights violations has been a major impediment to their effective 
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enforcement in the continent and globally. It is needless to emphasise that human rights 
were violated in all the three periods that defined the history of Africa.            
 
Africa has been ‘demonised’ on the basis of its pathetic human rights record. Without 
intending to be ‘the devil’s advocate’, it is important to note, whereas the present study 
concurs with the view that human rights are not highly esteemed in Africa; the same 
could be said of other continents. European and Asian countries, as well as America- the 
self-styled ‘mother of democracy and human rights’- have also had their share of human 
rights violations. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of these continents have 
also experienced massive violations of human rights, even to the magnitude of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Diverse forms of discrimination, particularly on 
racial grounds, have also taken place in some Western countries. Like the ‘Mosaic Law’, 
the respect for human rights is fundamentally premised on the assumption that ‘if you 
break one, you break all.’ When the Western world points the accusing finger on the 
violations committed in Africa, it should do likewise to those committed within its states. 
A violation is a violation, by whatever name called, notwithstanding its magnitude or the 
colour of its perpetrator.  
 
Where does the above argument leave us? Should we, like the proverbial Ostrich, bury 
our heads in the sand or fold our hands abreast, as the continent continues to wallow in 
the miasma of confusion and unabated violations? Should we ignore the historic struggles 
the continent has been entangled in, in its quest for a viable and sustainable human rights 
dispensation? Should we refuse to acknowledge that even though they could not define 
the concept, our pre-colonial ancestors knew of, and in fact respected human rights? The 
answers to all these questions is ‘no’. The efforts of Africa’s peoples to achieve human 
rights need to be appreciated.  
 
The historical background to the evolution of this concept in Africa, whose labyrinths 
were laid bare in this chapter, speaks volumes. Unfortunately, most governments in 
Africa and their agents have acted in utter disregard to the subsisting regional human 
rights norms. This situation calls for a constant re-examination and invigoration of the 
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regional human rights institutional and normative mechanisms to make human rights 
meaningful in the lives of the people in Africa.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A REVIEW OF THE NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
MECHANISMS OF THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
For purposes of conceptual clarity, the expression ‘African human rights system’, in the 
context of this chapter, refers to the regional system of norms and institutions for 
enforcement of human and peoples’ rights in Africa. There has been an academic 
controversy over the scope and definition of the African human rights system. Gutto, for 
example, argued that a distinction should be made between the broader ‘African human 
rights system’ and the narrower ‘African Charter system’.1 Accordingly, whereas the 
African Charter system centres around two enforcement institutions; namely, the African 
Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African human 
rights system goes beyond to include the political institutions and other organs created 
under the AU.2 
 
Gutto’s observations could be faulted because the African Charter, which is at the core of 
his so-called ‘African Charter system’, is a very important instrument of the ‘African 
human rights system’. Hence, the African human rights system cannot be construed as 
separate from the ‘African Charter system.’ Secondly, it is not proper to view the 
‘African Charter system’ distinctly from the pan-continental political institutions 
principally because the latter play an indispensable role in the operation of the former. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the African Charter, whose provisions are analysed in 
                                                 
1 Gutto S, ‘The reform and renewal of the African regional human and peoples’ rights system’, (2001) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 176. 
2 Ibid, p. 184. 
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detail below, effectively puts the African Commission under the control of the Assembly 
of the Head of State and Government (AHSG).3  
 
Further, just before the inception of the African Union, the former OAU Council of 
Ministers, which met in Lusaka in July 5-8, 2001, called for the incorporation of ‘organs, 
institutions/bodies which have not been specifically mentioned in the Constitutive Act.’4 
The AU Assembly, at its first ordinary session, decided that, ‘the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Committee of Experts on Rights and 
Welfare of the Child shall henceforth operate within the framework of the African 
Union.’5 These are a few illustrations of the links and synergies between the ‘political 
institutions’ and the ‘African Charter system’ which make it difficult for one to conclude 
that their existence is distinct.  
 
As a variant of Gutto’s proposition, this thesis perceives the African human rights system 
as a system that embodies two inter-related components; namely, the political (AU-
based) and the legal (African Charter-based) components.6 While the former is more 
concerned with regional politics than with human rights, the latter is wholly involved in 
human rights affairs. The meeting point of the two components, however, is their 
involvement in regional promotion and protection of human rights. On the face of it, the 
distinction between these two components is hard to tell.           
 
Odinkalu argued for a much broader definition of the expression ‘African human rights 
system.’7 According to him, the system encapsulates not only the subsisting regional 
                                                 
3 See Article 58 of the African Charter. 
4 Udombana N, ‘The institutional structure of the African Union’, (2002) 33 California Western 
International Law Journal, p. 84. 
5 Ibid. 
6 With regard to this arrangement, see the observations in Baimu E, ‘Human rights mechanisms and 
structures under NEPAD and the African Union: Emerging trends towards proliferation and duplication’ 
Occasional No 15, Centre for Human Rights (2002). 
7 Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedures in the reform of African regional human rights 
system’, (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 227. 
 223
human rights mechanisms but also supra-national, pan-continental systems and 
mechanisms and the domestic legal systems in Africa.8 This depiction, however, is 
overbroad and therefore misleading. It ignores the all important fact that, whereas supra-
national and domestic systems in Africa may enforce regional human rights norms, the 
regional mechanisms are not mandated to enforce, or even interpret, supra-national or 
domestic laws. They may only interpret and enforce those norms created under, or that 
are relevant to, the system.9  
 
Under the African human rights system, the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
serves as the link between domestic and regional human rights mechanisms.10 However, 
contrary to Odinkalu’s understanding, this rule does not make the domestic mechanisms 
part of the regional human rights system.11 Rather, the rule was evolved to uphold 
sovereignty of states by granting them the first opportunity in domestic dispute 
resolution.12 The African Commission confirmed this position when it stated that the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule prevents it from acting as a court of first instance as 
long as domestic remedies are available, effective and sufficient.13  
 
Through this assertion, the commission wanted to distinguish the roles between domestic 
and regional human rights systems.14 In this regard, Odinkalu’s perception should, 
                                                 
8 Ibid.  
9 See for example Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Establishing the Africa Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Article provides that: ‘the jurisdiction of 
the court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application 
of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned.’ (emphasis mine) 
10 See Art 56(6), African Charter. 
11 Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedures in the reform of African human rights system’, 
note 7 above, p. 227. 
12 See Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, in Murray R & Evans M, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice 1986-2000 (2002), p. 62.  
13 Communications 147/95, 149/95, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, Thirteenth Annual Activity 
Report. 
14 Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 62. 
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therefore, not be upheld, because one could be misled into understanding that the African 
human rights system includes the human rights norms and institutions created under the 
aegis of the UN, in as far as African states are parties to the UN treaties. As stated above, 
this chapter adopts the position that the African human rights system refers to the 
regional system of norms and institutions for enforcement of human and peoples’ rights 
in Africa. This system includes the regional political institutions involved in human 
rights, such as the AU and its organs.  
 
Based on this definition, it may be argued that the system, created under the auspices of 
the (OAU, now the AU), comprises a number of normative instruments. These 
instruments include: the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU)15; the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights16; the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa17; the Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in 
Africa18; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child19; the Cultural 
Charter for Africa20; the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism21; the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
                                                 
15 See the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, 11 July 2000, Lomé, Togo. The African Union replaced the Organisation 
of African Unity. Art 3(h) of the Constitutive Act of the Union stipulates that the Union aims, among other 
things, at ‘promoting and protecting human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.’ 
16 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU DOC CAB/LEG/67/3, rev 5, 27 June 1981.  
17 Adopted on 10 September 1969, entered into force on 20 June 1974, OAU Doc CAB/LEG 24.3. 
18 Adopted June 1977, entered into force 1985, OAU Doc CM/433/Rev L Annex I (1972). For a discussion 
on the political, human rights, legal and security aspects of the problems of mercenaries in Africa, see 
Fayemi J & Musah A (eds.), Mercenaries: An African security dilemma (2000). 
19 Adopted in July 1990, entered into force on 29 November 1999, OAU Doc CAB/LEG 153/REV 2. The 
Children’s Charter is reprinted in Heyns C (ed.), Human rights law in Africa 1997 (1999), p. 38. 
20 Cultural Charter for Africa of 1976 (1990), reprinted in Heyns C (ed.), Human rights Law in Africa, ibid, 
p. 55. 
21 Adopted by the 35th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Algiers, 
Algeria, 14 July 1999. 
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in Africa22; and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.23  
 
There are also two African treaties dealing with the environment, although not from a 
human rights perspective, which have been included by some scholars in the list of norms 
informing the African human rights system.24 These are the African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the Bamako Convention on the Ban 
of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management 
of Hazardous Wastes within Africa.25 By virtue of the AU being part of the African 
human rights system, the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union on the 
Establishment of the African Court of Justice could also be cited as one of its normative 
instruments.26 
 
In addition to the normative mechanisms, a number of institutions are involved, either 
directly or indirectly, in the enforcement of the norms of the system. These are: the 
African Union (AU)27; the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
Commission), established under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights created by the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
                                                 
22 Adopted by the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, July 11, 2003. 
23 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), available at 
http://www.achpr.org, last accessed 28 November 2007.  
24 See Gutto S, ‘The reform and renewal of the African regional human and peoples’ rights system’, note 1 
above, p. 176. 
25 Adopted at Bamako, Mali, 29 June 1991, reprinted in reprinted in (1993) 1 African Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 269. 
26 Adoped by the Assembly of the Union in Maputo on 11 July 2003. 
27 The Constitutive Act of the AU makes reference to the African Charter in its objectives (Art 3(h) 
Constitutive Act). Additionally, various institutions and organs have since been established within the AU 
framework, most of which will be directly or indirectly responsible for human rights protection and 
promotion. 
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Welfare of the Child, established under the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child.28  
 
It is important to note that the CAAU provides for the establishment of institutions and 
organs that may fundamentally support and facilitate the work of the regional human 
rights system.29 These organs include the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, 
the Pan African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent 
Representative Committee, the Specialised Technical Committees, the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council, and Financial Institutions.30 Arguably, these institutions, to the 
extent of their involvement in human rights, could also be enumerated among the existing 
institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system.  
 
Despite the proliferation of norms and institutions, the African Charter remains the main 
human rights instrument of the African system.31 Similarly, the African Commission has, 
since the inception of the Charter, been the sole institution that ensures state compliance 
with the Charter’s norms. This has been through, inter alia, the communications32 and 
                                                 
28 The Committee was inaugurated in 2002.  See Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In 
need of reform?’, (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 155-156. 
29 For a description of the organs of the AU and their functions in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, see Garling M & Odinkalu C, Building bridges for rights: Inter-African initiatives in the field of 
human rights (2001), p. 45-51; Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: The African Charter’, 
(2004) 108/3 Penn State Law Review, p. 684; Amanda L & Murray R, ‘Institutions with responsibility for 
human rights protection under the African Union’, (2004) 48/2 Journal of African Law, pp. 165-186. 
30 See Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU has also established other 
programmes and initiatives such as the Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA). 
31 Wachira G, ‘A critical examination of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards 
strengthening the African human rights system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African 
population’, in Viljoen F, (ed.), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006), 
p. 16. 
32 Articles 45 & 55, African Charter. 
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state reporting mechanisms.33 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was 
recently established to complement the role of the commission.    
 
Another terminology that ought to be clarified in the context of this chapter is 
‘enforcement’. The expression ‘human rights enforcement’ should be taken to mean ‘all 
measures intended and proper to induce respect for human rights.’34 Hence, human rights 
enforcement in this study relates to the act of securing compliance (by states) to the 
human rights norms of the African human rights system. It is noteworthy that the only 
use of the term ‘enforcement’ in the UN Charter occurs in relation to the enforcement of 
the decisions of the Security Council provided for under Chapter VII.35 By virtue of this 
provision, some international lawyers have equated human rights enforcement with the 
use of, or threat of use of economic or other sanctions or armed force.36  
 
This, however, is a very narrow construction of the terminology. The use of force and 
imposition of economic sanctions are just some of the ways human rights could be 
enforced. Enforcement could also be done through other means, such as the judgement of 
a court or tribunal that demands for compliance with existing human rights norms.37 Such 
a judgement may, for example, require the repeal or amendment of legislation that 
contradicts human rights principles. Awarding of remedies to a victim of violation is also 
another way of enforcing human rights because it somehow compels the violating party 
to respect human rights.38  
 
Unlike the UN Charter, the OAU Charter made no provision for the enforcement of its 
principles and objectives. It merely emphasised cooperation among member states and 
                                                 
33 Article 62, African Charter. 
34 Bernhardt R, ‘General Report’, in Bernhardt & Jolowicz (eds.), International enforcement of human 
rights (1985), p. 5. 
35 Art 45, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
36 Steiner & Alston P, International human rights in context: Law, politics & morals, p. 347. 
37 Bernhardt R, ‘General Report’, note 34 above, p. 5. 
38 Ibid. 
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the peaceful settlement of disputes.39 This contributed to the subsequent reluctance of 
member states to criticise one another for human rights violations. This position, 
however, was discarded by the CAAU, which gives the Union the right of intervention in 
respect of grave circumstances of human rights violations.40  
 
Against this background, this chapter reviews the institutional and normative mechanisms 
for the enforcement of human rights on the continental level in Africa. The main focus is 
on the main human rights treaty in the region, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and its enforcement institutions, the African Commission and Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. As argued above, these form the most important 
‘component’ of the African human rights system. It should be noted that it is not the 
intention of this chapter to review all the normative and institutional mechanisms of the 
Africa human rights system because this will be an enormous task that is beyond the 
scope of the study.  
3.2 Normative mechanisms of the African human rights system  
 
As stated above, the normative framework of the African human rights system is 
substantially broad, depending on how one defines the system. This part shall, however, 
be restricted to the review of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(hereinafter ‘ACHPR’, ‘the Charter’ or ‘African Charter’), being the key normative 
instrument of the system.   
     
3.2.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Charter is the principal substantive instrument of the African human rights 
system, providing a catalogue of rights, duties and their enforcement mechanisms. This 
part of the study therefore systematically reviews the Charter. It commences with a 
discussion on the structure and salient features of the Charter then proceeds to examine 
                                                 
39 See the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Articles II (1) (b) & III (4).  
40 See Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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its substantive provisions. For purposes of this study, the rights under the Charter shall be 
examined under two broad categories; namely, individual and collective rights. Individual 
rights shall be classified further, viz, (i) civil and political rights; and (ii) economic, social 
and cultural rights.  
3.2.1.1 Structure and salient features of the African Charter 
 
Structurally, the African Charter consists of 68 Articles and is divided into four chapters: 
Human and Peoples’ Rights; Duties; Procedure of the Commission; and Applicable 
Principles.41 It includes all the three generations of rights: civil and political rights42; 
economic, social, and cultural rights43; and group (peoples’) rights.44 The Charter is an 
innovative human rights instrument because some of its provisions distinctively depart 
from those in other regional human rights systems that preceded it.45 As Umozurike 
correctly argued, although the Charter is different in some way from those of the other 
regions, it would be an overstatement to describe these differences as autochthonous.46 
Rather, the differences merely reflect the developments in international human rights 
law.47  
 
                                                 
41 See generally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986.  
42 African Charter, Art 2-12. 
43 Ibid, Art 14-18. 
44 Ibid, Art 19-24. 
45 See Benedek W, ‘Peoples’ rights and individuals’ duties as special features of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Kunig P, Benedek W & Mahalu C, (eds.) Regional protection of human 
rights by international law: The emerging African system (1985), p. 59; Umozurike U, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997), pp. 87-96; Onguergouz F, The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (2003), 
pp. 57-58. 
46 For this view and an analysis of the distinctive features of the African Charter, see Umozurike U, ‘The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law, pp. 
911-913. 
47 Ibid. 
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The first notable feature relates to the numerous ‘claw-back’ clauses in the Charter’s 
provisions, which limit the enjoyment of some rights to the discretion of domestic 
jurisdictions.48 The issue of ‘claw-back’ clauses and how they limit rights under the 
Charter is discussed in detail in the next chapter. Notably, however, besides the ‘claw-
back’ clauses, the Charter lacks a derogation clause that would permit the suspension of 
certain rights and freedoms in strictly defined circumstances.49 This has both advantages 
and disadvantages. One advantage is that no emergency or special circumstances can 
justify the suspension of the rights enshrined in the Charter.50 States parties are therefore 
obliged to uphold the rights enshrined in the Charter in good as in bad times. The 
disadvantage of having no derogation clause in the Charter, on the other hand, is that 
during emergencies or special circumstances, a state may choose to disregard the Charter 
in its entirety.51  
 
There are numerous and significant examples of international instruments that contain an 
express derogation clause. These include Article 15 of the European Convention on 
                                                 
48 ‘Claw-back’ clauses are provisions in the Charter that condition the enjoyment or implementation of 
rights on national legislation. See Mutua M, ‘The African human rights system in a comparative 
perspective’, (1993) 3 Review of the  African Commission on Human  & Peoples' Rights, P. 7; Anthony A, 
‘Beyond the paper Tiger: The challenge of a human rights court in Africa’, (1997) 32 Texas International 
Law Journal, p. 518; Buergenthal T, International human rights (1995), p. 234. 
49 See Murray R, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights and international law (2003), pp. 
123-126; Harris D, O’Boyle & Warwick C, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1955), pp. 
489-506. 
50 In Communication 105/93, 130/94 & 152/96, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. 
Nigeria, Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights ( 
Annex V), the African Commission stated, inter alia, that governments should avoid restricting rights, and 
have special care with regard to those rights protected by constitutional or international human rights law. 
See also Communication 212/98, Amnesty international v. Zambia, Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Annex V); Naldi G, ‘Limitation of rights under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The contribution of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, (2001) 17 South African Journal of Human Rights, p. 113-114. 
51 Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An overview of its progress 
and problems’ (2001) 1 African human Rights Law Journal, p 2. 
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Human Rights, Article 4 of ICCPR and Article 27 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.52 At the national level, constitutions of some countries, such as South 
Africa, also have these clauses.53  
 
From the analysis of some of the human rights instruments, it may be concluded that at 
least three types of circumstances may permit states to derogate from rights54: (i) in the 
event of an exceptional public danger that threatens the existence of the state;55 (ii) during 
a war or other public danger threatening the life of the nation;56 and (iii) during a war or 
any other crisis situation that threatens the independence or security of a state.57 Hence, 
any armed conflict, whether internal or international, may be the basis for such 
derogation.  
 
Because of the absence of a derogation clause in the Charter, a state is able to disregard, 
for political reasons, its responsibilities while ill-advisedly reducing the democratic space 
between the separation of powers and civil liberties.58 The UN Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights echoed the importance of derogation clauses, by inviting all states ‘whose 
legislation contains no explicit clause that guarantees the legality of the implementation 
of a state of emergency, to adopt clauses in accordance with international norms and 
principles...’59 This indicates that international human rights norms attach importance to 
derogation clauses.  
 
                                                 
52 See Sermet L, ‘The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A critical discussion’, (2007) 7 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 143. 
53 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Art. 37. 
54 Sermet L, ‘The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
A critical discussion’, note 52 above, p. 143. 
55 Art 4 ICCPR. 
56 Art 15 European Convention.  
57 Art 27 American Convention. 
58 Sermet L ‘The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
note 52 above, p. 153. 
59 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res1995/33, Question 
on human rights and states of exception, 35th session, 24 August 1995. 
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The second notable feature of the Charter relates to its social and economic rights’ 
provisions. Arguably, the intention of incorporating this genre of rights in the Charter was 
to give effect to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESR) at the regional level.60 The Charter’s approach, however, differs from that of the 
ICESR in that it avoids the incremental language of progressive realisation of this category 
of rights. Instead, the obligations that states parties assume with respect to these rights are 
clearly stated as being of immediate application. Thus, the Charter places economic, social 
and cultural rights on the same footing as other rights.61  
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights acknowledged the difficulty 
posed by ‘the present hostile economic circumstances’62 but reminded the states parties 
that the Charter required immediate implementation of the rights it contained.63 Because 
realisation of socio-economic rights in the Charter is not subjected to availability of 
resources, the Charter is said to be overly ambitious and unrealistic.64 Accordingly, it 
presents a challenging normative framework for the implementation of this category of 
rights by states parties.65 
                                                 
60 Adopted and opened for signature, accession and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2200 A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966; entered into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27.  
61 Mbazira C, ‘Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and significant strides’, (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, p. 339. 
62 Presentation of the Third Annual Activity Report by the then Chairman of the Commission, Professor U 
O Umozurike to the 26th Session of the Assembly of Head of States and Government of the Organisation of 
African Unity, 9-11 July 1990, in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Documentation, 3rd 
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 28 April 1990 
(1990), Documents of the African Commission, p. 201.  
63 Ibid. See also Mbazira C, ‘Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and significant strides’, note 61 
above, p. 341. 
64 Odinkalu C, ‘Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ in Evans M & Murray R, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system 
in practice, 1986-2000 (2002), p. 196.   
65 Ibid. 
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It is also useful to mention that the Charter adopts a different approach to that of the 
European and Inter-American human rights systems by encapsulating all the three 
generations of rights in a single instrument. The European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms66 (hereinafter ‘European Convention’) does not 
contain social, economic and cultural rights. Instead, the articulation of these rights in 
Europe was left to the European Social Charter (ESC)67 and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).68  
 
In the Americas, the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man69 had elaborate 
provisions on economic, social and cultural rights which were, however, not repeated in 
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the American 
Convention’).70 In 1988, the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) eventually adopted a Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the San 
Salvador Protocol) which reduced into a treaty economic, social and cultural rights 
recognised under the Inter-American Human Rights system.71    
 
Thirdly, the Charter incorporates peoples’ rights in its provisions. These rights include 
equality of all peoples,72 right to existence and self-determination,73 right to sovereignty 
over group wealth and natural resources (including the right to dispose of the same),74 
                                                 
66 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221. 
67 See the European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, 529 UNTS 89, entered into force 26 February 1965. 
68 See Blored A, ‘The human rights dimension of the OSCE: Past, present and prospects’, OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Bulletins 3 (1995), p. 16. 
69 Res. XXX, 9th International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, 30 March to 2 May 
1948, Final Act, p. 38.  
70 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (The Pact of San Jose), 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978. 
71 Odinkalu C, ‘Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, note 64 above, p. 185. 
72 African Charter, Art 19. 
73 Art 20. 
74 Art 21. 
 234
right to development,75 right to national and international peace and security, and the right 
to a general satisfactory environment favourable to development.76 Even though the 
Charter recurrently refers to ‘peoples’, the concept is not defined anywhere in its 
provisions hence creating uncertainty and unnecessary speculation on the true import of 
the term.77 This observation shall be revisited at a later stage of this discussion where 
peoples’ rights will be discussed at length.  
 
The Charter also imposes duties on states and individuals.78 The Charter is founded on 
the premise that rights and duties exist concomitantly.79 Thus, its preamble is categorical 
that ‘the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties.’ 
Accordingly, each of these duties embodies ‘the values of African civilisation.’80 The 
principle that rights reciprocate duties also forms the basis of Article 27(2), which states 
that rights must be ‘exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, 
morality and common interest.’ This implies that rights can only make sense in the social 
and political arena when they are coupled with duties on individuals.81  
 
Finally, unlike the American and European Conventions, the African Charter does not 
provide for the establishment of a regional human rights court. This has largely been 
attributed, and pretentiously so, to the supposed ‘African cultural emphasis on conciliation 
                                                 
75 Art 22. 
76 Art 24.  
77 Dersso S, ‘The jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with respect to 
peoples’ rights’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 360. 
78 Duties of states are contained in Arts 20(3), 21(5), 22(2), 25 and 26. Arts 27-29 impose duties on 
individuals. These include the following: duties to the family, society, state, other legally recognised 
communities and the international community; duty to respect fellow human beings; duty to preserve the 
harmonious development of the family, strengthen African cultural values and to preserve national security 
as well as promote African unity. 
79 Viljoen F, ‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and humanitarian 
law’, (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 21. 
80 Preamble to the African Charter. 
81 Viljoen F, ‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and humanitarian 
law’, note 79 above, p. 21. 
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rather than formal adversarial settlement of disputes.’82 Allegedly, the drafters of the 
Charter were guided by the principle that the instrument ‘should reflect the African 
conception of human rights and should take as a pattern the African philosophy of law and 
meet the needs of Africa.’83 This kind of motivation was indeed a misguided attempt to 
jeopardise the long awaited opportunity to entrench a system that would enhance the 
enforcement of human rights at the regional level. It was quite pretentious for conciliation 
to be contemplated at the regional level while adversarial settlement of disputes took the 
centre stage in the domestic legal systems.84 Was the African culture to be practised only 
at the regional level and not the domestic one?    
 
In any event, the absence of an African human rights court provoked heated debate and 
controversy that later culminated in the adoption on 9 June 1998 of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.85 Although this is quite commendable, the impact of the 
continental human rights court is yet to be felt since its establishment is still at the 
formative stages. At a later part of this chapter, the provisions of the Protocol to the 
African Court shall be examined in order to give a clear picture of its expected functions 
within the context of the African human rights system.   
 
                                                 
82 Umozurike U, ‘The African Charter on human and people’s rights’, note 46 above, p. 909. 
83See OAU CAB/LEG rev 1 at p. 1  
84 Mutua M, ‘The African human rights court: A two-legged stool?’, (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 
342. 
85 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Adopted on 8 June 1998, Reprinted in Human Rights Law Journal 
(1999) 20/4-6, pp. 269-271. See also Mubangizi J, ‘Some reflections on recent and current trends in the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Africa: The pains and the gains’, (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, p. 147; Mutua M, note 85 above, p. 342. 
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3.2.1.2 Individual human rights under the Charter 
3.2.1.2.1 Civil and political rights  
 
The African Charter recognises the indivisibility and interrelatedness of rights. 
Specifically, it emphasises that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. 86 Thus, it intends to underscore 
the symbiotic relationship subsisting in the inter-dependence of rights whereby one 
category of rights cannot survive without the other. This relationship notwithstanding, the 
Charter guarantees a broad range of civil and political rights which now form the bulk of 
the African Commission’s jurisprudence. The commission has over the last two decades, 
or so, entertained numerous communications alleging violations of civil and political 
rights under the Charter. What follows therefore is a discussion of these rights and their 
scope in the light of the commission’s jurisprudence.  
 
3.2.1.2.1.1 Right to non-discrimination  
 
Every individual is entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in 
the Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth 
or other status.87 The exclusion of individuals from enjoying the rights in the Charter on 
the basis of these distinctions may amount to discrimination. ‘Discrimination’ means any 
distinction, exclusion or preference that has an effect of nullifying or impairing equal 
enjoyment of rights.88 Although discrimination is a particular form of differentiation, the 
two concepts are distinct. Discrimination refers to differentiation on subjective criteria 
                                                 
86 African Charter, Preamble, para 8. 
87 Art. 2. 
88 Communication 241/2001, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, Sixteenth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Annex VII), para 61. 
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like those mentioned in Article 2 of the Charter.89 This does not, however, rule out 
affirmative action that may be undertaken to redress past inequality.  
 
The African Commission has had the opportunity to interpret Article 2 in a number of 
cases. For instance, in Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme v. 
Zambia90, the Zambian government expelled West African nationals on grounds that they 
were living in Zambia illegally and that the African Charter did not abolish the 
requirements for visas and the regulation of movement over national borders between 
member states. The commission held that the nature of the expulsion by the Zambian 
government was discriminatory on nationality basis. The commission further stated that 
Zambia, by ratifying the African Charter, was committed to ‘secure the rights protected 
in the Charter to all persons within their jurisdiction, nationals or non-nationals.’91    
 
The commission also found a violation of Article 2 in Organisation Mondiale Contre la 
Torture and Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, Commission 
Internationale des Juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme (OMCT, AIJD, 
CIJ, UIDH) v. Rwanda.92 The communication alleged the expulsion of Burundian 
refugees from Rwanda as well as summary executions of Tutsis and political opponents, 
among other human rights violations. The commission found that the violations of the 
rights of the individuals in this case were on the basis of their being Burundian nationals, 
members of the Tutsi ethnic group or members of opposition parties, and as such violated 
Article 2 of the Charter. The commission concluded that: 
 
                                                 
89 Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 32; Onguergouz F, 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and 
sustainable democracy in Africa, note 45 above, pp. 77-78. 
90 Rencontre Africaine pour la De´fense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia (2000) AHRLR, (ACHPR 1996), 
p. 321. 
91 Ibid, para 22.  
92 Communication 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture & Others v. 
Rwanda, Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex 
X).  
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There is considerable evidence, undisputed by the government, that the violations of the 
rights of individuals have occurred on the basis of their being Burundian nationals or 
members of the Tutsi ethnic group. The denial of numerous rights to individuals on 
account of their nationality or membership of a particular ethnic group clearly violates 
Article 2.93 
 
It is evident that discrimination has been practised in many African states, more so 
against non-nationals. Mass expulsions, discrimination at the workplace, and subjection 
to unfavourable social and economic conditions, among other vices, have been 
experienced by foreign nationals in many African states.94 The latest of such activities 
was the series of xenophobic attacks on foreigners living in South Africa. Between April 
and May 2008, foreigners were targeted, and some attacked and killed, by some South 
African nationals. As a result of the nationwide attacks, more than 30,000 people were 
internally displaced and another 30,000 returned to their countries for fear of further 
attacks.  
 
Such discriminative practices, however, have often constituted a flagrant violation of 
Article 2 of the Charter, among other provisions. It is appreciated that African states are 
generally faced with many challenges, mainly of economic nature. In the wake of such 
difficulties, some resort to radical legislative and other measures to protect their nationals 
and their economy from non-nationals. Whatever the situation, however, such measures 
should not be taken to the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights.95  
 
Some governments have also been accused of promulgating legislation that is 
discriminative against some of its citizens. For instance, in Purohit and Moore v. 
                                                 
93 Ibid, para 22. 
94 Boukongou J, ‘The appeal of the African system for protecting human rights’, (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, p. 278. 
95 Communication 159/96, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme & Others v. Angola, Tenth Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex X), para 16. 
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Gambia96, the communication alleged that the principal legislation governing mental 
health in Gambia, namely the Lunatics Detention Act of 1917, was outdated and 
discriminative in effect. The complainants contended, as there were no review or appeal 
procedures against determination or certification of one’s mental state for both 
involuntary and voluntary mental patients, the legislation did not allow for the correction 
of an error assuming a wrong certification or wrong diagnosis had been made.97 In such 
circumstances, they further contended, if an error was made and there was no avenue to 
appeal or review the medical practitioners’ assessment, there would be a great likelihood 
that a person could be wrongfully detained in a mental institution.98 In finding a violation 
of Article 2 and 3 of the Charter, the commission stated: 
 
Clearly the situation presented above fails to meet the standards of antidiscrimination and 
equal protection of the law as laid down under the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the 
African Charter and Principle 1(4)99 of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care.100 The African 
Commission maintains that mentally disabled persons would like to share the same 
hopes, dreams and goals and have the same rights to pursue those hopes, dreams and 
goals just like any other human being.101 Like any other human being, mentally disabled 
persons or persons suffering from mental illnesses have a right to enjoy a decent life, as 
normal and full as possible, a right which lies at the heart of the right to human dignity. 
                                                 
96 Communication 241/2001, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, Sixteenth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Annex VII). 
97 Ibid, para 27. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Principle 1(4) provides: ‘There shall be no discrimination on the grounds of mental illness.’ 
‘Discrimination’ means any distinction, exclusion or preference that has an effect of nullifying or impairing 
equal enjoyment of rights [footnote retained]. 
100 GA Res 46/119, 46 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 189, UN Doc. A/46/49 (1991) [footnote retained]. 
101 Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, UNGA Resolution 3447(XXX) of 9 
December 1975, provides ‘Disabled persons have the inherent right to respect for their human dignity 
Disabled persons, whatever the origin, nature and seriousness of their handicaps and disabilities, have the 
same fundamental rights as their fellow citizens of the same age, which implies first and foremost the right 
to enjoy a decent life, as normal and as full as possible.’ [footnote retained]. 
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This right should be zealously guarded and forcefully protected by all states party to the 
African Charter in accordance with the well established principle that all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.102 
 
The African Commission’s observation in this regard is quite commendable because it 
draws the nexus between the right to non-discrimination and human dignity. In other 
words, discrimination undermines a person’s dignity by suggesting that he or she is 
inferior to the rest. Human dignity is an inherent basic right to which all human beings, 
regardless of their capabilities or disabilities, as the case may be, are entitled to without 
discrimination. It is therefore an inherent right which ‘every human being is obliged to 
respect by all means possible and on the other hand it confers a duty on every human 
being to respect this right.’103  
 
It must, however, be noted that the scope of the right to non-discrimination does not 
exclude reasonable measures intended to protect or support individuals who are 
disadvantaged by reason of their race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.104 
Such measures are generally referred to as affirmative action or ‘positive discrimination.’ 
Some states, such as South Africa, have come up with concepts like ‘fair discrimination’ 
to justify affirmative action.105 Hence, differentiation will not amount to discrimination if 
it is intended to redress imbalances in society and if it does not result to the violation of 
the right to equality and other associated rights. This essentially means that there is a very 
faint line between differentiation and discrimination. 
 
                                                 
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 1 [footnote retained]. Purohit and Moore v 
Gambia, note 96 above, paras 35–38. 
103 Ibid, para 57.  
104 See Umozurike U, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 32. 
105 See generally chapter two of the Constitution of South Africa (1996), Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA); and the Employment Equity Act.   
 241
The right to non-discrimination is closely linked to the right to equality.106 Article 3 of 
the Charter guarantees every individual the ‘twin-rights’ of equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law.107 This essentially means that the law should not have regard 
for race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. Like the right to non-
discrimination, the right to equality is not absolute, but rather recognises relative equality. 
Relative equality allows for a differential treatment of individuals proportionate to their 
circumstances.   
 
In Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Federation International des Ligues des 
Droits de l'Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l'Homme, Organisation Nationale 
des Droits de l'Homme au Senegal and Association Malienne des Droits de l'Homme 
(UIDH, FIDH, RADDHO, ONDH and AMDH) v. Angola108, the communication alleged 
the expulsion of West Africans from Angola without the opportunity to challenge the 
matter before the domestic courts. The commission held that states parties are under 
obligation to ensure that persons living in their territory, whether nationals or non-
nationals enjoy the rights guaranteed under the Charter. Thus, it found that the victims’ 
right to equality before the law was trampled on, in violation of Article 3 of the Charter, 
because of their origin.109  
 
The right to equality and equal protection of the law requires that no law shall be 
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.110 Hence, this right would be violated when, 
for example, a public authority in the performance of the functions of a public office 
discriminates against a person. The same could be said of a law that treats people in a 
discriminatory manner in respect of, for example, access to shops, hotels, lodging-houses, 
                                                 
106 Onguergouz F, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for 
human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa, note 45 above, p. 77.  
107 African Charter Art 3(1) & (2). 
108 Communication 159/96, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme & Others  v. Angola, Eleventh 
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex II), para 1. 
109 Ibid, para 18. 
110 See section 82 of Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 1963, as amended in 1999. 
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public restaurants, eating houses, beer halls or places of public entertainment or in respect 
of access to places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of public funds or 
dedicated to the use of the general public.  
 
Most communications before the commission that alleged the violation of Article 3 also 
alleged the violation of Article 2 of the Charter. Thus, it is inevitable to conclude that the 
right to non-discrimination and the right to equality are closely related, if not intertwined.  
    
3.2.1.2.1.2 Right to life and integrity of the person 
 
Article 4 of the Charter guarantees the right to life in much precise terms. It begins with 
affirming the inviolability of human beings then proceeds to acknowledge the entitlement 
to respect for life and integrity of the person.111 The provision prohibits arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life. This right has been regarded as the most fundamental right 
on the basis of which other rights accrue.112 As a matter of fact, a person cannot claim 
any other right if his or her right to life has been violated. Generally, this right is non-
derogable except in certain circumstances judicially recognised or resulting from lawful 
acts of war or self-defence.113 However, in some national jurisdictions, such as South 
Africa, this right is non-derogable even in times of emergencies.114 
 
The Charter is silent on what might constitute arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.  In 
the absence of a working definition from both the Charter and the commission, arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life should be understood to mean extra-judicial killings.115 
                                                 
111 Article 4 states, ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life 
and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’. 
112 See Nmehielle O, The African human rights system (2001), p. 85.   
113 See Davidson S, The Inter-American human rights system (1992), pp. 262-263; Onguergouz F, The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and 
sustainable democracy in Africa, note 45 above, p. 91. 
114 See Constitution of South Africa (1996), Art. 37. 
115 See Murray R, ‘Report on the 1996 Sessions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights- 19th and 20th Sessions: 26 March- 4 April, and 21-23 October 1996’, (1997) 18 Human Rights Law 
Journal, p. 19. 
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This reasoning could be deduced from Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and 
Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, Commission Internationale des 
Juristes, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme v. Rwanda, where the commission 
observed that extra-judicial killings of Rwandan villagers by the Armed Forces violated 
the right to life guaranteed by the Charter. 116  
 
The commission’s response to the violation of the right to life has generally been 
unsatisfactory because it has not only failed to provide the definition of the right to life 
within the context of the Charter, but has also failed to find its violation in certain 
instances. For example, in International Commission of Jurists v. Rwanda117, it failed to 
find a violation of the right even when it was informed of the extra-judicial killings that 
were taking place in Rwanda. Instead, it requested permission from the Rwandan 
government to conduct on-site investigation of the allegations.118  
 
Despite the quick response from the government, the commission did not immediately 
send a mission to Rwanda. It was until March 1994, after about four years from the time 
of its request, when it decided to send a two-person mission with the assistance of the 
United Nations.119 Visiting Rwanda four years after a communication had been lodged 
was both unfortunate and undesirable. The commission should have used that opportunity 
to elaborate on the context of the right to life as contemplated in the Charter. 
 
                                                 
116 Communication 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture and Association 
Internationale des juristes Democrates), Commission Internationale des Juristes (C.I.J) Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme v. Rwanda, Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex X). 
117 Communication 49/91, International Commission of Jurists v. Rwanda, Tenth Annual Activity Report of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex X). 
118 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 87.  
119 Ibid. 
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In Orton and Vera Chirwa v. Malawi120, the commission also failed to clarify the scope 
of this right. Although the communication alleged violation of the right to fair trial, right 
to liberty and freedom from torture, the commission went ahead to find the violation of 
the right to life. Mr. and Mrs. Chirwa, who were under political persecution from the then 
government of Kamuzu Banda, had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment. 
They were held in solitary confinement, denied good food, adequate medical care, 
shackled for long periods of time in their cells and prevented from seeing each other for 
years. Mr. Chirwa later died in prison while the case was pending before the commission. 
The commission found that Malawi had violated not only the right to fair trial, liberty and 
freedom from torture but also, the right to life was violated circumstantially.121 The 
findings of the commission are unsatisfactory in as far as it failed to comprehensively 
interpret those provisions that had been violated by Malawi.  
 
In Interights et al (on behalf of Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v. Botswana122, the 
communication related to the conviction for murder and subsequent sentencing to death 
of Mariette Bosch in Botswana, allegedly in violation of Article 4 of the Charter. The 
complainants argued, among other things, that the death penalty had been imposed in 
breach of the Charter. While accepting Botswana’s argument that the death penalty was 
not per se in breach of the Charter, the commission cited Inter-American jurisprudence 
which stated that the death penalty should be imposed only after full consideration of the 
circumstances of the offence and of the offender.123 It found that the court in respect of 
Mariette Bosch had looked at the circumstances fully. The commission also observed 
that:   
 
                                                 
120 Communications 64/92, 68/92 and 72/92, Orton and Vera Chirwa v. Malawi, Eighth Annual Activity 
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Communication 240/2001, Interights et al (on behalf of Mariette Sonjaleen Bosch) v Botswana, 
Seventeenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex 
VII). 
123 Ibid, para 52. 
 245
… it would be remiss for the African Commission to deliver its decision on this matter 
without acknowledging the evolution of international law and the trend towards abolition 
of the death penalty. This is illustrated by the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the 
2nd Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the general reluctance by those States that have 
retained capital punishment on their Statute books to exercise it in practice. The African 
Commission has also encouraged this trend by adopting a ‘Resolution Urging States to 
envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty’ and therefore encourages all States party to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to take all measures to refrain from 
exercising the death penalty.124 
 
It then ‘strongly urged the Republic of Botswana to take all measures to comply with the 
Resolution urging States to envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty.’125 Despite not 
finding a breach of the Charter, the commission also required the defendant state to 
‘report back to the African commission when it submits its report in terms of Article 62 
of the African Charter on measures taken to comply with this recommendation.’126  
 
This appears to be contradictory, although not dissimilar, to the approach that has been 
adopted by other international bodies.127 The commission had previously held that where 
a trial which ordered the death penalty was not fair and so violated Article 7 of the 
Charter, the subsequent execution will further violate the right to life under Article 4.128 
Murray observed that although individual commissioners have sometimes appeared to 
suggest that the death penalty is a violation of the guarantee of the right to life in Article 
4 of the Charter, the commission as a whole has not taken this position.129  
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See in this regard the ICJ’s approach in the Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v 10 NATO States) 
cases, ICJ Reports, (2004), p. 3. See also Murray R, ‘Developments in the African human rights system 
2003-04’, (2006) 6/1 Human Rights Law Review, p. 169. 
128 Communication 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, 
Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, Twelfth Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V). 
129 Murray R, ‘Developments in the African human rights system 2003-04’, note 127 above, p. 169. 
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In the examination of state reports, commissioners have reportedly asked states whether 
they have abolished the death penalty.130 For example, at the 31st Session of the 
commission in May 2002, one commissioner asked the delegation from Cameroon: ‘the 
death sentence is still in the criminal code but it has been said that for more than 15 years 
there has been no execution. Are there any efforts to guarantee the right to life and thus 
abolish the death sentence?’131 This essentially means that the commissioner perceived 
the abolition of the death sentence as a guarantee to the right to life. Once again, it failed 
to seize this moment to define the scope of the right to life as contemplated in the 
Charter. 
 
In the Resolution Urging the State to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty132, the 
commission urged states to review their approach and consider abolishing the death 
penalty. The commission stated that it:  
 
Urges all states parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights that still 
maintain the death penalty to comply fully with their obligations under the treaty and to 
ensure that persons accused of crimes for which the death penalty is a competent sentence 
are afforded all the guarantees in the African Charter…. Calls upon all states that still 
maintain the death penalty to: (a) limit the imposition of the death penalty only to the 
most serious crimes; (b) consider establishing a moratorium on executions of death 
penalty; (c) reflect on the possibility of abolishing death penalty.133  
 
From the foregoing, it is imperative to note that the commission is not unequivocal on the 
abolition of the death penalty. Rather, it gives states two options, the first being limiting 
the imposition of the death penalty only to the most serious crimes and the second being 
considering on the possibility of abolishing the penalty. Thus, it can be said that the right 
to life in the context of the African human rights system does not exclude judicial 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Adopted at 26th Ordinary Session on 15 November 1999, ACHPR/Res.42(XXVI), p. 99. 
133 Resolution Urging the State to Envisage a Moratorium on the Death Penalty, ACHPR/Res.42(XXVI), p. 
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execution. Generally, the commission still has a lot to do with regard to the clarification 
of the right to life. The commission is yet to interpret Article 4 in the light of issues such 
the right to life of a foetus, and other controversial components of the right to life that 
have come before the UN and other regional mechanisms.134 The importance of the right 
to life in Africa cannot be overlooked. This is especially because it is one of those rights 
that have been violated with impunity by successive brutal regimes which have engaged 
in endless power struggles and extra-judicial killings.135 
 
3.2.1.2.1.3 Right against all forms of slavery, slave trade, torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
 
Article 5 of the Charter protects a number of related rights; namely, (i) the right to the 
respect of the dignity inherent in a person; (ii) the right to recognition of ones legal status; 
and, (iii) the right against all forms of exploitation and degradation of people particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment.136 
The right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being is the basis of the human 
rights concept. This concept, as already discussed in the previous chapter, acknowledges 
that every individual has legal entitlements (rights) by virtue of being human. It is on the 
basis of this acknowledgement of one’s legal status that Article 5 recognises the fact that 
slavery is a dehumanising practice because it exploits people. Slave trade has been one of 
the greatest violations of human rights ever to be committed in Africa.137 Slave trade and 
slavery in their contemporary forms include practices such as: illegal sale and traffic in 
                                                 
134 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 88. 
135 Ibid, p. 85. 
136 Article 5 states: ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human 
being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited’. 
137 For a detailed discussion on how the trade affected human rights in Africa, see Chapter two of this 
thesis.  
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human beings, pledging of young girls for debts, forced marriages in exchange of dowry; 
use of domestic servants for extremely low pay; child labour; and, forced labour.138  
  
The problem presented by the provisions of Article 5 relating to slavery is that of 
enforcement. Slavery is a violation that cannot easily be traced to states because it is 
mostly perpetrated by individuals.139 It is often rooted in traditional and religious 
practices.140 The fact that this practice stems from non-state quarters accounts for the few 
complaints the African Commission has so far received in this area.  
 
In S.O.S Esclaves v. Mauritania141, the complainant alleged that, in some cases, the 
government of Mauritania supported the perpetrators of slavery, which was still a 
common practice in the country.142 The communication stated, inter alia, that ten adults 
were sold and bought as slaves; children from four families were enslaved by their 
parents’ masters; two women were married to their masters against their will; and six 
people and their families were disposed of their ancestral property by their parents’ 
masters.143 The communication was, however, found inadmissible for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.144  
 
In Bah Ould Rabah v. Mauritania145, the complainant and his family were forcefully 
expelled from their ancestral home by a man named Mohamed Bah on the grounds that 
                                                 
138 Ankumanh E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1996), p. 119. See also 
Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 89. 
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the deceased mother of the complainant was his slave. Subsequently, the house 
bequeathed to her descendants and the whole estate around it became legally the property 
of Mohamed Bah, the alleged ‘owner’ of the deceased.146 The complainant therefore 
alleged violation of Article 5 of the African Charter. The government of Mauritania 
claimed that the dispute was between two citizens who were members of the same family 
and that the allegations could not be justified as slavery.147  
 
The commission observed that the consequences of slavery still existed in the respondent 
state. It therefore called on all public institutions in Mauritania ‘to persevere in their 
efforts so as to control and eliminate all the offshoots of slavery.’148 It then ordered the 
government to ‘take the appropriate steps to restore the plaintiff his rights.’149 The 
commission, as has been its custom, failed to specify the ‘appropriate steps’ the 
government of Mauritania needed to take to restore the plaintiff’s rights. It also did not 
elaborate on the content of the right against slavery, especially in its contemporary 
application. This indeed is an overt failure on the part of the commission.     
 
Article 5 also provides for the prohibition of all forms of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment and treatment. The term ‘torture’ is still highly debatable and has 
generated divergent views in academic circles.150 In Article 1 of the Convention against 
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), torture is 
defined as: 
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150 See Cullen A, ‘Defining torture in international law: A critique of the concept employed by the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 34 California Western International Law Journal, p. 29, where 
the author sees the need for a less definitive and broader view of the concept of torture. See also Mujuzi J, 
‘An analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture adopted by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 429. 
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
Torture is still a persistent problem in Africa. It has been said that this practice is usually 
employed by both governments and individuals, mainly to counter dissent and to impose 
ideas or authority on others.151 According to Nmehielle, in Africa, ‘torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment are constant tools in the hands of many dictators to 
smother their opponents.’152 Mujuzi notes that due to this, it is unsurprising that the 
African Charter puts torture in the same category as slavery and slave trade, and 
categorises them as ‘forms of exploitation and degradation.’153 
 
From the commission’s jurisprudence, it can be deduced that torture includes acts such as 
beatings usually carried out by security forces, long periods of detention without charge 
or trial, overcrowded detention cells and prisons and detention in solitary cell. In Krishna 
Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton and 
Vera Chirwa v Malawi154, for example, the commission held that conditions of 
                                                 
151 Statement made at an international seminar ‘African cultures and the fight against torture’ available at 
http://ww2.fiacat.org/ en/article.php3?id_article=41, last accessed 31 July 2007. See also Mujuzi J, ‘An 
analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture adopted by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 150 above, p. 429. 
152 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 90. 
153 Mujuzi J, ‘An analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture adopted by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 150 above, p. 429. 
154 Communication 64/92, 68/92, 78/92, Krishna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty 
International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa) v. Malawi. The Commission was also seized with other 
communications alleging the violation of this right. However, they were dismissed for failing to meet the 
admissibility requirement. See, for example, See Nziwa Buyingo v. Uganda, Communication No. 8/88; 
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overcrowding and acts of beating and torture that took place in prisons in Malawi 
contravened this provision of the Charter. The commission has also found the holding of 
a prisoner in handcuffs, airless and dirty cells, chained by foot to the wall in the cell, and 
the denial of medical attention in situation of deteriorating health to be acts of torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.155 
 
In Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan156, eight Muslim university students on a picnic 
were arrested and charged with committing, in a public place, acts contrary to public 
morality prohibited under Article 152 of the Sudanese Criminal Law of 1991.157 The 
alleged offensive acts consisted of girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with men, 
crossing legs with men, and sitting and talking with boys.158 They were subsequently 
convicted and sentenced to fines and lashes. The lashes were executed in public under the 
supervision of the national court. The complainant alleged that the punishment violated 
Article 5 of the African Charter. In finding a violation and requesting the abolition of the 
penalty of lashes by Sudan, the African Commission observed as follows: 
 
Article 5 of the Charter prohibits not only cruel but also inhuman and degrading 
treatment. This includes not only actions which cause serious physical or psychological 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hilarie v. Benin, Communication no. 17/88; and El Hadji Boubacare v. Benin, Communication no. 18/88 
Law Reports of the African Commission Series A, Volume 1, ACHPR/LR/A1 (1997). 
155 Communication 137/94, 139/94, 156/96, 161/97, International PEN, Constitutional Rights Project, and 
Civil Liberties Organisation, Interights (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr.) v Nigeria, Twelfth Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V) (hereafter ‘the Saro 
Wiwa case’). 
156 Communication 236/2000, Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, Sixteenth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex VII). See also Banderin M, ‘Recent 
developments in the African regional human rights system’, (2005) 5/1 Human Rights Law Review, p. 133. 
157 Article 152 of the Sudanese Criminal Law of 1991 provides as follows: ‘1. Whoever commits, in a 
public place, an act, or conducts himself in an indecent or immoral dress, which causes annoyance to public 
feelings, shall be punished, with whipping, not exceeding forty lashes, or with fine, or with both. 2. The act 
shall be deemed contrary to public morality, if it is so considered in the religion of the doer, or the custom 
of the country where the act occurs.’ 
158 Communication 236/2000, Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, note 156 above, para. 3. 
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suffering, but which humiliate or force the individual [to act] against his will or 
conscience.159  
 
While ultimately whether an act constitutes inhuman degrading treatment or punishment 
depends on the circumstances of the case, the commission stated that the prohibition of 
torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is to be interpreted as 
widely as possible to encompass the widest possible array of physical and mental 
abuses.160 In this regard, the commission observed that no government has the right to 
apply physical violence on individuals for offences because that would be tantamount to 
sanctioning state sponsored torture under the Charter.161  
 
The commission further rejected the argument by Sudan that the lashings were justified 
because the authors of the petition committed acts found to be criminal according to the 
laws in force in the country. It did not, however, address Sudan’s argument that ‘it was 
better for the victims to have been lashed rather than hold them in detention for the said 
criminal offences and as such deny them of the opportunity to continue with their normal 
lives.’162 This is a relativist argument often advanced to establish that lashing is less 
cruel, inhuman or degrading than imprisonment. The argument, however, fails to 
appreciate that a punishment does not lose its degrading character just because it is a 
more effective deterrent.163 
 
The commission’s jurisprudence on the violation of Article 5 of the Charter is rather 
scanty because it is yet to articulate on what amounts to torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment in the context of the African Charter as has been done in the 
                                                 
159 Ibid, para 36. 
160 Para 37. 
161 Para 42. 
162 Para 34. 
163 Banderin M, ‘Recent developments in the African regional human rights system’, note 156 above, p. 
133. 
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European and Inter-American systems.164 This may partly be attributed to the few 
communications alleging the violation of this right. The fact that there are few complaints 
on the violation of this right, however, does not necessarily depict the situation on the 
ground. This is because, and sadly so to state, many practices which violate these 
provisions continue to persist throughout the continent.165 Notably, corporal punishment 
still punctuates the criminal laws of many African states.166 Certain religious and cultural 
practices such as amputation of limbs as criminal punishment are also common.  
 
Although the commission has not evolved substantial jurisprudence on the right against 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, it has all the same taken initiatives to 
elaborate on, and protect this right. For instance, it adopted a Resolution on Guidelines 
and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines).167 The 
Robben Island Guidelines (RIG) approaches the question of torture in three broad ways: 
prohibition, prevention, and responding to the needs of victims.168 Specifically, the 
                                                 
164 See, for example, Tyrer v. UK (1978) 2 ECHR, p. 1, where the court held that birching by order of a 
judicial authority in the Isle of Man amounted to degrading punishment and violated Article 3 of the 
European Convention.  Similarly the court held in Campbell  and Cosans v. UK 1982 4 ECHR, p. 293 that 
although birching in Scottish schools did not violate Article 3 of the Convention per se, suspension of the 
applicants from school refusing to submit to the punishment was in breach of parental convictions against 
corporal punishment protected under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.   
165 Nmehielle O, The African Human Rights system, note 112 above, p. 90. 
166 For instance, Section 18 of the Criminal Code of Southern Nigeria and S 68 (1)(f) of the Penal Code of 
Northern Nigeria, which authorise flogging for prescribed offences. S 55(1)(d) of the code allows the 
reasonable chastisement of a wife by her husband, if they are married under the customary law. See 
Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 44.  
167 Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines), adopted by the African 
Commission at its 32nd ordinary session, 17-23 October 2002, Banjul, The Gambia, Sixteenth Annual 
Activity Report (2002-2003). 
168 For a detailed discussion on these guidelines see, Mujuzi J, ‘An analysis of the approach to the right to 
freedom from torture adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 150 above, 
p. 440. 
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guidelines require states to, inter alia: criminalise torture; combat impunity for both 
nationals and non-nationals who commit acts of torture; establish complaints and 
investigation procedures to which all persons can bring their allegations of torture; take 
steps to ensure that conditions of detention comply with international standards; and train 
and empower, among others, law enforcement officers so that they refrain from using 
torture.169  
 
The guidelines also oblige states to ensure that all victims of torture and their dependants 
are offered appropriate medical care, have access to appropriate social and medical 
rehabilitation, and are provided with appropriate levels of compensation and support.170 
Remarkably, the guidelines recognise families and communities which have been 
affected by the torture and ill-treatment of one of its members as torture victims.171 A 
detailed discussion of these guidelines is beyond the scope of the present study.  
 
Suffice it to state that in spite of it being a step towards the right direction; the RIG is not 
binding on states, as it is a mere declaration and not a treaty. Additionally, its purported 
enforcement mechanism is said to be very weak. This is because, the guidelines establish 
a follow-up committee of only five members with the mandate to organise seminars, to 
disseminate the RIG, to develop and propose to the commission strategies to promote and 
implement the RIG at national and regional levels, to promote and facilitate the 
implementation of the RIG within member states, and to draft a progress report to the 
African Commission at each session. This is clearly too much work for only five 
individuals. The commission could also give effect to the guidelines when pronouncing 
its findings and recommendations to communications alleging the violation of this 
right.172   
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In another initiative the commission liaised with certain institutions, especially prison 
authorities, in some European countries in an effort to gain an insight on how, among 
other things, torture can be prevented in places of detention.173 Commissioners have in 
the past visited countries such as France. The commission has also granted observer 
status to many NGOs that deal with torture.174 It is hoped that with time, the 
commission’s jurisprudence on the violation of this right will evolve to address the 
perturbing levels of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on the 
continent.    
 
3.2.1.2.1.4 Right to liberty and security of the person 
 
Article 6 of the Charter provides that ‘every individual shall have the right to liberty and 
to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons 
and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained.’ This Article guarantees individuals physical liberty by prohibiting 
unlawful arrests and detention. The enjoyment of this right, however, is subject to reasons 
and conditions laid down by law. The right to liberty and security of the person requires 
the state to have justifiable grounds for depriving a person of his or her liberty, and 
further requires such deprivation to be in accordance with stipulated procedures.175 
 
The Charter is not explicit on what ‘law’ this right should be subjected to: is it 
international law or domestic legislations? One might argue that the drafters intended the 
term ‘law’, as used in this Article, to mean international law. This is because there is 
imminent danger in subjecting the formulation of the parameters of this right to domestic 
legislation. The danger is to the effect that what is ‘law’ in a certain domestic jurisdiction 
                                                 
173 See Thirteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para 
27 & Fifteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para 30. 
174 For a detailed discussion of the role of NGOs in the African human rights system, see Motala Z, ‘Non-
governmental organisations in the African system’, in Evans M & Murray R, The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (2002), pp. 246-279. 
175 Nmehielle O, The African Human Rights system, note 112 above, p. 92. 
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may be an oppressive legislation that facilitates the violation of this right.176 Essentially, 
we would agree with the proposition that the law to be relied on in limiting this right 
must be consistent with the standards recognised under international law.177  
 
The African Commission has had the opportunity to address communications alleging 
violation of Article 6 of the Charter. In Henry Kalenga v. Zambia178, for example, the 
complainant, who was detained without trial, petitioned the commission for his release. 
Zambia’s Ministry of Legal Affairs later informed the commission of his release, after 
being in detention for three years. The commission proceeded to declare the matter 
amicably resolved without consulting the victim. The conclusion of the case by the 
commission without developing its jurisprudence on this right or pronouncing the 
appropriate relief was rather disappointing. Similarly, in International Pen v. Burkina 
Faso179, where the victim alleged unlawful detention, a notification to the commission of 
the release of the victim was enough for it to declare the matter amicably resolved.180  
 
The commission’s approach of declaring communication’s amicably resolved without 
giving substantive reasoning was not taken lightly.181 Subsequently, it resolved to adopt a 
new approach of contacting the petitioner(s) to inquire whether other forms of relief are 
desirable besides release from detention.182 It also found violation of Article 6 where a 
victim was detained for seven years without trial.183 While this is a welcome step in the 
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right direction, the commission must go ahead to determine the award of compensation in 
cases where it finds a violation of Article 6, or any other provisions of the Charter.184 The 
fact that Article 6 does not make specific provisions regarding compensation should not 
in any way deter the commission from applying the standards known in international law, 
especially as authorised in Article 60 of the Charter.185  
 
3.2.1.2.1.5 Right to a fair trial 
 
Article 7 guarantees the right to a fair trial in the following terms: 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:  
(a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights 
as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; 
(b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal;  
(c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;  
(d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.  
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable 
offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no 
provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only 
on the offender. 
 
This Article lays down some essential components of a fair trial namely: (i) fair hearing; 
(ii) the right of appeal; (iii) presumption of innocence; (iv) defence by counsel of one’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Communication 39/90, Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v. Cameroon, Eighth Activity 
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex VI); Tenth Activity Report of 
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184 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 94. 
185 Ibid. Article 60 provides that: ‘The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human 
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rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal 
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choice; (v) trial by an impartial court or tribunal; (vi) individual criminal responsibility; 
and (vi) prohibition of ex-post facto laws.  
 
Article 7(1)(a) guarantees the right to an effective appeal to competent national organs 
against acts violating fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, 
laws, regulations and customs in force. According to the construction of the commission, 
the term ‘appeal’ seems to refer to the right to lodge an appeal to a higher court, where 
one exists. In The Constitutional Rights Project (Zamani Lekwot & 6 Others) v. 
Nigeria186, the victims were convicted and sentenced to death under the Nigerian Civil 
Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act. The petitioners contended, inter alia, that there was 
a violation of the right of appeal under Article 7(1)(a) of the Charter. The commission 
held that to foreclose any avenue of appeal to ‘competent national organs’ in criminal 
cases violates Article 7(1)(a) of the African Charter.  
 
The commission had earlier held section 11(4) of the Nigerian Armed Robbery and 
Firearms (Special Provisions) Act187, which restricted appeals, to be a violation of the 
right to appeal guaranteed under Article 7(1)(a) of the Charter.188 Similarly, the 
commission has also found ‘the system of executive confirmation, as opposed to appeal, 
provided for in the institution of special tribunals’ to be contrary to Article 7(1)(a).189 In 
other words, special tribunals are not entitled to substitute the right to appeal with the 
system of executive confirmation. The phrase ‘competent national organs’ in Article 
7(1)(a) has been said to envisage ingredients such as the expertise of the judges and the 
                                                 
186 Communication 87/93, The Constitutional Rights Project (Zamani Lekwot & 6 Others) v. Nigeria, 
ACHPR/LR/A1 (1997), p. 104. 
187 The sub-section provided that ‘no appeal shall lie from a decision of a tribunal under this Act or from 
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rights system, note 112 above, p. 96.  
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inherent justice of the laws under which they operate.190 Consequently, ‘to deprive a 
court of the personnel qualified to ensure that they operate impartially denies the right to 
individual’s to have their case heard by such bodies.’191  
 
Reference to ‘court or tribunal’ in the subsection indicates that the Charter applies to all 
courts and tribunals, whether specialised or ordinary.192 Thus, the commission has 
maintained that a military tribunal, per se, is not offensive to the rights in the Charter, nor 
does it imply an unfair or unjust process; neither is such a tribunal negated by the mere 
fact of being presided over by military officers.193 Such tribunals may, however, present 
serious problems in areas of equitable, impartial and independent administration of 
justice. For them to be recognised, at least in the context of subsection 7(1)(a) of the 
Charter, they must be subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness, justice, 
independence, and due process as any other ordinary court.194  
 
Article 7(1)(b) deals with the presumption of innocence, which is a criminal law principle 
that requires a person to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. In criminal cases, the 
burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. In most military dictatorships, however, 
this right has always been infringed in a bid to secure quick justice.195 The commission 
has found violation of this right in a number of cases.196 For instance, in Annette 
Pagnoulle  v. Cameroon197, the commission held that the detention of the complainant for 
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two years after he had served his sentence of imprisonment on the suspicion that he ‘may 
cause problems’ was a violation of his right to be presumed innocent.  
 
In Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria198, Mr. Niran Malaolu and three other 
staff of a Nigerian newspaper, the Diet newspaper, were arrested by armed soldiers at the 
editorial offices of the newspaper in Lagos on 28 December 1997. Neither Mr. Malaolu 
nor his three colleagues were informed of the reasons for their arrest or shown a warrant 
of arrest.199 Three of the arrestees were later released, but Mr. Malaolu continued to be 
held without charges until 14 February 1998, when he was arraigned before a special 
military tribunal for his alleged involvement in a coup. Throughout the period of his 
incarceration, he was not allowed access to his lawyer, doctor or family members.200 On 
28 April 1998, the tribunal, after a secret trial, found the accused guilty of concealment of 
treason and sentenced him to life imprisonment.201 The African Commission held that his 
right to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, had 
been breached.202 
 
The sub-section also requires proof of guilt to be conducted by a competent court or 
tribunal. To facilitate this process, the state must employ competent and qualified 
umpires to preside over cases. These umpires must be impartial and independent of 
executive influence.203 In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lekwot and 
6 Others) v Nigeria204, the commission found a bench composed of members of the 
armed forces and police to be partial and therefore in violation of Article 7(1)(b). A 
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competent court is one whose judges (or magistrates) are duly qualified, meeting both 
legal and natural qualifications such as integrity.205  
 
Suffice it to state that presumption of innocence, as contemplated in Article 7(1)(b), 
demands that the arrestee should be informed of the reasons for his being arrested. Such 
information must also be availed timely to avoid miscarriage of justice. This would allow 
the person to prepare his defence and where necessary, prove his innocence. It is 
unfortunate, however, that the Charter does not provide for, among other things, the right 
of arrestees to be informed, in a language that they understand, of reasons for their arrest 
and the charges against them. It was the African Commission’s Resolution on the Right to 
Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial that attempted to fill this gap. This resolution shall be 
revisited later in this part. 
 
Article 7(1)(c) guarantees every person the right to defence. The African Commission has 
defined this to envisage ‘all sorts of elements required to prepare for one’s defence.’206 
One such element that is expressly stipulated in the Charter is the right to be defended by 
Counsel of one’s choice. Thus, trial without being defended was held to be a violation of 
Article 7(1)(c).207 The guarantee of the right to be defended by ‘Counsel’ of one’s choice 
is problematic if ‘Counsel’ is understood to mean a fully qualified and admitted 
lawyer.208 It has correctly been suggested that the term ‘Counsel’ should be taken to 
mean ‘legal representative’ and nothing more.209  
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The commission found a violation of the provision when Defence Counsel was harassed 
during a trial to the point where he withdrew from the case.210 A similar finding was 
made when a Defence Counsel was allegedly assaulted by soldiers.211 It has also been 
held that the right to be defended by Counsel of one’s choice implies that one has the 
right of access to a lawyer when being detained without trial.212  
 
In Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria213, the complainant alleged, inter alia, that 
Mr. Malaolu was denied the right to be defended by lawyers of his choice and was, 
instead, assigned a military lawyer by the tribunal, in contravention of the right to a fair 
hearing.214 The African Commission, relying on paragraph 2(e)(i) of its Resolution on the 
Right to Recourse and Fair Trial, conceded that there was a violation of the accused’s 
basic guarantees.215 In Avocats Sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v. Burundi216, 
the African Commission was called upon to rule that, by denying Mr. Gaetan 
Bwampamye’s Counsel the right to plead his case, the Criminal Chamber of the Ngozi 
Court of Appeal held a hearing which was not equitable in terms of the African 
Charter.217 The communication alleged, inter alia, although the Criminal Chamber of the 
Court of Appeal accorded the prosecution the right to make oral submissions, the 
Defence Counsel was denied the same.218  
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The commission recalled that the right to fair trial involves ‘fulfillment of certain 
objective criteria, including the right to equal treatment, the right to defence by a lawyer, 
especially where this is called for by the interests of Justice, as well as the obligation on 
the part of courts and tribunals to conform to international standards in order to guarantee 
a fair trial to all.’219 The commission went further to elucidate the components of the right 
to equal treatment by stating that it means:  
 
… in the first place, that both the defence and the public prosecutor shall have equal 
opportunity to prepare and present their pleas and indictment during the trial. Simply put, 
they should argue their cases before the jurisdiction on an equal footing. Secondly it 
entails the equal treatment of all accused persons by jurisdictions charged with trying 
them. This does not mean that identical treatment should be meted to all accused. The 
idea here is the principle that when objective facts are alike, the response of the judiciary 
should also be similar. There is a breach of the principle of equality if judicial or 
administrative decisions are applied in a discriminatory manner.220 
 
The commission’s observations were indeed very constructive given that it interpreted 
the right to defence broadly enough to include equality of treatment of the accused 
persons and the prosecution. Where parties to a dispute are not afforded equal 
opportunities during trial, it is likely that justice would be compromised. Additionally, 
the commission held that the right to defence also implies, at each stage of the criminal 
proceedings, the accused and his counsel should be able to reply to indictment of the 
public prosecutor.221  
 
Although the Charter guarantees the right to legal representation, it fails to make 
provision for legal aid or assistance. The European222 and Inter-American223 human rights 
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systems have provisions for legal assistance. A distinction can be drawn on the 
circumstances under which free legal assistance is granted in the European and American 
systems. Undert the European system, legal assistance is a right in criminal cases ‘where 
[the accused] does not have sufficient means to pay for legal assistance’ and ‘when the 
interest of justice so requires’ that the person should be granted such assistance.224  
 
Under the American system, on the other hand, legal assistance is an inalienable right to 
be assisted by state-provided Counsel. This right accrues to an accused person under two 
circumstances; first, if the accused does not wish to defend himself or herself personally 
and, secondly, if the accused fails to engage his or her counsel within the time period 
established by law.225 By extension, this means that legal assistance is granted to ensure a 
speedier rendition of justice to the accused person. 
  
A combined reading of the above provisions of the European and American Conventions 
leads one to effectively conclude that the provision of free legal aid or assistance could be 
necessitated by at least two circumstances; namely, that (i) the interest of justice so 
requires and, (ii) the person is indigent, meaning that he or she does not have sufficient 
means to pay for legal representation. Boukongou contends, the determination of ‘interest 
of justice’ in criminal cases is based on the seriousness of the offence and the severity of 
the sentence, whilst in civil cases it is based on the complexity of the case and the ability 
of the party to adequately represent himself or herself; the rights to be affected; and the 
likely impact of the outcome of the case on the wider community.226 This reasoning 
partly explains why free legal aid and assistance in many African countries is granted to 
indigents in capital offences.  
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It cannot be gainsaid, the right to legal aid and assistance is an integral component of fair 
trial as it ensures that indigent persons are not denied fair hearing due to their insufficient, 
or lack of means to hire competent Counsel. However, the provision of legal aid and 
assistance is a capital-intensive undertaking, which many African states have found very 
difficult to accomplish effectively from their own resources.227 One can legitimately 
wonder about access to the African Commission in the case of persons in distress or 
destitute, especially as no state makes provision for legal aid for the submission of cases 
to an international authority.228  
 
A serious thought should be given to ways and means the African human rights system, 
which is in an environment characterised by abject poverty, could attend to indigent 
complainants. Arguably, many poor people across the continent are unable to file 
complaints with the commission due to inadequate financial means. Resource constraints 
notwithstanding, states need to commit themselves to legal assistance if the right to fair 
hearing is to be guaranteed.  
 
Article 7(1)(d) guarantees the right of an accused to be tried within a reasonable time by 
an impartial court or tribunal. The Charter’s reference to ‘reasonable time’ is to ensure 
that proceedings are not unduly prolonged. The rationale for the provision is to safeguard 
the speedy rendition of justice to ensure effectiveness and credibility.229 Reasonableness 
of the duration of proceedings, however, depends on the particular circumstances of a 
case. The commission held the detention of a victim for seven years without trial to be a 
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violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under article 7(1)(d).230 
Similarly, detention without trial was termed as a violation of this provision.231  
 
The commission has also interpreted what might reasonably constitute an impartial court 
or tribunal under Article 7(1)(d). In Constitutional Rights Project (Akumu) v. Nigeria232, 
the impartiality provision was dealt with in relation to the special tribunals that had been 
created to deal with cases involving robbery and firearms. The commission stated: 
 
The Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act, Section 8(1), describes the 
constitution of the tribunals, which shall consist of three persons: one judge, one officer 
of the Army, Navy or Air Force and one officer of the Police Force. Jurisdiction has thus 
been transferred from the normal courts to a tribunal chiefly composed of persons 
belonging to the executive branch of the government, the same branch that passed the 
Robbery and Firearms Decree, whose members do not necessarily possess any legal 
expertise. Article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter requires the court or tribunal to be 
impartial. Regardless of the character of the individual members of such tribunals, its 
composition alone creates the appearance of, if not actual, lack of impartiality. It thus 
violates Article 7(1)(d).233   
 
Accordingly, it could be said that impartiality under this provision has a nexus with 
independence from executive interference. A court or tribunal that is not independent 
from executive interference is obviously not expected to be impartial, especially where 
the executive is a party to a case.234  
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The last of the legal protections afforded to an accused person by Article 7 of the Charter 
is the prohibition of ex post facto laws. Article7(2) prohibits retroactive punishment. The 
Article also provides for individual criminal responsibility. The provision prohibits the 
introduction of new offences with retrospective effects. Article 7(2) is, however, not 
confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of criminal law to an accused’s 
disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define 
a crime and prescribe a penalty and the principle that criminal law must not be 
extensively construed to an accused detriment.235  
 
In Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria236, the commission 
stated that Article 7(2) must be read to prohibit not only infliction of punishment for acts 
not constituting crimes at the time they were committed, but to retroactivity itself.237 It 
further observed that, ‘an unjust but un-enforced law undermines . . . the sanctity in 
which the law should be held.’238 The commission has also been seized with 
communications alleging transfer of criminal liability to persons related to the accused. 
Members of an accused person’s immediate and extended families have in certain 
instances allegedly been arrested, detained and even prosecuted for offences they did not 
commit.239 The commission has, however, not dealt with this issue comprehensively.  
 
Although the Charter and the commission seem to attach significance to the right to fair 
trial, certain pertinent aspects of this right have been overlooked. For instance, the 
Charter does not provide for public hearing. This is regrettable because some African 
states have been notorious in holding what Bello called ‘secret proceedings’, which are 
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largely unfair to the accused person.240 The Charter also does not provide for the right of 
an accused person to be assisted by an interpreter which is particularly essential in Africa 
because a majority of the accused are indigenous, whereas court proceedings are usually 
conducted in foreign languages such as English, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic or 
French.241 This limitation in language, coupled with complex court procedures emphasise 
the need to have interpreters for accused persons.242  
 
Further, the Charter does not guarantee the right against self-incrimination or double 
jeopardy or compensation for miscarriage of justice.243 These shortcomings in the Charter 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. It is important to mention, however, that 
the commission has tried to overcome the shortcomings and deficiencies of the Charter in 
relation to this right by adopting a number of resolutions. For instance, at its 11th 
Ordinary Session, it adopted a resolution on the right to a fair trial.244 The resolution 
underscores the importance that the commission attaches to the right to fair trial. It 
recalled Article 7 of the African Charter and stressed that ‘the right to a fair trial is 
essential for the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.’245 In summary, 
the resolution amplifies Article 7 of the Charter as follows246: 
 
(a) All persons shall have the right to have their cause heard and shall be equal before the 
courts and tribunals in the determination of their rights and obligations. 
(b) Persons who are arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, in a language which 
they understand of the reason for their arrest and shall be informed promptly of any 
charges against them.  
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(c) Persons arrested or detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or be released.  
(d) Persons charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty by a competent court. 
(e) In the determination of charges against individuals, the individuals shall be entitled in 
particular to— 
(i) have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and 
communicate in confidence with counsel of their choice; 
(ii) be tried within a reasonable time;  
(iii) examine, or have examined, the witnesses against them and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses against them; and 
(iv) have the free assistance of an interpreter if they cannot speak the language 
used in the court. 
 
Additionally, in 1996, the commission, at its 19th ordinary session, adopted the 
Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening of the Independence of the judiciary.247 
Among other things, it called on African countries to repeal all legislation that are 
inconsistent with principles of judicial independence, especially on the appointment and 
posting of judges; incorporate universal principles on judicial independence in their legal 
systems; and refrain from taking actions that could directly or indirectly threaten the 
independence and the security of judges and magistrates.248  
 
The resolution was significant for several reasons. In the main, Judges have, in numerous 
occasions, been subjected to all forms of intimidation and persecution for carrying out 
their constitutional mandate.249 The judiciary is particularly consigned and confounded 
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into impotence by military regimes in many African countries. This has serious negative 
implications to the right to fair trial, since the harassment of judges ‘makes them to look 
over their shoulders in the dispensation of justice.’250 Additionally, the Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa were adopted by 
the African Commission in May 2003.251 The principles and guidelines are very 
comprehensive, covering most of the recognised elements of the right to a fair trial and 
due process under international human rights law.252  
 
Some of the specific elements covered are: judicial training; the right to an effective 
remedy; court records and public access; locus standi; the role of prosecutors; access to 
lawyers and legal services; legal aid and legal assistance; independence of lawyers; cross-
border collaboration among legal professionals; access to judicial services; military 
courts; arrest and detention; criminal charges and trials; juvenile trials; victims of crime; 
abuse of power; and traditional courts.253 The Principles and Guidelines therefore 
encompass almost all recognised pre-trial, in-trial and post-trial rights.  
 
The scope of this study does not permit a comprehensive analysis of these resolutions, 
guidelines and principles. Noteworthy, their adoption is a major leap towards the 
effective enforcement of the rights enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter. It is hoped that 
the commission will articulate them in its jurisprudence whenever it is seized with 
communications alleging violation of Article 7 or any other relevant provision of the 
Charter.  
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3.2.1.2.1.6 Right to freedom of conscience and religion 
 
Article 8 guarantees the protection of two interrelated rights- right to freedom of 
conscience and religion. The Article stipulates that:  
 
Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. 
No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise 
of these freedoms. 
 
Right to freedom of conscience entitles a person to hold a belief or conviction, be it of 
cultural, religious, political or any other nature. The rationale of entrenching this right is 
to allow an individual to hold a thought or belief that is independent of a state’s or other 
entity’s control per se.254 Freedom of conscience in its broader sense envisages the right 
to profess and practice one’s religion. This right, as contemplated under Article 8, 
includes the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in public or in private, alone or 
with others, without the state’s intervention.255 This could be in the form of worship, 
teaching, practice and religious observance, among other activities.256 Though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, freedom of religion could also include freedom to 
maintain or change one’s religion or belief.257 
 
The right to freedom of conscience and religion under the Charter, however, is subject to 
law and order. The Charter appears to be keen to ensure the balance between freedom of 
conscience and religion, on the one hand, and on the other, the protection of individuals 
or society from religious or pseudo-religious practices, which may infringe other people’s 
rights.258 While states parties have the discretion to determine whether a particular 
religion or belief is appropriate, that discretion must not be exercised contrary to Article 8 
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of the Charter. In this regard, the African Commission has been faced with complaints 
alleging the violation of this Article.   
 
In Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v. Zaire259, the 
complainants, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, were allegedly persecuted by the 
government of Zaire on the basis of their religious beliefs. The commission held that such 
persecution violated Article 8 since the former Zaire government had presented no 
evidence that the practice of their religion in any way threatened law and order. The 
commission has also held that freedom of religion has to be exercised in a way that does 
not violate the equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by the African Charter. Thus, it 
ruled against imposition of sharia trials and guaranteed the right of everyone to be tried 
by a secular court if they wish.260 It is important to note, however, that in some African 
States, freedom of religion is limited to the practice of a certain religious faith. An 
example is Libya where Islam has been proclaimed to be state religion, and the Koran 
part of the Libyan laws. 
 
The African Commission recently held that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
belief does not in itself include a general right of the individual to act in accordance with 
his or her belief.261 Rather, while the right to hold religious beliefs should be absolute, the 
right to act on those beliefs should not. In Gareth Anver Prince v. South Africa262, a 
South African citizen alleged the Law Society of South Africa had refused to register him 
for practice, given his disclosure of two previous convictions for the possession of 
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cannabis and his stated intention to continue to use it because its use was required by his 
Rastafarian religion.  He alleged violation of, among other provisions, Article 8 of the 
African Charter. The African Commission held that the restrictions on the use and 
possession of cannabis were reasonable and a legitimate limitation of Article 8.263 Indeed, 
participating in one’s religion should not be at the expense of the overall good of the 
society. Minorities like the Rastafarians may freely choose to exercise their religion, yet 
that should not grant them unfettered power to violate the norms that keep the whole 
nation together.264  
 
3.2.1.2.1.7 Right to freedom of expression 
 
Article 9 guarantees the right to freedom of expression in the following terms: ‘1. Every 
individual shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every individual shall have the 
right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.’ The right to freedom of 
expression is the cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests. 
It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion as it enables the society, when 
exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed.265  
 
The importance of freedom of expression is demonstrated by the many cases considered 
by the African Commission involving Article 9 violations.266 The commission observed 
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in Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and 
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria267, that freedom of expression is a basic human 
right, vital to an individual’s personal development, his political consciousness, and 
participation in the conduct of public affairs in his country.268 
 
The African Charter gives two aspects of this right namely: (i) the right to receive 
information and (ii) the right to express and disseminate one’s opinion. Access to 
information is fundamental to encouraging transparency and accountability in the way the 
government and public authorities operate. Thus in Amnesty International v. Zambia269, 
the commission observed that the failure of the government to provide two deportees 
with reasons for the action taken against them ‘means that the right to receive information 
was denied to them.’270  
 
In Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda 
v. Nigeria271, where the communication dealt with the proscription of newspapers by the 
military government in Nigeria, the commission held, inter alia: 
 
The proscription of specific newspapers by name and the sealing of their premises, 
without a hearing at which they could defend themselves…amounts to harassment of the 
press. Such actions not only have the effect of hindering the directly affected persons in 
disseminating their opinions, but also pose an immediate risk that journalists and 
newspapers not yet affected by…the Decree will subject themselves to self-censorship… 
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Decrees like these pose a serious threat to the public of the right to receive information 
not in accordance with what the government would like the public to know. The right to 
receive information is important: Article 9 does not seem to permit derogation, no matter 
what the subject of the information or opinion and no matter the political situation of a 
country.272 
 
In this regard, the commission was emphasising the non-derogable nature of the right to 
receive information. The commission’s observations would, however, not have been 
complete had it not re-emphasised that the right was to be exercised within the confines 
of a pre-established law. It is clear, from the wording of Article 9(2), that the right to 
express and disseminate one’s opinion may be restricted by law. This does not mean that 
national law can restrict this right to the extent that it becomes ineffective. To permit 
national law to take precedence over international law would defeat the purpose of 
codifying certain rights in international law and indeed, the whole essence of treaty 
making.273 With regard to the restriction of rights through domestic legislation, the 
commission has stated that restrictions should be as minimal as possible and not 
undermine rights guaranteed under international law.274 Thus, any restrictions on rights 
should be the exception and not the rule.275  
 
The commission has expressed the importance of the right to freedom of expression by 
adopting resolutions to elaborate it beyond the Charter provisions. Forinstance, it has 
adopted a Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Expression276, and a Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa.277 While the 2002 Declaration identified 
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freedom of expression ‘as a cornerstone of democracy’278 and stated that ‘respect for 
freedom of expression … will lead to … the strengthening of democracy’279, the 
commission had not in its previous decisions on Article 9 specifically linked the right to 
freedom of expression to the strengthening of democracy in Africa.280  
 
The case of The Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan281 provided the commission 
with an opportunity to clarify its jurisprudence on the provisions of Article 9 of the 
Charter and also to express its view on the important link between freedom of expression 
and the promotion and protection of democracy in Africa.282 The communication alleged 
that Mr. Ghazi Suleiman, a Khartoum based lawyer and human rights advocate was 
prohibited from travelling to deliver a public human rights lecture in Sinnar, Blue Nile 
State, in the Sudan. He alleged that he had been threatened by some state security 
officials that if he made the trip he would be arrested.283 The author complained, inter 
alia, of a violation of Article 9 of the Charter. In upholding the complaint, the African 
Commission observed: 
 
In adopting the Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association, the African 
Commission noted that governments should be especially careful that “in regulating the 
use of this right, that the competent authorities should not enact provisions which would 
limit the exercise of this freedom … [and that] … the regulation of the exercise of the 
right to freedom of association should be consistent with State’s obligations under the 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”284 Mr. Ghazi Suleiman’s speech is a 
unique and important part of political debate in his country.285  
 
The commission affirmed the views of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which 
held that:  
 
Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a society rests. 
It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is also a condition sine qua non 
for the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and, 
in general, those who wish to influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that 
enable the community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. 
Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a society that is 
truly free.286 
 
The commission could therefore be taken to mean that when an individual’s freedom of 
expression is unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is being 
violated, but also the corresponding right of others to receive information and ideas.287 
Hence, speech that contributes to political debate must be respected and protected. In 
light of the important role of the right to freedom of expression in the fledging 
democracies in Africa today, these observations and findings by the commission must be 
welcomed as a landmark decision.  
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3.2.1.2.1.8 Right to freedom of Association 
 
According to Article 10(1), every individual is entitled to the right to free association.288 
This right envisages a number of components. For example, it contemplates the freedom 
of individuals to come together for the protection of their interests by forming a collective 
entity which represents them. These interests may be of a political, economic, religious, 
social, cultural, professional or labour union nature.289 However, this does not mean that 
such an individual has an absolute right to become a member of a particular association. 
Rather, an association may decide not to admit or continue the membership of an 
individual without necessarily infringing on his right to freedom of association.290  
 
Equally, an individual cannot be compelled to become a member of an association nor 
disadvantaged if he or she chooses not to do so. This right therefore precludes 
compulsion to join an association, but subject to Article 29 of the Charter.291 Article 
29(4) imposes duties on individuals ‘to preserve and strengthen social and national 
solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened.’ This provision, read together with 
Article 10(2) limits the right to freedom of association to the effect that an individual 
could be forced into association in order to strengthen social and national solidarity.292  
 
In International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-
Wiwa Jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria293, the commission found that the 
tribunal which had convicted Saro-Wiwa and his fellow accused of murder did so 
                                                 
288 Art 10(1) states: ‘Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the 
law.’ 
289 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 110. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Art 10(2) provides: ‘Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in 29 no one may be compelled 
to join an association.’ 
292 See Heyns C, ‘Civil and political rights in the African Charter’, note 209 above, p. 169. 
293 In communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, International Pen, Constitutional Rights 
Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, Twelfth 
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V). 
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because they were members of a political group. Their freedom of association as 
expressed through their membership in that group was thus violated.294  The right to 
freedom of association has also been interpreted to include the right to dissociation.295 
 
The commission has cited many instances where the right to freedom of association may 
be violated.296 These include: banning of political parties297, being arrested as a result of 
one’s political belief298 and the prohibition of any assembly for a political purpose in a 
private or a public place.299 With regard to laws limiting the right to freedom of 
association, the commission has held that they should include an objective description 
that makes it possible to determine the criminal nature of an organisation.300 Apart from 
its jurisprudence, the commission has also adopted a resolution on the right to freedom of 
association with a view to strengthen the provisions of Article 10 of the Charter.301 The 
resolution provides, inter alia, that: 
 
                                                 
294 Ibid, para 108. 
295 Communication 101/93, Civil liberties Organisation in Respect of the Nigerian Bar Association v. 
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competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and international human rights 
standards; … in regulating the use of the right to association, the competent authorities 
should not enact provisions which will limit the exercise of the freedom and such a 
regulation should be consistent with state obligations under the Charter.302  
 
Though the resolution may not be seen as dramatic in clarifying the provisions of the 
Charter on the right to freedom of association, it serves the purpose of emphasis. What is 
important, however, is that the commission interprets the right bearing in mind the 
emphasis it has given to it in the resolution.  
 
3.2.1.2.1.9 Right to freedom of assembly 
 
The right to freedom of assembly complements the right to freedom of association. 
Article 11 of the Charter provides that: 
 
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this 
right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those 
enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and 
freedoms of others.  
 
The right to freedom of assembly allows individuals to indulge in meetings, picketing, 
protest marches and demonstrations, as long as the assemblers aim to express a common 
opinion. In Commission Internationale de Juristes v. Togo303, the commission found that 
the shooting at peaceful demonstrators by the Togolese military was a violation of the 
right to assembly. Since the purpose of the right is to protect assembly as a means of 
communicating opinion, the assembly must be ‘peaceful’ and unarmed. Actions or laws 
aimed against armed or violent assemblies will therefore not constitute an infringement of 
the right to assemble.304  
 
                                                 
302 Ibid. 
303 Communication 91/93, Commission Internationale de Juristes v. Togo. 
304 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 113. 
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3.2.1.2.1.10 Right to freedom of movement 
 
Article 12 of the Charter stipulates as follows: 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
border of a state provided he abides by the law.  
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to 
return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law 
for the protection of national security, law and public order, public health or morality.  
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in 
other countries in accordance with the laws of those countries and international 
conventions.  
4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a state party to the present Charter, 
may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.  
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that 
which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.  
 
The provisions of Article 12 could be divided into three main classes of rights: (i) 
freedom of movement within and freedom to return to an individual’s country of origin or 
residence; (ii) the right to seek and obtain asylum; and, (iii) the right not to be expelled 
extra-judicially or en mass.305 Freedom of movement in the context of the Charter applies 
to ‘every person’, including aliens or stateless persons. This freedom is, however, subject 
to the sovereign power of a state to regulate and control the entry of aliens into its 
territory. This means in effect that an alien does not per se have an unqualified right to 
enter, reside or remain in a particular country. The Charter does not make provision 
against the expulsion of a person from the territory of a state which he or she is a citizen 
or national.306 This is rather strange given that many Africans have over the years been 
sent to exile by their countries, for holding or perpetuating divergent political views.   
 
                                                 
305 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 114. 
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With regard to the rights of asylum seekers, Article 12(3) is quite an unusual provision in 
the sense that it provides that one has the right not only to seek but also to obtain 
asylum.307 Nmehielle correctly observed that, while a person may not be prevented from 
seeking asylum, the granting of asylum is entirely a different matter dependent upon the 
will of a state.308 Whether or not a person should obtain or be granted asylum rests with 
the law of the territory in which asylum is sought and international law.309 Further, the 
Charter gives persecution as a condition for the exercise of the right to seek and obtain 
asylum but does not indicate the grounds for the persecution. Generally, a person is 
afforded refugee status if he or she has been persecuted or has a well founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.310  
 
Article 12(4) and (5) prohibits two forms of expulsion of persons from the territory of a 
state party to the Charter. First, an alien lawfully admitted to any such territory may only 
be expelled pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with the law; Secondly, the 
mass expulsion of non-nationals. The Charter goes on to define mass expulsion as one 
aimed at national, racial, ethnic, or religious group. Unlike the prohibition of the 
expulsion of lawfully resident non-nationals in member states, the prohibition of mass 
expulsion aims to protect groups of persons based on nationality, ethnicity, race and 
religion, whether or not such groups of persons are lawfully residing in the expelling 
state.311 Mass expulsion has been an issue of concern in Africa. A notable example was 
the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969.312      
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3.2.1.2.1.11 Right to participate in the government of one’s country 
 
Article 13 guarantees the right to participate in the government of one’s country in the 
following terms: 
 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions 
of the law. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country;  
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict 
equality of all persons before the law. 
 
Article 13 presents different facets in which the right to participate in the government of 
one’s country may be enjoyed. Article 13(1), for example, provides that citizens may 
enjoy this right either directly or through freely chosen representatives. This seems to 
guarantee participation in decision making through a legislative body such as parliament. 
Essentially, this means that, subject to relevant electoral laws, citizens of a state party to 
the Charter are entitled to participate in periodic elections either as candidates or 
voters.313   
 
The purpose of Article 13(1) of the Charter is therefore to allow an individual, without 
apparent legal disability, to participate in periodic elections, exercise his or her voting 
rights, and participate in the conduct of public affairs directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.314 By extension, the provision requires state authority to be based on the 
sovereignty of the people. Hence, this right is infringed when any group or person seizes 
the reigns of government and imposes themselves on the rest of the population.315 
 
                                                 
313 See Mbondenyi M, ‘The right to participate in the government of one’s country: An analysis of Article 
13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the light of Kenya’s 2007 political crisis’, 
(2009) African Human Rights Law Journal (forthcoming in 2009).  
314 Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 32. 
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Article 13(1) should be read in tandem with Article 20(1) which recognises the right of 
peoples to self-determination. This nexus was recognised by the African Commission in a 
case concerning an attempted secession from Zaire by Katanga.316 Although the 
commission held that there was no violation of Article 20, it could be inferred, from its 
observations, that massive human rights violations as well as the denial of the right of 
political participation under Article 13(1) could constitute transgressions of the Charter 
on such a scale that it would justify secession.317 In another case, the commission held 
that to participate freely in government entails, among other things, the right to vote for 
the representative of one’s choice and to have the results of free expression of the will of 
voters respected.318 The commission has also found a ban on members of a former 
government and parliament after a coup to be in violation of their Article 13(1) rights.319  
 
The right to participate in the government of one’s country cannot be fully enjoyed unless 
citizens have the right to equal access to, for example, public services and property.320 
The drafters of the Charter, in recognition of this fact, incorporated these important rights 
under Article 13(2) & (3). These two provisions resonate the importance of democratic 
governance in which citizens have unfettered rights to participate, as well as a reasonably 
unrestrained right of access to public property and services. Unfortunately, the issue of 
equal access to public services and property in many African states has remained very 
controversial and complicated for reasons ranging from legal complexities, political 
involvement, corruption and extreme poverty.321  
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This situation is exacerbated by the fact that some states still largely rely on laws and 
policies promulgated by colonial governments, which in many cases prevent the most 
disadvantaged groups from accessing public services and property that they need to 
survive. Due to such policies and laws, equitable land allocation and distribution in post-
colonial Africa, for example, has not as yet been achieved.322 Political contests in most 
African states have therefore become all the more charged because of what is at stake; 
those who achieve political power benefit from widespread abuses, including theft and 
misappropriation of public resources.323  
 
Many African states have been paying lip service to the citizens’ right to participate in 
their government despite its fundamental importance to nation building. Consequently, 
Africans have been victims of governments of exclusion such as dictatorships, military 
rule, or single-party autocracies. Ethnicity, corruption and vote rigging have also had a 
hand in derailing the democratic process in the continent.  
 
The importance of this right is resonated in the CAAU. The Act condemns and rejects 
unconstitutional change of government.324 In fact, the CAAU categorically states that a 
government that seizes power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to 
participate in the activities of the Union.325 The AU has a variety of options on how to 
deal with an unconstitutional government, including imposition of sanctions. 326 At the 
time of compiling this chapter, Zimbabwe and Kenya were wallowing in political crises. 
Both countries were faced with disputed presidential elections which brought to question 
the legitimacy of their governments. In Kenya, the AU initiated a mediation process that 
led to the signing of an Accord on power-sharing between the warring political 
                                                 
322 Mbondenyi M, ‘The right to participate in the government of one’s country’, note 313 above. 
323 Ibid. 
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factions.327 The AU’s initiative in this regard is welcomed. One still waits to see the 
response of this pan-continental body with regard to the situation in Zimbabwe.   
 
3.2.1.2.1.12 Right to property 
 
Article 14 provides for the protection of the right to property, stating that ‘the right to 
property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public 
need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws.’ The right to property guaranteed under this provision is the right to 
own property, hold it and to dispose of it. In UIDF, FIDH, FADDHO, ONDH, AMDH v. 
Angola328, the commission observed that the deportation of the non-nationals in this case 
called into question rights guaranteed under the Charter such as property rights. It 
concluded that the deportation of victims, thus separating them from their property 
constituted a violation of Article 14 of the Charter. 
 
From the wording of Article 14, it can correctly be concluded that the enjoyment of the 
right to property is subject to encroach upon ‘in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of the law.’ The 
Charter, however, does not define what constitutes public or community interests. 
Additionally, it does not provide for compensation of state encroachment (acquisition) 
victims. The fact that state acquisition should be in accordance with appropriate laws is 
not sufficient enough to indicate whether the Charter subscribes to compensation of 
victims.329 However, ‘in accordance with appropriate laws’ could be construed to mean 
‘in accordance with international standards on state acquisition’.330  
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Thus, when interpreting Article 14 of the Charter, regard could be had to corresponding 
provisions of other human rights systems. Contextually, the Article is narrower than the 
corresponding provision of the American Convention, which is more progressive in the 
recognition of the right to property than any other regional human rights instrument.331 Its 
Article 21(2) stipulates that ‘no one shall be deprived of their property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest…’  
 
The African Commission and the court can thus ensure that the power of the state to 
encroach upon private property for public or community interest is not abused, by 
requiring states to adhere to the international law principle of payment of just and 
adequate compensation. As a general observation, the above discussion on civil and 
political rights clearly indicates that the jurisprudence of the commission is yet to attain 
the standards of other international judicial mechanisms, such as the Inter-American and 
European human rights systems. As Murray notes, this may be partly because the 
commission is faced with the difficult task of overcoming the shortcomings in the way in 
which the Charter has been drafted.332  
 
In all fairness though, it is important to note that the commission, as of recent, has shown 
some willingness to be creative in its interpretation of the Charter provisions.333 There are 
certain instances, however, where it failed to expound on certain rights even when the 
opportunity arose. This is not very encouraging especially given that the substantive 
rights in the Charter are not elaborate. It is hoped that the establishment and 
operationalisation of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights will reverse this 
trend. The inadequacy of the civil and political rights provisions of the Charter, their 
possible reform, as well as the failure of the commission to amplify them shall be 
discussed extensively in the next chapter.  
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3.2.1.2.2 Economic, social and cultural rights  
 
The Charter guarantees the protection of a number of economic, social and cultural 
rights. As noted earlier in this chapter, the approach of the Charter with regard to this 
category of rights is a marked departure from that of other regional human rights systems. 
The Charter puts economic, social and cultural rights at par with other rights such as civil 
and political rights. Its Preamble categorically provides that: 
 
…Civil and political rights cannot be disassociated from economic, social and cultural 
rights in their conception as well as universality and … the satisfaction of economic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.334  
 
Whether or not the Charter purports to give more priority to economic, social and cultural 
rights than to civil and political rights is an issue that is debatable. Gittleman fears giving 
priority to this category of rights over others would ‘undoubtedly grant a state greater 
latitude to restrict or violate civil and political rights.’335 This sentiment reflected the 
prevalent misunderstanding and suspicion of the nature of economic, social and cultural 
rights and their place in the human rights paradigm. Whatever the Charter purports, it 
must be understood that human rights are interrelated and indivisible. Perhaps, what the 
drafters of the Charter wanted to emphasise in the Preamble of the Charter is the 
importance of economic, social and cultural rights in the human rights discourse.336   
 
The most contentious issue on the Charter’s economic, social and cultural rights 
provisions relates to their enforceability.337 For many decades, socio-economic rights 
have been regarded as secondary rights. Mbazira rightly notes that, ‘civil and political 
rights are thought to be ‘absolute’ and ‘immediate’, whereas economic, social and 
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cultural rights are held to be programmatic; to be realised gradually and therefore not to 
be ‘real’ rights.’338 The argument that socio-economic rights are not justiceable is based 
on the conception that these rights require vast resources for their implementation. This 
view, however, is blind to the fact that not all socio-economic rights can be implemented 
immediately.339  
 
Indeed, the ICESCR attests to this fact by requiring states to ‘take steps to the maximum 
of [their] available resources, with a view to progressively achieving the full realisation 
of the rights . . .’340 Although the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has said that some of the obligations are of immediate effect, this does not 
necessarily mean that states are compelled to do the impracticable.341 The argument on 
impracticability of enforcement of socio-economic rights is also blind to the fact that the 
enforcement of some civil and political rights may be equally impracticable. The right to 
life, for example, imposes an obligation on the state to provide security to its citizens.342 
But this does not mean that murders are not committed. It is impracticable to provide 
every citizen with a policeman at his or her guard.343  
 
One would therefore agree with Ankumah that economic, social and cultural rights are 
justiceable under the Charter, but there is the need for their progressive realisation, taking 
into consideration the circumstances faced by the state parties.344 This aspect of the 
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argument as well as the obstacles to the enforcement of this category of rights under the 
African human rights system will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. It is 
expedient, however, to examine their normative framework under the Charter. 
 
3.2.1.2.2.1 Right to equitable and satisfactory conditions of work 
 
Article 15 of the Charter guarantees the right to equitable and satisfactory work 
conditions as follows: ‘Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and 
satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.’ According to 
Ankumah, this provision obligates states to adopt programmes and other measures to 
create job opportunities for every person.345  This interpretation should be criticised in as 
far as it construes the ‘right to work’ to mean the imposition of an obligation on the state 
to create job opportunities, more so, for every person.  
 
Umozurike argued, and rightly so, that the Charter does not guarantee the right to work 
simpliciter because that would have been an impossible task, given the economic 
situation of African states.346 Faced with the scarcity of industries and a limited wage 
system, a majority of Africans are peasant farmers and petty traders.347 Rather, this 
Article obligates states parties to adopt measures and programmes that would ensure a 
conducive work environment.348 One would think in terms of measures such as:  fair and 
equitable wages; the right to promotion where appropriate; the right to follow one’s 
vocation and to change employment; reasonable work hours; right to be paid vacation 
(leisure and rest); safe working conditions; and non-discrimination of individuals in their 
place of work.349  
 
                                                 
345 Ibid.  
346 Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 65.  
347 Ibid. 
348 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 125. 
349 See in this regard, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
European Social Charter, which clearly define the parameters of this right.  
 291
The right to work under satisfactory conditions also precludes sexual harassment at the 
work place. States parties are therefore obligated to come up with suitable legislation and 
policies to prohibit such vices that may render work conditions un-equitable and 
unsatisfactory. It should be noted, however, that the Charter, unlike Article 7 of both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), does not expressly 
guarantee the right to rest, leisure, limited working hours and paid holidays. Arguably, a 
broad interpretation of the phrase ‘equitable and satisfactory conditions’ would 
encompass all these aspects of the right.350  
 
The African Commission found a violation of Article 15, among other provisions, in 
Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v. Cameroon.351 The victim in this 
case was a magistrate who had been tried and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. Upon 
his release, the government of Cameroon refused to reinstate him to his position as a 
magistrate. Under an Amnesty law of 23 April 1992, persons granted amnesty and who 
had public employment were to be reinstated. The commission held that by not 
reinstating Mr. Mazou to his former position, the government was in violation of Article 
15.352  
 
3.2.1.2.2.2 Right to health 
 
Article 16 of the Charter guarantees everyone the right to enjoy the best attainable state 
of physical and mental health. States parties to the Charter are obliged to take the 
necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive 
medical attention when they are sick.353 The measures contemplated in this Article 
include, but are not limited to: elimination of epidemics; availing health services to the 
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people through construction of adequate hospitals and health centres; promulgation of 
appropriate health policies; establishing appropriate legal standards that empower people 
to demand action against the violation to their right to health; and provision of free 
vaccinations, drugs and other healthcare services.354   
 
In Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v. Zaire355, the 
complainants alleged, amongst other things, that the former Zaire government had failed 
to provide them with basic services. The commission found that the failure of the 
government to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity 
constituted a violation of the right to health. It also held that the shortage of medicines 
was a breach of the duty to protect the health of the people under Article 16 of the 
Charter. While it was innovative to link the provision of basic services to the right to 
health, the interpretation of the right by the commission in this case is somewhat 
overbroad. Not all basic services are linked to health. It would be appropriate for the 
commission to specify that the failure by the government to provide basic services is a 
violation of the right to health only to the extent to which the failure violates this right.356 
   
3.2.1.2.2.3 Right to education 
 
Article 17 of the Charter guarantees the right to education.357 This right entails a number 
of components, such as the right to primary education, the right to secondary education, 
the right to higher education, the right to fundamental education, the right to choice of 
schools and the principle of free primary (basic) education.358 While Article 17 lacks the 
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specificity on the content of the right to education, other international instruments are 
more elaborate.  
 
Under the European Convention, for example, the right is treated as a civil and political 
right.359 This gives it more force in terms of the obligation imposed on states to enforce it. 
Under the Inter-American system, it is one of the economic, social and cultural rights 
which are subject to the individual complaint procedure under Article 44 of the American 
Convention. In the American and European systems, as well as the ICESCR, the right is 
guaranteed more elaborately than in the African Charter. The Charter provisions overlook 
aspects such as the right to choice of education and the right to teach.360 The right to 
choice of education is important because it allows parents to decide the kind of education 
they think is appropriate for their children. It corresponds with the right of parents to have 
their children educated in conformity with their own religious, cultural, moral and 
philosophical convictions.361 Article 17(2) & (3) could thus be read to mean that 
education is intended to facilitate the promotion of cultures, morals and traditions of 
communities.362  
 
The African Commission emphasised on the importance of the right to education in Free 
Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine 
des Droits de l'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v. Zaire363, when it stated that the 
closure of universities and secondary schools, as alleged in the communication, 
constituted a violation of Article 17. The commission has also taken the initiative to 
strengthen the provisions of Article 17 by defining the scope of the right to education in 
its guidelines for state reporting.364 The guidelines indicate that the right to education 
                                                 
359 See Article 2, First Protocol to the European Convention. 
360 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 130.  
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Communication 25/89, 47/90, 100/93, Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for Human 
Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v. Zaire. 
364 See Old Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, section II (B) (42)-(59), cited in Nmehielle O, The 
African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 129. 
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comprises the right to primary education, secondary education, post-secondary education, 
fundamental education, the right to choice of schools and the principle of free and 
compulsory education for all.365   
3.2.1.3 Collective and peoples’ rights under the Charter 
 
The African Charter provides for collective and peoples’ rights. These rights, also known 
as ‘solidarity’, ‘group’ or ‘third generation’ rights, because they can be realised only 
through the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social scene, are the latest to be 
recognised by the international community.366 Accordingly, they cannot be claimed by 
any person in an individual capacity. They are rights that belong to individuals as a 
community, be it ethnic or national.367  
 
While this may be the case, it should be noted, however, the African Charter does not 
subordinate individual rights to collective rights. Instead, the Charter establishes a link 
between the inalienable rights of the individual and of the group in a contextual 
manner.368 Thus, it recognises the importance of the co-existence of both categories of 
rights. Indeed, one of the paragraphs in its Preamble emphasises this relationship by 
stating that member states of the OAU/AU recognise, ‘on the one hand, that fundamental 
human rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their national and 
international protection, and on the other hand, that the reality and respect of peoples’ 
rights should necessarily guarantee human rights.’369 This paragraph emphasises the need 
to look at human rights holistically, meaning, from both the individual and group 
(peoples) perspective.  
 
                                                 
365 Ibid, p. 129. 
366 Vasak K, ‘For the third generation of human rights: The rights of solidarity’, (Inaugural Lecture, 10th 
Study of the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, July 1979).  
367 Umozurike U, The African Charter on human and peoples rights, note 45 above, p. 70. 
368 See the argument in this regard in Boven T, ‘The relations between peoples’ rights and human rights in 
the African Charter’ (1986) 2/4 Human Rights Law Journal, p. 191.  
369 African Charter, Preamble, para 5. 
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Although the Charter provides for peoples’ rights, it does not define the content of the 
rights. The absence of at least a working definition for the term ‘peoples’ in the Charter 
has opened it up to different interpretations.370 The result is that no agreement and 
certainty exist as to when and how peoples’ rights apply to particular cases. Accordingly, 
the term ‘peoples’ in the Charter has been said to embody many different aspects.371 One 
of them relates to peoples subject to colonial or alien domination. Seen from this 
perspective, the Charter uses the term to underscore the struggle for the eradication of 
colonialism in Africa.372 According to Heyns, some of the provisions on peoples’ rights 
under the Charter reflect a reaction to the continental experience of slavery and 
colonialism.373 
 
The term also refers to the population of a state as a whole.374 Murray cites different 
occasions when the African Commission mentioned, for example, the protection of the 
‘people of Rwanda’, ‘people of Togo’, ‘people of Liberia’ and ‘people of South 
Africa.’375 Another interpretation of the term as employed in the Charter signifies the 
people of Africa in general.376 The preamble to the Charter mentions the awareness of 
African states of their duty to ‘achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which 
are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence.’377 Similarly, the African 
                                                 
370 Dersso S, ‘The jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with respect to 
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Commission has on several occasions spoken of ‘African peoples.’378 Finally, ‘peoples’ 
is also used to refer to the distinct communities within a state.379 In this sense, the 
subjects of peoples’ rights are the different ethnic groups or inhabitants of a particular 
territory within a state, who on account of historical, cultural and/or existing patterns of 
discrimination have come to form a sense of separate identity.380  
 
The African Commission has contributed to the uncertainty of the meaning of the term 
‘people’, owing to the different interpretations and divergent opinion from its members. 
Hence, during one of the commission’s sessions, commissioner Nguema commented: ‘… 
I think that according to the interpretation and even the principles which are enforced in 
the OAU at the level of the states it is admitted that we do not have to take account of the 
rights of various ethnic groups to consider them as peoples’ rights.’381 Conversely, 
commissioner Umozurike retorted: ‘... there is no way that people here simply means all 
the people of the country— it is people that have an identifiable interest, and this may be 
carpenters, may be tribes, may be fishermen or whatever.’ 382 
 
The fact that even the commissioners seem  not to agree on the definition of ‘peoples’ in 
the context of the Charter indicates that so far there is no standard to determine the 
working definition of the term for the purposes of African human rights system. In other 
words, it is not as yet very clear how and when a group qualifies to be a ‘people’, and 
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hence a subject of peoples’ rights. The attribution of the term to any group of persons, 
such as ‘fishermen’ or ‘carpenters’, certainly emphasises the need to clarify the meaning 
of the concept in the African context.  
 
Although there is no general consensus on the definition of people, some working 
characteristics of ‘peoples’ have emerged from studies made under the auspices of 
UNESCO.383 Such characteristics include: common historical tradition; ethnic group 
identity; cultural homogeneity; linguistic unity; religious or ideological affinity; territorial 
connection; and common economic life.384 In addition, the group as a whole must have 
the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people.385 What 
follows, therefore, is a discussion of the nature and scope of this category of rights as 
reflected in the African Charter’s provisions and the commission’s jurisprudence.   
 
3.2.1.3.1 Right to the protection of the family and other related rights  
 
Article18 of the Charter provides for a number of group rights. The groups envisaged 
therein are: the family, children, women, the aged and the disabled. It states that: 
 
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the 
state which shall take care of its physical and moral health. 
2. The state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognised by the community.  
3. The state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the right of the women and the child as stipulated in international 
declaration and conventions. 
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in 
keeping with their physical and moral needs. 
 
                                                 
383 See UNESCO, Meeting of Experts on International Law, Paris, February, 1990.  
384 Ibid.  
385 Ibid.   
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The Article identifies the family as the custodian of the moral and traditional values 
recognised by the community. The rights guaranteed to the family may include the rights 
to found a family, to marry and to have a family. It may also include the right not to get 
married without one’s consent and equality in marriage.386 The rationale for incorporating 
this provision is to ensure the peaceful existence of the family. In UIDH, FIDH, 
RADDHO, ONDH and AMDH v. Angola387 it was held that deportation of the victims 
leading to separation from their families was a violation of Article 18 of the Charter 
which guarantees the right to the protection of the family.  
 
Other than promoting its physical and moral health, the Charter does not specify ways in 
which the state could assist the family. It is not enough for the state to create a legislative 
framework to secure family rights. It must, in addition, strive to create social conditions 
that would enable families to flourish. It has been proposed that the state could, for 
example, undertake special programmes geared towards training of families in order to 
help create a stable and positive environment in which children will be imparted with 
virtues and values.388 In addition to the promotion and protection of the family, Article 18 
also obliges states to protect the rights of women and children. In addressing women’s 
rights, states are required to ensure the elimination of every form of discrimination 
against women and also to ensure the protection of their rights as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions.  
 
This provision of the Charter has attracted mixed reactions arising from the juxtaposition 
of women with the rather complex and controversial notions of the family, tradition and 
morality.389 One view is that Article 18(3) consigns women’s rights to a ‘legal 
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comma’.390 It has also been argued that it protects women in the context of the family and 
that outside this arena there is not much protection afforded to women.391 It has also been 
criticised for failing to address numerous issues affecting the rights of women such as 
female genital mutilation (FGM), inheritance by women, and forced marriages.392 
 
In spite of these observations, some of which are true, it should be understood that the 
intention of incorporating these provisions in the Charter was not to suppress women’s 
rights in Africa. In Africa, women’s rights are taken as seriously as other categories of 
rights. This fact is vindicated by the adoption of a Protocol on the rights of women.393 
Arguably, the Protocol is comprehensive enough to address some of the concerns raised 
by the critics of Article 18(3) of the Charter. A discussion on the provisions of the 
Protocol is beyond the scope of the present study.   
 
The second part of Article 18(3) guarantees the protection of the rights of child in 
accordance with international declarations and conventions. Children are usually 
vulnerable and need special support in order to fully enjoy their rights. They need family 
care and protection from abuse, neglect, forced labour, forced marriages, detention, 
among other concerns. The rights of the Africa Child have indeed been addressed more 
comprehensively in a separate instrument.394 The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, apart from providing for substantive rights, sets up a supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: a progressive approach to the women’s human rights’, (1997) 3 East 
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 300
organ, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child to 
monitor its enforcement.395  
 
With regard to the rights of the aged and disabled, Article 18(4) stipulates that this 
category of persons shall have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with 
their physical or moral conditions. Like many other aspects of the Charter, this area has 
not received adequate attention from the African Commission. The protection afforded 
aged and disabled persons must go beyond providing suitable facilities, food and 
specialised medical care, to providing them with opportunities to engage in productive 
activities which are suited to their abilities and consistent with their vocations or 
desires.396 The state may thus, be required to foster the establishment of social 
organisations aimed at improving the quality of life for this category of persons.397  
 
Additionally, states should ensure that disabled and old persons are able to access public 
places such as public buildings and other social infrastructure. This is essential because, 
most public offices have not been designed to allow, for example, people on wheel-chairs 
to access them. Public lavatories and streets in most African towns and cities do not have 
rumps which may ease the movement of such persons. As a result, many rights— civil 
and political as well as socio-economic— of such persons are violated. For instance, their 
right to freedom of movement is significantly limited. The same could be said of their 
right to freedom of association in as far as they are impaired by such factors to associate 
with other members of the society. The African Commission should look for ways of 
facilitating the enjoyment of all the rights contained in the Charter by this category of 
persons to the fullest possible extent, without necessarily waiting for communications 
alleging violation of their rights.   
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3.2.1.3.2 Right to self-determination 
 
Article 19 of the Charter defines the content of the right to self determination by 
providing that ‘all peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have 
the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.’ Article 20 
expounds this provision by providing that: 
 
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen.  
2. Colonised or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds 
of domination by resorting to any means recognised by the international community.  
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the states parties to the present 
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or 
cultural. 
 
From the wording of the Article, it can be concluded that self determination entails the 
following components: (i) the right to existence (ii) the right of all peoples to freely 
determine their political status and to pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen; (iii) the right of colonised or oppressed 
peoples to free themselves from the bonds of dominion by resorting to any means 
recognised by the international community; and (iv) the right of all peoples to get 
assistance of the states parties in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it 
political, economic or cultural.  
 
The Charter is categorical that the right to self-determination is unquestionable and 
inalienable. It is difficult, therefore, for one to agree with the argument that Article 20 of 
the Charter could only have been intended to underscore the colonial experience and 
domination of Africa.398 The fact that Article 20(1) guarantees all peoples the right to 
freely determine their political status and to pursue their economic and social 
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development according to the policy they have freely chosen, clearly indicates that this 
provision was intended to survive in post-colonial Africa.  
 
This provision essentially means that people have the right to form a government, 
establish and exercise control over their own institutions, and work towards their self-
development. Such a government can only be formed where like-minded people with a 
common ideology and political belief come together.399 Where a group within a state is in 
a fundamental disagreement with other groups on issues pertaining to governance, such a 
group should be allowed, under the principle established in Article 20(1), to secede and 
form their own government. Unfortunately, this has not been the interpretation given to 
Article 20 of the Charter.  
 
In Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire400, the people of Katanga wanted to secede 
from the former Zaire. The commission agreed that self-determination may be exercised 
in a number of ways, such as independence, self-government, local government, 
federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords with the 
wishes of the people. The commission, however, observed that this must be fully 
cognisant of other recognised principles, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.401 It 
vehemently maintained that it was obliged to uphold the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Zaire as a member of the former OAU and a party to the African Charter.   
 
It further ruled that in the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to 
the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire is called to question, and in the absence of 
evidence that the people of Katanga were denied the right to participate in government as 
guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African Charter, Katanga was obliged to exercise a 
variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Zaire.402 From the foregoing, one could conclude that, under the African 
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human rights system, the right to self-determination is recognised within the limits of the 
territorial integrity of a state. This may involve self-government, local government, 
federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of government.  
 
The commission also considered the issue of peoples’ right to self-determination in 
relation to the separatist movement of Casamance in Senegal.403 After analysing the 
positions of both the government and the separatist movement, the commission rejected 
the claim of the separatists for the independence of Casamance from Senegal as lacking 
‘pertinence.’404 Although it criticised the Senegalese state because it ‘had a mechanical 
and static conception of national unity’, the commission recommended that the issue 
must be addressed within the framework of ‘the cohesion and continuity of the people of 
the unified Senegalese state in a community of interest and destiny.’405 This clearly 
indicates the commission’s preference for national unity over and above the right to 
secede. Notably, the commission once again failed to explain the defining features of 
‘people’ and whether the Casamance people possess these features.406 
 
From the analysis, Article 20(1) of the Charter seems to guarantee the right to seceded in 
exceptional circumstances. Be that as it may, not to recognise that there can be cases of 
well founded secessionist pleas is not only to turn a deaf ear to living reality, but also a 
blind eye to the conceptual deficiency of the old normative framework on the issue of 
secession.407 Rather than dismiss claims on the right to secede, the African Commission 
should have adopted certain prescriptive measures, which would ensure that neither 
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frivolous claims are allowed to dent its competence, nor is the right denied to genuine 
claimants.408     
 
Article 20(2) explicitly intended to block foreign domination. It has correctly been argued 
that the provision has not yet been overtaken by events, even though all African states 
have now attained independence.409 The provision guarantees ‘colonised and oppressed’ 
people the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination. ‘oppressed people’, it 
is observed, could well be within sovereign states because oppression manifests itself in 
different forms-social, economic, political etcetera.410 Thus, the application of this 
provision should not be confined to freedom from colonial domination, but may be 
extended to contemporary forms of oppression. Finally, Article 20(3) obligates states 
parties to the Charter to assist people in the liberation struggle against foreign 
domination, politically, economically or culturally. This provision seems to have outlived 
its purpose and therefore it is not any relevant to the contemporary African society.411 
 
3.2.1.3.3 Right over wealth and natural resources 
 
Article 21 guarantees the right over wealth and natural resources. This right is a 
component right of self-determination, and has been so regarded since the adoption of the 
UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.412 In the resolution, 
the UN General Assembly recognised ‘that the under-developed countries have the right 
to determine freely the use of their natural resources…in order to be in a better position to 
further the realisation of their plans of economic development in accordance with their 
national interests.’413   
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A distinction may be drawn in the way Article 21 of the Charter guarantees this right to 
the ‘peoples’ and states. While it is the right of all peoples to freely use, exploit, and 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources414, states are under obligation to exercise 
control over the same.415 The obligations of the state in this regard are two fold: (i) to 
individually and collectively exercise the right to freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity416; and (ii) to 
eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by 
international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the 
advantages derived from their national resources.417  
 
It is not clear why international monopolies were seen as the possible foreign economic 
exploiters in the context of Article 21(5). States are also known to have participated in 
foreign exploitation, particularly during colonialism. As Umozurike observed, the 
drafters of the Charter seemed to have forgotten this fact too soon, especially given that 
many African states were barely two decades into independence at the time the Charter 
was adopted.418  
 
The findings and recommendations of the African Commission in Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v. Nigeria419 (otherwise known as the ‘Ongoni 
case’ or ‘SERAC case’) bring out very pertinent issues on Article 21 of the Charter. The 
communication was brought on behalf of the Ogoni people, alleging that the military 
government of Nigeria had, among other provisions, violated Article 21 of the Charter by 
virtue of being directly involved in oil production through the State oil company, the 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the majority shareholder in a 
consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC).420  
 
It was the complainant’s contention that the oil consortium has exploited oil reserves in 
Ogoniland with no regard for the health or environment of the local communities, 
disposing toxic wastes into the environment and local waterways in violation of 
applicable international environmental standards. The consortium also neglected and/or 
failed to maintain its facilities causing numerous avoidable spills in the proximity of 
villages. The resulting contamination of water, soil and air had serious short and long-
term health impacts, including skin infections, respiratory ailments, and increased risk of 
cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems.421 The African Commission held 
that Nigeria violated the rights, inter alia, to the free disposal of one’s wealth and natural 
resources under Article 21. It noted that: 
 
… despite its obligation to protect persons against interferences in the enjoyment of their 
rights, the Government of Nigeria facilitated the destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary 
to its Charter obligations and despite such internationally established principles, the 
Nigerian Government has given the green light to private actors, and the oil Companies 
in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the Ogonis. By any measure of 
standards, its practice falls short of the minimum conduct expected of governments, and 
therefore, is in violation of Article 21 of the African Charter.422 
 
With regard to the violation of Article 21(5) of the Charter, which imposes a duty on 
states parties to undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign exploitation particularly that 
practised by international monopolies, the commission stated:  
 
Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate 
legislation and effective enforcement, but also by protecting them from damaging acts 
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that may be perpetrated by private parties. This duty calls for positive action on the part 
of governments in fulfilling their obligations under human rights instruments.423 
 
The commission seemed to suggest that although the Nigerian government had the right 
to produce oil to fulfil the economic and social rights of Nigerians as a whole, it equally 
had the duty to protect the interests of the Ongonis who were being affected by its 
activities. Hence, when a state allows private persons or groups to act freely and with 
impunity to the detriment of the rights recognised in the Charter, it would be in violation 
of its obligations to protect the human rights of its citizens.424 There is, therefore, an 
obligation on governmental authorities to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment of 
the rights in the Charter is not interfered with by private persons. 
 
3.2.1.3.4 Right to economic, social and cultural development 
 
Article 22 of the Charter encapsulates the controversial right to development. This right, 
which is relatively new, was first enunciated by Keba M’Baye.425 At the request of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN Secretary-General made a study in which he 
concluded that a large number of principles based on the UN Charter and human rights 
texts and declarations confirm the existence of the right to development.426  
 
The right to development, considered holistically, includes political, economic, social and 
cultural processes aimed at the constant improvement of the well-being of all 
individuals.427 This right guarantees all people free participation in the economic, social 
and cultural processes of their states and the fair distribution of the proceeds. Owing to its 
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broad spectrum, the right to development should be construed in the light of other related 
rights contained in the Charter, inter alia, the right to self-determination, the right to 
exercise sovereignty over wealth and natural resources, the right to a general satisfactory 
environment and the right to peace and territorial integrity.428 Although the Charter 
imposes a duty on the state, either individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of 
the right to development, it fails to be precise on the scope of the duty and on how this 
right could be exercised. It is therefore up to the state to be innovative to ensure the 
enjoyment of this right.     
 
3.2.1.3.5 Right to peace 
 
The Charter guarantees all peoples the right to national and international peace and 
security. Accordingly, the principle of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed 
by the Charter of the United Nations are to govern the relationship between African 
states.429 Article 23(2) of the African Charter obliges states to strengthen peace, solidarity 
and friendly relations by ensuring: 
 
(a) Any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall 
not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other state party to 
the present Charter;  
(b) Their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the 
people of any other state party to the present Charter.  
 
The concept of peace as a human right is entirely novel and began with the African 
Charter.430 The Charter intends to promote the principle of good and peaceful co-
existence among states. Thus, a state which collaborates with terrorists or militia groups 
against another state tends to jeopardise the purport and intention of Article 23 of the 
                                                 
428 Ibid. 
429 Article 32(1) of the Charter stipulates: ‘All peoples shall have the right to national and international 
peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of 
the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern relations 
between states.’ 
430 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 152. 
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Charter. The continent has experienced gross violation of this provision of the Charter in 
recent times. For example, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been accused 
for harbouring Ugandan and Rwandese rebels who have been attacking their 
governments from time to time.431 Similarly, Uganda has been known to be the base and 
training ground for Congolese rebels.432 This has compromised the otherwise good 
relationships these countries might have enjoyed by being neighbours. 
 
The Charter provisions regarding the right to peace have some shortcomings. For 
example, it is difficult to see how Article 23(1) of the Charter can be enforced.433 It is 
true that in Africa, peace and security have become increasingly of grave concern. 
However, the Charter does not contain enough contents to aid the enforcement of this 
right. The two situations in which states are obliged to ensure the achievement of peace— 
solidarity and friendly relations— are not adequate, especially in the absence of political 
will of states parties to the Charter.434 It should suffice to note that the elements and the 
scope of the right to peace are yet to be determined. Additionally, no effort has so far 
been undertaken to elevate the concept beyond the level of generalities.435  
  
3.2.1.3.6 Right to a general satisfactory environment 
 
In terms of Article 24 of the Charter, all people have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.  This right is concerned with maintaining 
an environment fit for human habitation that poses no, or minimum, threat to human life. 
Environmental conservation is very important in this respect. It is important to note that 
the right has both individual and collective dimensions.436 The individual dimension is 
the right of any victim or potential victim of an environmentally damaging activity to 
obtain reparation for harm suffered, while the collective dimension imposes a duty on 
                                                 
431 See generally, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007 (2007). 
432 Ibid. 
433 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 153. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Umozurike U, The African Charter on human and peoples’ rights, note 45 above, p. 75. 
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individuals and states to cooperate to resolve environmental problems.437 The issue of 
environmental rights in Africa did not begin with the adoption of the African Charter. 
Rather, it was engrafted into the African human rights system in 1968 when African 
heads of states and governments adopted the African Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources.438  
 
Despite the inaction on the violation of the right to a general satisfactory environment, 
the right has become very important and relevant to Africa. The importance culminated 
from the toxic waste dumping of 1988 in some African countries by international 
corporations.439 After discovering toxic waste dumping in the continent, the former OAU 
took quick action to forestall future occurrences. The same year, the OAU Council of 
Ministers passed a resolution condemning the import of toxic wastes to Africa, and 
emphasised that toxic dumping is a crime against Africa.440 This resolution was followed 
by the adoption of the convention banning the importation of toxic waste into Africa.441 
 
When interpreting Article 24 of the Charter, it is inevitable to note that the primary 
responsibility lies with states to adopt measures that will effectively address 
environmental degradation. On the other hand, individuals ought to have the right in 
domestic law to institute private action against any violation of the right to a general 
satisfactory environment. Unfortunately, many states in Africa do not have adequate 
national environmental laws or policies, if at all. Thus, the realisation of this provision of 
the Charter is impeded.     
 
                                                 
437 Ibid. 
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To conclude this discussion, it must be pointed out that the African Charter is a 
challenging, ambitious and innovative document in the area of group or collective 
rights.442 It fails to take note that these rights are weak in their content and in the manner 
of their enforcement. Perhaps, by making provision for these rights, the drafters of the 
Charter intended to respond to human rights concerns in the context of African realities, 
given that Africans are more group oriented than individualistic.443 Be that as it may, 
there is still a lot to be desired in as far as these rights are concerned. It is not surprising 
that the African Commission has handled only a handful of communications alleging 
their violation. The inadequacy of the Charter pertaining to this category of rights shall be 
revisisted in the next chapter of this thesis.  
 
3.3 Institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system 
 
Having discussed the provisions of the African Charter as the normative basis of the 
African human rights system, we now embark on the review of the institutional 
mechanisms put in place to enforce it- the African Commission and Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. As stated earlier, both the ‘political’ and ‘legal’ components of the 
human rights system have institutional mechanisms with responsibility for human rights 
enforcement in the region. However, given the scope of the present study, our discussion 
shall be confined to the two institutions mentioned herein.  
3.3.1 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Commission was established in 1987, a year after the African Charter 
entered into force.444 The commission consists of eleven members (commissioners) 
chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, ‘known for their 
                                                 
442 See generally Dersso S, ‘The jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
with respect to peoples’ rights’, note 77 above, pp. 358-381. 
443 See generally Eze O, Human rights in Africa (1984), p. 9; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the 
African Cultural Fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties’, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, p. 349. 
444 African Charter, Art 30. 
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high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples’ 
rights; particular consideration being given to persons having legal experience.’445 The 
eleven commissioners are elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (AHSG)) from a list nominated by states parties to the African Charter.446 
The commissioners, who serve in their personal capacity,447 are elected for a six-year 
term and are eligible for re-election.448 During proceedings, they elect the chairman and 
vice-chairman of the commission for an initial tenure of two years subject to re-
election.449 In carrying out their functions, they enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunities.450 Their emoluments and allowances are provided for in the regular budget 
of the AU.  
 
A commissioner’s office becomes vacant due to death or resignation, or if, in the opinion 
of other members of the commission, the member has stopped discharging his 
functions.451 The issue of incompetence is unfortunately not mentioned. A commissioner 
may be incompetent or fall short of the required standard and yet still be willing to serve. 
The power of the commissioners to sanction each other should have related to 
unavailability, incompetence or inability to maintain the necessary standard, rather than 
the unwillingness to serve.452 Noteworthy, however, a commissioner can be removed by 
either his own action or that of his colleagues and not by the Assembly or his own 
national state. This strengthens his independence from those that nominate or elect 
him.453  
 
                                                 
445 Ibid, Art 31. 
446 Ibid, Art 33. 
447 Ibid, Art 31(2). 
448 Ibid, Art 36. 
449 Ibid, Art 42. 
450 Ibid, Art 43. 
451 Ibid, Art 39. 
452 Umozurike U, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 45 above, p. 51. 
453 Ibid. 
 313
There is a general dissatisfaction on a number of issues regarding the composition of the 
African Commission, ranging from the mode of election, impartiality of members, gender 
representation, and equitable geographic and legal cultural representation.454 These 
aspects shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter where the challenges to effective 
enforcement of human rights in Africa will be elucidated. Meanwhile, the commission’s 
mandate is stipulated in chapter II of the Charter. Specifically, Article 45 entrust it with 
four broad functions: 
 
• Promotion of human and peoples' rights; 
• Protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid down by the 
Charter; 
• Interpretation of the African Charter at the request of a state party, an institution 
of the AU or an African organisation recognised by the AU; and 
• Performance of any other tasks that may be entrusted to it by the AHSG. 
 
In its promotional functions, the commission is expected to, among other things, engage 
in: information collection; formulation and development of principles relating to human 
rights to guide legislative actions by African governments; and, collaboration with other 
African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human rights.455 Evaluation of periodic reports by states is also a promotional function of 
the commission in as far as it seeks to determine the extent to which states parties have 
implemented the provisions of the Charter in their respective jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
Article 62 requires states parties to furnish country reports every two years.456 
 
                                                 
454 See, for example, Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 172; Rembe S, The 
system of protection of human rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems 
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455 African Charter, Art 45 (1) (a)-(c).  
456Art 62 states in part: ‘each state party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the 
present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving 
effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter…’  
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The commission performs its protection functions in terms of Articles 47 to 60 of the 
Charter. In particular, Articles 47 to 54 make provision for interstate complaints while 
Articles 55 to 60 establish the machinery for the receipt and handling of individuals’ 
complaints.457 What follows is a more detailed discussion of the practice of the 
commission in its endeavour to fulfil its mandates concordant to chapter II of the Charter.   
3.3.1.1 The commission’s promotional mandate 
 
3.3.1.1.1 General promotional activities 
 
The African Commission is mandated to promote human and peoples’ rights. In 
particular, Article 45 (1) spells out the specifics of this mandate to include:  
 
(a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in 
the field of human and peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia and 
conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local 
institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights, and should the case 
arise, give its views or make recommendations to governments.  
(b) to formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal 
problems relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms 
upon which African governments may base their legislations.  
(c) co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights.  
 
In exercising this mandate, the commission has over the years made efforts aimed at 
realising the areas outlined above. Specifically, it has come up with programmes of 
action and activities geared towards the promotion of human and peoples’ rights. For 
example, at its Second Session in Dakar, Senegal in 1988, it spelt out its first Programme 
                                                 
457 Art 56. 
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of Action, outlining its research and information dissemination, quasi-legislative and 
cooperation activities.458  
 
Building on this programme of action, the commission at its Eleventh Session in March 
1992 finalised and adopted another Programme of Action for the years 1992-1996. The 
programme, as adopted, contained as its main components, the establishment of the 
information and documentation centre; convening seminars, workshops and training 
courses; promotional activities by commissioners; translation and distribution of public 
documents of the commission, including state reports and relevant summary records; 
publication of Annual Reports of the commission: the Review Bulletin, brochure and 
other publications; and convening inter-session working groups.459 Moreover, the 
commission has been cooperating with other human rights institutions in many areas 
relating to promotion and protection of human rights. In a bid to strengthen cooperation, 
the commission from its 22nd Ordinary Session has been granting observer status to Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs).460  
 
The commission has also been progressive on information dissemination and publication. 
It has so far produced and circulated several human rights documents, including the 
Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, its Annual Activity 
Reports, the Charter and its Rules of Procedure.461 Additionally, the commission has 
passed a number of resolutions and recommendations in the exercise of its promotional 
mandate. Such resolutions have, for example, called on Sudan to allow detainees access 
to lawyers and doctors and asked the government to support negotiations for the 
settlement of the conflict with the Southern region.462  
                                                 
458 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 177. See also Doc. AHG/155 
(XXIV) Annex VIII. 
459 Ibid. See also Badawi E, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A call for justice’, 
in Koufa K, (ed.), International Justice (1997), p. 283. 
460 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 178. 
461 Ibid. See in this regard, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Establishment 
(Information Sheet no. 1), p. 11. 
462 Ibid. 
 316
Another resolution urged African states to respect the rights of prisoners and to ratify the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.463 The 
resolutions, some of which were discussed in the preceding part of this study, are quite 
many and address various aspects of the broad human rights discourse. Sadly, these 
resolutions have received little publicity and there are no indications that states take them 
seriously.  
 
The commission has also developed a procedure by which each commissioner is assigned 
a number of member states for promotional activities.464 These commissioners visit these 
states and organise lectures, seminars, and other activities in collaboration with various 
institutions. The commissioners report on their promotional activities at each session of 
the commission. Additionally, the commission initiated the internationally recognised 
Special Rapporteurs mechanism that is not specifically provided for in the African 
Charter.  
 
So far there are five Special Rapporteurs: the Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary 
and Extrajudicial Executions (appointed in 1994)465; the Special Rapporteur on Prisons 
and Conditions of Detention in Africa (appointed in 1996)466; the Special Rapporteur on 
Women’s Rights in Africa (appointed in 1999)467; the Special Rapporteur on Human 
rights Defenders (appointed in 2004)468; and the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, 
Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons in Africa (appointed in 2004).469 It must be 
stated, however, for a number of reasons, including scarce resources and the lack of 
cooperation from some states, the Special Rapporteurs mechanism has not performed to 
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the commission’s expectations. The challenges and shortcomings of the mechanism shall 
be discussed in the next chapter.   
 
In terms of Article 45(1)(c), the African Commission is also mandated to cooperate with 
other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection 
of human and peoples’ rights. To this end, cooperation has been sought with 
organisations such as the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights and other international and national human rights organisations. The 
commission has improved its working relations with NGOs470, National Human Rights 
Institutions471 and more states delegates and other stakeholders now participate in its 
sessions. In terms of the Rules of Procedure, these organisations can attend the 
commission’s sessions.472 
 
Generally, there are a number of problems connected with the commission’s efforts to 
enforce its promotional mandate that need to be mentioned here.473 From the catalogue of 
activities listed above, it is evident that the promotional mandate of the commission is 
enormous. However, promotional activities are only carried out during the inter-session 
period. Even so, the commissioners have restricted themselves to visiting universities and 
other institutions of higher learning in the countries assigned to them, giving lectures on 
the African Charter, African human rights issues and the work of the commission.474 
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While this is happening, an average African is ignorant, not only of his or her rights, but 
also of the work of the commission.475  
 
Thus, in the process of executing its mandate, the commission should focus on more 
issues than it has in the past. The size of the continent and the inadequacy of material and 
human resources also present a problem to effective promotion of human rights in Africa. 
With one commissioner working part time and responsible for promoting the Charter in 
three to five countries476, the chances for effective promotion are slim.477 It therefore 
becomes necessary to operate through a network of national, international and private 
organisations based in those areas. Human rights promotion requires sustained activities 
tailored to suit the ages and the vocations of the target audience. Additionally, promotion 
requires publicity in the media-radio, television, newspapers— which in many African 
countries are still controlled by governments.478 It follows that the efforts to promote the 
Charter are impeded by the prevalent political climate in a country.479 The problems 
highlighted herein shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter.      
 
3.3.1.1.2 The State reporting mechanism  
 
State reporting is more of a promotional activity of the commission than it is a protective 
one. Article 62 of the African Charter obligates member states to submit reports every 
two years.480 Such reports are to indicate the legislative or other measures taken by states 
to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed under the Charter. 
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While obligating states to submit reports, the Charter failed to identify the organ 
competent to receive and review these reports.481 As a result, the African Commission at 
its Third session adopted a resolution requesting the OAU Assembly to entrust it with the 
task of reviewing state reports.482 The commission rightly noted that ‘it [was] the only 
appropriate organ of the OAU capable not only of studying the said periodic reports, but 
of making pertinent observations to states parties.’483  
 
In response to this request, the OAU Assembly, as it then was, entrusted the commission 
with the task.484 Unfortunately, through the request, which was meant to mandate it with 
the task of ‘examining’ the periodic reports, the commission limited its own scope and by 
extension the effectiveness of the reporting mechanism.485 Nothing is specifically stated 
in relation to what is to be done with the ‘conclusions’ or ‘observations’ arising from the 
examination, as is the case, for instance, under the European Social Charter system.486 
This, notwithstanding, the importance of state reporting in the promotion of human rights 
cannot be ignored. The African Commission has spelt out the importance or benefits of 
the state reporting mechanism to include the following487: 
 
• Through the reporting system the implementation of the African Charter by states 
within their domestic systems is monitored.  
• Through the examination of state reports, the African Commission is afforded the 
opportunity to understand the problems encountered by states in transforming the 
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Charter into reality, and the commission may make recommendations which may 
be taken by states to address the problems and promote effective realisation. 
• The reporting system enables states to constantly check the whole government 
machinery as it requires all relevant government institutions and departments to 
evaluate their legal regulations, procedures and practices in terms of the 
provisions of the Charter. 
• State reporting permits the African Commission to collect information on 
common experiences, both good and bad, from state parties so that states may 
learn from each other.  
 
On the basis of the above, state reporting should be seen as a non-contentious mechanism 
that allows states to present a comprehensive picture of the human rights situation in their 
countries.488 The mechanism gives states the opportunity to engage in constructive 
dialogue with the commission with a view to enhance their human rights standards. 
Through this dialogue the difficulties to the realisation of human rights and possible ways 
to address them could be identified.489  
 
In the formative years of state reporting, the commission did not have clearly laid down 
procedures. Thereafter, at its Fourth ordinary session in October 1991, it adopted the 
‘General Guidelines for National Periodic Reports’.490 The initial guidelines were divided 
into seven parts, each dealing with different aspects of rights and duties contained in the 
Charter.491 The guidelines were, nevertheless, found not to be very useful because they 
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were too detailed and complex, making it difficult for member states to follow.492 The 
commission, realising the problems associated with the old guidelines, proceeded to 
amend them. These amendments were intended to aid state parties to submit reports that 
are clear, organised, adequate in scope and sufficient in detail.493 Although the initial 
guidelines had shortcomings, they assisted in clarifying some ambiguous provisions of 
the Charter, hence, deepened normative understanding thereof.494 Mugwanya succinctly 
captures this achievement as follows: 
 
… while the Charter has no derogation clause, the guidelines require states to report on 
whether there is a provision in their laws for derogation and under what circumstances 
derogations are possible. Moreover, the guidelines are detailed on the information states 
must furnish to demonstrate that they have taken appropriate measures to give effect to 
individual and group rights. For instance, as regards peoples’ rights to equality under 
Article 19, they require states to state the constitutional framework which protects the 
different sections of national community.495 
 
The amended guidelines highlight eleven areas to be addressed in the reports.496 On the 
basis of these guidelines, the commission has evolved the procedure and practice of 
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examining state reports. Normally, examination of state reports is conducted in the 
commission’s open sessions. However, only commissioners are allowed to pose questions 
to state representatives.497  
 
Procedurally, the state representative is given the opportunity to present the state’s 
reports, after which the commission’s Rapporteur poses questions to him or her. 
Additional questions are posed to the representative by other commissioners and are 
generally not limited to the line of questions prepared by the Secretariat.498 After the 
question and answer session, the Rapporteur sums up, and the Chairman of the 
commission concludes the session. In the past, the commission had adopted the practice 
of not considering a member state’s report if there was no person from the state to present 
it. The commission, however, changed its approach at its 23rd Ordinary Session.  
 
The new approach allows two letters of notification to the state concerned to send a 
representative.499 The commission then goes ahead to examine the report and forward its 
comments to the state, should it fail to comply.500 In the case of non-submission of 
reports, the commission may authorise the Secretary to send to the state concerned a 
report or reminder on the submission of the report of additional information.501 Where the 
state concerned does not respond to the reminder, the commission is obliged to point it 
out in its Annual report to the AHSG.502  
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Generally, the state reporting mechanism has encountered myriad challenges since its 
inception. For example, due to the failure to submit reports, the African Commission has 
not fully succeeded in enhancing the promotion of human rights through this mechanism. 
Reasons for the lack of compliance by states with their reporting obligations include a 
general lack of political will on the part of states parties; the fact that states parties have 
to file reports under other international human rights instruments to which they are 
signatories; the lack of a coordinated effort between state departments; and the 
complexity of the first reporting guidelines issued by the African Commission.503 
Additionally, many of the reports filed have revealed a lack of seriousness in carrying out 
introspective self-evaluation. The deficiencies and challenges encountered in state 
reporting shall be discussed fully in the next chapter.  
 
Noteworthy, however, in an apparent move to curb the issue of delayed reports, the 
commission, in its 5th Annual Report, recommended to the AHSG to adopt a resolution 
on overdue reports.504 Thus, at its 29th Ordinary Session in Cairo, the AHSG adopted a 
resolution that inter alia505: 
 
(2) Urges the states parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which 
have not yet submitted their reports to submit them as soon as possible; 
(3) Requests that states should report not only on the legislative or other measures taken 
to give effect to each of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights but also on the problems encountered in 
giving effect to these rights and freedoms; 
(4) Recommends that the states in their periodic reports give information on the 
implementation of the right to development; 
(5) Encourages states parties which encounter difficulties in preparing and submitting 
their periodic reports to seek help as soon as possible from the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights which will arrange for assistance in this task through its own 
or other resources. 
                                                 
503 See Mugwanya G, ‘Examination of state reports by the African Commission: A critical appraisal’, note 
487 above, p. 276.  
504 Fifth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Annex VII. 
505 AHG/Res (XXVIII), 1993. 
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This resolution is a welcome idea in as far as it seeks to redress the shortcomings of 
irregular or non-reporting by member states. The mere adoption of resolutions, however, 
will not be enough to change the ingrained negative attitudes of African governments to 
human rights reporting.506 Rather, a radical system of sanctions and monitoring involving 
the organs of the African Union would be a more effective and meaningful approach. 
Proposals for the reform of the state reporting mechanism shall be discussed at length in 
the next chapter.  
 
3.3.1.2 The commission’s protective mandate 
 
Although Article 45(2) does not specifically state how the commission may exercise its 
protective mandate, chapter III of the Charter provides for the communication 
(complaints) procedure, which has generally been one of the ways this mandate is 
exercised. As already stated, the complaints procedure is conducted in terms of Articles 
47 to 60 of the Charter. In particular, Articles 47 to 54 make provision for interstate 
complaints while Articles 55 to 60 govern individuals’ complaints.507  
 
3.3.1.2.1 Inter-state communications procedure 
 
The African human rights system has provisions for the settlement of human rights 
disputes between states. However, neither the African Charter nor the Rules of Procedure 
of the African Commission indicate the type of disputes or violations of the Charter that 
are contemplated under the inter-state complaints procedure. As Nmehielle suggested, 
violation of Article 20 dealing with the general question of the right to self-determination 
and Article 23, which deals with the right to national and international peace and security, 
would fall within the purview of the procedure.508 Additionally, the procedure could be 
                                                 
506 Kofi Q, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards a more effective reporting 
mechanism’, note 481 above, p. 266.  
507 African Charter, Art. 56. 
508 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system,note 112 above, p. 203. 
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used where a state chooses to claim on behalf of its nationals whose rights may have been 
violated by another state party to the Charter.509  
 
The Charter provides for two approaches to redress inter-state complaints. Pursuant to 
Article 47:    
 
If a state party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another state party 
to this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written 
communication, the attention of that state to the matter. This communication shall also be 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the Commission. 
Within three months of the receipt of the communication, the state to which the 
communication is addressed shall give the enquiring state, written explanation or 
statement elucidating the matter. This should include as much as possible relevant 
information relating to the laws and rules of procedure applied and applicable, and the 
redress already given or course of action available. 
 
The procedure under Article 47, therefore, envisages a situation where the contending 
states may want to resolve a dispute in a friendly manner without involving the 
commission. It may happen, however, that the contending states may fail to settle the 
issue through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure. In such cases, 
Article 48 of the Charter provides that either state shall have the right to submit the 
matter to the commission within three weeks from the date on which the original 
communication is received by the respondent state.510   
 
The second procedure, which is contemplated under Article 49 of the Charter, allows a 
state party to proceed directly with a communication to the commission. Article 49 reads:  
 
                                                 
509 Ibid. 
510 Article 48 of the Charter reads ‘If within three months from the date on which the original 
communication is received by the state to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of 
the two states involved through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure, either state shall 
have the right to submit the matter to the commission through the Chairman and shall notify the other states 
involved.’ 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of 47, if a state party to the present Charter considers that 
another state party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter 
directly to the commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the state concerned. 
 
The two procedures may be distinguished in more than one way. The most obvious 
distinction is that the first procedure (‘Article-47 procedure’) allows the amicable 
settlement of a dispute between contending states before they proceed to the commission, 
while this is not required in the second procedure (‘Article-49 procedure’). The second 
distinction is that, while Article-47 procedure requires three months of exchange of 
information before the commission is seized of the complaint, Article-49 procedure 
indicates no such period. One would wonder why the Charter makes provision for two 
procedures in inter-state communications. The drafters of the Charter should rather have 
made one provision in which a time limit for bilateral peaceful resolution of the dispute is 
specified before a communication is filed with the commission.511  
 
Another issue concerning the inter-state communications procedures relates to the role of 
the OAU/AU Secretary-General. Both procedures require states parties to address their 
communications to the commission and the Secretary-General. One would think that the 
commission should have been the only and proper institution to receive communications. 
The commission, at its discretion, could then use the good offices of the Secretary-
General to ensure amicable settlement of disputes between states parties.512  
 
In an attempt to streamline the inter-states complaint procedure, the African Commission 
has established guidelines on the submission of inter-state communications.513 These 
guidelines require the complaining state to: (i) state in writing, inter alia, its name, 
official language, and the year in which it ratified the African Charter; (ii) state the name 
of the accused state, its official language and the year it ratified the Charter; (iii) state the 
                                                 
511 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 201. 
512 Ibid. 
513 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Guidelines on the Submission of 
Communications: Information Sheet no. 2, 14 (hereafter ‘Information sheet no. 2). 
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facts constituting the violation; (iv) indicate measures that have been taken to resolve the 
matter amicably; why the measure, if any, failed, or why no measure was used at all. 
Along this line the state must also indicate measures taken to exhaust local remedies; (v) 
state domestic legal remedies not yet pursued, giving reasons why this has not yet been 
done; (vi) state whether the case has also been referred to other international avenues, 
such as referral to other international settlement body like the UN or within the OAU 
system; and (vii) show complaints submitted to the Secretary-General of the OAU/AU 
and to the accused state, accompanied by any response from these two sources.514 
 
These guidelines are similar to the requirements in individual complaints in some 
respects. For example, under both procedures, the commission can proceed to consider a 
communication only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, unless it is obvious to the commission that the procedure of achieving these 
remedies would be unduly prolonged.515 What follows below is a discussion of the 
individuals’ complaints procedure before the commission.  
 
3.3.1.2.2 Individuals (‘other’) communications procedure 
 
Other than the inter-state communications procedure, the Charter mandates the African 
Commission to receive ‘other communications’. Although neither the Charter nor the 
Rules of Procedure of the commission define the term, Article 55(1) tends to suggest that 
‘other communications’ connotes communications that are not from a state party because 
it provides that: 
 
Before each Session, the Secretary of the commission shall make a list of the 
communications other than those of states parties to the present Charter and transmit 
them to the members of the commission, who shall indicate which communications 
should be considered by the commission.  
 
                                                 
514 Ibid.  
515 See also the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, note 497 above, Rule 97 (c). 
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An analytical reading of this provision would suggest that the Charter does not restrict or 
limit access to the commission by non-state complainants. This would essentially mean, 
therefore, that any person, group of persons or non-governmental organisation, is allowed 
to lodge a complaint or petition alleging violation of the Charter. Hence, the Charter has 
been said to be more liberal in granting access to its non-state complainant’s procedure 
than other regional and international human rights systems.516 For example, whereas the 
Inter-American system allows only NGOs legally recognised in the member states of the 
OAS to lodge complaints before the Inter-American Commission517, the African system 
does not have such regulations.518 Thus, NGOs from all over the world, with or without 
observer status with the commission, have enjoyed unlimited access to the commission 
on behalf of complainants.  
 
In the same vein, the African Charter does not contain any primary requirement that 
petitioners be the actual victims of the Charter violation, neither does it require that the 
complainants or petitioners be within the jurisdiction of the respondent state. It is 
therefore expedient to examine the non-state (individuals) communications procedure in 
detail, in order to highlight its ramifications. The examination shall be conducted 
sequentially by discussing the procedure from the point a communication is lodged with 
the commission to when redress is offered. For purposes of clarity, the non-state 
complaints procedure (or ‘other communications’) shall herein be referred to as ‘the 
individual communications procedure’.        
 
3.3.1.2.2.1 Submission of individual communications 
 
Before a communication is submitted to the Commission, certain issues must be 
ascertained. First, according to Rule 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure, a communication 
submitted against a non-party state cannot be entertained because the commission is 
mandated to only receive individual communications against a state party to the African 
                                                 
516 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p.204. 
517 See American Convention on Human Rights, Art 44. 
518 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112, p.204. 
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Charter. The commission has also held that one cannot bring a communication against a 
non-state member such as an inter-state organisation.519 Secondly, as stated earlier, the 
complainant need not be or know the victim. Additionally, it is not necessary to be 
actually resident in, be a national of, or at the time of complaining, be present in the state 
against which the allegation is made.520  
The starting point of the individuals’ communications procedure is the submission of a 
complaint (communication) by the individual. The Secretary of the commission is 
required to make a list of all individual communications and transmit them to the 
commissioners.521 A communication will only be considered by the commission upon the 
decision of a simple majority of the Commissioners.522 It is not clear whether Article 
55(2) of the Charter, which provides for a simple majority decision of the commissioners 
prior to the determination of a communication, could be taken to mean that the 
commission could decline to consider a communication that meets all admissibility 
requirements just because a simple majority of its members so decide. One would agree 
with Murray that this provision could only be applicable in cases where admissibility 
requirements have not been met because anything to the contrary may give the 
commission unfettered discretion which could be abused.523  
3.3.1.2.2.2 Admissibility of individual communications 
 
Once an individual communication has been received, it is incumbent upon the 
commission to decide whether or not the communication meets the admissibility 
                                                 
519 See Communication 12/88, Mohamed El-Nekheily v OAU, Seventh Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
520 Old Rule 114 (2), deleted in amended Rules. See also Murray R, ‘Decisions by the African Commission 
on individual communications under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights’, (1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 420. 
521 African Charter, Art 55(1). 
522 Ibid, Art 55 (2). 
523 Murray R, ‘Decisions by the African Commission on individual communications under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights’, note 520 above, p. 420. 
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requirements stipulated under Article 56 of the Charter. While so doing, it may set up 
working groups, comprising a maximum of three commissioners, to recommend on the 
admissibility of a communication.524 In the process, the commission or its working group 
is at liberty to request additional information relating to the issue of admissibility from 
either the complainant or the respondent state.525 The decision on admissibility can only 
be taken after the communication or its brief summary has been transmitted to the state 
party concerned to make its observations.526 The commission is mandated to give the 
state party three months within which to submit its comments.527  
 
Unless the commission is compelled by exceptional circumstances to review its position, 
a decision on admissibility is final. Thus, if a communication is declared inadmissible its 
consideration will automatically come to a close. A decision on inadmissibility may, 
however, be reconsidered at a later date if the commission is requested to do so.528 
Sometimes the commission invites the author to do so, as in Alberto T. Capitao v. 
Tanzania, where it observed that the ‘case can be resubmitted when the local remedies 
have been properly exhausted or if the complainant proves that local remedies are 
unavailable, ineffective or unreasonably prolonged.’529 Where, however, a 
communication is declared admissible, the parties will be informed and the case will 
proceed to the ‘merits stage’.530 
 
The principle that communications have to comply with certain admissibility 
requirements serves as a screening or filtering mechanism between national and 
                                                 
524 Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure. 
525 Ibid, Rule 117. 
526 Ibid.  
527 Ibid, Rule 117(4). 
528 Ibid, Rule 118(2). 
529 Communications 53/90 and 53/91, Alberto T. Capitao v. Tanzania, Seventh Annual Activity Report of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex IX); Eighth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex VI). 
530 Rules of Procedure of the Commission, Rule 118 (1).  
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international institutions.531 This requirement places a divide between sovereign states 
and international supervision. Viljoen correctly notes that disputes between nationals and 
their states should, in the first instance, be resolved at the national level.532 Article 56 of 
the African Charter, therefore, provides such a filter by outlining seven admissibility 
requirements in the following terms: 
 
Communications relating to human and peoples’ rights referred to in Article 55 received 
by the commission shall be considered if they:  
1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity,  
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or with the 
present Charter,  
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the state 
concerned and its institutions or to the Organisation of African Unity,  
4. Are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media,  
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this 
procedure is unduly prolonged, 
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are 
exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter, and 
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these states involved in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter 
of the Organisation of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter. 
 
1. The communications must indicate their authors even if they request 
anonymity. 
 
 
Article 56(1) stipulates that communications must ‘indicate their authors even if the latter 
requests anonymity.’ This should be understood to mean that the authors should furnish 
the commission with their full particulars.533 This requirement was interpreted by the 
                                                 
531 Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, in Murray R & Evans M, The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 12 above, p.  62.   
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid.  
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commission to mean the authors must give their full identity534 and contact address.535  It 
was the commission’s position that, even though the author’s address is not expressly 
required under Article 56, the same is necessary to facilitate communication with the 
author.536 Accordingly, the author may request anonymity but still needs to state his or 
her name and other relevant particulars.537  
 
It has been contended, and rightly so, that anonymity will sometimes be difficult to 
maintain as the respondent state needs to be alerted to the specific situation that gave rise 
to the complaint against it.538 The Charter and the Rules of Procedure are not clear on 
whether the complainant should request to remain anonymous in respect of the 
respondent state or the general public or even to some commissioners.539 It will be 
expedient therefore for complainants to specify how anonymity should be granted with 
respect to their specific communications.540  
 
Anonymity could be enhanced by a party being represented by, for example, an NGO and 
the commission could use the name of the NGO in the title of the case.541 Alternatively, 
the commission may be requested to use a pseudonym in order to protect the 
complainant’s identity. But either way, it may be difficult to maintain anonymity in the 
event the respondent state is called upon to vindicate its position and counter the 
complainant’s allegations.  
                                                 
534 Communication 70/92, Ibrahim  Diomessi, Sekou Kande, Ousmane  Kabe v. Guinea, Seventh Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex IX); Ninth Annual 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex VIII).  
535 In communication 57/91, Tanko Bariga v. Nigeria, Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex IX), the Commission made it clear that an address is 
required because ‘for practical reasons it is necessary that the Commission is able to contact the author.’ 
536 Ibid.  
537 Rule 104 of Rules of Procedure.  
538Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 67.  
539 Ibid. 
540 Gumedze S, ‘Bringing communications before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 129. 
541 Ibid. 
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2. The communications must be compatible with both the African Charter and 
the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (or the CAAU).  
 
The essence of Article 56(2) is that the commission considers communications only if 
they are ‘compatible with’ the African Charter. Compatibility with the African Charter 
has various aspects. First, the communication must provide prima facie evidence that a 
right set out in the Charter has been violated.542 In Frederick Korvah v. Liberia543, where 
the complainant alleged, among other things, the lack of discipline in the Liberian 
security police and corruption, the communication was declared inadmissible because the 
allegations did not ‘amount to violations of human rights under the provisions of the 
Charter.’544 The commission has also stated that although it is not necessary to mention 
specific provisions of the Charter, there must be sufficient indication of the factual basis 
of the violation.545   
 
Secondly, the communication must be directed at a state party and must be submitted by 
someone who is competent to do so.546 Observing that numerous petitioners in the early 
years of the commission overlooked this requirement, Viljoen states: 
 
In the first few years, this requirement was the cause of most findings of inadmissibility: 
twenty-three of the fifty-four cases found to be inadmissible until May 1999. There are 
four categories of countries against whom these communications were directed: non-
African states, OAU member states that had not yet become states parties of the Charter; 
the only African non-OAU member, Morocco and the OAU itself.547 
                                                 
542 Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 69. 
543 Communication 1/88, Frederick Korvah v. Liberia, Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex IX). 
544 Ibid. 
545 Communication 162/97,Mouvement des Refugies Mauritaniens au Senegal v. Senegal, Eleventh Annual 
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inadmissible on the ground that the facts do not reveal a prima facie violation of the Charter.  
546 See Viljoen F, ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 72.  
547 Ibid, pp. 72-73.  
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Thirdly, the communication must be based on events that have occurred within the period 
of the Charter’s application.548 This stems from the general principle of international law 
that treaties ‘do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place in any 
situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty in 
respect of that party.’549 Thus, the commission is competent only to consider violations 
that are alleged to have occurred from the date of entry into force of the Charter.  
 
In relation to states that became parties after the entry into force of the Charter, the 
commission has the competence to consider communications that have originated after 
the date of entry into force for a particular state. The date of entry into force is three 
months after the deposit by that state of its instrument of adherence.550 Thus, in 
Communication 39/90, Annette Pagnoulle v. Cameroon551, the commission reiterated that 
it ‘cannot pronounce on the quality of court proceedings that took place before the 
African Charter entered into force in Cameroon’, but was quick to point out that: ‘if, 
however, irregularities in the original sentence have consequences that constitute a 
continuing violation of any of the Articles of the African Charter, the commission must 
pronounce on these.’552     
 
Fourthly, the communication must be based on events that took place within the 
territorial sphere in which the Charter applies. 553 The territorial requirement is to the 
effect that states parties to the Charter are in principle only responsible for violations that 
occur within their territory.554 It should be noted, however, that the requirement that a 
communication must be compatible with both the African Charter and the OAU Charter 
                                                 
548 Ibid. 
549 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 28.  
550 African Charter, Art 65.  
551 Communication 39/90, Annette Pagnoulle v. Cameroon, Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African 
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(or the Constitutive Act of the African Union) raises some controversy. It is obvious that 
the Constitutive Act which succeeded the OAU Charter is not a source of substantive 
rights in the African human rights system.555 It is understandable that a complaint 
pursuant to the provisions of the Charter should show a violation because the Charter 
contains substantive rights. What still needs to be demystified is the requirement for 
compatibility with the OAU Charter (or CAAU).556  
 
3. The communications must not be written in disparaging or insulting 
language directed against the state concerned and its institutions or to the 
OAU/AU. 
 
The Charter disqualifies communications that are written in disparaging or insulting 
language directed at the state complained against and its institutions, or the OAU 
(AU).557 No other international or regional human rights instrument contains this ‘non-
disparaging language’ requirement for purposes of admissibility. One would agree with 
Ankumah that ‘even if this provision did not exist, it would not be prudent for a litigant to 
write a communication in disparaging or insulting language as it would tend to detract 
from the issues.’558 Apparently, the requirement seeks to ensure respect for state parties 
and their institutions as well as the African Union.559 It is, however, unfortunate that the 
phrase ‘disparaging or insulting’ language is not defined in the Charter. Thus, whether or 
not the language is disparaging is for the commission to determine.  
 
The commission has found a communication inadmissible on this ground. In Ligue 
Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cameroon560, the communication alleged 
                                                 
555 Odinkalu A & Christensen C, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Development 
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violations of human rights in Cameroon between 1984 and 1989. It contained statements 
such as ‘Paul Biya must respond to crimes against humanity’, ‘30 years of the criminal 
neo-colonial regime incarcerated by the duo Ahidjo/Biya’, ‘regime of torturers’, and 
‘government barbarism’. The commission held these statements to be insulting language.  
 
As Odinkalu and Christensen observe, the decision of the commission in this regard sets 
a dangerous precedent in as far as it tends to make Article 56(3) subject to the feelings of 
state parties.561 It deliberately dismissed the frustrations of victims of human rights 
abuses and fails to recognise that violations of human rights naturally evoke bitterness 
and anger. The commission should have asked the drafters of the communication to strike 
out the ‘offending or disparaging’ phrases instead of dismissing the communication in its 
entirety.562  
 
4. The communications must not be based on news disseminated through the 
mass media.  
 
This is another provision that is unique to the African Charter as no other human rights 
instrument provides for a similar admissibility requirement. It appears that the provision 
is aimed at ensuring that authors of the communication are able to investigate and 
ascertain the truth of the facts before requesting for the commission’s intervention.563 In 
Jawara v. The Gambia564, for example, the commission resonated that:  
 
It would be damaging if the commission were to reject a communication because some 
aspects of it are based on news disseminated through the mass media. This is borne out of 
the fact that the Charter makes use of the word ‘exclusively’. There is no doubt that the 
media remains the most important if not the only source of information… the issue 
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therefore should not be whether the information was gotten from the media, but whether 
the information is correct.565 
 
Thus, while it is important that allegations contained in communications be verifiable, 
there would be situations where authors of communications may not gain the requisite 
information access and therefore, must depend on the news disseminated through the 
mass media. The mass media ought to play a part in ensuring respect for human rights.566  
 
5. The communications must be sent after all existing local remedies have been 
exhausted.   
 
The rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies is paramount in that it provides the 
respondent state the opportunity to redress, within the framework of its own domestic 
legal system, the wrongs alleged to be done to the individual.567 Besides giving the state 
the first opportunity to redress alleged violations, the rule also ensures respect for state 
sovereignty.568 Accordingly, Article 56(5) requires admissibility of communications that 
‘are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is 
unduly prolonged.’  The use of ‘if any’ in this sub-Article connotes that exhaustion of 
domestic remedies is predicated on their availability.  
 
From the commission’s jurisprudence, Viljoen cites four possible categories of situations 
in which remedies may be said to be unavailable.569 These are: (i) where a decree or other 
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measure has ousted the jurisdiction of the courts, making judicial recourse impossible570; 
(ii) where pursuing a remedy is dependent on extrajudicial considerations, such as a 
discretion or some extraordinary power granted to an executive state official571; (iii) 
where a situation of serious massive violations of human rights exists572; and (iv) where 
complainants are detained without trial.573 Arguably, the Charter does not waive the rule 
where remedies are inadequate or when it can be established that the due process of law 
is not tenable.574  
 
The commission has on many occasions ensured that communications complied with the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. Thus, communications based on claims 
pending in national courts have been declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.575 Similarly, the commission has held that exhaustion of local 
remedies does not preclude exhaustion of appellate procedures.576 With regard to 
effectiveness of remedies, the commission found a ‘discretionary’ and ‘extraordinary’ 
remedy of a non-judicial nature to be both inadequate and ineffective.577 Hence, in Civil 
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above, p. 57. 
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Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria578, the commission held that the rule does not apply in 
cases where national legislation or decree ousts the jurisdiction of the court to entertain 
claims for breaches of fundamental rights.579  
 
The ‘unduly prolonged’ criterion, upon which the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule 
could be waived, has also received the attention of the commission. In communication 
59/91, Louis Emgba Mekongo v. Cameroon, for example, the commission decided that 
the fact that the complainant’s case had been pending in a Cameroonian court for twelve 
years was sufficient proof that procedures for exhaustion of domestic remedies had been 
unduly prolonged.580 The commission is yet to define the phrase ‘unduly prolonged’ 
under Article 56(5) of the Charter.   
 
It has been argued correctly that the question of whether or not local remedies have been 
exhausted is that of fact whose burden rests upon the author or applicant of the 
communication.581 This may be the reason why Rule 104(1)(f) of the Rules of Procedure 
authorises the commission to request the author to furnish clarifications regarding 
measures taken to exhaust local remedies or to give an explanation of why local remedies 
would be futile, if it is so alleged. It must, therefore, be shown that an attempt had been 
made to have recourse to national procedures.582 In communication 8/88, Buyingo v. 
Uganda, the commission failed to get a response from the complainant on whether or not 
he had recourse to local remedies as required by Article 56 of the Charter.  
 
It needs to be observed that the practice of the African Commission in demonstrating the 
burden of proof for the exhaustion of domestic remedies has not been consistent.583 In 
some cases, when the state party refuses to provide a response to allegations, the 
                                                 
578 Communication 45/90, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria,note 572 above, p. 71. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Communication 59/91, Louis Emgba Mekongo v. Cameroon. 
581 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 225. 
582 See communication 92/93, International PEN v. Sudan, Thirteenth Activity Report 1999-2000 (Annex 
V). 
583 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 225. 
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commission accepts the facts as alleged in the complaints and makes a decision thereon. 
In other cases, the commission appears to be more reluctant towards the complainant’s 
allegation.584 Rather than request for additional information from the complainant in 
these cases, the commission declares the communication inadmissible on the grounds that 
the complainant failed to provide information as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
In developing its jurisprudence, the African Commission should avoid double standards 
and maintain consistency in the determination of communications.585   
 
6.  The communications must be submitted within a reasonable period from the 
time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the commission is seized 
with the matter. 
 
Article 56(6) requires communications to be submitted within a reasonable period from 
the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the commission is seized of the 
matter. As with the UN human rights treaties, the Charter does not state the time limit 
within which communications must be submitted.586 The determination of a ‘reasonable 
period’ therefore, is left upon the commission to decide. This is in contradiction with the 
European and Inter-American systems. Both systems allow a maximum period of six 
month after the date the ‘final decision was taken’587 or after the notification of the final 
judgement.588  
 
The fact that the Charter requires communications to be submitted within a reasonable 
period, without specifying the time limit, has both negative and positive implications. On 
the one hand, it may prejudice valid claims because what is ‘reasonable period’ to one 
member of the commission may not be likewise to another. On the other hand, this 
                                                 
584 Ibid. See also Odinkalu A & Christensen C, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Development of its non-State communications procedure’, note 555 above, p. 265. 
585 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 225. 
586 There is no such rule under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR or under CAT. See Viljoen F 
‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 91.  
587 European Convention, Art 35. 
588 Inter-American Convention, Art 46(1)(b).  
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provision has positive implications in the sense that many African people are ignorant of 
the commission’s procedures and if a time limit was to be prescribed, many 
communications would be declared inadmissible due to non-compliance.589 Additionally, 
this less stringent requirement takes account of the communication difficulties in many 
African countries.590  
 
Some communications dealing with the exhaustion of domestic remedies have impliedly 
addressed circumstances that may be used in interpreting what a reasonable time is. For 
example, in Mekongo v. Cameroon, the commission declared the complaint admissible 
even though the complainant had spent over twelve years pursuing a discretionary 
presidential remedy after the conclusion of domestic proceedings. This could be taken to 
mean that twelve years after the exhaustion of domestic remedies was reasonable time, 
especially because the complainant could not lodge a communication by reason of his 
pursuit of a discretionary remedy. Similarly in John Modise v. Botswana591, the 
commission admitted a communication that was submitted nearly fifteen years from the 
time judicial proceedings were concluded.   
 
7. The communication must not relate to cases which have been settled in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or the 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or the provisions of the African 
Charter. 
 
According to Article 56(7) of the Charter, a communication is inadmissible if it has 
already been ‘settled’ under the African Charter. In other words, the rule ne bis in idem 
applies.592 This rule prohibits ‘double jeopardy’ by protecting a state from being found in 
violation twice for one violating act or conduct. Its effect is similar to that of autrefois 
                                                 
589 Viljoen F ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 91. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Communication 97/93, John Modise v. Botswana, Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex X). 
592 Viljoen F ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’, note 12 above, p. 91. 
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acquit and autrefois convict principles of criminal law, which prohibit the re-trial of an 
accused person for an offence for which he or she had already been either acquitted or 
convicted.593  
 
While the African Charter allows for the simultaneous submission of communications to 
both the African Commission and a UN treaty body such as the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the complainant has to abide by the first decision or finding.594 This was 
enunciated in Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt595 where, before submitting the communication 
to the African Commission, the complainant approached the UN Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights with the same matter. The latter decided not to entertain it or to make any 
pronouncement on it and the African Commission found that the inaction by the UN Sub-
Commission ‘does not boil down to a decision on the merits of the case and does not in 
any way indicate that the matter’ has been ‘settled’, as required by Article 56(7).596 The 
communication was consequently declared admissible.  
 
In summary, it can be said that the African Charter’s provisions on admissibility are quite 
elaborate compared to those of other international human rights instruments. Its most 
positive features are the fact that authors of communications are not required to be 
victims and that there is no fixed period within which communications have to be 
submitted. Unfortunately, however, there is a requirement that communications should 
not be written in disparaging language. Generally, admissibility has played an important 
role in the findings of the commission. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
593 Ibid. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Communication 40/90, Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex II). 
596 Ibid. 
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3.3.1.2.2.3 Procedure after a communication has been declared 
admissible  
 
Once the communication passes the admissibility test under Article 56 of the Charter, it 
proceeds to the substantive consideration stage (merit stage). The admissibility decision 
is made known to the state party as soon as possible by the Secretary of the 
commission.597 At this stage, Rule 119(2) requires the state party concerned to ‘submit in 
writing within three months to the commission, its explanations or statements, elucidating 
the issues under consideration and indicating, if possible, measures taken to remedy the 
situation.’ The commission, however, has the discretion to extend the period if such 
extension serves the interests of justice. The author is also given the opportunity to 
comment on what the state submits.598 It is interesting to note that no time limit has been 
set within which the author’s comment should be received by the commission. This may 
be an oversight on the part of the drafters.   
 
The commission considers the communication in the light of information submitted to it 
by parties in writing.599 During this stage, hearing takes place; a brief presentation of the 
case is made by the complainant or an NGO and the respondent state is then given the 
opportunity to respond to the allegations. The complainant or NGO is then asked to reply 
to the state’s response. After a careful deliberation based on the facts and arguments put 
forward by the parties, the commission retires in private to make its decision on whether 
it finds a violation of the Charter or not. Where the commission finds a violation, it issues 
recommendations to the state party concerned.600 In effect, the commission’s decisions 
are recommendations.  
                                                 
597 Rule 119 (1). This Rule requires the secretary of the Commission to submit, as soon as possible, the 
decision of admissibility and text of relevant documents to the state party concerned. The Rule further 
mandates the secretary to inform the author of the decision about the admissibility of the communication. 
598 Rule 119 (3). 
599 Rule 120 (1). 
600 For a more detailed discussion on the Commission’s procedure in determining a communication, see 
Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, pp. 230-232. 
 344
There are occasions where the respondent state party completely ignores or refuses to 
respond to allegations made by a complainant, or to respond to the request for 
information by the commission. In such situations, the commission would rely on the 
facts as presented by the complainant and treat them as given.601 The commission is, 
however, cautious when applying this rule. It has therefore warned that, the fact that the 
complainant’s allegations were not contested, or were partially uncontested by the state 
does not mean the commission would blindly accept their veracity.602 Thus, the 
commission could invoke the power vested in it under Article 46 to get information from 
alternative sources and from third parties.603 Alternatively, the commission may set up a 
working group of three of its members to whom it would refer the communication and 
which would submit final recommendations to it.604 
 
3.3.1.2.2.4 The commission’s recommendations on communications 
 
There is no provision in the Charter that mandates the commission to make 
recommendations to states on every individual communications it considers. Rather, the 
term, ‘recommendation’, is mentioned in the context of special cases revealing the 
existence of serious or massive violation of human rights. Article 58 of the Charter 
stipulates that: 
 
1. When it appears after deliberations of the commission that one or more 
communications apparently relate to special cases which reveal the existence of a 
series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ rights, the commission 
shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these 
special cases. 
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the commission 
to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied 
by its findings and recommendations.  
                                                 
601 Ibid. See also Mekongo v. Cameroon,  pp. 26-27. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Ibid.  
604 Rules 120(1). 
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3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the commission shall be submitted by the latter 
to the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may 
request an in-depth study. 
 
From the foregoing provisions, it is obvious that the commission has no enforcement 
powers and its recommendations, unless the state agrees, are not capable of being 
executed in the national jurisdiction.605 Worst still, the powers of implementation of its 
reports and recommendations lie with the Assembly of Heads of States and Government. 
Accordingly, it functions at the mercy of states parties. It has, therefore, rightly been 
observed that Article 58 ‘would appear to suggest that not only does the commission have 
no jurisdiction in separate individual cases unless they are of an urgent nature, it also has 
no formal power to take the initiative itself.’606  
 
It is rather unfortunate that the Charter is silent on how the African Commission should 
deal with communications not revealing the existence of a series of serious or massive 
violations of human and peoples’ rights.607 As a result of this overt weakness in the 
Charter’s provisions, some governments have in the past declined to comply with the 
commission’s recommendations and decisions. For example, during the period of military 
dictatorship in Nigeria, the commission adopted decisions condemning both ouster 
clauses and special tribunals in the country.608 However, the government of Nigeria 
                                                 
605 Odinkalu C, ‘Proposals for review of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human & 
Peoples’ Rights’, (1992) 21/2 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 543. 
606 Murray R, ‘Decisions by the African Commission on individual communications under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 520 above, p. 46. 
607 In communications 27/89, 46/90, 99/93 (Joined), Organization Mondiale Contre la Torture and three 
others v. Rwanda, Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Annex X), the Commission joined four communications, which made reference to the expulsion 
from Rwanda of Burundi nationals who had been in Rwanda for many years for allegedly being a national 
risk due to their ‘subversive activities’, as well as the arbitrary arrest and extra-judicial executions of 
Rwandans, mostly being the Tutsi ethnic group. In this communication, the Commission held that the facts 
constituted serious or massive violations of the Charter, namely of Arts 4, 5, 6, 12(3) & 12(5). 
608 See, for example, ‘Account of Internal Legislation of Nigeria and the Dispositions of the Charter of 
African Human and Peoples’ Rights’, Second Extraordinary Session, Kampala, 18-19 December 1995 
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contended, among other things, that the commission, in deciding communications, acted 
outside its competence.609  
 
Similarly, in respect of an individual communication brought after the military coup in 
1995, Gambia raised the objection at the admissibility stage that ‘the commission is 
allowed under the Charter to take action only in cases that reveal a series of serious or 
massive violations of human rights.’610 While this position is true in relation to the 
Charter’s provisions, the commission’s Rules of Procedure and its practice refute these 
arguments comprehensively. The commission developed its own Rules of Procedure in 
such a way as to enable it to accept communications from individuals alleging human 
rights violations that are not necessarily serious or massive.611 Thus, in responding to the 
above stated allegations levelled by Nigeria, the commission justified its capacity to find 
a violation on the merits of a communication and to subsequently issue recommendations 
in the following terms: 
 
It is true that the communications procedure, as set out in Article 55 of the Charter, is 
quasi-judicial, in that communications are necessarily adversarial. Complainants are 
complaining against some act or neglect of a government and the commission must 
ultimately, if it is unable to effect a friendly settlement, decide for one side or the other. 
These actions of the commission are clearly required by the stipulations of Articles 55-59 
of the Charter….This charge to ensure protection clearly refers to the commission’s 
duties under Articles 55-59 to protect the rights in the Charter through the 
communications procedure. The commission therefore cannot take the government’s 
contention that in deciding communications it has acted outside its capacity.612 
                                                                                                                                                 
DOC. II/ES/ACHPR/4. See also tha analysis in Viljoen F & Louw L, ‘The status of the findings of the 
African Commission: From moral persuasion to legal obligation’, (2004) 48/1 Journal of African Law, p. 5. 
609 Ibid.  
610 See communication 147/95, 149/95, Jawara v. The Gambia, Thirteenth Annual activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V), para 41.  
611 Viljoen F & Louw L, ‘The status of the findings of the African Commission: From moral persuasion to 
legal obligation’, note 608 above, p. 5.  See also old Rule 114 replaced by 1995 Rules of Procedure. 
612 ‘Account of Internal Legislation of Nigeria and the Disposition of the Charter of African Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, note 608 above. 
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As for the argument by Gambia, the commission dismissed the proposition as 
‘erroneous’, relying on Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter and its own practice of 
considering communications ‘even if they do not reveal a series of serious or massive 
violations.’613 From the foregoing, it is now settled that the commission has innovatively 
interpreted its functions under the Charter and incorporated in its Rules of Procedure the 
mandate to consider communications and give recommendations, whether or not massive 
or serious violations of human and peoples’ rights have occurred.614  
 
The commission has in many instances included recommendations to its findings. 
Further, it has become more inclined over the years to make recommendations, which are 
more detailed than in the past.615 Unfortunately, states do not always put the 
recommendations into effect. This of course, is one of the main challenges to human 
rights enforcement in Africa and has been described as ‘one of the major factors of the 
erosion of the commission’s credibility.’616 This challenge shall be discussed more 
comprehensively in the next chapter.  
 
Another improvement initiated by the commission involved the revision of its Rules of 
Procedure in 1995617 to enable its decisions and recommendations to be published and 
not hidden in secrecy under the so-called ‘confidentiality’ clauses in the African Charter 
and the old Rules of Procedure. Prior to this, the decisions and recommendations were 
                                                 
613See communications 147/95, 149/96, Jawara v. The Gambia, para. 42.  
614 Viljoen F & Louw L, ‘The status of the findings of the African Commission: From moral persuasion to 
legal obligation’, note 608 above, p. 5. 
615 Ayinla A, ‘The African Union (AU) human rights agenda: the panacea to the problem of non-
compliance with human rights norms in Africa?’, (2003) LLM Thesis, Makerere University, p. 26. 
616 ‘Non-Compliance of state parties to Adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A legal 
approach’, 24th Ordinary Session, 22-31 October 1998, DOC/OS/50b, para. 2. See also Österdahl I, 
‘Implementing human rights in Africa: The African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights and 
individual communications’, (2002), Swedish Institute of International Law Studies in International Law, p. 
15.   
617 At its 18th ordinary session held in Praia, Cape Verde, 12-11 October 1995. 
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clouded in secrecy.618 The quality of the commission’s decisions or ‘jurisprudence’ 
improved as a result of the revision of the Rules of Procedure as the commissioners 
became aware that their work is subject to public scrutiny.619 
 
Individual communications remained confidential until the release of the Seventh Annual 
Activity Report (1994). In this Activity Report, the commission for the first time included 
an Annex with information on the individual communications submitted to it under 
Article 55 of the Charter. Although the information was not comprehensive, the Annex 
watered down the secrecy under which the entire communication procedure had been 
hidden.620 The Annex included individual information on communications that had been 
decided by the commission, as well as on those that had been resolved amicably.  
 
3.3.1.2.2.5 Provisional (interim) measures and remedies  
 
This part analyses provisional (interim) measures and remedies under the individuals’ 
complaints procedure. The two concepts are examined under the same subtitle because 
they both provide some form of relief to victims of human rights violations, albeit at 
different stages of the proceedings. Interim or provisional measures are normally issued 
to avoid irreparable damage to victims, or sometimes, complainants, while a 
communication or petition is still under consideration by a supervisory organ of a human 
                                                 
618 Article 59 of the Charter stipulates as follows: ‘1. All measures taken within the provisions of the 
present Chapter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government shall otherwise decide. … 2. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published 
by its Chairman after it has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government’.  
619 The reports on the decisions of the commission appear in, amongst others, Review of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (established by the Commission in 1991); Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa, Compilation of decisions on Communications of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Extracts from the Commission’s Activity Reports 1994-1999 
(2000) and the International Human Rights Reports (since 1996). See Gutto S, ‘The reform and renewal of 
the African regional human and peoples’ rights system’, note 1 above, p. 180. 
620 Ibid. 
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rights mechanism.621 On the other hand, remedies are awarded to redress a violation of 
human rights after a communication is fully determined. Notably, however, whereas 
interim measures provide temporary relief to the victims, remedies are of a more 
permanent nature. We shall revert to this point at a later stage of this discussion.  
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that the African Charter does not specifically provide 
for interim measures. Consequently, the commission decided to make provision for these 
measures under its Rules of Procedure. Thus, according to Rule 111: 
 
1. Before making its final views known to the Assembly on the communication, the 
commission may inform the state party concerned of its views on the 
appropriateness of taking provisional measures to avoid irreparable damage 
being caused to the victim of the alleged violation. In so doing, the commission 
shall inform the state party that the expression on its views on the adoption of 
those provisional measures does not imply a decision on the substance of the 
communication. 
2. The commission, or when not in session, the chairman, in consultation with other 
members of the commission, may indicate to the parties any interim measure, the 
adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper 
conduct of the proceedings before it. 
3. In case of urgency [sic] when the commission is not in session, the chairman, in 
consultation with other members of the commission, may take any necessary 
action on behalf of the commission. As soon as the commission is again in 
session, the chairman shall report to it any action taken.  
 
Rule 111 does not specifically state at what stage of the proceedings provisional 
measures may be granted.  This leaves one to wonder whether these measures should be 
granted only to cases that have passed the admissibility test, or even to those that are yet 
to be admitted.622 While the commission is yet to give its position on this issue, it may be 
argued that the circumstances of the case, irrespective of admissibility, would determine 
                                                 
621 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 232. 
622 Ibid. 
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whether or not there should be a request for provisional measures. This may be deduced 
from the practice of the Inter-American Commission, where it was maintained that, in a 
request for provisional measures, the urgent risk of irreparable damage to persons, 
absolves it from the necessary requirements of the American Convention.623 Hence, ‘such 
precautionary measures may be requested even when the admissibility of a case has not 
yet been defined by the commission pursuant to Article 46 of the Convention, since, by 
their very nature, provisional measures arise from a reasonable presumption of extreme 
and urgent risk of irreparable damage to persons.’624  
 
The African Commission has applied Rule 111 to request for provisional measures in 
some cases. For example, in Constitutional Rights Project (Zamani Lekwot and 6 others) 
v. Nigeria625, a Nigerian NGO submitted a complaint on behalf of Zamani Lekwot, a 
former Army General and six others who were sentenced to death by a military tribunal 
and awaiting execution. The commission requested the Nigerian government not to 
execute the victims until it considered the substance of the case. With this request for 
provisional measures the NGO instituted an action in Lagos High Court to stay the 
execution.626  
 
The government responded by filing a preliminary objection on the grounds that the court 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the same having been ousted by decree. The 
court, however, held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case and issued an injunction 
against carrying out the execution pending the determination of the complaint before the 
African Commission.627 The death sentence was later commuted to five years 
                                                 
623 Pasqualucci M, ‘Provisional measures in the Inter-American human rights system: Innovative 
development in international law’, (1993) 26 Vanderbuilt  Journal of  Transnational Law, p. 803. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Communication 87/93, Constitutional Rights Project (Zamani Lekwot and 6 others) v. Nigeria, 102. 
626 Registered Trustees of the Constitutional Rights Project v. The President of Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and Two others (Unreported judgement of the High Court of Lagos State, Suit no. m/102/93) cited in 
Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 236. 
627 Ibid. 
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imprisonment. This indeed is a landmark achievement on the part of the African 
Commission that needs to be applauded.  
 
On the issue of remedies, it should be recalled that an aggrieved state or individual, 
whose rights have been violated, has recourse for redress. This may take the form of an 
apology, reparations, or damages for alleged wrong doing, condemnation of the acts of 
the violators, injunction in the case of a continuing violation, or the removal of the 
sources of violation, for example, the repeal of legislation or the enactment of a new 
one.628 Unfortunately, neither the African Charter nor the Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission explicitly provides for remedies to be ordered when a state party is 
found to be in violation of the Charter. The fact that the commission has no power to 
grant remedies has correctly been viewed as an ‘important reason for the inability of the 
commission to attain its principal objective of protecting human rights in Africa.’629  
 
Even in the absence of any specific mandate, the commission has, nevertheless, gone 
ahead to suggest a wide range of remedies to state parties upon finding them in violation 
of the Charter.630 At one time it was accused of assaulting the sovereignty of Nigeria for 
ordering ‘the annulment of decrees found to be in violation of the Charter’.631 Nigeria 
                                                 
628 Ibid, p. 236. 
629 Enonchong N, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Effective remedies in domestic 
law?’, (2002) 46 Journal of African Law, p. 197. 
630 See, for example, communication 59/91 Embga Mekongo Louis v. Cameroon and joint communications 
54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97-196/97 and 210/98 Malawi African Association v. Mauritania, Amnesty 
International v. Mauritania, Ms Sarr Diop v. Mauritania.), requesting a state to annul legislation that 
violates the African Charter (communication 101/93 Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria), ordering the 
release of prisoners (communication 60/91, Constitutional Rights Projects v. Nigeria and  communication 
87/93 The Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamanni Lakwot and 6 others) v. Nigeria and 
requesting the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into human rights atrocities (joint 
communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97-196/97 and 210/98 Malawi African Association v. 
Mauritania, Amnesty International v. Mauritania, Ms Sarr Diop v. Mauritania. 
631 See ‘Account of internal legislation of Nigeria and the disposition of the Charter of African Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, Second Extraordinary Session, Kampala, 18-19 December, 1995, DOC.II/ES?ACHPR/4. 
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questioned the competence of the commission to issue remedies. Thus, the commission 
justified its competence by stating that:  
 
…Nigeria is bound by the African Charter. The commission is likewise bound by the 
Charter, to consider communications fully, carefully, and in good faith. When the 
commission concludes that a communication describes a real violation of the Charter’s 
provisions, its duty is to make that clear and indicate what action the government must 
take to remedy the situation. Naturally, the commission could not make such judgements 
with regard to states outside its jurisdiction. But in ratifying the Charter without 
reservation, Nigeria voluntarily submitted itself to the commission’s authority in this 
regard.632  
 
Regardless of the basis on which the commission grounds its authority to issue remedies, 
the fact still remains that the issuing of remedies is now an established practice within the 
African human rights system. In its practice, however, the commission, unlike other 
human rights supervisory and enforcement organs, has been very reluctant to award 
damages or reparations even in cases where it finds violations of the Charter.633 For 
example, in Louise Engba Mekongo v. Cameroon, it found that the complainant was 
entitled to reparations for the prejudice he had suffered, but left the valuation of the 
amount of such reparation to be determined in accordance with the legal system of 
Cameroon. It is inconceivable how the commission expected the complainant to be 
awarded adequate compensation by the same judicial system that had denied him justice 
for twelve years.634  
 
States’ compliance with recommendations for remedies is also another area of great 
concern. Although the commission recommends some forms of remedies, their 
enforcement is lacking. The Charter is silent on follow-up to communications, thus, 
confining the enforcement of the commission’s recommendations to the goodwill of the 
states. Noteworthy, the commission has embarked on the practice of requiring states to 
                                                 
632 Ibid. 
633 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 112 above, p. 236. 
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‘report back to the commission when it submits its next country report in terms of Article 
62 on measures taken to comply with’ the remedies stated in the recommendations.635 It 
may be argued that this is not an effective follow-up mechanism because not all state 
parties to the Charter faithfully submit their country reports.636  
 
The commission had set a good follow-up precedent in Constitutional Rights Project v. 
Nigeria637, where it found a violation of the Charter and recommended that the 
government of Nigeria should free the complainants. At its 17th Session, the commission 
decided to bring the file to Nigeria for a planned mission for purposes of making sure that 
the violation of rights had been redressed.638 The lack of effective remedies and follow-
up procedures in the African human rights system over the years has definitely impacted 
on the effectiveness of the entire system as far as protection against violations of rights is 
concerned. It is in this regard that the creation of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is seen as a welcome idea. At least with the court in place, litigants are 
assured of binding and enforceable decisions against the respondent states. The 
parameters of the court are discussed in detail below.  
 
3.3.2 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Less than ten years after the African Charter and commission came into existence, there 
was mounting pressure to consider appropriate ways of improving the African human 
                                                 
635 Communication 211/98, Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia, concluding para. See also 
communication 241/2001, Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, concluding para. 
636 See Wachira G, ‘A critical examination of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards 
strengthening the African human rights system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African 
population’, note 31 above, p. 23. 
637 Communication 87/93, Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria. 
638 Wachira G, ‘A critical examination of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards 
strengthening the African human rights system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African 
population’, note 31 above, p. 29.  
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rights system.639 Various possibilities were mooted, particularly, on how the efficiency of 
the commission could be enhanced. It was suggested that the commission could be 
strengthened, complemented, or replaced by a court.640 The option of strengthening the 
commission was rather a theoretical one because, among other shortcomings, it is not 
independent of its political parent, the AU.641 The option of replacing the commission 
with a court was also not to be very noble because a court is not well-suited to promote 
human rights by conducting studies or organising conferences. Thus, the 
‘complementarity’ option, comprising of a dual system was most preferable.642 
 
The upsurge of the clamour for the creation of an African human rights court cannot 
solely be attributed, however, to the ineffectiveness of the African Commission. Rather, it 
also has to be viewed against the setting of changing world affairs. Between the late 
1980s and 1990s, for example, ‘African states, having outlived their purpose as proxies 
during the Cold War era, came under fresh scrutiny, with the protection of human rights 
increasingly being mandated as a pre-condition for the granting of Western development 
aid.’643 There was therefore the need to look for ways of putting strait the already crooked 
human rights record that was haunting the continent. One of those ways was the creation 
of a regional human rights court.  
 
Noteworthy, however, some African states not only resented the idea of a court that 
would challenge their judicial sovereignty but also sought the excuse that African culture 
gave reconciliation primacy over judicial settlement of disputes.644 That notwithstanding, 
                                                 
639 Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African 
States’ (2007) 51/1 Journal of African Law, p. 152. 
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rights protection mechanism for Africa?’, (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 118. 
642 Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the interests of African 
states’, note 639 above, p. 153. 
643 Ibid.  
644 Dieng A, ‘Introduction to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2005) 15 INTERIGHTS 
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it was inevitable that a court would eventually be created. Thus, the idea of a regional 
human rights court was caught between two schools of thought; one in favour of a 
wholesale transfer of the commission’s jurisdictions to the new court, the other defending 
the dual role of the commission by conferring a decision-making power on it.645 
Eventually, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the court’ or ‘the African 
court’) emerged as a compromise, complementing and reinforcing the functions of the 
commission. The adoption of its Protocol on 9 June 1998 and its entry into force on 25 
January 2004 were a major step in reinforcing the African human rights system.646  
 
The process of establishing the court has, however, been very slow and somewhat 
encumbered with some challenges. These challenges shall be discussed in the next 
chapter but at least two of them need to be mentioned here. First, it took until 25 January 
2004 (that is, longer than five years) to ensure the fifteen ratifications required for the 
entry into force of the Protocol.647 This is not very encouraging, given the fact that its 
creation was mooted for more than thirty years.648 Secondly, while preparations were 
underway to make the court operational, the African Union (AU) decided to merge it 
with the AU Court of Justice649, and suspend the process until the modalities of the 
merger had been considered.  
 
                                                 
645 Ibid. 
646 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/ PROT (III), available at 
http://www.achpr.org, last accessed 28 November 2007; reprinted in inter alia Murray R & Evans M (eds.) 
Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2001). The Protocol was signed in 
June 1998 and, 30 days after the requisite 15th ratification (Art 34 (3) of the Protocol) by the Union of the 
Comoros on 26 December 2003, it entered into force on 25 January 2004. 
647 Viljoen F (ed), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006), p. iii. 
648 The quest for a regional human rights Court began in the 1961 Lagos Conference that was organised by 
the International Commission of Jurists.  
649 Decision on the Seats of the Organs of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III). 
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Obviously, there are several legal and practical implications of such a merger. With the 
upserge of atrocities and other violations taking place across the continent, it is rather 
disturbing that the court has taken too long to come into being. It is therefore 
commendable that the AU has decided to continue with the ‘operationalisation’ of the 
court despite the fact that the complexities of the merger are still being considered.650 
Thus in July 2006, the first eleven Judges of the African Court were sworn in.651 This part 
of the study shall therefore critically examine the court as a regional mechanism for 
human rights enforcement in Africa. Due to the fact that it has not yet begun its 
proceedings, nor has it formulated its Rules of Procedure, discussion shall be confined to 
the provisions of the Protocol establishing it.  
3.3.2.1 Establishment and composition of the Court 
 
The African Court is established to operate within the AU framework, in accordance with 
Article 1 of its Protocol.652 Accordingly, this stresses the point that the attainment of the 
objectives of the African Charter requires the establishment of a court to complement and 
reinforce the functions of the African Commission.653 As already stated, the court was 
established when the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, came into force in 
January 2004.  
 
The Protocol consists of thirty-five Articles, addressing various issues pertaining to the 
court’s composition and operation. It provides for the appointment of eleven judges, 
nationals of member states of the AU, elected in an individual capacity from among 
                                                 
650 Decision on the Merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of 
the African Union, Doc. EX.CL/162(VI). 
651 See Viljoen F (ed.), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,note 
647 above, p. iii.  
652 Article 1 of the Protocol reads: ‘There shall be established within the Organization of African Unity an 
African Court Human and Peoples’ Rights hereinafter referred to as “the court”, the organisation, 
jurisdiction and functioning of which shall be governed by the present Protocol.’ 
653 See the last Preambular paragraph of the Protocol. 
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jurists of high moral character and of recognised practical, judicial or academic 
competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’ rights.654 Caution should 
be taken to ensure that political considerations that previously characterised the 
appointment of members of the African Commission are not allowed to jeopardise the 
composition of the court.  
 
The AU correctly noted that the ‘moral authority, credibility, and reputation of the … 
court … will, to a large extent, depend on the composition of its first bench.’655 This is 
indeed true because all eyes are on the first bench, which is expected to begin the 
transition from the tradition of the commission. The commission has set the tradition of 
incompetence, lack of motivation and laxity in the way it conducts its activities. 
Additionally, Amnesty International rightly observed that the ‘effectiveness and 
efficiency of the court will, to a large extent, depend on the personal and professional 
capacities of the judges, their skills and experience as well as their commitment and 
integrity.’656 It therefore proposed a checklist to ensure the nomination of the highest 
qualified candidates for judges as required under Article 11 of the Protocol.657 Article 14 
of the Protocol stipulates that: 
 
1. The judges of the court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly from the list 
referred to in Article 13(2) of the present Protocol. 
2. The Assembly shall ensure that in the court as a whole there is representation of the main 
regions of Africa and of their principal legal traditions. 
3. In the election of the judges, the Assembly shall ensure that there is adequate gender 
representation. 
 
From the above provisions, it is evident that the Protocol addresses the issue of 
nomination of judges in a comprehensive manner to avert the possibility of regional and 
                                                 
654 Art 11(1). 
655 Note Verbale, 5 April 2004, BC/OLC/66.5/8/Vol V at para. 3. 
656 Amnesty International, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Checklist to ensure the 
nomination of the highest qualified candidates for Judges, AI Index: IOR 63/001/2004. 
657 Ibid, p. 5. 
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gender imbalance. In tandem with Article 14, the AU has recommended that ‘States 
parties should ensure that at least one (1) of the candidates they nominate is a female and 
that they give preference to candidates with experience in more than one of the principal 
legal traditions of Africa (civil law, common law, Islamic law, custom and African 
customary law).’658 This would allow the court to greatly harmonise the different 
interpretations of the Charter provisions based on religious or traditional convictions that 
might have contributed to its violation in some states.  
 
Regarding the geographical composition of the bench, the AU proposed a ‘geographical 
representation formula’ as follows: West Africa—three, Central Africa—two, East 
Africa—two, Southern Africa—two and North Africa—two.659 However, this proposal 
was not strictly adhered to in the appointment of the first bench, given that three judges 
were appointed from North Africa while only one was appointed from East Africa.660 
Generally, however, the distribution is fair since all the geographical regions of the 
continent are represented. While geographic distribution of judges is desirable, this 
criterion should not be overemphasised at the expense of the competence and quality of 
the individual judges.661  
 
The judges are elected for a period of six years and may be re-elected only once.662 For 
purposes of continuity, the terms of four judges elected on the first bench expire at the 
end of two years, and the terms of four other judges shall expire at the end of four 
years.663 Article 15(4) provides that ‘all judges except the President shall perform their 
functions on a part-time basis. However, the Assembly may change this arrangement as it 
                                                 
658 Note Verbale, note 655 above, para. 2.  
659 Ibid. 
660 See Viljoen F (ed.), The African human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 
647 above, iii. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Article 15 (1).  
663 Ibid. Article 15(3) provides that: ‘A judge elected to replace a judge whose term of office has not 
expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor’s term.’ 
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deems appropriate.’ This may partly be attributed to the financial constraints facing the 
AU and the African human rights system. Viewed critically, this is a significant 
deficiency in comparison with, for example, the European system, whose judges serve on 
a full-time basis.664  
 
As the African Court is an attempt to remedy the weaknesses in the protection of human 
rights in Africa, it would be better for its judges to serve on full-time basis. The 
Assembly should therefore exercise its discretion under Article 15(4) of the protocol to 
‘change this arrangement’ and appropriately provide for a full-time bench.665 This 
discretion may be invoked as soon as the court is fully operational with a reasonable 
workload of cases. 
 
Independence of the judges of the court is also guaranteed under the Protocol. Article 17 
provides that independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with 
international law.666 It also restrains a judge from hearing cases in which he or she may 
have previously taken part as agent, counsel, advocates for one of the parties, or as a 
member of a national or international court, or a commission of inquiry, or in any other 
capacity.667  
 
The Protocol expressly excludes the participation of judges in cases involving nationals 
from their country.668 This is quite contrary to the practice under the Inter-American 
system which permits judges who are nationals of member states to preside over cases 
involving their own states.669 The position taken by the African system is indeed noble 
because it gives room to transparency and accountability. A judge who presides over a 
                                                 
664 Under the Inter-American human rights system, judges also serve on part-time basis. See Amnesty 
International, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Checklist to ensure the nomination of the 
highest qualified candidates for Judges, note 656 above.   
665 Baderin M, ‘Recent developments in the African human rights system’, note 156 above, p. 143. 
666 Art 17(1).  
667 Art 17(2). 
668 Art 22. 
669 See Art 55 and 41 of the American Convention. 
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case involving a national from his or her country may be accused of being biased in the 
event he or she makes a decision that is not popular among his or her colleagues.670 
Further, this position minimises the likelihood of states nominating judges, not on merit, 
but on ulterior motives aimed at securing their personal interests.  
 
In the course of their duties, judges of the court ‘shall enjoy, from the moment of their 
election and throughout their term of office, the immunities extended to diplomatic 
agents in accordance with international law’.671 Thus, a judge cannot be held liable for 
any decision or opinion issued in the exercise of his or her functions.672 Whereas judges 
enjoy immunity, they are also prohibited from engaging in any activity that might 
interfere with their independence or impartiality.673 This provision of the Protocol 
accords with the recommendation by the United Nations that: ‘State parties to human 
rights treaties should refrain from nominating or electing to treaty bodies persons 
performing political functions or occupying positions which were not readily reconcilable 
with obligations of independent experts under the given treaty.’674  
 
Additionally, judges enjoy security of tenure so that they may dispense their duties 
without any influence, fear or favour instigated by, for example, the state that nominated 
them. Pursuant to Article 19 of the Protocol, a judge cannot be suspended or removed 
from office unless by the unanimous decision of the other judges of the court. Such a 
decision can only be made on grounds that the judge concerned has been ‘found to be no 
longer fulfilling the required conditions to be a judge of the court.’675 This provision is 
not so clear and it leaves more questions than answers. One may wonder whether the 
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‘requirements’ to be fulfilled relate to competence or integrity. Perhaps, the Rules of 
Procedure of the court should elaborate these requirements to avoid confusion.676  
 
Meanwhile, the AU Assembly is empowered by the Protocol to set-aside the decision to 
suspend or remove a judge.677 However, the Protocol does not state the grounds upon 
which the Assembly could decide to reverse such a decision. It is therefore hoped that 
this provision will be implemented with caution, when the need arises, so as to avert the 
subordination of the court to the whims of the Assembly. It should also be made clear, 
perhaps in the court’s Rules of Procedure, whether, how and on what grounds a 
suspended or removed judge can seek the intervention of the Assembly, in order to avoid 
unnecessary interference with the court by the Assembly. 
 
The AHSG is mandated to determine the seat of the court678, within the territory of one of 
the state parties to the Protocol.679 Although the Protocol does not specify the location of 
the court, it has been proposed that it will be situated in Arusha, Tanzania.680 In light of 
the complementary roles envisaged for the court and commission, it would have been 
expedient for the two institutions to be located in the same country. Currently, the 
Secretariat of the commission is in Banjul, The Gambia, although it also holds sessions in 
other member states.  
 
The location of the court in relation to that of the commission is one issue that requires 
very serious consideration if regional enforcement of human rights is to be meaningful.681 
Arusha being more centrally located, it would be proper for the AHSG to consider the 
possibility of moving the commission’s Secretariat to this venue for the two institutions 
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to work closely. Article 25 allows the court to convene its sessions in the territory of any 
member state of the AU and for its seat to be changed by the Assembly after due 
consultation with the court. This is important because the operations and proceedings of 
the court will be impeded in the event its seat is engulfed in war or other related 
calamities.682  
 
Finally, the issue of funding of the court has also been addressed in the Protocol. 
According to Article 32, the ‘expenses of the court, emoluments and allowances for 
judges and the budget of its registry shall be determined and borne by the AU, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by the AU, in consultation with the court’. This is 
an improvement on Article 44 of the African Charter, which merely states ‘provision 
shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the commission in 
the regular budget of the Organisation of African Unity.’  
 
3.3.2.2 Access and Jurisdiction of the court 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Access to the court 
 
Access to the African Court is governed by Article 5 of the Protocol. Thus: 
 
1. The following are entitled to submit cases to the court: 
a) The commission 
b) The state party which had lodged a complaint to the commission 
c) The state party against which the complaint has been lodged at the commission 
d) The state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation 
e) African Intergovernmental Organisations 
2. When a state party has an interest in a case, it may submit a request to the court to be 
permitted to join. 
3. The court may entitle relevant Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with 
observer status before the commission, and individuals to institute cases directly 
before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of this Protocol. 
                                                 
682 Ibid. 
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Article 34(6), on the other hand, allows states parties to make a declaration accepting the 
competence of the court to receive cases under Article 5(3). It reads: 
 
At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the state shall make 
a declaration accepting the competence of the court to receive cases under Article 5(3) of 
this Protocol. The court shall not receive any petition under Article 5(3) involving a state 
party which has not made such a declaration. 
 
From the above provisions it is clear that the Protocol grants two kinds of access to the 
court: direct (automatic) and indirect (optional). Direct or automatic access is granted to 
the potential litigants listed under Article 5(1)(a)-(e), while indirect or optional access is 
permitted subject to a state’s declaration to that effect. In line with this classification, it 
may be argued that individuals may also access the court, either directly or indirectly.  
 
A distinction could be drawn between these two approaches in the sense that individuals 
may access the court directly only where a state has made the declaration contemplated 
under Article 34(6), while indirectly, through the commission, if the latter chooses to 
present individual communications before the court. Since the commission (which is 
mandated to consider communications from individuals) has direct access to the court, it 
could choose to defer jurisdiction to the court on some of the individual communications.     
 
It should be pointed out that the main reason for the inclusion of Article 34(6) is thought 
to have been a strategy to encourage states to ratify the Protocol.683 This is because the 
Draft Protocol had provided for direct access by individuals and NGOs to the court in 
‘urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive violation of human rights’, but this was 
omitted in the final Protocol.684 The inclusion of a provision requiring a declaration by 
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states to allow access by individuals is not unique to the African Court. Other human 
rights instruments have similar provisions. These include: the First Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights685; the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women686; the 
Convention against Torture and Other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment687; and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.688  
 
Indirect (optional) access is also adopted by the Inter-American system. Under this 
system, individuals lodge their cases with the Inter-American Commission, which then 
determines which cases would proceed to the court.689 Individuals or NGOs interested in 
taking part in the proceedings are allowed to act as advisors to the Inter-American 
commission. Victims and their representatives also play a crucial role in making 
arguments on reparations and legal costs.690 Thus, in both the Inter-American and African 
systems, no special declaration is required to access the commissions. As Padilla 
observed, the commissions could be seen as ‘sieves’ to weed out frivolous and 
unnecessary communications that might find their way to the courts if direct access were 
allowed.691 
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The European system, during the co-existence of the European Commission and Court, 
also made provision for a declaration by states to allow individuals and NGOs to access 
the court.692 Prior to the coming into force of Protocol 11, Articles 25(1) and 46(1) of the 
European Convention required the High Contracting Parties to make separate 
declarations to allow the European Commission and Court, respectively, to entertain 
communications from individuals and NGOs.693 Under the new arrangement, however, 
the European Human Rights Court may receive applications from any person, NGO or 
group of individuals claiming to be victims of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties.694  
 
The rationale for limiting individual and NGOs access to the African Court, however, 
needs to be queried. First, one may argue that Article 5 as read together with Article 
34(6) grants the state undue protection from proceedings from individuals and NGOs on 
matters relating to human rights violations.695 It is needless to re-emphasise that human 
rights violations are mostly perpetrated by states against individuals. Thus individuals, or 
human rights NGOs, are more likely to be the complainants. As a matter of facts, states 
rarely initiate cases against each another for human rights violations.696  
 
A good example can be deduced from the records of the African Commission. Since its 
inception, it has rarely received Inter-State communications in accordance with Articles 
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47-49 of the Charter.697 This is despite grave human rights violations that have occurred 
in some African states, such as the Rwandan genocide, crisis in the DRC and the ongoing 
Darfur crisis in Sudan, just to mention a few examples. Rather, most of the 
communications before the African Commission have been initiated either by individual 
victims or NGOs. 
 
Secondly, it is doubtful that many states will be considerate enough to make the 
declaration contemplated under Article 34(6) of the Protocol.698 States are generally 
reluctant to expose themselves to international scrutiny. Again, there has been an ongoing 
notion that the African human rights system prefers an amicable rather than adversarial 
dispute resolution mechanism. In view of the foregoing, the motive behind the agitation 
for a regional human rights court would have been better fulfilled if individuals and 
NGOs had been allowed automatic or direct access to the court.699  
 
It is true that granting limited access would make the court appear as a ‘forum that 
evolves human rights jurisprudence aimed at enhancing the realisation of rights by states’ 
and not as a ‘court of first instance or an appeal court for all cases.’700 However, as it 
stands, the court could end up serving as an appeal forum for states against unfavourable 
decisions from the commission rather than a forum for individuals to obtain legally 
binding judicial decisions and remedies for the violation of their human rights by their 
states.  
 
The latter is a more dangerous position because the court would have failed to serve one 
of the key purposes that led to its establishment, namely, redressing human rights 
violations perpetrated mainly by the state. Thus, the failure of a state to make the 
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declaration under Article 34(6) would frustrate the raison d’être of the Protocol.701 One 
would also argue that nearly all the rights entrenched in the African Charter are 
enforceable against the state and not individuals. What makes the state to be the 
complainant, as the Protocol seems to suggest, is therefore a legal paradox.  
 
Thirdly, access by NGOs is further restricted to ‘relevant NGOs with observer status 
before the commission.’ While it is possible to determine which NGOs have observer 
status before the commission, the term ‘relevant’ is not so clear. What constitutes a 
‘relevant NGO’ is not known.702 The wording of this provision therefore generates more 
questions than answers. Determination of a ‘relevant NGO’ is a mystery which only the 
commission could probably demystify. It may also be contended that the statement ‘the 
court may entitle…’ (emphasis added) in Article 5(3) gives the court the discretion to 
either allow or deny access to a ‘relevant NGO with observer status’. This imposes a 
further, and unnecessary, restriction to access to the court by NGOs.703 Generally, this 
provision is very restrictive when compared to what exists in the Inter-American system, 
where any NGO legally recognised in one or more member states of the OAS may lodge 
petitions with the Inter-American Commission.704 It is hoped that the African system will 
follow this precedent, especially when drafting its Rules of Procedures. 
 
Fourthly, it is not clear whether Article 34(6) places an obligation on states to make the 
declaration contemplated therein.705 The Article seems to suggest that states must, at one 
point or the other, make such a declaration because it uses the word ‘shall’. Accordingly, 
this provision fails to impose a time limit within which the declaration is to be made.706 
Article 14(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
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Discrimination and Article 21 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, which have similar provisions, use the term ‘may’. 
Hence, this provision should be read in the strict sense to require states to make a 
declaration to that effect.707 It is suggested that the Rules of Procedure of the court should 
address these issues in a very comprehensive manner in order for the court to operate 
efficiently. Preferrably, the Rules should state the time limit within which a state should 
make the declaration contemplated in Article 34(6) of the Protocol. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Jurisdiction of the court 
 
In legal parlance, the term ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court, tribunal or other 
judicial body to entertain a matter brought before it. Any judicial mechanism or organ 
possesses jurisdiction over matters only to the extent granted to it by the enabling legal 
provisions. Thus, the African Court has power to entertain cases to the extent the Protocol 
permits it. The jurisdictional provisions of the Protocol are very important as they 
determine who will have access to the court, under what conditions, and what types of 
violations it can entertain.  
 
In the broader sense, therefore, the Protocol grants the court the following heads of 
jurisdiction: personal jurisdiction (ratione personae); subject matter jurisdiction (ratione 
materiae); temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis); contentious jurisdiction; advisory 
jurisdiction and; conciliatory jurisdiction. In the narrower sense, the jurisdiction of the 
court could be categorised into three, namely, contentious (adjudicatory), advisory708 and 
conciliatory.709 Personal jurisdiction of the court, which relates to the issue of who may 
access the court, has been discussed at length above. What follows therefore is a 
discussion of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in the light of its advisory, 
contentious (adjudicatory) and conciliatory powers.   
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3.3.2.2.2.1 Contentious (adjudicatory) Jurisdiction 
 
The court’s contentious or adjudicatory powers are conferred to it by Article 3(1) of the 
Charter. In terms of this Article, the jurisdiction of the court extends to ‘all cases and 
disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this 
Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.’ 
When read together with Article 7, the material scope of the contentious jurisdiction 
seems to be remarkably broad. Article 7 provides that ‘the court shall apply the 
provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the 
states concerned.’  
 
These provisions, it has been argued, give the court a wider adjudicatory jurisdiction than 
the other regional human rights systems.710 Accordingly, it has been observed that, 
whereas the European711 and Inter-American712 human rights courts’ jurisdiction is 
limited to the conventions under which they were established, the African Court can 
consider cases brought before it under any human rights treaty ratified by the states 
concerned.713 Naldi and Magliveras, for example, describe Article 3(1) as ‘innovative’, 
and said that the Article: 
 
would appear to extend the jurisdiction of the court over any treaty which impinged on 
human rights in Africa, e.g., the OAU Convention on Refugees, and the African Charter 
                                                 
710 Naldi G & Magliveras K, ‘Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the 
establishment of a regional court of human and peoples’ rights’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, p. 435. 
711 European Convention, Arts 32–34.  
712 American Convention, Arts 62(1). 
713 See generally the arguments in Quasigah E, ‘The African Court of Human Rights: Prospects, in 
Comparison with the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in 
African Society of International and Comparative Law, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference, held 
in Addis Ababa 3–5 August 1998 (1998), pp. 61–62. 
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on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, but also UN instruments such as the International 
Covenants on Human Rights . . .714 
 
Hence, while some scholars have insisted that Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol should 
be interpreted widely to allow the court to adjudicate on human rights instruments other 
than the African Charter715, others have advocated for a narrower interpretation because, 
according to them, they afford the court excessively broad jurisdiction.716 Some of those 
advocating for a narrower interpretation argue that if the court exercises its jurisdiction 
under these provisions, stricto sensu, ‘jurisprudential chaos’ might occur.717 This, 
according to the argument, might occur in two ways.  
 
First, the application of treaties other than the Charter would ‘creep into’ the jurisdiction 
of other human rights organs and could possibly lead to inconsistent interpretations and 
applications of those treaties.718 Secondly, it is contended that, because this broad 
jurisdiction exceeds the competence of the African Commission as provided in the 
African Charter, it would permit the African Court to intrude into ‘a faculty the African 
Commission itself does not possess.’719 This position is predicated on the fact that Article 
                                                 
714 Naldi G & Magliveras K, ‘Reinforcing the African system of human rights: The Protocol on the 
Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 710 above, p. 435. 
715 See, for example, Mutua M, ‘The proposed African court on human and peoples’ rights: Evaluation and 
comparison’, note 84 above, p. 435; Mutua M, ‘The African human rights court: A two-legged stool?’, note 
84 above, p. 354; Udombana N, ‘Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than 
never’, (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, p. 90 and Eno W, ‘The Jurisdiction of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 227–
228. 
716 See, for example, Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 28 
above, pp. 166–168; Osterdahl I, ‘The Jurisdiction Rationae Materiae of the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A comparative critique’, (1998) 7 Revue Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, p. 138. 
717 See, for example, Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 28 
above, p. 167. 
718 Ibid. 
719 Padilla D, ‘An African human rights court: Reflections from the perspective of the Inter-American 
system’, note 690 avoe, p. 193. 
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7 of the Protocol goes beyond Article 60 of the African Charter, which urges the African 
Commission simply to: 
 
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from 
the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by 
African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the provisions 
of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of 
which the parties to the present Charter are members. 
 
Clearly, while the African Commission is allowed to draw inspiration from the sources 
listed under Article 60, it is nonetheless confined to the interpretation of the African 
Charter. There is therefore the fear that the apparent jurisdictional asymmetry between 
the court and the commission could give rise to problems in future.720 Heyns foresees the 
possibility of states being deterred not only from ratification of the Protocol, but also 
from ratification of other human rights treaties.721 In his view, the phrase ‘any other 
relevant human rights instruments’ under Article 3(1) should be taken to mean only those 
treaties that explicitly confer adjudicatory jurisdiction on the court.722 
 
Some of the arguments for a narrow interpretation of Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol 
are both exaggerated and unfounded. As Udombana argues, although it is true that the 
wording of Article 3(1) could deter some states from ratifying other treaties in future, it is 
rather simplistic to deny the court substantial jurisdiction purely on the basis of this 
argument.723 As a matter of fact, the ratification of treaties is a voluntary commitment by 
a state to be bound by the provisions thereof. Thus, if the jurisdiction conferred to the 
                                                 
720 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 28 above, p. 167. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Ibid. See also Van der Mei A, ‘The new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an 
effective human rights protection mechanism for Africa’, note 641 above, p. 119. 
723 Udombana N, ‘Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never’, note 
715 above, p. 90. 
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court by Articles 3(1) and 7 would scare any state from ratifying a particular treaty, the 
state’s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights should be queried.724 
After all, the court could apply its discretion and wisdom to determine the cases it would 
adjudicate on. The argument on ‘jurisprudential chaos’ on the basis of different 
interpretations is also a bit far stretched. Differences in interpretations will obviously 
occur whenever various organs apply the same instruments, but this may not necessarily 
result to ‘jurisprudential chaos.’725  
 
Some of those advocating for a broader interpretation of the above provisions insist that 
the court does not deserve to limit itself to the spirit and letter of the African Charter. 
Instead it must refer to other treaties ratified by the states, including UN treaties, bilateral 
and multilateral treaties at regional and sub-regional levels. According to Udombana, an 
aggrieved person who is not adequately covered by the African Charter may bring a case 
in terms of the Protocol under ‘any other international treaty’ that provides a higher level 
of protection, including sub-regional treaties, such as the ECOWAS treaty.726 Thus, the 
argument goes on, conferring a wider jurisdiction on the court would expose those states 
that took ratification as a public relations exercise. After all, it is further contended, the 
court has the discretion either to consider or transfer cases to the African Commission.727 
This should allow the court to avoid overload and to hear only those cases which have the 
potential to advance human rights protection in a meaningful way.728  
 
The above observations cannot go uncontested. In the main, it is acknowledged that the 
purpose of a regional mechanism such as the African Court is to interpret and give effect 
to the norms and instruments promulgated at the regional level. It would, therefore, be 
highly unusual for an institution from one system (AU) to enforce the treaties of another 
                                                 
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid. See also Charney J, ‘Is international law threatened by multiple international tribunals?’, (1998) 
27/1 Recueil des cours, p. 101. 
726 Ibid. See also Mutua M, ‘The African human rights court: A two-legged stool?’, note 84 above, p. 354. 
727 Art 6(3) Protocol on the African Court. 
728 Eno W, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 715 above, p. 228. 
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system (UN). Reference to ‘any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
states concerned’ could therefore mean instruments promulgated within the African 
region. The use of the word ‘relevant’ justifies this position.729 It is inevitable to note, 
however, that the phrasing of these Articles needs to be revisited and their meaning made 
clear. As they stand, Articles 3(1) and 7 are ambiguous and confusing.     
 
3.3.2.2.2.2 Advisory Jurisdiction 
 
In addition to contentious jurisdiction, the court is also vested with advisory powers. 
Accordingly, it has the discretionary competence to give advisory opinions ‘on any legal 
matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided 
that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the 
commission.’730 A request for an opinion can be made by the AU, one of the AU organs, 
an AU member state, or an African organisation recognised by the AU.  
 
Like its adjudicatory jurisdiction, the court possesses an advisory jurisdiction that 
exceeds that of any other regional human rights system, in the sense that it can express 
itself not only on the Charter but also on any other human rights instrument. The 
European Convention only entitles the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to 
ask for an opinion,731 while the American Convention allows the OAS member states 
and, within their spheres of competence, the OAS organs to do so. 732 
 
                                                 
729 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 28 above, p. 168. 
730 See Art 4(1) which reads: ‘At the request of a member state of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or 
any African organisation recognised by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter 
relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of 
the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the commission.’ 
731 European Convention, Art 47. 
732 See Pasqualucci J, ‘Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the 
Evolution of International Human Rights Law’, note 623 above, p. 241; and Buergenthal T, ‘The Advisory 
Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court’, (1985) 79 American Journal of International Law, p. 
1. 
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Some aspects of the advisory jurisdiction provisions of the Protocol need further 
clarification. For example, the inclusion of the AU in Article 4(1) of the Protocol does 
not seem to add any value to the provision because the AU, by definition, will have to be 
represented by one of its organs, which in their own right enjoy the right to seek an 
advisory opinion from the court.733 Further, the Protocol is not clear as to whether NGOs 
having observer status before the African Commission can request for an advisory 
opinion from the court.734  
 
One might think that the phrase ‘any African organisation recognised by the OAU (AU)’, 
under Article 4(1), could be taken to include NGOs with observer status before the 
commission. If this is the case, such NGOs might invoke the Article 4(1) provisions and 
apply for an advisory opinion.735 It could also be argued, to the contrary, that because 
NGOs in principle have no direct access to the court in contentious cases, they have no 
right to request an opinion since they could use this opportunity to argue a case against a 
member state that has not accepted the court’s jurisdiction in cases brought by NGOs and 
individuals.736 It is opined that Article 4(1) should be interpreted liberally to allow NGOs 
to request a legal opinion from the court.  
 
It is evident that the power of the African Court to render advisory opinions is purely 
discretionary. By allowing NGOs to participate, the opinions of the court could serve as a 
reference for a dynamic and progressive interpretation of the African Charter and other 
human rights treaties.737 Like in the case of the Inter-American Court, the Protocol should 
have made it possible for the African Court to give opinions on the compatibility of 
national legislation or practices with international human rights law. 738 This is significant 
because the possibility of these organs’ obtaining clarification from the African Court 
                                                 
733 Van der Mei A, ‘The new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an effective human 
rights protection mechanism for Africa’, note 641 above, p. 121. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid. 
738 See American Convention, Art 64(2).  
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could contribute to the objective application of human rights treaties and the development 
of universal human rights jurisprudence in the continent.739  
 
3.3.2.2.2.3 Conciliatory Jurisdiction 
 
In the course of its proceedings, the court may try to reach an amicable settlement in a 
case pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.740 As already 
stated, the Charter and the African system at large, favours the amicable settlement of 
disputes approach. Article 9 is discretionary in the sense that it uses the word ‘may’. It is 
not known whether the contending parties will be allowed to request for an amicable 
settlement of a pending case or the court would do so at its own volition.741 It is advisable 
that cases be allowed to proceed to a completion so that the human rights jurisprudence 
of the African system is allowed to develop. An amicable settlement may not allow for 
such development.742 
 
There is an apparent dilemma in conferring both conciliatory and adjudicatory powers on 
a single body. This has been one of the causes of disquiet in the African Commission, 
whose practice has leaned more towards conciliation than on adjudication. The court 
should give a careful though on this arrangement when drafting its rules of procedure.743 
This, however, should not be taken to mean that amicable settlement is an inappropriate 
task for a judicial body.744 Rather, expediency demands that the court should concentrate 
                                                 
739 Hopkins K, ‘The effect of the African Court on the domestic legal orders of African states’, (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal, p.  234. 
740 Art 9 of the Protocol provides that, ‘The court may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending 
before it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.’  
741 Van der Mei A, ‘The new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an effective human 
rights protection mechanism for Africa’, note 641 above, p. 121. 
742 Ibid. 
743 Ibid. 
744 For the propriety or otherwise of having a judicial body performing both adjudicatory and conciliatory 
functions, see generally, Whinney E, Judicial settlement of international disputes: Jurisdiction, 
justiciability and judicial law-making on the contemporary international court (1991), p. 7;  Chinkin C, 
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on adjudicatory functions and leave the quasi-judicial functions to the commission. Thus, 
where the parties to a dispute agree to resolve it amicably, the court may transfer the 
matter to the commission for settlement. Accordingly, this would save the court’s time 
and also that of the parties.745 
3.3.2.3 Procedures of the court  
 
 
Article 33 of the Protocol provides that the court shall draw up its own rules and 
determine its own procedures in consultation with the commission.746 As at the moment, 
the court’s rules of procedure have not been drafted, therefore no detailed discussion on 
the court’s procedures may be meaningful. The Protocol, however, has scanty provisions 
that may serve as the guidelines to some procedural aspects of the court. These provisions 
touch on, for example, admissibility and consideration of cases, judgements and 
remedies. This part therefore examines the provisions relating to such procedural aspects 
and recommends on how the court could comprehensively address them in its rules of 
procedure. In this regard, inspiration is obtained and lessons are drawn from the 
Universal, Inter-American and European human rights systems. 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Admissibility and consideration of cases 
 
The African Court is mandated to consider all cases and disputes submitted to it 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, the Protocol and any other 
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.747 Accordingly, the yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Alternative dispute resolution under international law’, in Evans M (ed) Remedies in international law: 
The institutional dilemma (1998), pp. 128-129. 
745 Van der Mei A, ‘The new African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an effective human 
rights protection mechanism for Africa’, note 641 above, p. 121. 
746 Art 33 reads: ‘the court shall draw up its Rules and determine its own procedures. The court shall 
consult the commission as appropriate.’ 
747 Art 3 of the Protocol.  
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to be drafted rules of procedure of the court shall lay down the detailed conditions under 
which cases shall be considered by the court.748  
 
In considering cases, Article 10(1) of the Protocol requires the court to conduct its 
proceedings in public, except in circumstances where its Rules of Procedure shall allow it 
to hold them in camera. Article 3(2) seems to suggest that the court has the power to 
choose which cases it will examine. Thus, it could elect to deal with only the most 
important legal issues.749 Like its counterpart, the African Commission, the starting point 
of consideration of cases by the court is the admissibility stage. According to Article 6(2) 
of the Protocol, the court ‘shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account the 
provisions of Article 56 of the Charter.’ Article 56 of the Charter lays down seven 
admissibility requirements that must be fulfilled before a communication is considered on 
merit. These requirements as well as the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
relating thereto were discussed at length elsewhere in this chapter.  
 
Noteworthy, the court is permitted to request the opinion of the commission before 
making a decision on the admissibility of a case instituted by relevant NGOs or 
individuals.750 In such cases, the commission is not mandated to give a ‘ruling’ but an 
‘opinion’, meaning that the court would then have to give a ruling on the admissibility of 
such a case.751 Due to this, the Protocol is thought to be initiating an unnecessary 
movement of a case between the court and the commission.752 This situation is 
aggravated by the fact that the court may eventually decide to defer the determination of 
a case to the commission.753 Thereafter, assuming the application to be admissible, the 
court may decide to refer the case back to the commission for determination on merit.  
                                                 
748 Ibid, Art 8. 
749 See Mutua M ‘The African Human Rights Court: A two-legged stool?’, note 84 above, p. 2 356. 
750 Art 6(1) of the Protocol.  
751 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of Human rights, note 693 above, p. 
203. 
752 O’Shea A, ‘A Critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 
695 above, p. 295. 
753 Article 6 (3) provides that: ‘The Court may consider cases or transfer them to the Commission.’ 
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The approach of the Inter-American system and its European counterpart (prior to 
Protocol 11 amendment) differs from that of the African system in that the commissions 
under both systems would make preliminary decisions on admissibility.754 This limits the 
movement of a case between the commission and the court. The European Court at one 
time held that all admissibility questions had to be raised before the commission first, and 
not come to the court for the first time.755 It would be expedient to have such an approach 
adopted under the African system; perhaps it would also bolster the African 
commission’s protective functions. 
 
In relation to post-admissibility consideration of cases, the Protocol does not indicate 
clearly the procedure to be followed or the conditions under which admissible cases may 
subsequently be referred to the commission.756 The Protocol only provides that ‘the court 
may consider cases or transfer them to the commission.’757 Consequently, in exercising 
its discretion under Article 6(3), the court must act as its own filter and channel some 
cases back to the commission. This clearly demonstrates the inefficiency of a two-tier 
system where both organs may receive the same types of application. The scanty 
provisions dealing with the relationship between the commission and the court give 
insufficient guidance on how the machinery will operate in practice. It is hoped that these 
issues will be resolved in the Rules of Procedure.758 
 
In the course of its proceedings, the court is obligated to conduct public hearings, unless 
otherwise required in its Rules of Procedure.759 Whereas the African Commission’s 
complaints process has been conducted in private and little information is available on 
the procedure, it is encouraging to see the Protocol provide for public proceedings. In this 
time and age where accountability and transparency are exceedingly necessary in dispute 
                                                 
754 O’Shea A, ‘A Critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 
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756 Dieng A, ‘Introduction to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 644 above, p. 5. 
757 Art 6(3) of the Protocol.  
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resolution, the importance of conducting public hearings needs no special emphasis. As 
Murray argued, through public hearings, potential litigants will be acquainted with the 
procedures of the court.760 What remains is for the court, preferably in its Rules of 
Procedure, to define the scope of ‘public hearings’. Under the European system, for 
example, the concept of public hearing also requires the public disclosure of all 
documents.761 
 
Litigants before the court have the right to be represented by legal representatives of their 
choice.762 Where the interests of justice so require, free legal representation may be 
provided for an indigent litigant.763 Given the abject poverty in many African states, it is 
believed that this is essential in trying to ensure that litigants, irrespective of their 
economic status, are heard by the court. It is necessary for the Rules of Procedure to 
clarify the qualifications of the legal representatives of the litigants. Additionally, the 
question of who to shoulder the expenses of the legal representative to the indigent 
litigant— whether it is the state party concerned or the court— should also be clarified.764  
 
According to Article 26, the court shall hear submissions by all parties and, if deemed 
necessary, hold an enquiry.765 Such inquiries could be in the nature of on-site visits to 
establish allegations presented before it by the litigants. In this regard, the states 
concerned are obligated to assist in the process by providing relevant facilities for the 
efficient handling of the case.766 This provision is especially important because it 
                                                 
760 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights’, note 693 above, 
p. 203. 
761 Rule 33(3) of the Rules of the European Court makes specific mention of documents being accessible to 
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762 Art 10(2). 
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764 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights’, note 693 above, 
p. 203. 
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safeguards the victim from the mischief of a recalcitrant state that may wish to destroy or 
withhold crucial evidence. 
 
Pursuant to Article 26(2), the court is empowered to receive written or oral evidence, 
including expert testimony. In tandem with this provision and given the vastness of the 
continent, the court could receive foreign depositions instead of requiring the physical 
presence of witnesses for de novo trials. Video-taped recordings of witness testimony 
rendered on oath with all the guarantees of due process could be used to facilitate this 
process.767 These economical measures can go a long way towards accelerating the 
litigation of cases and mitigating related expenses. This will also go a long way to reduce 
the length of proceedings.  
 
As part of its procedures, the court is also empowered to adopt interim measures. Article 
27(2) provides that ‘in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to 
avoid irreparable harm to persons, the court shall adopt such provisional measures as it 
deems necessary.’ The importance of interim measures in preventing irreparable harm to 
victims of violations has been discussed at length in our discussion on the procedures of 
the African Commission. It is expected that the rules of procedure shall address this issue 
comprehensively and, where need be, specify the consequences of breaching them. As 
already stated, states have not been taking serious the interim measures pronounced by 
the African Commission. Hopefully, the court will not be treated with equal contempt. 
Additionally, the rules of procedure should state the nature and scope of these measures 
because the Protocol has failed to do so.  
 
3.3.2.3.2 Judgements of the court 
 
The court is empowered to make findings and order appropriate remedies when there is a 
violation of rights.768 The judgments of the court, decided by majority of the judges, 
                                                 
767 Padilla D, ‘An African Human Rights Court: Reflections from the perspective of the Inter-American 
system’, note 690 above, p. 192. 
768 Art 27(1) of the Protocol.  
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would be final and not subject to appeal.769 However, the court is empowered to review 
its decisions in the light of new evidence under conditions to be set out in its Rules of 
Procedure.770 In cases where the judgment of the court is not unanimous, either in whole 
or in part, any judge would be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion.771  
 
A novel feature of the Protocol that distinguishes the commission from the court is that it 
requires the court to render its judgements ‘within ninety days of having completed its 
deliberations.’772 This is to ensure a speedier dispensation of justice than has been the 
case with the commission. It is a prerequisite that the judgments of the court be reasoned, 
and must be read in open court, due notice having been given to the parties.773 The effect 
of this provision is to avert the possibility of the court resorting to the initial practice of 
the commission where judgements were neither reasoned nor detailed.  
 
The above provisions notwithstanding, it should be stated categorically that the ability of 
the system to bring about change largely depends on how binding the judgments of the 
African Court would be. Article 30 of the Protocol provides that state parties ‘undertake 
to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time 
stipulated by the African Court and to guarantee its execution.’ This provision imputes on 
states the primary responsibility for the execution of the judgments of the court. Apart 
from this Article, there does not seem to be any specific recourse provided in the Protocol 
where a delinquent state deliberately refuses to comply with the court’s judgment.774  
 
Apparently, Article 30 only emphasises the voluntary nature of the execution of 
judgments, and has nothing to do with imputing an obligation on states to ensure the 
                                                 
769 Art 28(2). 
770 Art 28(3).  
771 Art 28(7).  
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774 Hopkins K, ‘The effect of an African Court on the domestic legal orders of African states’, note 739 
above, p. 238. 
 382
same.775 Accordingly, ‘states undertake’ does not seem to carry the requisite force to 
compel a recalcitrant state to comply with the court’s judgement. The court does not 
therefore possess any express power to ensure that its judgments are adhered to, and thus 
appears powerless to react when its decisions are ignored. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the court seems to be largely dependent on the willingness of states to 
comply with its decisions.776  
 
On a more positive note, however, the Protocol provides for mechanisms which may be 
used to compel states to comply with the court’s judgements. For example, the Protocol 
requires the judgments to be brought to the notice of the member states of the AU as well 
as the African Commission.777 Additionally, the court is required to submit, in each 
regular session of the AU Assembly, a report on its work during the previous year. 778 
The report would include cases in which a state has not complied with the court’s 
judgment.  
 
It should be noted that the approach adopted by the Protocol is more realistic than that of 
the Charter which subjects the publication of reports and rulings of the commission to 
prior approval by the Assembly. The involvement of the Assembly in the activities of the 
court, it is hoped, will compel states to comply with its judgements.779 This is because, 
compared to the OAU Charter, the AU Constitutive Act provides an improved framework 
for compliance with supranational decisions. For example, it provides for relevant 
sanctions against states that fail to comply with the Act.780  
 
The AU is therefore expected to protect the integrity of the system by adopting political 
measures that are necessary to secure compliance with the court’s judgment. Moreover, 
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the involvement of the Executive Council of the AU in the monitoring of the court’s 
judgements should be seen as an added impetus to the effective operation of the court.781 
The council will perhaps be instrumental in ensuring that national courts play a crucial 
role in the enforcement of the judgements of the African Court. In the Inter-American 
system, for example, the Inter-American court’s judgments on reparations are to be 
executed in national courts.782 Unfortunately, there is no similar provision in either the 
African Charter or the Protocol on the African Court. Nonetheless, the Executive Council 
may have a role in encouraging national courts to comply, in terms of their own laws, 
with the judgements of the African Court. 
 
3.3.2.3.3 Remedies 
 
International human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and the Torture Convention, recognise the right of victims 
of human rights abuses to receive remedies for their injury. However, the primary 
responsibility for the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of these remedies lies 
in the main with the existing national mechanisms of a country: the judiciary, executive 
and legislature.783 International mechanisms only expected to play the second-fiddle. 
Under international law, remedies for violation of human rights are diverse and their 
award depends on diverse factors.784 The importance of remedies to a victim of human 
rights violation has been highlighted in this thesis in relation to the commission, thus, it is 
needless to repeat the same here.  
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Article 27(1) of the Protocol to the African Court deals with the issue of remedies in the 
following terms: 
 
If the court finds that there has been a violation of a human or peoples’ rights, it shall 
make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair 
compensation or reparation…. 
 
Essentially, the court is given a very wide discretion to order whatever it deems 
‘appropriate’. This provision does not state the exact nature or type of order or remedies 
the court may grant. The terms ‘compensation’ and ‘reparation’ employed therein are 
quite vague and ambiguous. Thus, in exercising its wide discretion, the court may order 
remedial action in the form of specific and defined orders and remedies, for instance 
injunctions and sanctions.785 It is important that the court avoids a restrictive 
interpretation of its remedial powers by ordering adequate reparation whenever the 
interest of justice demands. 
 
When awarding remedies, the court should also determine the issue of costs. The 
Protocol is silent on how this issue should be treated. While the Protocol provides for 
‘free legal representation’, for example, there is no indication of who will bear the costs 
of such, other than the general requirement in Article 32 that ‘expenses of the court, 
emoluments and allowances for judge and the budget of its registry shall be determined 
and borne by the AU.’786 The rules of procedure should therefore clarify whether parties 
will be allowed to make prayers for costs and how the court should determine such 
prayers.787 
 
As a general analysis, the African Court has more potential to contribute to the effective 
enforcement of human rights in Africa than its counterpart, the commission. In order to 
                                                 
785 Waris A, ‘The remedies, Application and enforcement provisions of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ rights’, note 783 above, p. 101. 
786 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights, note 693 above, 
218. 
787 Ibid. 
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ensure its place among the eminent judicial bodies788, however, the court, through its 
Rules of Procedure, must think strategically of how it will operate efficiently. Thus, it is 
essential that it receives neither too few nor too many cases because, ‘a court which is 
scarcely used cannot make much of a mark. A full docket, on the other hand, though not 
the only requirement, provides a tribunal with a series of opportunities to display its 
potential.’789 Additionally, in order to be persuasive, the court may have to be innovative 
in the presentation of its judgements. Mechanisms such as indicating both sides of the 
argument, giving ratio decidendi, dealing with all points raised and examining issues of 
admissibility and jurisdiction fully and properly, are essential for its own legitimacy.790 
3.3.3 Relationship between the court, the commission, the AU 
and other relevant human rights bodies 
 
3.3.3.1 Relationship between the court and commission 
 
The court has not been established to replace but to complement and reinforce the 
commission. This fact can be deduced from the Preamble and other provisions of the 
Protocol. The last paragraph of the Preamble to the Protocol emphasises that ‘the 
attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to 
complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.’ In such circumstances, one would expect the Protocol to set out clearly 
the relationship between the commission and the court, yet it does not. Rather, as O’Shea 
correctly observed, the relationship between the two organs is only dealt with in the most 
general terms, which give little if any hint as to how the machinery actually works.791  
 
                                                 
788 Such as the Inter-American and European human rights Courts.  
789 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights, note 693 above, p. 
218. 
790 Ibid. 
791 O’Shea A, ‘A Critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 
695 above, p. 293. 
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Accordingly, Article 2 provides that the court shall ‘complement the protective mandate’ 
of the commission. Article 8 requires that Rules of the court should indicate when cases 
should be brought before it ‘bearing in mind the complementarity between the 
commission and the court.’ 792 This appears to suggest that the African Court will only 
consider cases which have gone through the commission, thus following the approach of 
the previous European arrangement, prior to the adoption of Protocol 11.793  
 
Prior to the adoption of Protocol 11 to the European Convention, the European 
Commission looked at admissibility, would try to reach a friendly settlement, and then 
reported if there was a breach.794 It would send the case to the Committee of Ministers to 
be enforced, or it could choose to submit the case to the court, if the state concerned had 
accepted its jurisdiction. There was a presumption in this system that the European 
Commission, rather than the court, would have primary responsibility for fact-finding.795 
This delegation of responsibility between a commission, that deals with disputes of facts 
and a court which looks at disputes of law, might be useful for the African system.796 
 
Under the African system, the commission is conferred with both a promotional and 
protective mandate. It may be deduced from the provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol 
that the complementarity between the court and the commission does not specifically 
affect the promotional, but rather the protective, mandate of the commission.797 In 
                                                 
792 Art 8 reads: ‘The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the 
Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity between the Commission 
and the Court.’ 
793 O’Shea A, ‘A Critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 
695 above, p. 293. 
794 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights’, note 693 above, 
p. 198. 
795 Ibid. See also Merrills J, The development of international law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(1993), p. 10; Clements L, ‘Striking the right balance: The new Rules of Procedure for the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (1999) 3 European Human Rights Law Review, p.  267.  
796 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights’, note 693 above, 
p. 198. 
797 Ibid. 
 387
relation to their common protective mandate, the Protocol does not, however, contain any 
significant details regarding how this will be shared between the court and the 
commission—especially in relation to the filing of complaints by individual ‘victims’ of 
human rights violations and NGOs. These details have been left, perhaps, for the court to 
address in its Rules of Procedure.798  
 
The Protocol also initiates a relationship between the court and the commission with 
regard to admissibility proceedings. Article 6(1) intimates that ‘the court, when deciding 
on the admissibility of a case instituted under Article 5(3) of this Protocol, may request 
the opinion of the commission which shall give it as soon as possible.’ Also, Article 6(2) 
provides that the court shall take the provisions of Article 56 of the African Charter into 
account when considering the admissibility of all cases. While Article 56 of the Charter 
sets out the general admissibility rules of the commission, it does not address the 
commission’s relationship with the court in that regard.  
 
The Rules of Procedure of the court therefore need to be very comprehensive and should 
clarify the criteria for the admissibility of cases, spelling out clearly the relationship 
between the court and the commission.799 In fact, Article 33 of the Protocol stipulates that 
the court ‘shall consult as appropriate with the commission’ when it draws up its rules of 
procedure. This would be imperative in relation to the provisions of the Protocol which 
concern the relationship between the court and the commission.800 The commission 
should, also, consider revising its Rules of Procedure to ensure its good relationship with 
the court.  
 
                                                 
798 Ibid.  
799 O’Shea A, ‘A Critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 
695 above. 
800 Murray R, ‘A comparison between the African and European courts of human rights’, note 693 above, 
p. 198. 
 388
Successful functioning of the court would depend, among other things, on a viable 
working relationship between the commission and the court.801 Such expectations would 
require close co-operation between the commission and the court as interdependent 
components of the African human rights system operating within the African Union.802 It 
has been suggested that one way of ensuring that the complementarity between the court 
and the commission succeeds might be to vest the commission with promotional 
functions and the court with protective functions.803  
 
The rationale for this arrangement, according to its proponents, is to enable the 
commission and the court to be more effective in their areas of specialisation and to 
enhance cooperation and mutual reinforcement between the two institutions.804 While this 
may be an ideal scenario, the Protocol contemplates a sharing of the protective mandate 
between the commission and the court.805 The Protocol’s position, however, is not cast in 
stone. If the African human rights system is to be effective, the relationship between the 
court and the commission must be enhanced, even if it takes the amendment of the 
Protocol. The next chapter of this thesis shall comprehensively discuss and recommend 
on how the relationship between the two institutions could be perfected. 
 
 
                                                 
801 Badawi I, ‘The future relationship between the African Court and the African Commission’, (2002) 
African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 253. 
802 Ibid. This notion is reflected in Art 3(h) of the Constitutive Act of the Union, which stipulates that the 
Union aims, among other things, at ‘promoting and protecting human and peoples’ rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.’ See 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, 11 July 2000, Lomé, Togo. 
803 Kaguongo W, ‘The Questions of Locus Standi and Admissibility before the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, note 689 above, p. 84.  
804 Ibid.  
805 Harrington J, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Murray R & Evans M, The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice 1986-2000 (2002), p. 332.  
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3.3.3.2 Relationship between the court and AU and its organs 
 
The AU and its organs have a relationship with the court in a number of areas. For 
example, the Assembly of the AU is paramount in the appointment of the judges of the 
court.806 Thus, it is instrumental in ensuring the competence or otherwise of the court. 
Additionally, the Assembly may reverse a decision to suspend or remove a judge from 
office.807 The Assembly also determines the seat of the court and may change it after due 
consultation with the court.808 Further, the court is required to submit to each regular 
session of the Assembly, a report on its work during the previous year.809 The Union also 
determines the expenses of the court, emoluments and allowances for judges and the 
budget of its registry. 810 
 
Another organ of the AU that has relationship with the court is the Executive Council 
(formerly Council of Ministers). Article 29(2) of the Protocol indicates that the council 
shall monitor the execution of judgments of the court on behalf of the Assembly. 
Meanwhile, the African Commission does not have a direct relation with the Executive 
Council in as far as its reports are submitted directly to the Assembly.811 It would 
therefore be important to involve the council in the reports of the commission to ensure 
proper follow-up on the work of both the court and the commission, given the 
complementarity between them, especially in the protective mandate.812  
 
                                                 
806 See Arts 11-15 of the Protocol. 
807 Art 19 (2).  
808 Art 25 (1) & (2) of the Protocol to the African Court. 
809 Art 31.  
810 Art 32 reads: ‘Expenses of the Court, emoluments and allowances for judges and the budget of its 
registry, shall be determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with criteria laid down by the OAU in 
consultation with the Court’. 
811 Arts 52, 53, 54 & 58 African Charter.  
812 Amnesty International, Credibility in question: proposals for improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 656 above, p. 10. 
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The African Court of Justice (ACJ) is also expected to have relationship with the African 
human rights court, although both are encompassed in uncertainty on their future 
relationship. In the main, there is the ongoing debate on how to merge the two 
institutions.813 The official explanation for such a merger was that it would be financially 
expedient to do so.814 After the matter of the merged court had been referred back and 
forth between the Permanent Representatives Council (PRC), Legal Experts and the 
Executive Council, a Meeting of Governmental Legal Experts was scheduled to be held 
in Algiers in order to consider a draft instrument prepared by the Algerian foreign 
minister and former president of the International Court of Justice, Dr Mohammed 
Bedjaoui.815  
 
However, due to the fact that only 22 member states turned up for this meeting and that 
the necessary quorum was therefore lacking, a working group was constituted instead to 
consider the matter.816 The meeting adopted a Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, which introduced a number of fundamental changes 
to the Draft Protocol on the Integration of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union. The Draft Protocol attempted to 
change the content of the Protocol Establishing the Human Rights Court, in particular 
making individual petitions automatic.817 This attempt was resisted by a number of states 
                                                 
813 See paras 4 and 5 of Assembly/AU/Dec 45(III).  See also Viljoen F & Baimu E, ‘Courts for Africa: 
Considering the co-existence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of 
justice’, (2004) 22/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p. 241-267. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the interests of the African 
states’, note 639 above, p. 170. 
816 Ibid. See also Report of the Meeting of Government Legal Experts on the Merger of the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union, EX.CL/211(VII). 
817 Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the interests of the African 
states’, note 639 above, p, 170. See also Art 32 of the Draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, UA/EXP/Fusion courts3(I). 
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in that, although a modified version of this draft was tabled at the AU Summit in 
Khartoum in January 2006, no decision was taken on it.818  
 
Similarly, in a subsequent meeting held in May 2006, no agreement could be reached in 
relation to issues of jurisdiction, signature and ratification, and these matters were 
deferred for consideration to the AU Summit meeting in July 2006.819 Again, no decision 
was made, prompting the legal instruments to be referred to the Ministers of Justice and 
Attorneys-General from member states. By delaying any decision regarding the merger of 
the two institutions, African states have yet again ensured that the interests of the state 
trump.820  
 
3.3.3.3 Relationship between the court and other human rights 
bodies 
 
While the question of the relationship between the court and commission has received 
some attention and suggestions, the same cannot be said of the relationship between the 
court and other regional human rights enforcement institutions, such as the Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.821 As already argued above, the court can 
apply human rights instruments adopted under the African system. Apart from the 
African Charter, other relevant human right instruments under the African system include 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)822 and the Protocol 
on the Rights of Women in Africa.823  
 
                                                 
818 Ibid.  
819 Ibid. 
820 Bekker G, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the interests of the African 
states’, supra, p. 171.  
821 Banderin M, ‘Recent developments in the African regional human rights system’, note 156 above, p. 
147. 
822 CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990); 9 IHRR 870 (2002).  
823 See protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
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Article 32 of ACRWC establishes an African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child with a mandate ‘to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the 
child.’ Part of its protective mandate is to ‘interpret the provisions of the Charter at the 
request of a state party, an institution of the Organisation of African Unity or any other 
person or institution recognised by the Organisation of African Unity, or any state 
party.’824 Article 44(1) of the ACRWC mandates the committee to ‘receive 
communication, from any person, group or Non-Governmental Organisation recognised 
by the Organisation of African Unity, by a member state, or the United Nations relating 
to any matter covered by this Charter.’  
 
Article 5 of the Protocol of the African Court does not grant access to the committee on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child as it does the African Commission. Consequently, 
initiating a case on violation of the rights of children under the ACRWC may depend on 
the goodwill of states parties or African intergovernmental organisations.825 This position 
should not be encouraged given that most states have not been willing to redress human 
rights violations. There is, therefore, the need to address this issue in the court’s Rules of 
Procedure in order to enhance the relationship between the court and the committee. 
Fortunately, the African Women’s Protocol does not present this problem as its Article 27 
confers ultimate interpretational jurisdiction of the Protocol on the African Court.826  
 
The relationship between the court and other regional economic courts is also of concern. 
Possible conflict may arise in relation to jurisdiction especially in the area of intersection 
between human rights and economic development.827 Perhaps the African Court would 
do well to take such concerns on board, concentrating on ensuring that the African 
Charter is incorporated at both sub-regional and national levels. Viable lessons could be 
learned from the European experience where it has been stressed that there is the need for 
                                                 
824 Art 42(c), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.  
825 Banderin M, ‘Recent developments in the African regional human rights system’, note 156 above, p. 
148. 
826 Ibid.  
827 Ibid.  
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regional bodies to focus on ensuring rights are enforced at the national level.828 One task 
of the African Court should therefore be to forge a relationship with the national systems. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has comprehensively reviewed the key institutional and normative 
mechanisms of the African human rights system. The system, despite its many 
constraints, has made some positive strides in its endeavour to meet the demands for 
normative, jurisprudential and institutional developments of international human rights 
law. As identified in this analysis, there is the need to be cautious against overambitious 
provisions in the normative instruments. The so-called ‘unique provisions’ have made 
normative framework of the system more confusing than it ought to be. Again, some of 
the rights contained therein need to be revisited and attuned to international standards, as 
suggested in the course of the study. 
 
This chapter has also shown that the institutional mechanisms of the system have 
continued to register a tremendous positive impact. This is gauged from the premise that 
new institutions, which tend to inject ‘fresh blood’ into the system, have emerged to 
supplement the efforts of the African Commission in enforcing human rights in the 
region. The most remarkable of these institutions is the African Court, which has 
eventually been established after many decades of relentless activism by scholars, NGOs 
and other non-state actors. The study showed, among other things, that the jurisprudence 
of the African Commission has improved tremendously, though there is still room for 
further improvements. The improvements are a marked departure from the commission’s 
practice soon after its inception.   
 
It is too soon to determine the probable performance of the African Court. However, it is 
evident that the provisions of the protocol establishing it are more progressive, and 
therefore more promising, than those of the Charter that established its counterpart, the 
                                                 
828 Hill L, ‘Universality versus subsidiarity: A reply’, (1998) 1 European Human Rights Law Review p. 75. 
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African Commission. As normative instruments cannot be useful without an effective 
enforcement mechanism, the adoption and coming into force of the Protocol to the 
African Court is a very welcome development. The performance of the court shall be 
gauged largely on the basis of how it will handle its initial cases. As yet, no application 
has been brought before it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND 
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The African human rights system has largely been criticised for being ineffective, hence 
causing doubt on its potential to improve the continent’s poor human rights record.1  It is 
in this context that this chapter discusses the possible reforms that might make the system 
more effective. The issue of reforms notwithstanding, this chapter acknowledges that, 
although there are problems and challenges associated with the African human rights 
system, it has made some positive contributions in the sphere of international human 
rights law in its relatively short period of existence.2 As shown in the previous chapters, 
the system has not been static but has rather evolved over time to incorporate in its 
norms, institutions and practice, some aspects that were not given credence during its 
inception. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practices and 
procedures (1996); Murray R, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and international 
law (2000), Ch. 2; Nmehielle O, The African human rights system: Its laws, practice and institutions 
(2001); Bondzie-Simpson, ‘A critique of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (1988) 31 
Howard Law Journal, pp. 643-665;  Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-
2000: An overview of its progress and problems’, (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 1-17; 
Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of 
duties’, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law, pp. 339-380; Oloka-Onyango J, ‘Beyond the 
rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for social and economic rights in Africa’, (1995) 26 California 
Western International Law Journal, pp. 1-73; Amoah P, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: An effective weapon for human rights?’, (1992) 4 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, p. 226; Welch C, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A five-year 
report and assessment’, (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 43-61. 
2 For a similar comment, see Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: 
An overview of its progress and problems’, note 1 above, p. 1.  
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The chapter acknowledges that regional enforcement of human rights law in Africa has 
been, and continues to be, encumbered with a myriad of challenges. ‘Challenges’ in the 
context of this chapter connotes the setbacks and hurdles Africa faces (or has been 
facing) in its quest for effective regional enforcement of human rights. These challenges 
may be historical, political, social, economic, institutional, and normative, among others. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the causes of the African human rights system’s 
unsatisfactory progress and ascertain to what extent the challenges can be eliminated or 
their effects minimised.  
 
It is needless to emphasise that states have acted and continue to act in ways that are 
antithetical to their human rights obligations under the African system. This has, by 
extension, rendered human rights illusory in the daily lives of the majority of people on 
the continent.3 This perennial state of affairs aggravates the already precarious human 
rights situation in the region. As a result, some scholars have argued for a comprehensive 
reform and reinvigoration of the African system to enable it to, among other things, 
compel states to comply with their human rights obligations.4  
 
Generally, the reform of the African human rights system may take different forms, 
including, for example, the amendment of certain aspects of the provisions of the African 
Charter5, the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights6, the 
                                                 
3 Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa: Enhancing human rights through the African regional human 
rights system (2003), p. XV. 
4 See generally, Steiner H & Alston P, International human rights in context: Law, politics and morals 
(1996), p. 689; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the 
language of duties’, note 1 above, p. 339; Oloka-Onyango J, ‘Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the 
struggle for social and economic rights in Africa’, note 1 above, p. 1; Amoah P, ‘The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: An effective weapon for human rights?’, note 1 above, p. 226; Welch C, ‘The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A five-year report and assessment’, note 1 above, p. 
43. 
5 Art 68 of the African Charter provides for the amendment of the Charter by a majority of state parties.  
6 Art 35 of the Protocol provides that: ‘1. The present Protocol may be amended if a state party to the 
Protocol makes a written request to that effect to the Secretary-General of the OAU. The Assembly may 
adopt, by simple majority, the draft amendment after all the state parties to the present Protocol have been 
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Rules of Procedure of the African Commission7, or any other instrument that is relevant 
to the system.8 It might also necessitate changes in the institutional mechanisms for the 
enforcement of these norms. This chapter therefore examines the challenges and 
strategies to reinvigorate the African human rights system. For purposes of convenience, 
these are discussed under two separate headings, namely: normative and institutional 
challenges and possible ways to reinvigorate the African human rights system. 
 
4.2 The normative mechanisms of the African human rights system 
 
This part highlights the normative challenges of the African human rights system and 
suggests the possible reforms thereto. The African Charter, as stated earlier, is the main 
normative instrument of the African human rights system. Thus, the present debate on the 
reform of the system’s norms shall focus more on the Charter’s provisions. This part of 
the study does not purport to underscore every challenge or weakness of the existing 
normative provisions, nor does it intend to give solution to every challenge. Rather, it is 
an added voice to the ongoing debate on the reform and reinvigoration of the system.  
 
When addressing the question of how to reform the Charter’s provisions, two approaches 
may be considered. The first would be to reform the ‘flawed’ or ‘inadequate’ provisions 
of the Charter through interpretive and jurisprudential mechanisms. This approach 
contemplates a situation where the African Commission and the court are given the 
opportunity to interpret the Charter and bring its provisions in line with international 
jurisprudence.9 With regard to the commission, this approach is premised on Articles 60 
and 61 of the Charter. Accordingly, Article 60 provides: 
                                                                                                                                                 
duly informed of it and the Court has given its opinion on the amendment. 2. The Court shall also be 
entitled to propose such amendments to the present Protocol as it may deem necessary, through the 
Secretary-General of the OAU. 3. The amendment shall come into force for each state party which has 
accepted it thirty days after the Secretary-General of the OAU has received notice of the acceptance.’ 
7 Rule 121 & 122 provide that the Commission can change its own rules. 
8 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, (2001) 2 African Human 
Rights Law Journal, p. 156. 
9 Ibid, p. 157. 
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The commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ 
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and 
peoples’ rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organisation of 
African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by 
the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as 
well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised 
Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members. 
 
Article 61 adds: 
 
The commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine 
the principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down 
rules expressly recognised by member states of the Organisation of African Unity, 
African practices consistent with international norms on human and people’s rights, 
customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognised by African states 
as well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
 
A combined reading of the above provisions seems to suggest that, when interpreting the 
substantive provisions of the Charter, the commission shall ‘draw inspiration from 
international law on human and peoples’ rights’, and ‘take into consideration other 
general or special international conventions.’ In this sense, the phrase ‘shall draw 
inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the 
provisions of…the Charter of the United Nations,…the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations…’ could be interpreted to mean 
that the provisions of these instruments shall be used by the commission as persuasive 
precedents. 
  
Both Articles 60 and 61 use the ‘shall’ term, meaning that the African Commission is 
under an obligation to ‘draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ 
rights’ and ‘take into consideration other general or special international conventions.’ 
The commission could therefore interpret the rights in the Charter in line with the 
standards set by other regional and the universal human rights mechanisms, where 
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appropriate. Arguably, the Charter, as it stands, provides for its own development through 
the jurisprudence of the commission and the court.10 This approach, however, will only 
be effective if the intention is to keep reforms to the Charter’s provisions to the barest 
minimum and under the control of the commission and the court.11  
 
The second approach calls for the comprehensive reform of the normative framework of 
the Charter. This approach is premised on the argument that since the Charter was drafted 
in a world that is either non-existent or has undergone significant transformation, it is 
inevitable for it to be radically reformed to reflect such changes.12 For example, in the 
early 1960s, African states were unshackling from colonialism and the human rights 
concept was largely seen as a foreign ideology that was irrelevant to Africans. Under 
such circumstances, Heyns rightly opined, it was not possible for the Charter to be 
framed to the same extent as is presently possible.13 From this viewpoint it has been 
contended that, while the commission is entitled to exercise its mandate under Articles 60 
and 61 to reinvigorate the Charter and redress its inadequacy, this is not a healthy practice 
in the long run, unless its interpretations are followed up by the reform of the Charter 
provisions.14 Law must be predictable and as a result, words used in legal texts should be 
given their ordinary meaning as far as is possible.15  
 
The jurisprudence developed by the commission and the court may also not be regarded 
with the same degree of seriousness as the Charter provisions. It is much easier for one to 
understand the provisions of the Charter than peruse a lengthy judicial precedent which 
purports to interpret the Charter. Moreover, some of the problems inherent in the Charter, 
as well as other normative instruments of the African system, may be beyond the powers 
                                                 
10 See Murray R, ‘Report on the 1996 Sessions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
19th and 20th Sessions’, (1997) 18, Human Rights Law Journal, p. 923. 
11 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 8 above, p. 157. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. See also Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, p. 245. 
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of the commission and the court to rectify, even through creative interpretation.16 Under 
such circumstances, the intervention of the Assembly of Head of States and Government 
of the African Union may be required.  
 
An all important motivation for the comprehensive reform of the Charter, according to 
Heyns, is the ongoing restructuring of the African human rights system that intends to 
place the system on a much firmer foundation.17 The OAU has been transformed to the 
AU and the African Commission has been supplemented by the African Court. These 
institutional developments need to complement the work of the existing normative and 
institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system. Since the emerging 
normative and institutional mechanisms of the system are more appealing and 
comprehensive than those that already exist, they provide a good indication that time is 
ripe to consider comprehensive reforms of the entire system to encourage uniformity.18 It 
is therefore pertinent to investigate the various provisions of the Charter that are in need 
of reform.  
4.2.1 Reforming the civil and political rights provisions of the Charter 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Charter is an innovative human rights instrument 
that incorporates into one document all the three generations of rights: civil and political 
rights19; economic, social, and cultural rights20; and group (peoples’) rights.21 Sadly, 
however, the Charter’s civil and political rights provisions have a number of 
shortcomings, although they constitute the bulk of the substantive provisions of the 
Charter. First, the Charter has conspicuously omitted several internationally recognised 
civil and political rights.22 For example, it does not guarantee the right to privacy which 
                                                 
16 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ note 8 above, p. 158. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 African Charter, Art 2-14. 
20 Ibid, Art 15-18. 
21 Ibid, Art 19-24. 
22 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’, note 8 above, p. 159. 
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is an important right entrenched in all the regional human rights instruments, as well as in 
those of the universal system.23  
 
The right to privacy protects individuals from unnecessary interference by the state or its 
agencies. It has various facets, including the right not to have: (a) their person or home 
searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) information relating to 
their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; or, (e) the privacy of their 
communications infringed.24 The omission of this important right from the Charter is 
regrettable, considering the fact that it is always infringed in many domestic jurisdictions 
in Africa. The police, for example, have been the most notorious violators of this right, 
especially when arresting suspects and undertaking seizure and searches when enforcing 
criminal laws and procedures.25 Privacy undoubtedly embodies a very important personal 
right and can only be restricted with good reason and constraint.    
 
The Charter also does not guarantee the right against forced labour. Article 5 of the 
Charter, where this right could possibly have fitted-in so well, protects a number of 
related rights, namely: (i) the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a person; (ii) 
the right to the recognition of ones legal status; and (iii) the right against all forms of 
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment.26  
 
The right against forced labour is essential in Africa for a number of reasons. First, forced 
labour was a common practice during the slave trade and colonial periods. The possibility 
                                                 
23 Even the constitutions of some states contain this right. See, for example, Section 76 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Kenya, 1963, as amended in 2002.  
24 See the Bomas Draft of the Constitution of Kenya, Art 47, available at 
www.gov.ac.ke/bomasconstitution.2004, last accessed 12 June 2008.  
25 See Umozurike U, ‘The significance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Kalu A 
&Osinbajo Y, Perspectives on Human Rights (1992), p. 45. 
26 Art 5 states: ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited’. 
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of this practice finding its way into the post-colonial societies cannot therefore be 
overlooked. Secondly, forced labour is still evident in some African cultural and religious 
practices.27 It is not uncommon to hear of people being forced to work in order to service 
their debts. Although it may be against their will, such people are threatened or even sent 
to prison to compel them to comply with their ‘masters’ demands.28 Thirdly, the right 
against forced labour is essential in Africa because some governments have policies that 
require people to do certain jobs for the state against their will. Such jobs may include 
helping in the construction of roads and bridges, or similar community labour 
involvements that are largely meant to be the responsibility of the state to its people and 
not vice versa.   
 
The Charter has also failed to explicitly give credence to the right to form trade unions 
and other civic organisations within states. Article 10 should have incorporated this right 
in clear and precise terms. The Article provides that ‘(1). Every individual shall have the 
right to free association provided that he abides by the law. (2). Subject to the obligation 
of solidarity provided for in 29, no one may be compelled to join an association’. 
Although not explicitly stated, this Article seeks to protect the rights and freedom of 
individuals who unite to form a collective entity that represent their common interests 
and objectives. These interests and objectives may be of a political, economic, religious, 
social, cultural, professional or labour union nature.29  
 
The Charter should therefore have clarified the scope of the right to freedom of 
association under Article 10, by specifically mentioning the right to form trade unions 
and other civic organisations. It is not enough just to mention freedom of association 
without defining its scope. It is common knowledge that many governments in Africa 
have attempted either to suppress or outlaw the formation of trade unions and civic 
organisations, particularly those suspected to be a potential threat to their smooth 
                                                 
27 See Mbondenyi M, ‘Improving the substance and content of civil and political rights under the African 
human rights system’ (2008) 17/2 Lesotho Law Journal, p. 7.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 8 above, p. 110. 
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running.30 Many NGOs and trade unions have been banned or forced to desist from 
criticising the government of the day.31 That is why it would have been expedient for the 
Charter to guarantee their protection.  
 
The Charter should have gone ahead to require states to take legislative and other 
measures to promote and encourage trade unions and civil society participation in 
decision-making and in public affairs at all levels of government. It should also have 
provided for the guarantee of smooth running and operation of these organisations in 
order to curtail state interference. It is suggested that the Charter should have provided 
that any legislation purporting to regulate the registration or operation of civil society 
organisations or trade unions should ensure that: (a) registration is in the hands of a body 
that is independent of government or political control; (b) any fee chargeable is no more 
than is necessary to defray essential cost of the procedure; (c) there is a right to 
registration, unless there is good reason to the contrary; (d) any standards of conduct 
applied to organisations is formulated with input from the affected organisations; and, (e) 
de-registration procedures provide for a fair hearing and for a right of appeal to an 
independent tribunal.32 
 
Further, the provisions of the Charter guaranteeing the rights to liberty and security of 
person and those of an arrested person do not reflect international standards and are 
inadequate.33 Article 6, for example, provides that ‘every individual shall have the right 
to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except 
for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 This was the order of the day in the single party days in Kenya. Many NGOs were either refused 
registration or deregistered when they commented on the inefficiency of the government of the day. See 
Mbondenyi M, ‘Improving the substance and content of civil and political rights under the African human 
rights system’, note 27 above, p. 8. 
32 See the Bomas Draft of the Constitution of Kenya, note 24 above. 
33 See Arts 6 and 7 of the Charter which guarantee the right to liberty and security of person and the right to 
a fair trial, respectively. See also Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
note 1 above, pp. 123-133. 
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arbitrarily arrested or detained.’ First, the provision, through the use of a claw-back 
clause, entrusts to states the responsibility to define the parameters of this right. More 
likely than not, this responsibility will be abused.34  
 
Secondly, the drafters of the Charter failed to acknowledge that this right goes beyond 
arbitrary arrest or detention to envisage important issues such as the right of every 
person: (a) not to be detained without trial, except in conditions that are clearly laid down 
under international law; (b) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources; (c) not to be tortured in any manner, whether physical or psychological; 
and (e) not to be subjected to corporal punishment or to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading manner.35 Thus, the Charter provisions guaranteeing these rights 
need to be brought in line with these standards. The same applies to the provisions on fair 
trial under Article 7 of the Charter which reads as follows: 
 
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:  
(a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his 
fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and 
customs in force; 
(b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal;  
(c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;  
(d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.  
2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally 
punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an 
offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is 
personal and can be imposed only on the offender. 
 
While the above provisions are essential to a fair trial, the drafters of the Charter either 
deliberately ignored or accidentally omitted some important rights of an accused or 
arrested person. Before ‘appealing to competent national organs’ or even exercising the 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 See the scope of this right in, for example, the Bomas Draft of the Constitution of Kenya, note 24 above, 
Art. 45. 
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‘right to defence’, an accused person is entitled to other forms of protection. For example, 
he or she has the right to be informed promptly, in a language that he or she understands, 
of the reason for the arrest.36 The person also has the right to remain silent and in this 
regard must be informed of the consequences of not remaining silent. Thus, the accused 
person should be protected from making forced confession or admission that could be 
used in evidence against him or her. Where the accused freely chooses to make a 
confession, it should be made before a competent authority mandated by law to conduct 
such proceedings.37 An accused person or a suspect should also be detained separately 
from persons serving a sentence because he or she is innocent until proved guilty.  
 
Article 7(1)(c) guarantees every person the right to be defended by Counsel of their 
choice. However, the Charter fails to make provision for state-provided legal assistance. 
By extension, it does not cater for indigent persons, who for lack of funds may fail to 
exercise the right to Counsel of their choice. The importance of legal representation, 
especially in criminal cases, cannot be overemphasised.38 It is the state’s duty to legally 
assist indigent persons to ensure fair trial. The omission in the Charter cannot easily be 
reconciled with the realities faced by African masses, who are generally poor and 
therefore lack the means to adequately choose legal representation.39 Some African 
countries have legal aid programmes, but these programmes are generally poorly funded 
and managed.40 There ought to be minimal commitments by states and NGOs in this area, 
if the right to fair trial is to be enjoyed by the poor masses.  
 
Additionally, the Charter has failed to provide that an accused person or a suspect must 
be brought before a court or tribunal as soon as is practically possible. Instead, Article 
7(1)(d) guarantees the right of an accused to be tried ‘within a reasonable time.’ It is 
                                                 
36 Udombana N, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the development of fair trial 
norms in Africa’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 313. 
37 Bomas Draft of the Constitution of Kenya, note 24 above, Art. 73. 
38 See the previous chapter of this thesis where the importance of legal aid and assistance has been 
discussed. 
39 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, p. 98. 
40 Ibid. 
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believed that the Charter makes reference to ‘reasonable time’ to ensure that proceedings 
are not prolonged.41 The rationale of the provision is to ensure the speedy completion of 
proceedings, which has nothing to do with the presentation of an accused before a court 
or a tribunal to be charged. Thus, it does not cater for potential delays in the 
commencement of proceedings.42 The Charter should have stated that an accused person 
must be brought before a court or tribunal, for example, not later than forty eight hours 
after being arrested, or not later than the end of the first court day after the expiry of the 
forty eight hours, if the forty-eight hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a day 
that is not an ordinary court day.43  
 
The Charter is also silent on the right to bail. The right of an accused person to be 
released on bond or bail pending trial or appeal should be mandatory, unless there are 
compelling reasons to the contrary. Other important rights of an accused person which 
have not been addressed in the Charter include: the right to judicial review of one’s 
detention; the right to compensation for unlawful detention or release from such 
detention; the right to public hearing or the circumstances under which public hearing 
may be excluded; the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; the right 
of the defence to examine and cross-examine witnesses in court and the right to an 
interpreter; the right of those acquitted to compensation for miscarriage of justice and; the 
right not to be subjected to a new trial for the same cause.44 The drafters of the Charter 
turned a rather blind eye to the importance of these rights.  
 
Article 13 of the Charter recognises the right to vote in a very superficial way. The 
Article guarantees every citizen the right to participate freely in the government of his 
country either directly or through freely chosen representatives.45 As stated in the 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Bomas Draft of the Constitution of Kenya, note 24 above, Art. 73. 
44 See Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa: Enhancing human rights through the African regional human 
rights system, note 3 above, p. 344.  
45 Art 13(1) states: ‘Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.’ 
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previous chapter, the right to participate freely in the government of ones country has 
different manifestations. For example, an individual without apparent legal disability 
should be able to participate in periodic elections, exercise his or her voting rights, and 
participate in the conduct of public affairs directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.46  
 
Arguably, the inclusion of the right to participate in government in the African Charter is 
partly in recognition of the fact that most egregious violations of human rights on the 
continent occur in conditions of political dictatorship and poor governance. Africa has 
experienced a series of undemocratic governments where democracy, constitutionalism, 
the rule of law and human rights have been ignored.47 Military rule and undemocratic 
change of governments have also taken toll unabatedly.  
 
Moreover, a large number of rulers as well as citizens have ‘traded-in’, for example, the 
right to vote, and once voted, they use the power and state machinery for their personal 
benefits. At best, political power is used to reward cronies and sycophants, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, to punish ‘dissidents’ and opponents. In essence, governance 
and political positions are transformed into arbitrary power exercised at whims by the 
‘powers-that-be’.48 Hence, in framing Article 13, the drafters of the Charter might have 
been compelled by the desire to wrest political power and governmental authority from 
the hands of the emerging post-colonial despots and vest it on citizens. 
 
                                                 
46 The right to vote in genuine periodic elections, based on universal franchise, is recognised in Art 25(b) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Nmehielle O, The African human rights 
system, note 1 above, p. 118. 
47 For a detailed discussion on this, see generally, Mangu A, ‘The road to constitutionalism and democracy 
in Africa’ (2002), LLD Thesis University of South Africa , Chapter 3.  
48 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, p. 118. See also, Mbondenyi M, ‘The right 
to participate in the government of one’s country: An analysis of Article 13 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in the light of Kenya’s 2007 political crisis’ (2009) African Human rights law 
Journal (forthcoming in May). 
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Generally, the normative framework of the Charter should be enhanced by incorporating 
rights that were omitted or inadequately addressed but which are guaranteed under the 
universal and other regional human rights instruments. Variations may of course be 
permitted but not to the extent that the universal protection of such rights would be 
compromised. One way to incorporate or reform those provisions could be through the 
adoption of Protocols to the Charter.49 The other way may be through the constructive 
and progressive interpretation of the provisions in accordance with international 
standards and principles. Alternatively, states parties could exercise their mandate under 
Article 68 of the Charter to amend the Charter as they deem it appropriate.50  
 
With regard to the approach that involves the constructive and progressive interpretation 
of the Charter’s provisions, the commission’s elaboration on several substantive rights is 
commendable.51 The commission has, for example, found Article 5 of the Charter to 
protect, inter alia, the right to life.52 The said Article guarantees the right against all 
forms of slavery, slave trade, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The 
commission’s findings were to the effect that deaths resulting from torture or from trials 
conducted in breach of the due process guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter violated the 
right to life guaranteed in Article 4.53 Additionally, it has interpreted Article 5 broadly to 
                                                 
49 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ note 8 above, p. 173. 
50 Murray R, ‘Report on the 1996 Sessions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights- 19th 
and 20th Sessions, note 10 above, p. 19. 
51 See Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedure in the reform of the African regional human 
rights system’, (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 239.  
52 Ibid. See also, Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91 & 89/93, Amnesty International, Comité Loosli 
Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Association of Members of the Episcopal 
Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V) (the Sudan cases) and communications 54/91, 61/91,98/93, 164/97 
& 210/98, Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des 
Droits de l.Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des Veuves et Ayant-droit and Association Mauritanienne des 
Droits de l.Homme v. Mauritania, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V) (the Mauritania cases). 
53 See the Sudan case, para 48 and the Mauritania case, para 119.  
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guarantee the enjoyment of certain economic, social and cultural rights. On this basis, it 
has condemned ‘practices analogous to slavery’ such as ‘unremunerated work.’54  
 
Further, the commission has elaborated the contents of the right to a fair trial in both its 
casework and resolutions.55 As stated in the previous chapter, the commission has 
extended the right to fair trial to encompass such issues as legal aid and assistance and the 
protection of the independence of the judiciary.56 In the Sudan case cited above, it linked 
Articles 7(1)(d)57 and 2658 of the Charter to achieve protection of the independence and 
integrity of the judiciary.59 The commission took the view that the purge of over 100 
judicial officers by the Sudanese government deprived the courts of qualified personnel 
required to ensure their impartiality and thus violated these Articles. In separate decisions 
against Sudan60, Nigeria61, and Mauritania62, the commission similarly found the practice 
of setting up of special courts or tribunals, contrary to the standard judicial procedures, to 
be in violation of both Articles 7(1)(d) and 26 of the Charter.63  
 
                                                 
54 See the Mauritania Case, 137. See also the argument in Odinkalu C, ‘Analysis of Paralysis or paralysis 
by analysis? Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 358-365.   
55 Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedure in the reform of the African regional human 
rights system’, note 51 above, p. 240. 
56 See Resolution of the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopting the Dakar 
Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa, DOC/OS(XXVI)INF, p. 19.  
57 Art 7(1)(d) guarantees every individual ‘the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial 
court or tribunal.’  
58 Art 26 reads, in part: ‘States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the 
independence of the courts. . .’ 
59 Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedure in the reform of the African regional human 
rights system’, note 51 above, p. 240. 
60 The Sudan cases, note 52 above. 
61 Communication 151/96, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report, para 
71. 
62 The Mauritania cases, note 52 above.  
63 Odinkalu C, ‘The role of case and complaints procedure in the reform of the African regional human 
rights system’, note 51 above, p. 240. 
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The commission has also extended the application of the right to freedom of religion 
guaranteed in Article 8 of the Charter to the controversial problem of application of 
Islamic Shari’a to non-Muslims.64 It held that Shari’a is inapplicable to non-adherents of 
the Islamic faith unless they voluntarily submit to it. It correctly observed that:  
 
. . . it is fundamentally unjust that religious laws should be applied against non-adherents 
of the religion. Tribunals that apply only Shari’a are thus not competent to judge non-
Muslims, and everyone should have the right to be tried by a secular court if they wish.65 
 
Significantly, the commission recommended that trials must always accord with 
international fair trial standards.66 Generally, the commission should be applauded for its 
evolving practice of interpreting the Charter provisions progressively. In some cases, 
however, it remained passive and failed to develop its jurisprudence, even when an 
opportunity presented itself.67 In Henry Kalenga v. Zambia68, for example, where the 
complainant had been detained without trial, it concluded the case without developing its 
jurisprudence on Article 6. The complainant in this case had petitioned the commission, 
demanding his release. Zambia’s Ministry of Legal Affairs later informed the 
commission of his release. The commission proceeded to declare the matter amicably 
resolved without expounding on Article 6. This trend by the commission should not be 
encouraged, if the inadequate provisions of the Charter are to be reformed.   
 
Apart from the inadequacy of some of its provisions, the Charter also deals with the 
limitation of civil and political rights in a very unsatisfactory manner.69 As stated in the 
previous chapter, it has no derogation clause that would permit the suspension of certain 
rights and freedoms in strictly defined circumstances. According to the African 
Commission, the absence of a derogation clause means that the Charter ‘does not allow 
                                                 
64 The Sudan cases, note 52 above, para 73. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, pp. 91-92. 
68 Communication 11/88, Henry Kalenga v. Zambia, ACHPR/LR/A1 (1997). 
69 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ note 8 above, p. 160. 
 411
for states parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations. 
Thus, even a civil war… cannot be used as an excuse by the state violating or permitting 
violations of rights in the African Charter.’70 It further observed that the lack of a 
derogation clause ‘can be seen as an expression of the principle that the restriction of 
human rights is not a solution to national difficulties: the legitimate exercise of human 
rights does not pose dangers to a democratic state governed by the rule of law.’71  
 
The commission’s observations on the absence of a derogation clause in the Charter may 
be rejected for two reasons. First, a derogation clause is essential because, under some 
circumstances, rights should be limited in any society. This process, however, must be 
carefully managed, ‘in order to ensure that such limitations are done in an acceptable 
way.’72 Thus, derogation clauses serve the dual function of allowing infringements of 
rights and at the same time defining standards that must be met by such infringements.73 
The absence of a derogation clause in the Charter therefore means that states can infringe 
rights in cases of emergencies without being called to question.  
 
Secondly, the commission’s approach should be rejected because, in reality, it can hardly 
be conducive to the protection of human rights. States under emergencies, for example, 
could easily ignore the Charter due to the impending danger.74 Under such circumstances 
the Charter would be discredited for failing to restrain states from violating or unduly 
restricting the rights of their citizens.75 One would therefore concur with Heyns to the 
effect that, the commission ought to reverse its interpretation of the Charter on this issue 
                                                 
70 Communication 74/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Liberties v. Chad (1997) 4 
IHRR, p. 94, Para 21. 
71 Communication 48/90, 50/91/ 52/91 and 89/93, Amnesty International and others v. Sudan, Thirteenth 
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Annex V), para 79. 
72 Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?’ note 8 above, p. 160. 
73 Ibid. See also Higgins R, ‘Derogation under human rights treaties’ (1976-77) 48 The British Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 281. 
74 Heyns C, ‘The African human rights system: In need of reform? note 8 above, p. 162. 
75 Ibid. See also Oraá J Human rights in states of emergency in international law (1992), p. 210. 
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by acknowledging the right of states to derogate from certain Charter rights in certain 
defined circumstances.76  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, some of the rights in the Charter contain internal 
qualifications or provisions that limit their reach. Some of these internal qualifications, 
otherwise known as claw-back clauses, subject the enjoyment of rights to national or 
domestic laws of states.77 Claw-back clauses have rightly been criticised since, in effect, 
they imply that international supervision of domestic law is limited in respect of these 
rights, thus defying the very reason for the existence of a regional human rights system.78  
The commission has attempted to address this inadequacy by, for example, interpreting 
claw-back clauses to the benefit of the complainant, in keeping with established 
international practice.79 Thus, it is now settled that the phrase ‘subject to law’, which is 
used in some of the provisions should be understood to refer not to domestic, but instead 
to international law.80 The commission’s creativity in this regard is commendable. 
                                                 
76 Heyns C, ‘The African human rights system: In need of reform? note 8 above, p. 162. 
77 For example, Art 8 guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion ‘subject to law and order.’ Art 9(2) 
states: ‘Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.’ 
Additionally, Art 10 guarantees the right to freedom of association to an individual ‘provided that he abides 
by the law.’ An individual’s freedom of movement under Art 12 is guaranteed ‘provided he abides by the 
law.’ Art 13 (1) guarantees citizens the right to participate freely in their governments ‘in accordance with 
the provisions of the law.’ The same is evident in Art 14 which permits the encroachment upon property ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.’ For the meaning of claw-back clauses, see Higgins R 
‘Derogations under human rights treaties’ note 73 above, p. 281. 
78See for example Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 1 above, p 
176; D’sa R, ‘The African Charter on human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems and prospects for regional 
action’, (1981/83) 10 Australian Yearbook of International Law, p. 110; Gittleman R, ‘The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal analysis’, (1982) 22 Virginia Journal of International law, p.  694; 
Kunig P, ‘The protection of human rights by international law in Africa’, (1982) 25 German Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 155; Murray R, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
International Law, note 1 above, p. 127.  
79 Odinkalu C, ‘Analysis of Paralysis or paralysis by analysis? Implementing economic, social and cultural 
rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 54 above, p. 358. 
80 Communication 101/93, Civil Liberties Organisation in respect of the Nigerain Bar Association v. 
Nigeria, Eighth Activity Report 1994-95 Annex VII, p. 394, para 16. 
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However, it is important that such creativity is succeeded by a modification of the 
Charter. Unless this is done, states will continue to defend infringements of rights 
through national law with reference to the claw-back clauses in the Charter.81  
 
Claw-back clauses, to the extent that they purport to exclude international supervision, 
should be scrapped from the Charter and replaced by an unequivocally phrased general 
limitation clause.82 The general clause should permit the limitation of rights only to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable.83 Such a limitation should take into 
account all relevant factors including the nature of the right; the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the need to ensure that 
the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and 
freedoms of others; and the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether 
there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.84  
 
Limitation of rights must be imposed only in strictly defined circumstances. The Charter 
as an instrument intended to lay down the minimum standards for all states parties 
should, as far as possible, leave no lacuna that may be misconstrued or manipulated by 
states. Domestic practice reveals that governments are always fast to exploit any 
loopholes or perceived loopholes in bills of rights to the detriment of the enjoyment of 
rights.85 
 
From the above analysis, one would agree with the observation that the Charter, as far as 
civil and political rights are concerned, has the capacity to be reformed. Unfortunately, 
‘its positive features are often under-estimated or overlooked, and its capacity for 
                                                 
81 Heyns C, ‘Civil and political rights under the African Charter’, note 8 above, p. 161. 
82 Ibid.  
83 See Art 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Section 33 of the Bomas 
Draft Constitution of Kenya, note 24 above. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, p. 66. 
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metamorphosis is yet to be fully explored.’86 It has been shown that the Charter can be 
made more effective through a dynamic and purposeful interpretation of its civil and 
political rights provisions. In certain cases, it may be needful to amend the Charter 
provisions through the adoption of relevant Protocols. We also concur with the view that 
the commission is faced with the difficult task of overcoming the shortcomings in the 
way in which the Charter has been drafted though it has shown some willingness to be 
creative in this regard.87  
 
Noteworthy, a great impediment to the realisation of civil and political rights in Africa is 
constituted by, among other factors, illiteracy, ignorance and poverty.88 To the many rural 
dwellers and the urban poor in Africa, the lack of awareness or means make it impossible 
for them to assert their rights. The cost of litigation is prohibitive, whereas legal aid 
services, where available, may be limited to serious criminal cases and rarely dispensed 
for civil matters. It follows that the rights entrenched in the Charter may to many be mere 
paperwork, irrelevant to their existence.89 It has been argued that the stage of 
development of most third world states makes economic growth their most important 
preoccupation; that in order to satisfy this need it is necessary to detract from civil and 
political rights.90 Delivering a public address at the University of Toronto, former 
Tanzanian President, Nyerere asked: 
 
What freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the soil 
provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, medical 
care, or even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to speak as he wishes. 
But these freedoms are much less real to him than his freedom to be exploited. Only as 
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his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom become properly meaningful 
and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity.91  
 
Nyerere tried to highlight the apparent insubordination of civil and political rights to 
economic rights as far as Africa is concerned. Such conceptualisation of this category of 
rights indeed contributed to their low esteem in Africa. Nyerere’s statement should not be 
interpreted as an excuse for ignoring or violating civil and political rights. The only 
reasonable interpretation is that civil and political rights are meaningful in the context of 
certain minimum living standards. The relevance of all categories of rights cannot be 
overlooked, given that human rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.   
 
4.2.2 Reforming the economic, social and cultural rights and other 
substantive provisions of the Charter 
 
The Charter guarantees the protection of a number of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Like civil and political rights, it does not comprehensively guarantee some 
economic, social and cultural rights in accordance with international standards. For 
example, the Charter, under Article 15, guarantees the right to equitable and satisfactory 
work conditions.92 However, unlike Article 7 of both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it does not expressly guarantee the right to rest, leisure, 
limited working hours and paid holidays. This right also goes hand-in-hand with other 
rights, such as the right of workers to go on strike, which have not been included in the 
Charter.     
 
                                                 
91 Reproduced in Africa Contemporary Record (1969-1970) 2, p. 30-31; Howard R, ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: 
Should Economic Rights take priority over civil and political rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
(1983) 5 Human Right Quarterly, pp. 467-490. 
92 Art 15 provides: ‘Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.’ 
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Further, Article 16 guarantees the enjoyment of the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health.93 It then provides that ‘states parties… shall take the necessary measures to 
protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when 
they are sick.’ The provision, however, does not include at least some minimum 
requirements that states should fulfil in order to safeguard this right. The right to health 
demands more than receiving medical attention when one is sick. It includes the right to 
health care services and reproductive health care. The Charter fails to guarantee 
emergency medical treatment, which is not uncommon in many African states.94  
 
The Charter is also not elaborate in its provision that guarantees the protection of the 
right to education. It simply states that ‘every individual shall have the right to education’ 
without stipulating the parameters of this right. As stated in the previous chapter, this 
right embodies a number of essential components. For example, it consists of the right to 
primary education, secondary education, higher (tertiary) education, and the right to 
choice of schools, among others.95 One cannot understand whether the Charter also 
guarantees individuals the right to establish and maintain independent educational 
institutions that would further their religious, cultural or other pertinent interests.96 The 
right to establish and maintain independent educational institutions, like its counterpart, 
the right to education, is important because it allows one to decide the kind of education 
they think is appropriate either to themselves or their children.97  
 
The Charter also does not contain certain economic, social and cultural rights, including 
the right to food, social security and adequate standards of living. These are basic rights 
which any state is expected to guarantee its citizens. Many African states have been 
violating these rights with impunity. State funds, which would rather have been used to 
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safeguard these rights, have always been mismanaged or diverted to private accounts of 
the ‘powers-that-be,’ leaving many innocent citizens wallowing in abject poverty. It is 
therefore very unfortunate that these basic rights were not given any attention by the 
drafters of the Charter. The inadequacies of most social, economic and cultural rights in 
the Charter have been discussed at length in the previous chapter and it is needless to 
rehearse the arguments in the present chapter.  
 
From the foregoing, it is inevitable to conclude that economic, social and cultural rights 
have not been fully addressed under the Charter and as such the relevant substantive 
provisions need to be reformed. This calls for both progressive interpretation and, in 
certain cases, the promulgation of protocols to address certain rights more 
comprehensively. For example, protocols should be adopted to protect the rights of 
vulnerable groups such as the aged, disabled and minority communities, thus expounding 
on Article 18(4) of the Charter. The inadequacies of the provisions relating to women and 
children’s rights under Article 18(3) have been redressed through the adoption of the 
Protocol on Women in Africa and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, respectively. Thus there was no need, at least in this thesis, to concentrate on the 
inadequacies of the Charter with regard to these two groups of persons. Arguably, the two 
legal instruments that expound Article 18(3) sufficiently reinforce the Charter in as far as 
women and children’ rights are concerned.      
 
It is recommended that economic, social and cultural rights should be taken as seriously 
as civil and political rights in both the agenda of the AU and the activities of the African 
human rights system. People should be educated on the existence of these rights and their 
enforcement procedures. It is sad to note that, while economic, social and cultural rights 
are very essential, they are generally not known to, or ignored by, the lay person. This 
trend needs to be reversed. 
 
Apart from the economic, social and cultural rights debate, the question of duties in the 
Charter also needs to be revisited. As shown in the previous chapter, the Charter imposes 
duties on both the state and individual. However, some of the duties are not clearly 
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worded, making them not capable of being enforced. More should be done to clarify the 
status of the duties in the Charter. Particularly, their moral and legal dimensions should 
be defined.98 The duties in the Charter cannot easily be given meaning in a legal context. 
For example, there is uncertainty on how the duty to preserve the harmonious 
development of the family in Article 29(1) could be enforced by a domestic court of law 
or the regional enforcement mechanisms such as the African Commission and the court.99    
 
The scope and content of peoples’ rights under the Charter also needs to be revisited. If 
peoples’ rights are to be utilised to address some of the human rights challenges affecting 
the continent, it would be imperative for the commission to put extra effort in their 
interpretation and application and in the promotion of their understanding.100 For 
purposes of legal certainty, it would also be crucial for the commission to elaborate 
sufficiently clear criteria for determining the nature of the groups which qualify as 
‘people’ within the meaning and context of the Charter.101  
 
A number of groups across the African continent have been, and continue to be, subjected 
to gross human rights violations. In particular, some have been dispossessed of lands they 
consider their traditional homes and with which they have a special attachment.102 These 
groups have also been, and continue to be, subjected to discrimination and 
marginalisation as a result of their allegedly inferior and outdated cultural practices.103 It 
is worthy to note that the commission has begun to see the importance of protecting the 
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rights of these vulnerable indigenous communities. For example, it recently adopted a 
report that recognises certain groups as indigenous peoples.104  
 
The commission should also be commended for some landmark pronouncements on 
economic, social, cultural and peoples’ rights, in spite of the inadequacy of the Charter’s 
provisions. In The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria105 (hereafter the ‘SERAC’ or ‘Ongoni’ case), 
discussed in the previous chapter, it underscored the role of the state in providing socio-
economic rights to its people. This communication is important because, for the first time 
the commission was able to deal in a groundbreaking way with alleged violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
Although not provided for in the Charter, the commission recognised the right to housing 
or shelter by broadly interpreting Articles 14 (property), 16 (health) and 18 (family 
rights). The commission observed that the right to shelter implies an obligation to respect, 
in the sense that it obliges the government of Nigeria not to destroy the houses of its 
citizens and not to obstruct efforts by individuals or communities to rebuild their lost 
homes.106 The right to shelter also implies an obligation to protect because it obliges the 
government to protect its citizens from interference with their right to live in peace.107 
The commission also affirmed that the right to housing includes a right to be protected 
against forced evictions. It concluded that ‘the conduct of the Nigerian government 
clearly demonstrates a violation of this right [to housing] enjoyed by the Ongonis as a 
collective right’.108    
                                                 
104 Ibid. See African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, Activity 
Report 2005 (April 2006); see also IWGIA Report, 39th ordinary session of the African Commission on 
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Using the same approach, the commission found a violation of the right to food, which is 
not expressly guaranteed by the Charter. Towards this end, it interpreted Articles 4 (right 
to life), 16 (right to health) and 22 (the right of all peoples to their economic, social and 
cultural development) as encompassing the right to food. Although it did not define the 
content of this right, the commission listed some minimum obligations resulting from this 
right. These include the duty not to destroy or contaminate food resources; not to allow 
private parties to destroy or contaminate food resources; and not to prevent peoples’ 
efforts to feed themselves. The commission therefore concluded that Nigeria violated all 
three of these obligations.109  
 
The position taken in the Ongoni case shows that the commission is able and willing to 
adopt a creative and dynamic approach to interpreting the Charter. This therefore 
demonstrates that cases of alleged violations of economic, social and cultural rights and 
collective rights can be fully justiceable. It also means that the commission can ‘read-in’ 
those rights that have not been expressly stated in the Charter. The commission upholds 
this opinion by stating that ‘it will apply any of the diverse rights contained in the African 
Charter… and there is no right in the African Charter that cannot be made effective’.110 
This viewpoint is contrary to the popular opinion that this category of rights is 
unjusticeable, thus distinguishing the Ongoni case as a precedent for international and 
domestic courts on socio-economic and cultural rights.111   
4.3 The institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system 
4.3.1 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The reform of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights necessitates a 
multi-dimensional and incremental process, based on a careful and rigorous assessment 
of its actual performance and real potential.  It is in tandem with this realisation that this 
                                                 
109 Para 64-66. 
110 Ibid, para 68. 
111 See Odinkalu, C and Christensen, C ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
development of its non-state communications procedures’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 278. 
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part of the study examines a number of aspects of the African Commission which may be 
included in such a reform process. These aspects include, but are not limited to, the 
commission’s composition, organisation, mandates and functions.    
 
To begin with, a number of concerns have been raised regarding the commission’s 
composition and organisation. These include the mode of election, independence and 
impartiality of its members; gender representation; and equitable geographic and legal 
cultural representation.112 It has been noted, and correctly so, that the commission is 
effectively under the control of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 
(AHSG), thus bringing to question its ability to function independently and impartially.113 
A number of provisions in the Charter attest to this fact. For example, it provides for the 
establishment of the commission ‘within the OAU’114; its commissioners are political 
appointees115 and its power to make decisions, including the publication of measures 
taken lies with the AHSG.116  
 
This situation is aggravated by the fact that the commission cannot make binding 
decisions against state parties but only recommendations to the AHSG.117 This is in stark 
                                                 
112 See, for example, Nmehielle O, The African human rights system, note 1 above, p. 172; Rembe S, The 
system of protection of human rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems 
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contrast with, for instance, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which has provision for mechanisms with jurisdiction to make binding 
decisions against contracting states.118 Moreover, the involvement of the AHSG in the 
election of the commissioners has raised some doubt about the effectiveness of the 
commission, as it appears to be subordinate to the AHSG.119 These fears are confirmed 
by the fact that since its establishment, the commission has been served by Attorneys-
General, Ambassadors, Ministers, Judges, Advocates and university lecturers, who are  
normally appointed as a result of their ‘good standing’ with their governments, and not 
necessarily on the basis of their competence and human rights credentials.120 
Consequently, their election has seriously undermined the independence and credibility 
of the commission.121  
 
The independence of the commissioners is the cornerstone of the mechanism’s 
credibility. The Charter emphasises that the commissioners ‘shall serve in their personal 
capacity.’122 This means that they ought to serve independently without any iota of 
influence from their home governments, despite the fact that they were nominated by 
them.123 The appointment of commissioners who are also Ministers or Ambassadors in 
their home governments has been condemned because they can hardly function 
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independently or even effectively.124 Their efficiency is largely impaired by the workload 
that comes with the performance of multiple tasks. Some of these political appointees 
also lack expertise, commitment and interest in human rights. Their attendance of the 
commission’s sessions is therefore largely due to formality and performance of duties. 
No wonder, it is not uncommon to find as many as between four and five commissioners 
being absent as a result of engagements, not related to the commission’s work.125 
Consequently, the commission’s endearvours to improve the enforcement of human 
rights in the region has grossly been impaired.  
 
In an apparent attempt to reverse this trend, the AU has come up with guidelines on the 
election of commissioners with a view to redress the issues of independence and 
impartiality.126 The guidelines require states to only nominate and elect persons with 
requisite knowledge, expertise and commitment to human rights and whose regular 
assignments do not, or appear to, compromise their independence.127 It is interesting to 
note that in the recent nomination and election of the commissioners as well as judges of 
the African Court, these guidelines were adhered to and states only elected candidates 
whose positions and careers did not seem to conflict with their independence and 
impartiality.128 In line with the subordination argument, the AHSG has been accused of 
asserting its influence and position to interfere with the commission’s work. This is in 
light of, for example, the Assembly’s decision to suspend the publication of the African 
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Commission’s 17th Activity Report and deletion of certain aspects of the 19th Activity 
Report before its publication.129  
 
At its sixth Summit in Khartoum, Sudan, in January 2006, the Assembly decided ‘to 
adopt and authorise, in accordance with Article 59 of the Charter, the publication of the 
19th Activity Report of the African Commission and its Annexes, except for those 
containing the Resolutions on Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.’130 The 
decision to suspend the publication of the Report was made after Zimbabwe protested 
that the report did not incorporate its response to the findings of the commission on a fact 
finding mission which was part of the Annual Activity Report’s Annexes. This is despite 
the fact that the commission had solicited the said response to no avail.131 
 
The subordination of the commission to the control of the AHSG has made it impossible 
for it to effectively remedy human rights violations because states, which are normally 
the main perpetrators of violations, seemto have the last word in the commission’s 
work.132 It is therefore important for the commission to clarify its status, and dialogue 
with the AHSG to ensure that the interference in its work by both individual states and 
the Assembly is addressed.   
 
The geographical composition of the commission has also remained unsatisfactory until 
recently. It is unfortunate that the Charter does not provide for geographical and gender 
balance in the composition of the commission. Thus, over the years, most commissioners 
have come from West Africa.133 At its Twentieth Session, for instance, six 
commissioners were from West Africa, two each from North and Central Africa, and one 
from East and Southern Africa. East and Southern Africa have particularly been under-
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represented. Equitable geographical representation at the commission has often been 
made an issue, and rightly so. The reason for this is the connection between the 
geographical divides and legal cultures of Africa, and the need to have these legal 
cultures represented.134  
 
Apart from geographic representation, the issue of gender balance in the commission has 
also been of concern. From its inception, it appeared that the role of women in the 
commission was taken for granted.135 This trend has changed in the recent years and a 
more representative commission is now in place. Its membership now reflects a diversity 
of gender and the geographical regions of Africa. As at April 2007, the commissioners 
were elected as follows: two from Eastern Africa136; three from Western Africa137; one 
from North Africa138; and four from Southern Africa.139 The only region that is not 
represented is Central Africa. It should be noted that the number of female 
commissioners has also increased. The commission now has five female commissioners, 
which is almost half of the total number. The current chairperson is also a woman 
(Madame Salamata Sawadogo). This is a marked improvement that needs to be 
encouraged because the increasing participation of women in the commission will 
encourage positive developments in promotional and protective activities in the areas of 
human rights that affect women.  
 
Another area in which the commission is in need of reform relates to its promotional 
mandate. Although initiative has been taken to promote human rights in the region, the 
same has not been satisfactory, partly because the commission is hampered by a number 
of internal and external challenges. To begin with, it is inevitable to note, although 
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publicity is essential to the realisation of the commission’s promotional mandate, the 
same has not been done effectively. Odinkalu notes that one of the reasons why the 
commission has not had much impact is because many Africans are not even aware of its 
existence or, if they are, they do not appreciate its mandate and capacity.140  
 
There is the need to publicise the commission and the Charter through, for example, 
publications, promotional missions, hosting more sessions in all states and through the 
mass media. Additionally, national human rights institutions, civil society and 
educational institutions have a great role to play in creating awareness and sensitising the 
general public of the regional human rights mechanisms.141 Publicity, if taken seriously, 
would play an important role in enhancing the effective promotion of human rights. 
Individuals, NGOs and Inter-Governmental Organisations need reliable information to 
put pressure on governments.142 The lack of publicity in the work of the commission has 
contributed to the low esteem human rights have enjoyed on the continent. Moreover, 
poor publicity has led to the situation where national legislations, including constitutions 
of states parties, are at variance with the provisions of the Charter, hence complicating its 
enforcement.143  
 
Apart from the issue of publicity, the commission has also somehow failed in its 
relationship with NGOs, though admittedly, they have greatly influenced its activities.144 
For example, it was through the efforts of NGOs that the commission was able to appoint 
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Special Rapporteurs on Prisons and Other Conditions of Detention145, on Summary, 
Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Executions146, on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa, 
on Human Rights Defenders and on Women’s Rights.147 As if to appreciate and 
acknowledge their involvement in its work, the commission has so far granted observer 
status to more than 300 NGOs, to enable them to participate during its sessions.148  
 
Whereas the participation of NGOs should be encouraged, the commission has seemingly 
developed the tendency of abdicating some of its responsibilities for its actions, or 
inaction to these organisations.149 For instance, one commissioner, who merely was being 
assisted by an NGO, reportedly attributed his failure to deliver to the lack of funding 
from the NGO.150 This is rather unfortunate because the commission ought to execute its 
mandate, with the available resources, without necessarily having to rely on NGOs.  
 
In spite of assistance from NGOs, some of the Special Rapporteurs cannot boast of much 
success in their assigned areas. This has resulted to their usefulness being questioned. 
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Upon her appointment, the first Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights, for example, 
failed to undertake any of the studies on the situation of women’s rights in Africa that 
were initially planned.151  The same is noted of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions. Harrington notes the following shortcomings about this particular 
Rapporteur: 
 
Firstly, the Special Rapporteur had no expertise in the subject, no concrete notion of how 
to proceed, and no written mandate to guide him… The second problem was that there 
were no material means-financial or administrative-made available to the Special 
Rapporteur, even for writing and sending faxes and making phone calls. The Secretariat 
of the African Commission proved manifestly incapable of playing the role of 
administrative arm for the Special Rapporteur’s activities…Thirdly, the Special 
Rapporteur was professionally ill-placed to pursue investigations of, or negotiations with, 
African governments. At the time of his appointment he was a mayor. In 1997 he was 
appointed the Tunisian ambassador to Senegal….Although superficially these positions 
might have seemed as presenting him with abundant opportunities to know and influence 
African governments, in practice the nature of his duty to represent his own state made it 
extremely difficult if not impossible for him to appear at other times in the guise of an 
independent Rapporteur.152 
 
As evidenced by the above narration, it is not so much the inadequacy of the African 
Charter that hampers the African Commission’s effectiveness, but lack of resources and, 
most critical of all, lack of will power and requisite expertise on the part of some 
commissioners. The attempt by the commission to designate Special Rapporteurs to 
circumvent the constraints of the institution can only be successful where the individual 
chosen has the willingness to devote energy to the task. Unfortunately, the commission’s 
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choice of Special Rapporteurs from within its ranks has only highlighted the disparate 
nature of some commissioners’ commitment to the institution and human rights in 
general.153 
 
Additionally, the commission’s promotional activities have paid lip service to economic, 
social and cultural rights by being predominantly focused on civil and political rights.154 
Concerns have been raised by representatives of civil society organisations, in several of 
the commission’s sessions, that there is the need for a focus on socio-economic rights 
too.155 As recently as 2004, the African Commission, in collaboration with the 
International Centre for Legal Protection of Human Rights (Interights), the Cairo Institute 
for Human Rights Studies and the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, 
co-hosted a seminar on ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa.’156 The seminar 
highlighted the violation of economic, social and cultural rights in the continent, 
emphasising their neglect and relegation to a secondary status. More needs to be done by 
the commission to give weight to the promotion of this category of rights on the 
continent.  
 
At another level, it is evident that the promotional mandate of the commission is very 
extensive. However, the commission carries out its promotional activities only during the 
inter-session period. Even so, the commissioners have restricted themselves to visiting 
universities and other institutions of higher learning in the countries assigned to them, 
giving lectures on the African Charter, African human rights issues and the work of the 
commission.157 While limiting itself to such activities, the commission is definitely seized 
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with the knowledge that masses of Africans are ignorant of its existence. Hence, it needs 
to do more than just give lectures in institutions of higher learning. It could, for example, 
organise public awareness meetings in towns and villages, targeting people from diverse 
backgrounds. This, however, requires the collaboration and cooperation of African states. 
Additionally, sufficient resource allocation needs to be considered towards this end.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the size of the continent and the inadequacy of material 
and human resources present challenges to effective regional promotion of human rights. 
With one commissioner working part time and responsible for promoting the Charter in 
three to five countries, chances of effective promotion are slim.158 It is therefore 
necessary for the commission to operate through a network of national, international and 
private organisations based in those areas. Because human rights promotion requires 
publicity in the mass media, which in many African countries are still controlled by 
governments, the commission must seek the support of all stakeholders if its promotional 
mandate is to be a success.159  
 
Another promotional activity of the commission that warrants reform is the state 
reporting mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism is undermined by several 
factors, the first one being its inadequate legal framework.160 As Kofi observed, the 
reporting obligation under Article 62 of the Charter is rather terse compared to that of 
other human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR.161  Whereas the ICCPR requires 
states to report on ‘the measures’ they have adopted, the African Charter requires state 
parties to ‘report on the legislative and other measures...’162 This suggests that the African 
system places a greater emphasis on legislative measures. 
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Further, the African Commission lacks the explicit authority to make ‘general 
comments.’ On the other hand, the ICCPR gives the Human Rights Committee (now 
Human Rights Council) the authority to issue ‘general comments’.163 It was out of this 
realisation that the participants at the 1991 ‘Conference on the African Commission’ 
recommended that the commission should ‘interpret Articles 45(1)(b) and 60 of the 
Charter as providing the commission with the mandate to perform the functional 
equivalent of the Human Rights Committee’s general comments.’164 
 
The African Commission’s initial guidelines on state reporting, which were unnecessarily 
complex, also contributed to the improper functioning of the reporting mechanism. In the 
formative years of state reporting, the commission did not have clearly laid down 
procedures. Thereafter, at its 4th ordinary session in October 1991, it adopted the General 
Guidelines for National Periodic Reports.165 The initial guidelines were found not to be 
very useful because they were too detailed and complex, making it difficult for member 
states to follow.166 The commission, realising the problems associated with the 
guidelines, amended them. The subsequent amendments found states already de-
motivated and not willing to comply with their reporting obligations because no 
seriousness was attached to the mechanism from the beginning.167  
 
Other reasons for non-compliance by states with their reporting obligations under the 
Charter include the general lack of political will and the lack of a co-ordinated effort 
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between state departments.168 The non-coercive nature of the reporting procedure is also 
a potential reason for lack of commitment to the reporting process. States that submit 
their reports do so as a mere formality or a public relations exercise.169 Those that choose 
not to submit their reports are neither reproved nor punished. Simply put, many states do 
not seem to appreciate the importance of putting together and submitting their reports as 
and when due.170 Partly because of the failure by states to submit reports as they should, 
the African Commission has not fully succeeded in enhancing the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the region.  
 
The first report under the African Charter was submitted by Libya in January 1990.171 As 
at 9th March 1992, only eight state parties had submitted their initial reports.172 As at 
30th March 2000, 24 states had never submitted a report and only 12 had no overdue 
reports.173 As at June 2007, 15 states had not submitted any report, 14 states had 
submitted all their reports, while 14 states had submitted one report but owed more.174 
Moreover, most reports lack serious self-evaluation.175 Nigeria’s initial report, for 
example, was very brief and uninformative.176 Some initial reports, however, such as 
those of The Gambia, Mozambique and Algeria, were of a satisfactory standard.177  
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To overcome the problem of irregular submission and non-submission of reports, the 
commission has, since November 1995, been willing to receive reports which combine 
several years.178 However, this approach does not also seem to be working. Perhaps the 
approach of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and that of the 
Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination could be adopted to 
salvage the situation. The two UN Committees have developed procedures that enable the 
examination of a country’s human rights situation even when no report has been 
submitted.179  
 
Heyns’ recommendation, that an inter-departmental body responsible for state reporting 
should be formed in each country, ought to be considered.180 Additionally, a reporting 
support unit should be formed under the African human rights system, to assist 
governments with setting up such structures, and to train those who will staff it. Further, 
national human rights institutions should become involved in follow-up, both in respect 
of communications and reports.181  
 
Another inhibiting factor to effective state reporting is the lack of seriousness during the 
report examination proceedings. There is some indication that the report examination 
proceedings are taken lightly by both the commission and reporting states.182 For 
example, during the 18th session when the report of Tunisia was being examined, some 
shortcomings regarding the procedures were noted.183 To start with, the Rapporteur and 
the commissioners had not been provided with copies of the report and other relevant 
documents and background material. Further, no English translation of the report was 
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provided, thus effectively locking out the English speaking commissioners from 
participating in the proceedings.  
 
The commissioners were forced to restrict themselves to listening to the presentation of 
the Tunisian delegate and to exchanging opinions than posing concrete questions of 
substance and criticising the government’s information or offering assistance and 
guidance for changes of the Tunisian legislation and administrative practice.184 At the 
21st ordinary session of the commission, the situation had not changed significantly. The 
reports of Sudan and Zimbabwe were available only in English, thus eliminating the non-
English-speaking commissioners from the examination proceedings.185  
 
At the 28th ordinary session of the commission held in Benin in 2000, the reports of 
Namibia and Ghana were not examined because their representatives did not show up.186 
Earlier, at its 25th ordinary session in 1999187, the African Commission was compelled to 
adopt a resolution concerning the Republic of Seychelles’ refusal to present its initial 
report.188 The resolution noted that the commission had since its 17th session invited 
Seychelles to present its initial report. However, the government had refused to abide by 
the request, under the pretext of unavailability of resources to implement such an 
obligation.189  
 
Considering this to be a breach of Article 62 of the African Charter, the commission 
invited the Assembly of Heads of State and Government ‘to express their disapproval of 
such a persistent refusal that amounts to a deliberate violation of the Charter by the 
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
185 See Malstrom S, ‘21st ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(1997) 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p 382. 
186 Murray R, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2001) 19 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights, p. 94. 
187 Held at Bujumbura, Burundi, 26 April to 5 May 1999. 
188 Murray R, ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, note 186 above, p. 94. 
189 Kofi Q, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards a more effective reporting 
mechanism’, note 160 above, p. 277. 
 435
Republic of Seychelles.’190 It further requested the Assembly ‘to invite Seychelles to 
abide by the Charter and to consider the appropriate measures to be taken against the 
Republic of Seychelles.’191 In spite of the commission’s efforts, Seychelles’ report could 
still not be examined afterwards because no delegate was there to present it.192  
 
Even when representatives are sent by states, it sometimes happens that they are unable 
to provide the required information in response to questions from the commission. A 
good example to be cited in this regard is that of Ghana’s Chargé d’Affaires who 
presented the country’s initial report in 1993.193 The representative’s incompetence 
warranted the commission to urge the government of Ghana to submit in writing 
additional information and response to questions which could not be answered by the 
representative during the examination of the report.194  
 
If the reporting mechanism is to be effective, it is necessary for the commission to start 
taking the exercise more seriously.195 The commission also needs to adopt a more critical 
examination and assessment attitude in the form of concluding observations.196 Indeed, 
this approach was attempted at the commission’s 29th session in 2001.197 The commission 
adopted concluding observations, pointing out positive aspects, areas of concern, and 
recommendations to states parties, in respect of the reports presented by Algeria, Congo, 
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Ghana and Namibia.198 Unfortunately, the commission has not been consistent in its 
approach of giving concluding observations.199 Viljoen correctly noted that without 
concluding observations the reporting process ‘has little meaning because no critical 
evaluation can be conducted without the commission stating its position on the facts 
presented before it.’200 
 
It is said that the report examination process usually ends with profuse thanks to the 
representatives, without any advice to the state parties on how to improve their human 
rights situations.201 This defeats the logic and essence of having the process in the first 
place. It is equally unfortunate that the commission lacks sufficient time to examine 
reports in detail because it has too much to do within a fixed period in the course of its 
sessions. The time allocated for the examination proceedings should be extended since 
state reports inform the commission on the extent to which the Charter’s provisions have 
been given effect at the state level.202  
   
Another inhibiting factor to the effectiveness of the reporting mechanism is related to 
budgetary constraints and secretarial problems. Some of the problems mentioned above, 
such as the lack of adequate time to consider reports and their non-submission in the 
approved languages, are linked to budgetary constraints and the resulting lack of 
secretarial support.203 These problems have given rise to other challenges such as limited 
periods of working sessions, inability to make documents available for circulation to 
those who need them, default in transcription and translation of reports; and the 
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unavailability of easy access to modern communication technology such as e-mail and 
the internet. Financial allocations from the OAU/AU have often declined rather than 
increased.204 This, of course, can be attributed to the existent difficulty of the Union to 
recover the total amount of budget contributions from member states.  
 
Under Article 41 of the African Charter, the commission of the African Union is 
responsible for the costs of the African Commission’s operations, including the provision 
of staff, financial and other resources, necessary for the effective discharge of its 
mandate.205 During the 2006 financial year, the commission was allocated One million 
one hundred and forty-two thousand four hundred and thirty six United States Dollars.206 
In the 2007 financial year, there was a five per cent increase to the 2006 budget. This 
brought the budget to about $ 1,199,557.8.207 Out of this amount, only $ 47,000 was 
allocated for the commission’s programmes, including promotion and protection 
missions.  
 
As per the commission, this amount is enough to cover only four promotion missions in a 
year, whereas the commissioners are expected to undertake at least two missions each in 
any year.208 There is no allocation for research, training/capacity building, special 
mechanisms activities, projects, seminars and conferences, commemoration of human 
rights events, such as the Africa Human Rights Day, etc. This amount does not cover 
even a third of the cost of the promotion missions for commissioners and special 
mechanisms earmarked for a year.209 This explains the magnitude of the financial strain 
the commission is currently facing.  
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Consequently, the commission continues to resort to extra-budgetary sources to 
supplement AU funding. It has therefore been relying on material and financial support 
from its partners, such as the Danish Human Rights Institute210, Rights and 
Democracy211, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)212, Open 
Society Initiative for West African (OSIWA)213, and the Republic of South Africa214, 
among others. The extra-budgetary resources, notwithstanding, the financial situation at 
the Secretariat of the commission is still disturbing. For example, by the end of 2007, the 
commission had only 23 members of staff to undertake its enormous tasks.215 The staff 
provided to the commission by the AU is clearly inadequate to effectively support its 
very broad mandate.  
 
It cannot be gainsaid that the effectiveness of the Secretariat is critical for the success of 
the African Commission. The commission considers at least fifty communications at each 
ordinary session and a lot of research is needed to finalise a communication.216 Given the 
workload of, for example, the Special Rapporteurs, each of them should have at least one 
full-time legal officer to coordinate their activities. At the moment however, only two of 
them have been provided with legal officers on short term basis.217 Legal officers should 
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also be appointed to advise commissioners on state reports. To promote human and 
peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa— a vast continent of 53 independent 
states— the current staff strength is clearly inadequate. 
 
 The above are the key factors inhibiting the effectiveness of the state reporting 
mechanism. There may be others that are either connected with or incidental to these. It 
should therefore suffice to state that the above discussed factors are only instructive but 
not exhaustive. It is not possible, in a study of this magnitude, to analyse in detail all the 
challenges to state reporting. Apart from the specific suggestions and recommendations 
discussed above, there are a number of other ways the state reporting mechanism can be 
reinvigorated and made more effective. One such stategy is to increase the role of NGOs 
and national human rights Institutions in state reporting. For example, the commission 
can request these organisations to furnish ‘shadow’ or alternative reports to those of the 
states. The ‘shadow’ or alternative reports provide the requisite information that will 
enable the African Commission to engage in constructive dialogue with state 
representatives when the reports are considered.218 Experience at the UN level has shown 
that reports are better prepared where the state encouraged inputs from NGOs and also 
when there is widespread dissemination of the report, making it possible for the public to 
give comments thereon.219  
 
The practice of furnishing ‘shadow’ reports is also entrenched in the European system. 
Article 23 of the European Social Charter imposes on governments an obligation to send 
their periodic reports to national organisations of employers and trade unions. These 
organisations have the right to comment on the report, and the government has a duty to 
forward the comments to the monitoring bodies.220 The African Commission could adopt 
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similar approaches as under the European Social Charter and UN system in its dealings 
with the NGOs. NGOs can also play the very important role of ensuring that the 
commission’s recommendations are in fact respected by states.221 The increased 
involvement of these organisations is also essential because the commission is 
logistically limited to monitor compliance with its recommendations.  
 
The national human rights institutions and NGOs that have been granted observer status 
with the commission may be relied on to put the necessary pressure on their governments 
to supply their reports.222 Moreover, NGOs should not only participate in the processes of 
preparing ‘shadow’ reports but should also be encouraged to be present during the 
examination of state reports. The fact that states would be aware that NGOs are present 
and ready to furnish the commission with information may check dishonesty in state 
reporting, besides putting pressure on states to remedy violations to avoid embarrassment 
before the commission.223 If the NGOs and national human rights institutions perform 
their functions as required, a more effective monitoring system could be guaranteed. 
 
Another strategy to reinvigorate the state reporting mechanism is to involve African 
Union (AU) organs in its implementation. The success of the mechanism depends, to a 
significant extent, on the possibility of exposing and sanctioning non-compliant states. 
The exposure of non-compliant states may go a long way to improve state reporting 
because African governments are never comfortable with adverse publicity, especially 
with respect to their poor human rights records.224 There is sufficient legal basis on which 
the African Commission can rely in order to bring on board some AU organs in its state 
reporting activities. 
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Article 45(1)(c) of the African Charter, for example, calls on the African Commission, 
when performing its functions, to ‘co-operate with other African and international 
institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights.’ 
This is a general provision that could be interpreted liberally to allow the commission to 
work with any organ of the AU in its state reporting activities.225 The commission could, 
for instance, collaborate with relevant AU organs to induce some degree of political 
pressure on a recalcitrant state, as a way of strengthening the state reporting mechanism. 
The fear of expulsion from the AU is perhaps one of the sanctions that could eventually 
compel African states to honour their obligations under the African Charter. A pro-
human rights interpretation of Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
could be used to achieve this result.226 This Article provides that: 
 
… [A]ny member state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union 
may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications 
links with other member states, and other measures of a political and economic nature to 
be determined by the Assembly. 
 
This provision may be used by the AU to come up with, for example, policies and 
resolutions on state reporting that states ought to comply with. This way, the AU will be 
fully involved in ensuring that this process becomes a success. As it stands today, the 
state reporting mechanism requires more seriousness on the part of both the commission 
and the states parties to the Charter.  
 
Other than its promotional mandate, the effectiveness of the protective mandate of the 
commission, which is exercised mainly through the communication (complaints) 
procedure, has been and is still being, undermined by several factors. First, for a long 
time, there was uncertainty as to whether the commission had the authority to consider 
individual complaints, and also about the exact mandate of the commission when 
considering such complaints.227 Article 58 provides for a special procedure to be 
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followed by the commission in the case of ‘a series of serious or massive’ human rights 
violations. However, it was not entirely clear from the text whether individual 
communications could be considered by the commission if these communications did not 
reveal such ‘serious or massive violations.’228 The commission has taken upon itself, on 
the basis of Article 55229 of the Charter, to consider individual communications, even if 
they do not reveal serious or massive violations.230  
 
Moreover, the requirement under Article 58 that the commission should draw the 
attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to prima facie situations of 
serious or massive violations, and then await further instructions from the Assembly, 
proved to be a dead letter, since the latter has apparently never responded to such 
requests.231 This has, however, not deterred the commission from finding ‘a series of 
serious or massive violations’ in a number of cases, without necessarily bringing such 
cases to the attention of the AHSG.232  
 
In some cases, the commission has failed or ignored to deal with states against which 
several communications alleging serious and massive violations were pending. For 
example, in separate cases brought against Chad233, Malawi234, Zaire235 and Rwanda236, 
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the commission found that there were serious and massive violations, but it did not take 
action beyond these findings.237 In the case of Rwanda, on receipt of complaints alleging 
serious and massive violations of the right to life in October 1990, the commission 
contacted Rwanda for permission to conduct on-site investigation.238 Although Rwanda 
immediately granted permission for the same, the commission was unable to carry out the 
investigation probably due to financial and other administrative reasons.239  
 
It is also evident that the Charter is not clear on what kind of findings the commission is 
able to make after the consideration of individual communications and what the possible 
remedies are.240 Nonetheless, the commission has developed a practice of its own in this 
regard, which has been discussed at length in the previous chapter. What needs to be 
done, however, is to entrench the commission’s procedure in the Charter or in the 
commission’s Rules of Procedure.241 It is advisable for the Charter to be revised to 
provide a clear legal basis for making of findings and recommendations by the 
commission.  
 
On remedies, the commission has not applied a consistent approach in some cases.242 For 
instance, while it ordered the annulment of the offending decrees in Civil Liberties 
Organisation v. Nigeria243, it failed to do the same in other cases with similar facts.244 
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This has brought to question its ability to chastice recalcitrant states. It is therefore 
proposed that the commission should be consistent when awarding remedies for cases 
with similar facts. Additionally, the pronouncement of such remedies should be clear and 
unambiguous. Some of the remedies the commission previously awarded were not 
clear.245 For instance in the Banda and Chirwa Cases, while it found serious violations 
and that the Malawian government was liable for violations committed by the previous 
regime, it did not clearly recommend the appropriate remedy. The commission merely 
stated that the government was ‘responsible for the reparation of these abuses.’246  
 
In three other cases in which it found massive violations, the commission blindly 
accepted the government’s arguments that it had an amnesty law under which various 
crimes were covered and that the subsequent fair trial of one of the complainants 
absolved the government from liability.247 The commission should have analysed the 
government’s alleged fairness of the complainant’s trial and accord remedies arising from 
the state’s actions before exonerating it.248 As a result of its failure to do so, one is left to 
wonder whether ‘a subsequent fair trial’ is a form of remedy acknowledged by the 
commission. If so, it is not clear whether the victim would be entitled to some form of 
compensation for past injustices or for miscarriage of justice that occurred prior to the 
fair trial.   
 
Additionally, the quality of the commission’s decisions is quite unsatisfactory.249 
Generally, they are not detailed and seldom expound on the Charter’s provisions.250 It is 
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therefore recommended that the commission should make its decisions more elaborate. 
Other than expressly citing the relevant provisions of the Charter, the decisions should be 
supported by judicial precedents, as well as jurisprudence from national and other 
international mechanisms. Such elaborate and well formulated decisions are essential in 
deepening the normative understanding of the rights in the Charter.251  
 
Further, recent efforts by the commission to publish its decisions must be supported and 
enhanced. In addition, the commission should welcome and encourage efforts by 
individuals and organisations to publish its work.252 The commission’s findings on 
communications were confidential prior to the release of the Seventh Annual Activity 
Report in 1994. In this Activity Report, the commission for the first time included an 
Annex with information on the individual communications submitted to it.  
 
 Another factor inhibiting the effectiveness of the commission’s protective mandate is the 
inordinate delay between the institution of a complaint and making of a final decision 
thereon. Until the 16th Session of the commission, for instance, it often took between two 
to six years for the commission to render its decision on admissibility.253 For example, 
Diakité v. Gabon254 was filed with the commission in April 1992. The commission, 
however, declared this case inadmissible more than eight years later, a length of delay 
that is both unsatisfactory and worrisome. In Association pour la defence des droits de 
l’homme et des libertés v. Djibouti255, where the commission delayed the case for unduly 
long, the matter was later resolved amicably.256  
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The inadequate staffing and management of the commission’s Secretariat, particularly 
during the initial years of the commission’s existence and the failure of states to respond 
promptly to the commission’s inquiries are said to have contributed to these delays.257 
The commission’s recent approach of presuming the truth of allegations contained in 
communications and its proceeding to hear cases, notwithstanding a state’s silence, is 
commendable for speeding up the dispensation of justice. Now, on average, the 
commission is said to be rendering its admissibility decisions between six months and 
one and a half years after the filing of a communication.258 There is still the need to 
increase the sessions of the commission as well as the staffing of the Secretariat to avoid 
any further delays in the dispensation of justice.   
 
Another factor that undermines the protective mandate of the commission, which is also 
related to inordinate delay, is the lack of organisation at sessions.259 Murray noted that 
although the commission holds two sessions per year, lasting fifteen days each, the 
efficient use of time during the session is lacking.260 It has further been noted that in 
some instances, the commitment of individual commissioners to the discharge of their 
responsibilities has been pathetic and the commission’s internal checks on such conduct 
have not been sufficient.261 Although the commission has an obligation to police itself262, 
in most cases it has failed to do so.  
 
Mugwanya observes that the commission has always been reluctant to take action in 
cases where commissioners’ perpetual absence constituted negligence or the lack of 
commitment.263 One example he cited in this regard is when the commission failed to 
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bring to the attention of the Secretary-General the fact that commissioner Beye had not 
attended five consecutive Ordinary sessions and two Extraordinary sessions in 1989 and 
1995.264 It was further noted that, in several instances, the commission begins its session 
with the requisite quorum but the quorum degenerates in the course of the session when 
some commissioners leave prematurely.265  
 
The commission also lacks detailed written record of the debates and decisions taken at 
the sessions.266 Murray succinctly captures this position when she stated as follows: 
 
A final communiqué is produced at the end of sessions, but this is only a few pages long 
and often does not detail the discussions on specific points. As a result, there are many 
occasions where it is either not possible to remember what issues were raised, whether 
any decision was reached at a previous session or, if so, what it was. There is thus 
considerable repetition of previous discussions, which wastes valuable time. While 
submissions made by participants at the session are now collected, copied and 
disseminated to participants, sometimes by the end of that day, this has for long not been 
the case.267  
 
She therefore rightly suggests that the commission could improve its own efficiency by 
requiring its Secretariat to make a detailed report of the session and disseminate it 
amongst the commissioners, NGOs, states and other participants.268 
 
Like its promotional activities, the protective activities of the commission also lack ample 
publicity. The commission has developed a practice of publishing its decisions on 
communications in detail in its Activity Reports. Unfortunately, these reports are not 
disseminated widely enough. Consequently not many international bodies and national 
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
265See Ankumah E, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 1 above, p. 48. 
266 Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000…’, note 1 above, p. 8.   
267 Ibid.  
268 Ibid. 
 448
judicial systems are aware of the commission’s decisions.269 Indeed, it is not sufficient 
for the commission to post its decisions on its website, more so as annexes in its Annual 
Activity Reports, without giving them ample publicity among, for example, the states 
parties and other AU organs.  
 
Another inhibiting factor to the effectiveness of the commission’s protective mandate is 
the lack of proper follow-up procedures.270 Although the commission recommends some 
forms of remedies, their enforcement is lacking. The African Charter is devoid of 
mechanisms that could compel states parties to abide by the recommendations; neither 
has the commission laid down procedures to supervise their enforcement. This effectively 
confines the enforcement of the commission’s recommendations to the goodwill of the 
states concerned.271 At present the commission’s follow up is made through diplomatic 
note verbales, during field missions and during its ordinary sessions when state delegates 
are present.272 This approach, however, has failed to yield satisfactory results. 
 
The commission has evolved the practice of requiring states to include, in their 
subsequent country reports, the measures they have taken to comply with the remedies 
stated in its recommendations.273 It has been been argued, and rightly so, that this is not 
an effective follow-up mechanism because not every state party to the Charter submits its 
country reports.274 The effectiveness of this practice is yet to be realised. It is 
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recommended that a Special Rapporteur on follow-up should be appointed.275 In the same 
manner, the commission should endeavour to award and monitor state compliance with 
interim measures to prevent irreparable harm to victims of human rights violations.  
 
Few interim or provisional orders have so far been issued by the commission.276 Even 
then, they have not been elaborate enough.277 For instance, in Degli v. Togo278, the 
commission generally called upon the state ‘to ensure the security of the individual and 
avoid any irreparable prejudice being inflicted on the victim of the alleged violations.’ In 
the Ken Saro Wiwa case279, the complaint revealed serious acts of torture against Ken 
Saro Wiwa. Although the commission acknowledged the need for interim measures to 
prevent the occurrence of irreparable harm, the interim measures ordered were also not 
specific.280 
  
The commission is also affected by the persistent lack of support and cooperation from 
states, especially when it comes to the enforcement of its recommendations. The eleven 
commissioners cannot do much without states carrying out their obligations under the 
Charter.281 Political leaders are sometimes tempted to take a stand on human rights 
situation based on what they consider to be their own national interest.282 For example, 
there have been unfortunate instances of democratic governments supporting dictatorial 
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regimes in Africa. Beneath the ostensible reasons are profit motives and political or 
ideological advantages they wish to exploit.283   
    
States parties have failed to comply with their obligations under the Charter and some 
have deliberately ignored recommendations made by the commission.284 In 2004, for 
example, the African Commission granted provisional measures to the Endorois 
community in Kenya.285 It urged the state to take immediate steps to ensure that no 
further mining concessions were issued or land transferred prior to the decision of the 
commission on the substance of the matter. The provisional measures notwithstanding, 
mining went on in the region. By the 39th Ordinary Session the communication was still 
being considered on its merits but the state was yet to heed to the provisional measures.286 
Another example is the landmark Ogoni decision.287 The recommendations made in the 
decision including that environmental and social impact assessments be conducted and 
the victims be adequately compensated, are yet to be implemented.   
 
At its 24th Ordinary Session, the African Commission adopted a resolution noting the 
lack of compliance by states parties with its recommendations on communications. It 
called upon those states which had not implemented the recommendations to do so 
without delay, within 90 days from notification.288 The commission stated that it would 
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submit a report on human rights situation and the extent of compliance of each state with 
its recommendations to each session of the Executive Council of the AU.289 The 
resolution notwithstanding, most, if not all, concerned states are yet to implement the 
commission’s recommendations. It appears that it is impossible to execute 
recommendations of the commission in the respondent state unless the latter agrees to do 
so voluntarily.  
 
The fact that the African human rights system lacks efficient mechanisms to enforce the 
commission’s recommendations has resulted to the continued neglect of its decisions by 
states. It is hoped that the AU and its new structures and institutions will provide a 
framework to ensure decisions reached by the African Commission and court, when it 
commences its proceedings, are implemented. It has correctly been argued that the 
successful enforcement of human rights in Africa will depend, in large part, on the 
development of economic integration among states on the continent.290  
 
The AU structure offers the highest level of economic integration that African states 
could aspire for. Viewed together with the provision for sanctions under Article 23(2) of 
the Constitutive Act, trade and other economic activities come within the purview of the 
‘other measures of … economic nature to be determined by the Assembly’ as tools for 
sanctioning recalcitrant states. If this tool is used effectively, states will be compelled to 
honour their human rights obligations under the system. It is also recommended that the 
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African Union should exercise its right to intervene in a member state in respect of grave 
circumstances of human rights violations as envisaged in the Constitutive Act.291  
 
The recently established Peace and Security Council of the African Union may also be 
useful in assisting the commission to enforce some of its recommendations, especially 
where the continuing violations are serious or massive. Additionally, the Charter should 
be revised to enhance the commission’s powers to ensure that its decisions are complied 
with and its remedies are enforced. Where a state fails to do so, or where an amicable 
settlement is not forthcoming, the state should be punished accordingly.  
 
The effectiveness of the African commission can also be improved through strengthening 
its Secretariat. This would entail a number of things, for instance, increasing the number 
of its professional staff.292 In particular, legal experts and competent press personnel are 
needed to expedite and publicise the work of the commission. Moreover, the quality of 
personnel should be emphasised. Recruitment of the staff should include, among others, 
African legal experts and scholars.   
 
Even though the Charter does not assign any specific function to the Secretariat, it is 
customary for secretariats of this nature to perform administrative and other management 
functions in line with their respective mandates.293 This is especially because 
commissions of this nature are usually composed of part-time commissioners, who may 
probably not be able to oversee the day to day running of the Secretariat or perform other 
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administrative functions.294 As a result of the Charter’s silence in this regard, the rules of 
procedure of the commission prescribe some roles to the secretariat.295 It follows, 
therefore, that the resource implications in carrying out the functions assigned to the 
Secretariat are enormous. However, as explained above, this has been one of the areas 
where the African system has been found wanting.296  
 
To strengthen its secretariat, the commission could also initiate programmes that would 
attract people from across the continent to visit it and contribute to its work. This may 
include a fully-funded legal researchers’ programme for post-graduate students from 
African universities, pursuing degrees that are relevant to the commission’s work.  
African universities and institutions of higher learning should also be encouraged to send 
researchers, students and distinguished scholars to the commission on a regular basis.297 
The more people get to understand the system, the better. This is because, an insight into 
the system will reveal the potential areas of reforms thereto. 
 
The efficiency of the commission could also be enhanced if sub-commissions, entrusted 
with promotional activities are established. The sub-commissions, based on the main 
geographical divides of the continent, will represent the Western, Eastern, Northern, 
Central and Southern regions of the continent. Apart from conducting promotional 
activities, the sub-commissions could receive communications, from their regions, on 
behalf of the commission and process them in accordance with the requirements of the 
Charter and the Rules of Procedure.298 The admissible communications would then be 
forwarded to the commission’s headquarters to be determined in accordance with the laid 
down procedures.  
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As far as accessing the court is concerned, the sub-commissions would assist in the 
admissibility process, in accordance with the court’s Protocol and the Rules of Procedure. 
They could also examine the reports from states within their sub-regions. The rationale 
for the creation of sub-commissions is to bring the activities of the African human rights 
system closer to the people. As argued earlier, the African continent is vast, consisting of 
states with ideological, social, economic and political differences. Thus, sub-
commissions will create a sense of identity and cohesiveness amongst the few states 
within a sub-region. This reasoning can be supported by at least two arguments.  
 
First, given the diversity of the continent, it is possible for sub-regional arrangements to 
be more readily accepted than global, or even regional, arrangements. Arguably, a state 
would confidently submit to international supervision if the machinery is set up by a 
group of like-minded states. Moreover, a state is expected to be more willing to yield to a 
sub-commission comprising of its friends and neighbours, than to a regional commission 
in which it plays a relatively insignificant role. The emergence of Regional Economic 
Commissions (RECs) attests to this fact. It is evident that states are more responsive to 
these commissions than to the continental bodies.299 
 
Secondly, it is obviously more convenient for a case to be heard within the sub-region 
than elsewhere. This is largely because, complainants will not have to travel long 
distances and more witnesses could be summoned than it may be the case with a regional 
arrangement. Also, it is more likely for states within a sub-region to agree on sanctions 
against another member than at a continental level. Further, the establishment of sub-
commissions will to some extent generate competition amongst the various sub-
commissions as each will strive to ensure that it does not lag behind in matters of human 
rights, or that it is not publicly criticised as a sub-region with the worst human rights 
record.300 commissioners are also more likely to take interest in human rights violations 
in their sub-regions than on the continental level.   
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Definitely, the pragmatism of establishing sub-commissions may be contested on grounds 
of their financial implication. It may be argued that since the commission is faced with 
financial constraints, it is not conducive at this time to implement the idea of sub-
commissions, especially if their budgets would strain the meagre resources of the human 
rights system. To overcome the financial implications of establishing sub-commissions, it 
is proposed that each sub-region should take care of the expenses of its sub-commission. 
The commissioners who come from the sub-region will then be in-charge of the activities 
thereof and report to the commission. Thus, their emoluments will continue to be drawn 
from the AU coffers. 
 
The creation of sub-commissions would encourage division of labour and efficiency of 
the commission. It would also ensure that the commissioners are put to more productive 
use that it is currently the case. The involvement and participation of NGOs from within a 
sub-region would also be enhanced. Further, the commission will also be more accessible 
to people who will not have to travel to The Gambia to have their rights vindicated, 
unless it becomes very necessary for them to do so. Finally, the commission’s interaction 
with sub-regional mechanisms such as ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC, and the 
tribunals established under them, will be invigorated through the proposed sub-
commissions.301 This will have a positive impact on the jurisprudence of the African 
human rights system. 
4.3.2 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
At the time of compiling this part of the study, the African Court had not yet commenced 
its proceedings. Its Rules of Procedure are still being drafted, its Registry has not yet 
been set up and it is not known when it will consider its first case. In 2006, the court 
submitted its first Activity Report to the AU Summit, noting that it had held three 
meetings since the appointment of its Judges in 2006.302 The Report cited a number of 
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challenges already faced by the court in its initial months of operation. These include 
heavy dependence on the AU Commission, lack of awareness among those in the AU 
Commission of the importance and status of the court and lack of headquarters. After 
deliberating on the Activity Report, the Assembly, among other things, instructed the AU 
Commission to liaise with Tanzania in order to facilitate the establishment of the 
headquarters of the court in in Arusha.303  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, the process of establishing the court has generally 
been very slow.  This is evidenced by the fact that, it took longer than five years to secure 
the fifteen ratifications required for the entry into force of the court’s Protocol. This is not 
very encouraging, given the fact that its creation took more than thirty years from the 
time it was first mooted.304 With the atrocities in Darfur (Sudan), Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Chad, Zimbabwe, and other violations taking place across the continent, it is 
obvious that the court is essential and its delayed operationalisation should not be 
condoned. The AU could not continue to fold its hands, while many Africans continue to 
be victims of human rights violations. 
 
It is inevitable to note that the prolonged operationalisation of the court is one of the 
challenges facing regional enforcement of human rights under the African system. In the 
first place, the idea of a regional human rights court in Africa has been resisted for a 
number of reasons. The main argument has been that there are adequate mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights at the national level.305 This argument is premised on the 
assumption that there is no need for a regional court because national bills of rights 
reflect all the important provisions of human rights treaties and may be enforced through 
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constitutional courts. A regional human rights court, according to this argument, will 
therefore encourage unnecessary duplication of the mandates of these courts.306     
 
This argument should be rejected given the ineptitude of national courts of most African 
states. Not every African state can boast of effective judicial protection of human rights. 
Additionally, as O’Shea correctly argues, a national constitution is not only an instrument 
for the protection of human rights, but is also a reflection of the general needs and 
interests of a particular state.307 It follows, therefore, that whenever there is a conflict 
between the general interests and human rights provisions of a constitution, the court may 
be called upon to balance the two. This balancing and its attendant limitation of human 
rights may offend internationally accepted standards for the protection of human rights 
and should therefore be subjected to international judicial scrutiny.308  
 
Another challenge to the potential effectiveness of the court may be linked to resource 
allocation. African states are ravaged by poverty and in most cases they are left with no 
option but to prioritise their resource allocation. Already, there are a number of new 
institutions that require support from states in terms of resources. Additionally, a majority 
of the African states rely on donor aid to manage their huge economic burdens. Given 
such circumstances, having a regional court, that would more likely than not have further 
adverse economic implications, is not an idea most states are prepared to embrace at the 
moment.  
 
Further, certain provisions on the jurisdiction of the court also present certain challenges 
which may have negative implications to its effectiveness. Article 3(1) provides that: ‘the 
jurisdiction of the court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant 
human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.’ Article 7 further states: ‘the 
court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights 
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instruments ratified by the states concerned.’ These provisions could create a whole range 
of uncertainties.  
 
It has been argued, they give the court a wider adjudicatory jurisdiction than the other 
regional human rights systems.309 Whereas the European310 and Inter-American311 human 
rights courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the conventions under which they 
were established, the above provisions could well be interpreted to mean that the African 
court has the jurisdiction to consider cases brought before it under any human rights 
treaty ratified by the states concerned. These include UN and other African human rights 
treaties. Some commentators have indeed taken this approach.312  
 
Consequently, Article 3(1) should be amended to provide that the court exercises 
jurisdiction over the African Charter and other relevant instruments promulgated under 
the AU.313 In the event an amendment is not preferred, the African Court should make it 
clear at the earliest opportunity that it does not exercise jurisdiction over the entire corpus 
of human rights treaties ratified by African states.  Additionally, Article 7 of the Protocol 
grants the court much less latitude than the commission is granted under the African 
Charter. This is bound to lead to a difference in the way the rights in the Charter are 
interpreted by the commission and the court.314 
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Another area of equal importance to the court’s efficiency is its power to issue binding 
judgements. The ability of the system to bring about change depends on how binding the 
judgements of the African Court will be.315 Article 30 of the Protocol provides that state 
parties ‘undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties 
within the time stipulated by the African Court and to guarantee its execution.’ Apart 
from this provision, the Protocol does not seem to provide for any sanction against a state 
that deliberately refuses to comply with the court’s judgments. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the court seems to be largely at the mercy and willingness of states to 
comply with its decisions.316  
 
States parties therefore ought to be compelled to comply with, and enforce the 
judgements of the court. At least one of two approaches could be used to achieve this 
intention. First, Article 30 of the Protocol could be amended with an express provision 
spelling out the consequences of a state’s failure to comply with, or enforce the court’s 
judgements. Alternatively, the court’s Rules of Procedure could provide for the 
enforcement of the court’s judgements at the national level because supra-national 
enforcement of decisions is normally practically difficult.317 This difficulty is mainly 
caused by the reluctance of states to enforce decisions against each another. Perhaps, this 
is instigated by the general fear that if a state chastises another, the same would most 
probably be done to it sooner or later.318  
 
Suffice it to state that the success, or otherwise, of the African Court will to a large extent 
depend on the willingness of states to embrace the core values of the African human 
rights system. As Mutua notes, this is a two-dimensional obligation: first, it necessitates 
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that states incorporate the provisions of the African Charter into their own municipal laws 
and ensure compliance with it. Secondly, it necessitates that states accept and obey the 
judgments of the court notwithstanding ideological conflicts that may exist between their 
own jurisprudence and that of the court.319 The court will only be useful if it will manage 
to correct the shortcomings of the African system and provide victims of human rights 
violations with an effective and accessible forum to vindicate their rights.320 It is needless 
to state that the court will not meet the expectations of Africans if it is not provided with 
material and other forms of support that it may require for its effective performance.321 
 
4.3.3 Institutional overlaps and duplication and their challenges to the 
effective enforcement of human rights in the region 
 
In the main, this part of the study adds our voices to the ongoing debate on 
mainstreaming of the human rights system within the AU in order to strengthen it. It has 
been argued that the failure to mainstream the system within the former OAU partly 
explains the weaknesses that have been experienced in the implementation and 
enforcement of the regional human rights instruments.322 Similarly, failure to anchor the 
system in the newly created AU is more likely to reproduce the marginalisation 
experienced under the OAU. As already stated earlier, the African human rights system 
has not remained static since its inception. Rather, it has been advancing both 
normatively and institutionally.  
 
For instance, while the African Commission used to be its sole enforcement mechanism, 
the African Court has lately been established to complement it and there is also the 
possibility of the African Court of Justice being instrumental in human rights protection 
in the region. Additionally, the AU has undertaken a number of initiatives geared towards 
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human rights promotion and protection in the region. These include the creation of the 
NEPAD and APRM, as well as other organs created under the Constitutive Act of the 
AU. As a result of these developments, the regional human rights system seems to suffer 
from normative and institutional overlaps, tending towards duplication and 
proliferation.323  
 
A number of examples could be cited to vindicate this argument. Most notable is the 
duplication of certain functions between the African Commission and the Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (herein after ‘the Committee’).324 The 
Committee, established under Article 32 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (herein after ‘Children’s Charter’), has promotional and protective 
mandates that are more or less similar to those of the African Commission. For example, 
the protective mandate includes examining periodic reports by states325 and receiving and 
determining complaints by individuals and groups, as well as intestate complaints.326 This 
is regardless the fact that the rights and freedoms of children, although elaborated and 
expanded in the Children’s Charter, can easily be interpreted and enforced through the 
African Commission, as well as the African Court.327 
 
At another level, duplication is apparent between the African Court of Justice (ACJ) and 
the African human rights court. As stated earlier, the jurisdiction of the regional human 
rights court ‘shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant human 
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rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.’328 Undoubtedly, therefore, the 
enforcement of human rights is its core business. The ACJ, on the other hand, has a 
broader jurisdiction extending to all AU treaties and conventions and other issues 
concerning international law, including bilateral issues between AU member states.329 
Moreover, the Assembly of the Union may confer jurisdiction on the court over any other 
dispute.330  
 
Hence, there is a broad symmetry in both courts in relation to their composition and 
jurisdiction.331 Like the African Court, the ACJ has the competence to interpret and apply 
the CAAU.332 Thus, their jurisdictions overlap in the sense that, while the ACJ could 
adjudicate on human rights matters that fall within the competence of the human rights 
court, the latter could be requested to give advisory opinions or hear cases based on the 
human rights provisions of the CAAU. There is therefore the possibility of the two courts 
rendering conflicting judgements on human rights issues if allowed to operate 
independently from each other.333  
 
There is also potential duplication and jurisdictional conflicts likely to be experienced by 
the African human rights court and the commission. Both the commission334 and the 
court335 are mandated to interpret the Charter and receive communications. However, 
there is no clarity as to when it would be appropriate to submit a complaint to the court 
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rather than to the commission, or vice versa. It is equally important to note that the AU is 
not precluded from establishing more institutions than those currently in place. The 
CAAU mandates the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to establish more 
institutions if this would be desirable for the achievement of the Union’s objectives.336  
 
One would therefore concur with Magliveras and Naldi that ‘the number of organs of the 
Union appears to be very large and in the long run it could not only result in the 
cumbersome operation of the Union but also present a financial burden.’337 Additionally, 
as Kithure observed, the proliferation of institutions and norms at the regional level is 
likely to present problems to African states regarding how to allocate resources and 
personnel to deal with the attendant obligations.338 Even if funds were available, this 
should not serve as permission to create many institutions with their attendant operational 
and staffing needs.  
 
With rationalised, synchronised and consolidated institutions, any increased funding will 
make more effective contribution in achieving demonstrable results in the promotion and 
protection of human rights and enhancing justice and the rule of law on the continent.339 
In under-resourced Africa, the proliferation of institutions should be a source of concern, 
since understaffing and under-funding plague the existing human rights institutions and 
mechanisms on the continent.340 As stated earlier, the African Commission is currently 
under severe shortage of human and financial resources, which restricts its effective 
functioning.   
 
The foregoing therefore stresses the need to mainstream and rationalise the existing 
regional human rights institutions in a way that they can complement but not duplicate 
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each other. In the context of the present study, ‘mainstreaming’ should be understood to 
mean the process that would involve the consolidation of the existing human rights 
mechanisms within the AU framework in order to enhance their relationship with each 
other.341 The AU, as the parent organ of the African human rights system would therefore 
hold the central place in ensuring the co-ordination and synergy of the existing human 
rights mechanisms in the region.  
 
Rationalisation, on the other hand, would involve defining the relationship and synergies 
of the existing human rights enforcement institutions in order to minimise or overcome 
overlaps and duplication within the African human rights system. Hence, while 
mainstreaming would be initiated to improve the ‘vertical relationship’ (between the AU 
and the regional human rights institutions), rationalisation should be seen as a way to 
improve the ‘horizontal relationship’ (between the human rights enforcement 
institutions). What follows, therefore, are proposals of some ways in which 
rationalisation could be achieved. Due to the subject matter of the present study, our 
discussion shall be confined to the rationalisation of the African human rights court, the 
African Commission and the African Court of Justice.  
4.3.3.1 Rationalising the African human rights court and the 
commission 
 
It should be emphasised that the mere establishment of a regional court should not be 
construed as the end to the many challenges encompassing the enforcement of human 
rights under the African system. Much still needs to be done, especially with regard to its 
relationship with its counterparts, such as the African Commission, to ensure its 
efficiency. Further, it should be reiterated that the court was not established to replace, 
but rather to complement and reinforce the commission.  
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On the above premise, one would expect the court’s Protocol to set out, in no uncertain 
terms, the relationship between the commission and the court, yet it does not. Instead, as 
O’Shea correctly noted, the relationship between the two organs is only dealt with in the 
most general terms.342  For example, while Article 2 provides that the court shall 
‘complement the protective mandate’ of the commission, Article 8 requires the intended 
Rules of Procedure of the court to indicate when cases should be brought before it, 
‘bearing in mind the complementarity between the commission and the court.’ 343  
 
The Protocol also initiates a relationship between the court and the commission with 
regard to admissibility proceedings. Article 6(1) intimates that ‘the court, when deciding 
on the admissibility of a case instituted under Article 5(3) of this Protocol, may request 
the opinion of the commission which shall give it as soon as possible.’ Also, Article 6(2) 
of the Protocol provides that the court shall take the provisions of Article 56 of the 
African Charter into account when considering the admissibility of all cases. Clearly, all 
these provisions are not very instructive on the intended relationship between the two 
institutions. Two approaches are therefore mooted to rationalise these institutions. The 
first approach contemplates a situation where the protective and promotional functions 
are vested in the court and the commission, respectively.344 The second one prefers that 
both institutions are vested with clearly defined protective functions. Additionally, the 
commission would continue with its promotional functions.345  
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The first approach is motivated by a number of factors. First, it is important to have a 
clear division of labour between the commission and the court. This arrangement will 
therefore enable them to be more effective in their areas of specialisation and will also 
enhance cooperation and mutual reinforcement between the two institutions.346 Secondly, 
it is both time and cost effective. It is questionable whether the allocation of resources to 
have two separate organs with a judicial mandate is rational, given that the commission is 
already severely hampered by inadequate resources.347 Instead of the institutions 
duplicating each others functions, it is expedient that each be vested with distinct roles.  
 
Thirdly, if both the commission and the court are involved in the interpretation of the 
Charter, but do so separately, then it is possible that the African human rights system may 
have two separate voices saying two different things.348 In such circumstances, it would 
be appropriate to allow only the court to conduct judicial functions. Other than that, the 
court comprises judges who, unlike commissioners, may exude competence in their work. 
Further, all measures should be taken to ensure that the court operates independently 
from the commission which has been accused of suffering from severe image 
problems.349  
 
While the first approach makes sense given the reasons fronted to justify it, it has been 
argued that the protocol establishing the court contemplates a sharing of the protective 
mandate between the commission and the court.350 Indeed, Article 2 confirms this 
position. It states that ‘the court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, 
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complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights…’ (italics added). It is in line with this position that the second approach, which 
prefers that the commission performs both protective and promotional functions, is 
recommended. This is essentially because stripping the commission of its protective 
mandate and reducing it to a ‘human rights promotion body’ would not be in line with 
Article 2 of the Protocol.351  
 
Indeed, the commission and court may complement each other in a number of ways. For 
instance, as Harrington suggested, the two institutions could divide the consideration of 
communications, with the commission deciding the admissibility as the court determines 
the merits.352 After all, Article 6(1) of the Protocol gives the court the right to ask for the 
opinion of the commission on questions of admissibility. Thus, the commission could 
desist from holding hearings and instead work as a screening body which determines the 
admissibility of cases for the court.353 Since the court does not have promotional 
mandate, the commission could continue with these activities.  
 
Alternatively, the court could leave collection and collation of facts to the commission 
and restrict itself to the determination of cases chiefly on the basis of the commission’s 
written records. Hearings before the court could thus be restricted to oral arguments by 
counsel, rather than the examination of witnesses. On the other hand, hearings before the 
commission could be restricted to the examination of witnesses and evidentiary 
documents.354 However, a fundamental prerequisite for the adoption of this practice 
would be for the commission to be divided into sub-commissions as previously proposed 
in this chapter. This will then resolve the issue on whether the commission and the court 
should be located in the same place.  
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In the long run, this approach will guarantee the evolution of consistent African human 
rights jurisprudence as well as improve on the superficial method of dealing with 
communications traditionally associated with the commission. Suffice it to state that there 
could be more ways of perfecting the relationship between the commission and the court. 
However, the most important factor to be considered when selecting the most suitable 
approach is whether duplicity and overlaps are avoided. The preferred approach should 
also be cost effective and time saving.  
4.3.3.2 Rationalising the African human rights court and the 
African Court of Justice 
 
This part discusses the possible ways the African human rights court and the ACJ could 
be rationalised to increase their efficiency and perfect their relationship. Its gist is the 
argument that Africa does not need more than one regional court; the region should settle 
for a single (integrated) regional court. It is possible that the agitation for two regional 
courts in Africa is motivated more by the ongoing events in Europe than by the need to 
improve on supra-national adjudication. For example, as Udombana observed, like 
Europe, Africa is intensifying economic and political integration through structural 
evolution.355  
 
Indeed, a critical evaluation would reveal that institutions such as the AU have been 
patterned along the lines of their counterparts in Europe, for instance, the European 
Union (EU). Similarly, Europe has two regional courts—a human rights court and a court 
of justice, which arrangement seems to have impressed those fronting for the same in 
Africa. Africa’s approach, therefore, seems to hinge on the assumption that if the idea of 
two courts has succeeded in Europe; it can also succeed in Africa.356 This assumption is 
nonetheless faulty. 
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In the main, the historical experiences of the two continents are fundamentally different. 
What motivates Africa’s current integration endeavours differs from the European 
motivation. For example, the architects of the European movement sought, by 
emphasising common traditions and interests, to have the European nations work together 
rather than just living together or working against one another.357 In contrast, Africa’s 
current movement has more to do with the challenges resulting from globalisation than 
the euphoria of unity. The socio-economic origin of the AU therefore emanated from the 
desire of African leaders to meet the present challenges of globalisation and regional 
integration.358 
 
Thus, it would be pretentious for Africa to expect European model and approaches, 
which have blindly been transplanted into the region, to flourish.359 It therefore follows, 
from our discussion on the challenges facing the African human rights system, that at the 
moment, the region does not need more than one court. In fact, the proliferation of courts 
and recourse mechanisms in the region may pose further challenges. For example, this 
study has already elaborated how there is the danger of conflicting interpretations of 
treaties by the two institutions. The problem could be compounded by the fact that 
neither court is envisaged to be superior to the other nor can overrule decisions of the 
other. The resultant confusion would impede, rather than facilitate, the development of 
human rights jurisprudence in Africa.360 The other challenge is the lack of resources to 
operate two regional courts. Vast resources are needed to effectively operate the two 
institutions.361 Udombana succinctly captured this phenomenon when he stated as 
follows:  
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To start with, each of the proposed courts will require a building to house the court 
rooms, judges’ chambers, and the offices for secretariats, including the Registrars. These 
offices must be equipped with furniture and other necessary supplies. Accommodation 
for the judges and their support staff will also have to be provided…. Another major 
resource the courts will require is a library and documentation centre. The library must be 
stocked with rich legal materials dealing with both African and comparative law. It must 
also maintain a comprehensive collection of the laws of member states. In addition, there 
should be facilities for users, such as legal research and photocopy services and separate 
similar facilities for the judges of the courts. Furthermore, like any modern library, they 
must be equipped with computers and internet access. Competent librarians will need to 
be employed. They will also have to be trained in each of the principal legal systems and 
the courts’ languages and regularly exposed to modern information systems.362  
 
Udombana’s analysis identifies just some, not all, of what the two courts will require to 
function properly. It is not surprising that the AU, perhaps seeing the imminent difficulty 
of operating two regional courts, resolved to integrate them.363 However, the failure to 
reach a consensus on the modalities of the integration made the AU Assembly to permit 
the operationalisation of the African human rights court.  
 
The operationalisation of the human rights court notwithstanding, the idea of an 
integrated regional court may be favoured for a number of reasons. First, an integrated 
court would avoid splitting of resources towards maintaining two courts. Secondly, an 
integrated court will result in simplicity and is an antidote to the ongoing proliferation of 
regional institutions.364 Thirdly, an integrated court would give the region an opportunity 
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to underscore the interface between human rights and economic matters.365 Fourthly, an 
integrated regional court will offer opportunities for developing a unified, integrated, 
cohesive, and, hopefully, indigenous jurisprudence for Africa.366 Finally, integration of 
the two courts will synchronise the judicial system in Africa. Both courts operating under 
one umbrella will have a similar regional focus and will operate under the auspices of a 
common organisation— the AU. Moreover, they will operate under standards and 
regulations that are at least compatible if not similar to one another.367  
 
However, integration of the two courts, now that the African human rights court is 
operational, is going to be much more problematic because they are at different stages of 
development. According to Kithure: 
 
The question to be grappled with remains: Should the integration of the courts be 
realised, what will happen to the judges of the African Human Rights Court who may not 
secure slots in the integrated court? Under such circumstances it is likely that vested 
interests might make submerging of the African Human Rights Court into the Court of 
Justice very difficult even though it could be the most pragmatic thing to do. There are 
bound to be deep-seated vested interests (of judges and others) that may lead to a 
vehement opposition against any kind of interference with an already functioning human 
rights court.368 
 
Apart from the different stages of development being a major obstacle to the integration 
process, the required qualifications and expertise of the judges of the two courts are also 
different and may be issues of concern.369 For instance, while to be elected to the human 
rights court an individual is required to have, among other things, recognised practical, 
judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’ 
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rights,370 for the ACJ, the qualifications should be in international law.371 Competence 
and experience in human rights are therefore not a prerequisite for one to be appointed to 
the ACJ.372  
 
The issues relating to the differences in jurisdiction and expertise of the judges of the two 
courts, however, could be resolved. To start with, the Court of Justice, given the nature of 
its jurisdiction, can resolve human rights disputes. Its core business is the ‘interpretation 
and application’ of the AU Constitutive Act.373 It is needless to reemphasise that pursuant 
to this Act, the objectives374 and the fundamental principles375 of the AU are concerned 
with various aspects of human rights promotion and protection. Further, it should be 
noted that since human rights have a nexus with international law, experts in international 
law will ordinarily have some knowledge of human rights.376 This will then resolve the 
issue of competence and experience of the judges with regard to resolving human rights 
cases. Alternatively, in the election of the judges of the merged court, member states 
could be advised to nominate some candidates with expertise on human rights who, if 
elected, would deal with cases on this subject.377  
 
When integrating the two courts, the AU may settle for one of two options. The first 
would be to abandon the respective protocols of the two courts and instead adopt another 
one to establish an integrated court. Such a protocol may, however, embrace important 
provisions from both the Protocol establishing the human rights Court and the protocol 
on the Court of Justice. This arrangement would then necessitate the creation of a 
‘Special Chamber’ to specifically deal with the enforcement of the regional human rights 
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norms.378 Of course, this option has its own disadvantages, the main one being that it 
would be time-consuming.379 Moreover, its pragmatism is also questionable simply 
because the Protocol establishing the human rights court is already in force and the 
human rights court is already setting up its required structures.   
 
This first option was attempted, although not in the manner proposed above. A group of 
seven experts discussed the issues surrounding the merger and produced a Draft Protocol 
prior to the AU’s Assembly summit of 2005.380 The Draft Protocol envisaged that the 
African Court would become a ‘specialised human and peoples’ rights division’ of the 
merged court.381 The new merged court would then be composed of fifteen Judges of 
which at least seven should have ‘competence in human and peoples’ rights.’382 
However, the Permanent Representatives’ Committee at its meeting in January 2005 were 
unhappy with the Draft and agreed that the merger of the two courts should not unduly 
delay the establishment of the African Court.  
 
The second option would be to maintain the jurisdiction of both courts but amend their 
Protocols to facilitate their integration and rationalisation.383 This option would ensure 
that the initial purposes of establishing the two courts are not compromised whatsoever 
and that their respective objectives are fulfilled jointly and severally. In this regard, the 
‘integration’ of the two institutions would be based more on ‘essence’ rather than ‘form’. 
In other words, it is the purposes and objectives of these institutions that would be 
integrated and nothing else. The courts will then exercise the jurisdiction of both the 
human rights court or that of the ACJ, depending on the type of dispute before them. 
                                                 
378 Udombana N, ‘An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court…’, note 355 above, p. 
865. 
379 Kithure K, ‘Overlaps in the African human rights system’, note 323 above, p. 141.  
380 Draft Protocol on the Integration of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the African Union. EX.CL/162 (VI) Annex I. 
381 Ibid, Art. 2(3).  
382 Ibid, Art. 4. 
383 Kithure K, ‘Overlaps in the African human rights system’, note 323 above, p. 141. 
 474
Matters could also be referred from one court to another whenever the need arises, in 
order to utilise the competence of both courts to the fullest extent.  
 
While so doing, the African Commission could still play its role, either wholly as a 
human rights promotional institution, or would scrutinise communications on behalf of 
the human rights court. From this arrangement, it would be prudent for the commission to 
defer its protective mandate to the court so as to avoid duplicity and overlaps. With the 
prevalence of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity on the continent, it is 
appropriate for the intended merged court to consider prosecuting these crimes.384 Suffice 
it to state that, it is only after the two regional courts and the commission have been 
streamlined that it would be possible to properly mainstream them within the AU. The 
current situation is pathetic because the relationships between these institutions are not 
clearly defined.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 
It is obviously not possible to discuss all the challenges to effective regional enforcement 
of human rights in Africa in a study of this limited magnitude. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the African human rights system is not static. Rather, it has been evolving from 
the time of its inception. In such circumstances, it is inevitable to encounter new and 
unexpected challenges. Besides the normative and institutional challenges discussed 
above, effective regional enforcement of human rights in Africa is also challenged by a 
number of other factors, including, but are not limited to: poverty, diseases, internal and 
international conflicts, terrorism, civil disobedience, foreign interference, poor 
governance, historical antecedents, cultural and ideological influences, among others. All 
these combine with the normative and institutional challenges discussed above, thus 
leading to a complex web of factors inhibiting the effective regional enforcement of 
human rights on the continent.    
 
                                                 
384 Ibid, p. 143. 
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Much as one would want to delve into the details of all the actual or potential challenges, 
it has only been possible to highlight some of them and leave the rest for further research 
and investigation. Hence, this chapter cannot claim to have been exhaustive; rather it is a 
mere pointer to the nature and magnitude of the challenges that have been underscored in 
the bulk of the literature on the African human rights system. What has been attempted, 
therefore, is a discussion of the more prominent challenges and the possible ways to 
reinvigorate or reform the system. Most of the challenges and possible reforms were 
highlighted in the various literatures on diverse aspects of the African human rights 
system, which formed the basis of the present study. The literature was reviewed 
comprehensively in chapter one. We cannot, therefore, claim that the present discussion 
is exhaustive in as far as the system is still evolving and as much as more is still being 
researched and published on various aspects of the African human rights system.   
 
Generally, this chapter has attempted to emphasise that the developments registered over 
the last few decades are a clear indication and a positive sign that the African human 
rights system is gradually moving towards success. The complete success of the system, 
however, calls for a close relationship between the AU, AU’s institutions with human 
rights responsibility and the African human rights system. As Baimu suggested, these 
institutions should complement rather than compete with one another; the relationship 
between them should be one of collaboration, as distinguished from that of control.385 In 
the meantime, ways and means will have to be explored on how all the regional 
institutions with human rights responsibility in Africa can jointly pursue the common 
goal of a peaceful, stable and developed Africa, in tandem with human rights protection 
and promotion.386  
 
Further, for the African human rights system to be effective, the criteria to be followed 
when setting up new structures or mechanisms need to be defined. In this regard, some 
inquiry should be conducted to ascertain important issues such as: the added value of a 
                                                 
385 See Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’, 
(2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 318. 
386 Kithure K, ‘Overlaps in the African human rights system’, note 323 above, p. 141. 
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proposed structure or mechanism; its legal, financial and administrative implications; and 
how the proposed structure would interface with the existing structures and mechanisms. 
No institution should be established prior to such an inquiry.387  
 
It is also important to conduct an ‘impact assessment’ before mechanisms are established. 
The efficiency of the African human rights system is not on the number of institutions 
established, but rather on their relevance and impact. In line with the proposed ‘impact 
assessment’ is the need to conduct an ‘audit’ on the existing mechanisms. Whereas an 
‘impact assessment’ should be conducted prior to the establishment of new mechanisms, 
an ‘audit’ should be done on the already existing ones to gauge their efficacy. It is 
proposed that the AU should create a special unit that would be involved in both impact 
assessment and auditing.  
 
While it is appreciated that Annual Activity reports may be useful in gauging the 
performance of the existing mechanisms, it is important to have an independent body to 
do so. External evaluation is usually more critical and thorough than an internal one. 
Thus, a unit vested with monitoring and evaluation functions should be formed, 
specifically to monitor and evaluate the existing regional human rights mechanisms. The 
unit would then be in a position to advise on issues such as, the need, or otherwise, to 
create a new human rights institution, financial matters, mainstreaming and 
rationalisation of the human rights mechanisms, ways to improve the efficiency of the 
system, etc.    
 
Ultimately, it may be argued that the future of human rights enforcement in Africa is 
more in the hands of Africans than it is in the hands of other stakeholders. Although the 
global community can and should play a role in addressing some of the challenges facing 
the system, it is up to the people of Africa to chart their own destiny. Hence, to alleviate 
the challenges, the concerted effort of all role-players, but more particularly member 
states of the AU, is required. Suffice it to state therefore that the on-going debate on the 
                                                 
387 Baimu E, ‘Human rights in NEPAD and its implications for the African human rights system’, note 385 
above, p. 318. 
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possible ways to invigorate the African human rights system is in itself a milestone 
contribution towards the efficiency of the system. Certainly, the debate should be 
encouraged, particularly among African scholars and human rights activists because it is 
basically a paramount step towards an effective African human rights system.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL CONCLUSION   
 
This study was motivated by the need to investigate the challenges facing regional 
enforcement of human rights in Africa and to recommend suitable reforms for the 
African human rights system to make it more effective. A number of issues were 
discussed, including the historical antecedents, normative, institutional and other aspects 
of the system, with a view to highlighting the challenges. In the main, the study has 
shown that Africa is in need of effective human rights mechanisms. Having passed 
through the eras of slave trade and colonialism and now struggling with post-colonial 
uncertainties, the continent needs to direct all its resources to the attainment of reasonable 
standards of human rights, particularly at the regional level.  
 
While it is true that the African human rights system has achieved remarkable progress 
since its inception, much still remains to be done. The journey towards an effective 
regional human rights system is far from being completed; the road leading thereto is 
rather narrow and long, yet the prosects and possibilities of attaining this goal are quite 
high. In other words, amid the conflicts, uncertainties and confusion associated with the 
system, there is hope for a brighter and a better future. The alarming scepticism on the 
future of the regional human rights system may therefore be dismissed as unmeritorious, 
farce and sham.   
 
As shown in the preceding chapters, the African human rights system has generated 
unending academic debates, both negative and positive, on its past, present and future. 
The merits of these debates were extensively discussed throughout this study. For 
instance, efforts were made to trace the roots of the human rights concept as understood 
by Africans. It emerged that the concept is neither foreign nor an imposition.1 Rather, it is 
                                                 
1 See generally chapter two of the thesis where reference and arguments of the following scholars were 
analysed in this regard: Busia K, ‘The status of human rights in pre-colonial Africa: Implications for 
contemporary practices’, in McCarthy-Arnolds E, et al, Africa, human rights, and the global system: The 
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an outgrowth of the African society, with certain peculiarities and specificities. Sadly, 
human rights have been violated with impunity over the past centuries, as they still are 
today. The violations, however gross, have in the past not been unequivocally 
condemned.2 Worst of all, even the former OAU, which was expected to set the trend for 
human rights promotion and protection on the continent, maintained a passive posture 
amidst the massive violations that occurred during its subsistence. Commenting on the 
passiveness of the OAU to human rights violations on the continent, Mangu correctly 
notes as follows: 
 
The weak status of human and peoples’ rights in the OAU Charter had serious 
implications for their promotion and protection in Africa. The practice of most OAU 
member states was inimical to the promotion and protection of human rights on the 
continent. Years of authoritarianism, single party or military rule, rebellions, and armed 
conflicts transformed Africa into a continent of ‘human wrongs’ instead of ‘human 
rights’.3  
 
Luckily, the replacement of the OAU with the AU, the emergence of the NEPAD and its 
APRM, and the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
                                                                                                                                                 
political economy of human rights in a changing world, p. 49; Mangu A, ‘The Road to Constitutionalism 
and Democracy in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2002), LLD 
Thesis University of South Africa, p. 235-257; Appiagyei-Atua K, ‘A rights-centred critique of African 
philosophy in the context of development’, (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 335-357; 
Quashigah K, ‘The philosophic basis of human rights and its relations to Africa: A critique’, (1992) 
Journal of Human Rights Law and Practice, pp. 22-38; Hountondji P, ‘The master's voice: The problem of 
human rights in Africa', in Ricoeur P (ed), Philosophical foundations of human rights (1986), p. 319; 
Anthony E, ‘Beyond the paper Tiger: The challenges of a human rights court in Africa’, (1997) 32 Texas 
International Law Journal, pp. 519-521; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural 
fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law,p. 
339.    
2 See the argument in Mangu A, ‘The Changing human rights landscape in Africa: Organisation of African 
Unity, African union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African Court’, (2005) 23/3 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p. 388. 
3 Ibid. 
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among other developments, have in a way contributed to changing the human rights 
landscape in Africa.4 With the current progressive status of the regional human rights 
system, it should be impermissible for gross violations to be committed anywhere on the 
continent without serious repercussions. Clearly, the continent has been on a journey 
towards an effective regional human rights system. In the course of the journey, many 
challenges have been met; some have been surmounted, while others are yet to be 
overcome.  
 
It is against this background that the present study recommends strategies of 
strengthening the African human rights system with the hope that the system would 
eventually salvage the continent from the present state of persistent human rights 
violations. The study is an added voice to the ongoing reforms debate. It is not a 
conclusion in itself, but both an addition to, and a summation of, whatever has already 
been discussed on this subject that is crucial to the future success of the continent. Its 
findings, recommendations and conclusions are therefore partial because the debate on 
the reform of the system is not about to end; neither is the system static. It is rather in the 
process of transformation. Throughout the study, many findings, recommendations and 
conclusions were made pertaining to various issues. This chapter therefore serves as a 
summary of those findings, conclusions and recommendations in line with the research 
questions, aims and hypotheses that defined the parameters of the study. The chapter also 
recommends some questions for further research and investigation.  
5.1 Summary of findings, recommendations and conclusions 
 
This study was premised on the fact that the human rights situation in Africa is 
exceptionally precarious because many states and their agencies are not committed to 
their obligations as stipulated in the various international and regional human rights 
norms.5 Generally, the study illuminated the problems as well as the prospects and 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Mugwanya G, Human rights in Africa: Eenhancing human rights through the African regional 
human rights system (2003), p. xv.  
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opportunities for regional enforcement of international human rights law in Africa. In the 
main, the study found that, although the regional system is encumbered with numerous 
challenges, it has also made some positive contributions in the sphere of international 
human rights law in its relatively short period of existence.6 If relevant reforms are made, 
the prospects are good for the African human rights system to become more effective.7  
 
While the above observations summarise the main findings of this study, it is important 
to note that every chapter embodies some specific findings and conclusions that are 
relevant to the overarching objectives and subject matter of this research. In summary,  
chapter one laid the foundation for the entire study. It introduced the subject matter and 
research problem, and set out the aims and scope of the study. It also discussed the 
research methodology, conducted a review of the literature on the subject matter of the 
study and formulated a number of research questions and hypotheses.  
 
Chapter two discussed the historical and philosophical background to human rights in 
Africa. It examined the history, development and evolution of the concept on the 
continent from antiquity to the contemporary period by traversing through three epochs—
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. The chapter reinforced the arguments and 
counter-arguments on the place of human rights in Africa. Consequently, it provided 
answers to a number of questions relating to, among other things: the definition of human 
rights; whether human rights are merely Western or they have a bearing in the African 
context; the philosophical and conceptual origins of human rights law in Africa; and how 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  
7 See generally Steiner H & Alston P, International human rights in context: Law, politics and morals 
(1996), p. 689; Mutua M, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the 
language of duties’ note 1 above, p. 339; Oloka-Onyango J, ‘Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the 
struggle for social and economic rights in Africa’, (1995) 26 California Western International Law 
Journal, p. 1; Amoah P, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: An effective weapon for 
human rights?’, (1992) 4 African Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 226; Welch C, ‘The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A five-year report and assessment’, (1992) 14 Human 
Rights Quarterly, p. 43. 
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the concept evolved in Africa to attain its present regional status, as well as the origin and 
the development of the African human rights system.  
 
Chapter three reviewed the normative and institutional mechanisms of the African human 
rights system. Its focus was on the main human rights treaty in the region, namely the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and on its enforcement institutions, the 
African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The chapter analysed, 
inter alia, the extent to which the mechanisms of the African system are effective. It 
found that states have failed to live up to the promise of human rights protection in spite 
of the proliferation of human rights treaties and institutions on the continent. Many 
shortcomings were identified with regard to the African Charter’s provisions, the African 
Commission’s practice and the Protocol establishing the human rights court. Chapter four 
highlighted the challenges and strategies to invigorate the African human rights system. 
The system has rightly been criticised as being ineffective thus raising more questions 
than answers on its potential to improve the continent’s poor human rights record.8  
 
Contrary to the fears of many writers, however, the uniqueness of some of the normative 
and institutional mechanisms of the African human rights system in no way detracts from 
its viability as an effective system. For instance, the African Charter, which is the main 
normative instrument of the system, is a relatively balanced instrument, despite its 
profusion of concepts.9 While this is true, it is also difficult to deny that ‘the density and 
originality of this document very often goes hand in hand with an equally remarkable 
technical poverty.’10 As already shown in the preceding chapters, the so-called ‘technical 
poverty’ of the Charter is displayed by, among other things, the imprecise formulation of 
some of the rights, the indiscriminate use of claw-back clauses, the lack of definition of 
concepts such as ‘people’ and the conspicuous absence of a derogation clause. Despite 
                                                 
8 Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An overview of its progress 
and problems’, (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 1. 
9 Onguergouz F, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human 
dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa’ (2003), p. 784.   
10 Ibid. 
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these weaknesses, it should be appreciated that the Charter was birthed in very difficult 
circumstances and as such it represents the best that could possibly be achieved at that 
time. According to ‘the father of the Charter’, Keba M’baye: 
 
The Charter constitutes the actual result which could be attained at the time of its 
adoption, bearing in mind the great disparity characterising the political and economic 
situation of Africa. Powerful internal currents simmered away beneath the surface and the 
Charter bears the stigma of these Animist, Islamic, traditional and Christian currents, to 
name only some of them. The Charter gathered all these seeds to its breast and created a 
product which is a result of their cross-fertilisation.11 
 
It is needless to re-state, in crafting the present instrument, the drafters of the Charter had 
to surmount difficulties and complexities, including the dilemma of reconciling the 
universality and cultural relativism doctrines. Now that the document has been adopted, it 
is incumbent upon all stake-holders and role-players to implement it to the fullest 
possible extent. The Charter can certainly be improved upon as it undeniably possesses 
the crucial tenets of a legal instrument that is capable of protecting human rights.12 This, 
however, requires innovation, especially with regard to the interpretation and 
implementation of its inadequate or ‘flawed’ provisions. By interpreting some of the 
Charter’s provisions as broadly as it could, the African Commission has already began 
this trend. This is expected because, as already stated elsewhere above, Artilces 60 and 
61 encourage the commission to interprete the Charter in the light of general international 
law.  
 
Although marked by a slow start characterised by some form of ‘judicial conservatism’, 
the commission has now gathered the momentum to evolve a robust body of ‘case-law’ 
on the basis of the provisions of the Charter. This is indeed commendable given the loose 
nature of the Charter’s provisions and the social, economic, political, cultural and legal 
                                                 
11 M’Baye K, Les droits de l’homme en Afrique (1992), p. 267. 
12 Onguergouz F, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for 
human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa’, note 9 above, p. 797. 
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diversities on the continent. As indicated in the previous chapters, the commission is 
lately determined to interpret the provisions of the Charter more liberally in order to 
specify and give effect to the basic rights contained therein. While this is happening, 
states parties to the Charter need also to be actively involved in the quest for a workable 
Charter and a viable regional human rights system, generally. This could be through the 
promulgation of additional protocols or amending the Charter in line with its Articles 66 
and 68.  
 
Indeed, the adoption of the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is a living proof that the Charter was not intended to be a static 
instrument.13 The establishment of the court is itself ‘a useful addition to the mechanism 
for monitoring the rights guaranteed by the African Charter; it is all the more useful 
because the court has been given relatively broad powers.’14 Hopefully, the two regional 
human rights enforcement institutions on the continent— the commission and court— 
will be given the necessary support, including the material means, to effectively perform 
their tasks. At the moment, these institutions are challenged by, among other things, the 
general lack of political will power from states parties and inadequacy of material means 
that are necessary to ensure their efficiency.            
 
In a nutshell, many of the findings of this study strongly indicate that the journey towards 
an effective regional human rights system is still far from being concluded. The 
strengthening of the system can only be the product of a collective effort, requiring the 
synergy of many actors. There is therefore the need for Africans and their governments, 
in concert with human rights organisations within and outside the continent to work 
together to create conditions for development, equity, democracy and freedom on the 
continent.15 When these are attained, motivations for human rights violations, instability 
and rebellion would be drastically reduced and the enforcement of human rights law 
                                                 
13 Ibid, p. 791. 
14 Ibid, p. 792. 
15 Alemika E, ‘Protection and realisation of human rights in Africa’, in Kalu A & Osinbajo Y, Perspectives 
on human rights (1992), p 168. 
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would more likely become a reality. As the study confirmed, the regional platform is 
likely to become the most appropriate arena for human rights enforcement.16 However, 
the African human rights system has suffered great opposition and challenges, rendering 
it the least performer of the existing regional human rights systems. These challenges, 
which were comprehensively discussed in the course of the study, take various forms and 
stem from different quarters.17   
 
The study would therefore agree with Odinkalu’s view that the effective protection of 
human rights in post-colonial Africa necessitated a re-orientation of states away from the 
institutional infrastructure and attitudinal orientation inherited from the colonial period.18 
Unfortunately, this process was never undertaken let alone achieved. In fact, most of the 
laws, institutions and attitudes that underwrote the violations of human rights during 
colonialism did not just survive independence, they prospered thereafter.19 Oloka-
Onyango notes that: 
 
Nearly half a century after most countries on the continent attained independence, so 
many of them continue to utilise colonial laws governing political association, public 
health, education and free expression. The consequence is that their very claim to have 
                                                 
16 See in this regard, Benedek W & Heinz (eds.), Regional systems of human rights protection in Africa, 
America and Europe: Third Afro-Americo-European Conference, Strasbourg, June 1992 (1992); Nowak 
M, Introduction to the international human rights regime (2003), p. 26; Wachira G, ‘A critical examination 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards strengthening the African human rights 
system to enable it effectively meet the needs of the African population’, in Viljoen F, (ed), The African 
human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006), p. 16.  
17 Murray R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1987-2000: An overview of its progress 
and problems’, note 8 above, p. 1; Heyns C, ‘The African regional human rights system: In need of 
reform?’, (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 158. 
18 Odinkalu C, ‘Back to the future: The imperative of prioritising for the protection of human rights in 
Africa’, (2003) Journal of African Law, p. 2. 
19 Ibid. 
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made a difference in the human rights reality of the people they govern is effectively 
negated.20 
 
It is not surprising that early insecurities about the precariousness of their newly won 
independence led Africa’s post-colonial leadership to evolve a rather extreme assertion of 
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction that kept human rights outside the political and 
diplomatic priorities of the continent until the very end of the 20th century.21 Hence, 
Article III (2) of the OAU Charter proclaimed ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states’ as one of the basic principles of the OAU. Another principle required ‘respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to 
independent existence.’22 Thus, as elucidated in chapter two of this thesis, the focus today 
on human rights in Africa is against the background of a long history of pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial influences. This partly explains why, more than twenty years 
after the entry into force of the African Charter, the reality is far from the ideal foreseen 
by those African jurists who drafted it.23 The drafters hoped that the Charter would bring 
to a halt the impunity in most states. However, this ideal is yet to be realised, for it is 
difficult to imagine how a state that is not committed to the promotion and protection of 
human rights at the national level would be devoted to do the same at the international 
level. 
 
On a more positive note, however, this study confirmed that the African human rights 
system is capable of being reformed, notwithstanding the many challenges and setbacks 
facing it. Suitable reforms to the African system will go a long way to improve the 
                                                 
20 Oloka-onyango J, ‘Human rights and sustainable development in contemporary Africa: A new dawn or 
retreating horizons?’ (2000) Human Development Report 2000 Background Paper, p. 4, available at 
http://www.undp.org/hdro/Oloka-Onyango2000.html. 
21 Odinkalu C, ‘Back to the future: The imperative of prioritising for the protection of human rights in 
Africa’, note 18 above, p. 2. 
22  Art III (3), Charter of the OAU, 479 UNTS 39. 
23 See Gutto S, ‘The compliance to regional and international agreements and standards by African 
governments with particular reference to the rule of law and human and peoples’ rights’, note 1 above, p. 
94. 
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enforcement of human rights law in the region. Such reforms may be normative, 
institutional, procedural, jurisdictional, political, and financial, among others. In this 
regard, one of the study’s main findings was to the effect that, for the system to operate 
effectively, institutional mainstreaming and rationalisation are necessary. Currently, there 
are a number of institutions and initiatives (or programmes) on the continent with the 
mandate to promote and protect human rights. As a result, the institutions either overlap 
or duplicate each others’ efforts. While it is encouraging to note that the African system 
is registering a positive impact, the study insists that proliferation of these enforcement 
mechanisms should not be encouraged. This is because, the existing and emerging 
institutions tend to overlap and duplicate the functions which could otherwise be 
performed by fewer and better resourced institutions.24  
 
One of the most pertinent conclusions of the study is to the effect that the future of 
human rights enforcement in Africa is more in our hands (Africans) than it is in the hands 
of other stakeholders. Although the international community can, and should be invited to 
play some role in addressing some of the challenges facing the system, it is up to us to 
champion the destiny of our continent. The study has also shown that the achievements 
that have been made over the last few decades are a clear indication that the African 
human rights system is capable of success. Once again, it is inevitable to note that the 
regional human rights system has made remarkable progress in the promotion and 
protection of human and peoples’ rights since its inception. Unfortunately, the steps taken 
have been small and somewhat slower in practice than they are in theory. The system is 
rather littered with a large number of human rights conventions, declarations and 
statements that remain dead letters.25 This trend needs to be reversed if the regional 
mechanisms are to produce any meaningful results. 
                                                 
24 See generally, Kithure K, ‘Overlaps in the African human rights system’, in Viljoen F, (ed), The African 
human rights system: Towards the co-existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, note 16 above, pp. 144 -145. 
25 Ibid, p. 144. 
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5.2 Questions and recommendations for further research and 
investigation 
 
The study has been an attempt to answer a number of questions that were raised in 
chapter one. In spite of such attempts, however, a number of other questions could still be 
raised in line with the subject matter and objectives of this study. This, therefore, calls for 
further research and scientific investigation in this area of study. The first question that 
requires further investigation concerns the status of human rights enforcement in Africa 
in the twenty-first century. This area is broader than has been addressed in this study. 
Many things have transpired since we began to compile this piece of work. Since the 
transformation of the African human rights system is a process, it is imperative that 
research should be conducted as often as is practicably possible to gauge its performance. 
Further research on the progress and status of regional enforcement of human rights in 
Africa should be keen to address issues such as: whether there are any new regional 
human rights enforcement mechanisms; to what extent the mechanisms are effective; and 
whether the existing normative and institutional mechanisms for regional enforcement of 
human rights are registering any positive improvement.  
 
Another question that needs to be investigated further relates to ways of improving the 
efficiency of the African Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Many 
proposals and recommendations have been made on the possible reforms to these 
institutions. However, it cannot be said that what is entailed in this study and elsewhere is 
final and perfect. Sustained scholarly debate and research is required. Whilst a reasonably 
large body of literature exists on the court and commission, there is still room to research 
further especially on the issue of reforming these institutions. Questions such as how the 
proliferation of institutions with human rights responsibility should be handled call for 
extensive research beyond what has been done here.   
 
The role and potential of other regional human rights systems in influencing the 
effectiveness of the African human rights system also requires further research. The 
African system is the youngest of the three systems and the least developed. The African 
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Commission has also begun the trend of drawing inspiration from the European and 
Inter-American systems and will most likely continue to do so. While this should be 
encouraged, it is crucial to establish the pros and cons of such an approach. Similarly, the 
role and place of the civil society in ensuring the effectiveness of the system should also 
be underscored. As already stated elsewhere in this study, the African Commission has 
developed an important relationship with NGOs which needs to be encouraged and 
strengthened. The role of these organisations in facilitating the effectiveness of the 
regional human rights system therefore needs to be defined through a thorough research.  
 
With regard to human rights education, it has already been said that Article 25 of the 
Charter provides the normative basis for the development and implementation of 
effective human rights education programmes in the region. Further research is therefore 
needed to look into how the commission could establish a meaningful regional system for 
human rights education through, for example, its partnership and co-operation with 
NGOs. Research is also required to assess and analyse the implementation by states of 
their human rights education obligation under Article 25 of the Charter. Further research 
would be essential in ensuring the collaboration between governments, NGOs, 
individuals and the African Commission in pursuing joint human rights education 
programmes.  
 
The role of individual African states in ensuring the effectiveness of the regional human 
rights system also needs to be researched at length. Further research is needed on how the 
state may be streamlined and managed to promote and sustain the values propagated by 
the African human rights system. It may take an extensive study to find out, for example, 
why African leaders and governments have not lived up to the promise of human rights 
protection in spite of the proliferation of human rights legislations, policies and 
institutions on the continent. It may also necessitate a comprehensive study to underscore 
the relationship between democratic and other forms of good governance and the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. Additionally, the role played by the 
global community in the context of globalisation of laws and politics should be on the 
spotlight as it is central to the realisation of effective regional human rights protection.  
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The challenges to effective enforcement of human rights at the regional level in Africa 
that were articulated in the present study were also not exhaustive. It is obviously 
impossible to discuss all the challenges in a study of this magnitude owing to its limited 
scope. Much as we wanted to delve into the details of each actual or potential challenge, 
it was only possible to highlight some of them and leave the rest for further research and 
investigation. Hence, the study cannot claim to have been exhaustive; rather it is a mere 
pointer to the nature and magnitude of the challenges and an added voice to the reforms 
debate.  
 
From the foregoing, it is noteworthy that the study on the challenges to effective regional 
enforcement of human rights in Africa is far from being complete. As already shown, 
Africa is a continent besieged with many challenges; some being self-imposed, others as 
a result of external influences. This notwithstanding, there has been positive progress in 
regional enforcement of human rights in Africa. Indeed, things do change! It is against 
this backdrop that the present study has established that the future of human rights in 
Africa is, after all, not bleak as it may have been purported to be. What remains is the 
concerted effort of all the role-players, with the African states and peoples being in the 
lead, towards an effective regional human rights system. If it is to be, it is up to us!   
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